軍国少年の半世紀、そして結局．．．
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[PR]上記の広告は3ヶ月以上新規記事投稿のないブログに表示されています。新しい記事を書く事で広告が消えます。
その日を忘れちゃいかんと言うから広島・長崎への原爆投下の日のことかと思ったらそうじゃないようだ。
コラムの紹介者はクライン孝子、コラムは産経新聞なんだが、底の浅いインチキ右翼と媚米似而非保守の旗手産経新聞はほんとに良いコンビだよな。
■2007/11/06 (火) その日を私たちは、忘れてはならない。
日頃洗脳だの工作だのと喚き立てている本人が、実はこうまで完璧にアメリカに洗脳されているど阿呆だちゅう実に解りやすい事例なんだが、それともなにか？
戦後日本に家畜の餌を食料として恵んだことでアメリカ自身の言うところの「人道」にもとる核爆弾で数多の非戦闘員を焼き殺し、後遺症の苦しみを背負わせたことや、主要都市に焼き尽くすことを目的とした絨毯爆撃をやった罪が濯がれるとでも言う気か？
腹痛すぎ！！
コラムの紹介者はクライン孝子、コラムは産経新聞なんだが、底の浅いインチキ右翼と媚米似而非保守の旗手産経新聞はほんとに良いコンビだよな。
■2007/11/06 (火) その日を私たちは、忘れてはならない。
【やばいぞ日本】第４部 忘れてしまったもの（１－４）一片のパン「幼いマリコに」産経のサイトまで行って中身を覗いてみたらさ、忘れちゃならんのは進駐軍のアメリカ兵に食い物をめぐんでもらったことだとよ。（大爆
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/life/education/071106/edc0711060344001-n1.htm
日頃洗脳だの工作だのと喚き立てている本人が、実はこうまで完璧にアメリカに洗脳されているど阿呆だちゅう実に解りやすい事例なんだが、それともなにか？
戦後日本に家畜の餌を食料として恵んだことでアメリカ自身の言うところの「人道」にもとる核爆弾で数多の非戦闘員を焼き殺し、後遺症の苦しみを背負わせたことや、主要都市に焼き尽くすことを目的とした絨毯爆撃をやった罪が濯がれるとでも言う気か？
腹痛すぎ！！
PR
ブッシュと仲良くした奴が次々と消えていくなｗ
クルド切り捨てに次いで今度はムシャラフだ、尤も、いま現在アメリカがムシャラフを切り捨てるってことは現実的には不可能だから、対クルドと対パキスタンで見られるようなこういう矛盾を積み重ねるんだろうけど．．．
これまでで一等可愛そうなのはムシャラフなんだが、これだけブッシュに駐禁忠勤に励んだ挙げ句に、政権守るために戒厳令布いたらブッシュからすらイチャモンだ。
強権でしか統治できない地域に自由を持ち込めばどうなるかってことくらいはもう学ぶべきなんだが、パキスタンはブットで行こうちゅうことだとすれば、これは笑い話にすらならんわけで、そうなりゃ次はカルザイが転けるぞ。
ぼちぼち「テロとの戦い」の本質がなんであるか、もっと解りやすく言えば、これが何との戦いであるかというようなことくらい悟ったらどうだ？
「補給活動中断 日米信頼に「ほころび」」で
そしてさ、なにより
あんたの書いていることを分かりやすく書き直せば、アメリカにとって日本政府は信頼に足らんけど自衛隊、就中海自は信頼できるパートナーだということであり、これは本質的にそうだから却下はしないが、自衛隊、とりわけ海自という組織が創設以来アメリカ軍の補完を目的にしているという実態そのものであり、その重点が我が国の防衛よりはアメリカ軍の活動の補完にある、こういうこと。
そしてあんたが疑いもなく書いたことを極言すれば、自衛隊は我が国政府の意向や国益を離れてアメリカのために活動することも是、こういうことにならんか？
しかしそこに疑いを全く差し挟めないところに媚米家の施された恐ろしき洗脳の実態を垣間見る思いがする罠。
さて、先週あたり我が国でも報じられるているように、国務省の考え方は、核で前進が認められればテロ支援国家リストから北鮮は外す、こういうことなのであり、あの微妙なクリス・ヒル発言
しかし媚米似而非保守や頭の悪い熱湯欲はそこは言わない、理解していても聞こえないふりなのか？はたまた理解すら出来ていないのか？
いずれであろうともなんともお幸せなオツムであることか。
クルドやムシャラフのいまは近い将来の日本なんだけど、そこどうよ？
参照記事
Musharraf tries to stifle outcry over Pakistan emergency
U.S. Warns Musharraf Not to Use Martial Law
Musharraf Declares Emergency Rule in Pakistan
Constitution Suspended; Chief Judge Fired
Kurds Promise Response to Turkish Strike
Kurdish Rebels Release Turkish Soldiers
Activists Detained in Pakistan Emergency
Pakistani Sets Emergency Rule, Defying the U.S.
パキスタンに戒厳令 憲法停止、テレビ局などに軍展開か
２度目のクーデター ムシャラフ大統領
非常事態宣言「統合保つため」 パキスタン大統領
【軍事報告】補給活動中断 日米信頼に「ほころび」 野口裕之
クルド切り捨てに次いで今度はムシャラフだ、尤も、いま現在アメリカがムシャラフを切り捨てるってことは現実的には不可能だから、対クルドと対パキスタンで見られるようなこういう矛盾を積み重ねるんだろうけど．．．
これまでで一等可愛そうなのはムシャラフなんだが、これだけブッシュに
強権でしか統治できない地域に自由を持ち込めばどうなるかってことくらいはもう学ぶべきなんだが、パキスタンはブットで行こうちゅうことだとすれば、これは笑い話にすらならんわけで、そうなりゃ次はカルザイが転けるぞ。
There has long been a deep fear within the administration, particularly among intelligence officials, that an imperfect General Musharraf is better for American interests than an unknown in a volatile country that is central to the administration's fight against terrorism. In recent months the White House had been hoping that a power-sharing alliance between General Musharraf and Pakistan's former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, would help the general cling to power while putting a democratic face on his regime. Now, experts predict that the United States will be watching Pakistan closely in the coming days to see how hard General Musharraf cracks down on his opponents ' and whether opposition political leaders, journalists and scholars are imprisoned. Much of the attention will be on Ms. Bhutto, who strongly condemned the emergency declaration and quickly cut short a visit to Dubai to return to Pakistan during the crisis. Officials will be watching to see whether Pakistan's fractured opposition, including Ms. Bhutto and her political party can unite and pose a serious challenge to General Musharraf. They will also be watching the reaction of the military, which has been demoralized by a spate of suicide bombings against military targets. Whatever happens, experts say that General Musharraf's decision was not good news for the Bush administration Even if Pakistan does get back on the path to democracy, Saturday's action will likely tarnish the Pakistani leader, as well as the legitimacy of any election organized by his government.（Musharraf Leaves White House in Lurch）
Events of this weekend, she said, were a setback that took Pakistan "off the path" to full democracy. Rice, who is on a two-day visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories, emphasized that the United States has financed educational reform and economic assistance. The aid was "not to Musharraf, but to a Pakistan you could argue was making significant strides on a number of fronts." The United States, she said, "has a number of important relations with Pakistan on a whole range of issues." U.S. troops are prohibited from military action against al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds near the Afghanistan border in Pakistan, and depend on the Pakistani military to carry that fight.（Rice: U.S. to Review Aid to Pakistan）テロ特で訳わかったようなこと言ってる媚米似而非保守や熱湯欲の諸君！！
ぼちぼち「テロとの戦い」の本質がなんであるか、もっと解りやすく言えば、これが何との戦いであるかというようなことくらい悟ったらどうだ？
「補給活動中断 日米信頼に「ほころび」」で
その過程で冷戦もあり、「米海軍」の「海自」に対する信頼は「確固」となった。だがそれは、必ずしも「米国」の「日本」に対する信頼が「確固」になった－ことを意味しない。イラクやクウェートでの陸空自衛隊の活躍が強力なカスガイの一つとなって、日米両国はかろうじて信頼を担保してきた。１１月１日、インド洋での海自の補給活動が法律上、期限切れとなった。カスガイが一つ抜け落ちたのである。なんちゅうことを迷う様子もなく書いている野口裕之のいつもながらの馬鹿ぶりが際だつんだが、テロ特で日米関係に翳りが出るだろうことは気になるけど、アメリカの拉致問題放念で日米関係に指す翳りは気にせんのか？
そしてさ、なにより
「米海軍」の「海自」に対する信頼は「確固」となった。だがそれは、必ずしも「米国」の「日本」に対する信頼が「確固」になった－ことを意味しない。ちゅうんじゃさ、あまりにも日米安保体制に対する疑いが無さ過ぎやせんか？
あんたの書いていることを分かりやすく書き直せば、アメリカにとって日本政府は信頼に足らんけど自衛隊、就中海自は信頼できるパートナーだということであり、これは本質的にそうだから却下はしないが、自衛隊、とりわけ海自という組織が創設以来アメリカ軍の補完を目的にしているという実態そのものであり、その重点が我が国の防衛よりはアメリカ軍の活動の補完にある、こういうこと。
そしてあんたが疑いもなく書いたことを極言すれば、自衛隊は我が国政府の意向や国益を離れてアメリカのために活動することも是、こういうことにならんか？
しかしそこに疑いを全く差し挟めないところに媚米家の施された恐ろしき洗脳の実態を垣間見る思いがする罠。
さて、先週あたり我が国でも報じられるているように、国務省の考え方は、核で前進が認められればテロ支援国家リストから北鮮は外す、こういうことなのであり、あの微妙なクリス・ヒル発言
"We don't want a situation where denuclearization is achieved while some relations among states are allowed to deteriorate," Hill said after meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Kenichiro Sasae.（US Working With NKorea on Terror List）を和訳すれば、「日朝間の拉致が進展するまでは核問題には前進して欲しくない。」ということ、すなわち、核問題が前進すれば日本には悪いけど北をテロ支援国家リストから外しまっせ、こういうことなんだな。
しかし媚米似而非保守や頭の悪い熱湯欲はそこは言わない、理解していても聞こえないふりなのか？はたまた理解すら出来ていないのか？
いずれであろうともなんともお幸せなオツムであることか。
クルドやムシャラフのいまは近い将来の日本なんだけど、そこどうよ？
参照記事
Musharraf tries to stifle outcry over Pakistan emergency
U.S. Warns Musharraf Not to Use Martial Law
Musharraf Declares Emergency Rule in Pakistan
Constitution Suspended; Chief Judge Fired
Kurds Promise Response to Turkish Strike
Kurdish Rebels Release Turkish Soldiers
Activists Detained in Pakistan Emergency
Pakistani Sets Emergency Rule, Defying the U.S.
パキスタンに戒厳令 憲法停止、テレビ局などに軍展開か
２度目のクーデター ムシャラフ大統領
非常事態宣言「統合保つため」 パキスタン大統領
【軍事報告】補給活動中断 日米信頼に「ほころび」 野口裕之
いまさらこんなに騒ぐような話か？
遡れば民・自合併なわけで、要するに民主党の中でもまともな奴らってのは眼も意気地もないちゅうことが今回露呈した、それだけのこったろ？
そして辞任表明なんだが、代表選で何も起きないようなら民主党は社会党の亡霊どもにとうに乗っ取られていた、そういうこと。
（以下2007/11/04の23:48加筆）
面白半分に法螺吹き婆さんが何を書いたか覗いてみたんだが、やはり期待は裏切らないね。
自分では何も書けないから他者の転載なんだが、この他者がまたひどい。
■2007/11/04 (日) ワンマン不能で気分害したワガママ坊や小沢氏（１）
きっとダメ晋三のトンズラと並べる馬鹿が出てくるとは思ったが割と少なくて、それ書いてる奴は選りすぐりの馬鹿なんだが、考えても見ろ？
ダメ晋三の職場放棄には何も仕掛けがなかったが小沢さんの辞任表明には、考えつくだけで少なくとも二重の仕掛けがある。
よって決して同じではないんだがね。
参照記事
Japan opposition chief to resign
Japan opposition leader offers to resign: media
遡れば民・自合併なわけで、要するに民主党の中でもまともな奴らってのは眼も意気地もないちゅうことが今回露呈した、それだけのこったろ？
そして辞任表明なんだが、代表選で何も起きないようなら民主党は社会党の亡霊どもにとうに乗っ取られていた、そういうこと。
（以下2007/11/04の23:48加筆）
面白半分に法螺吹き婆さんが何を書いたか覗いてみたんだが、やはり期待は裏切らないね。
自分では何も書けないから他者の転載なんだが、この他者がまたひどい。
■2007/11/04 (日) ワンマン不能で気分害したワガママ坊や小沢氏（１）
<<また、放り出した小沢一郎 氏末尾の徳永日本学研究所 代表 徳永圀典って署名がなんともいかめしいんだが、こんなそこいらの素人でも考えつくようなことしか書けないで一体日頃なにを研究しているのやら？
数日前、私は、小沢一郎は、「高転びに転げ落ちる」と予言したが、当にその通りとなった。
そしてその辞め方も、安倍総理と変わらぬお粗末君であった。
きっとダメ晋三のトンズラと並べる馬鹿が出てくるとは思ったが割と少なくて、それ書いてる奴は選りすぐりの馬鹿なんだが、考えても見ろ？
ダメ晋三の職場放棄には何も仕掛けがなかったが小沢さんの辞任表明には、考えつくだけで少なくとも二重の仕掛けがある。
よって決して同じではないんだがね。
参照記事
Japan opposition chief to resign
Japan opposition leader offers to resign: media
なんなの？ この頭悪そうなタイトル？
言わせてもらうけど、スパイ防止法のある国だってこの程度の話はゴロゴロあるわけでさ、一等分かりやすいのはいまアメリカにある問題。
イスラエルロビーが違法活動で情報を得たちゅう話なんだが、これでライスやハドリーに裁判所から召還命令が出とるわけよ。
で逮捕されているロビイストは、イスラエルへの情報供与、主にアルカーイダ観覧情報なんだが、これはアメリカの当局者からの要請によると供述してるんだそうだ。
いずれにしろ、これも同盟国間の問題だべ？
そしてドイツでは、テロ対策を巡るＢＮＤの活動強化に関して議論が分裂している。
まあ要するにシュタージのような権能を持たせるべきかどうかちゅうような話なんだが、こんな問題は防諜法のある無しよりも寧ろ国益が定義できてるかどうかちゅう問題だろ？
それも無しでどうやって｢反国益｣を定義すんだ？
いずれにしても、この「スパイ防止法がないから云々」ちゅうのはこの婆さんの数年来の繰り言なんだが、やっぱね、理解も出来ていないことを書き散らかすのはやめて欲しいしさ、せめて諸外国ではどうかって事例も併記しながらやってもらいたいもんなんだが、これも、日本語すら人並みには使いこなせないこの婆さんに英語やフランス語やドイツ語のソースをあたれってなことになるわけでさ、どだい無理な話だ罠。
■2007/11/04 (日) 日本にはスパイ法ないからスパイごろごろ
馬鹿丸出しだな、これは．．．
参考記事
Rice subpoenaed in spying trial
言わせてもらうけど、スパイ防止法のある国だってこの程度の話はゴロゴロあるわけでさ、一等分かりやすいのはいまアメリカにある問題。
イスラエルロビーが違法活動で情報を得たちゅう話なんだが、これでライスやハドリーに裁判所から召還命令が出とるわけよ。
で逮捕されているロビイストは、イスラエルへの情報供与、主にアルカーイダ観覧情報なんだが、これはアメリカの当局者からの要請によると供述してるんだそうだ。
いずれにしろ、これも同盟国間の問題だべ？
そしてドイツでは、テロ対策を巡るＢＮＤの活動強化に関して議論が分裂している。
まあ要するにシュタージのような権能を持たせるべきかどうかちゅうような話なんだが、こんな問題は防諜法のある無しよりも寧ろ国益が定義できてるかどうかちゅう問題だろ？
それも無しでどうやって｢反国益｣を定義すんだ？
いずれにしても、この「スパイ防止法がないから云々」ちゅうのはこの婆さんの数年来の繰り言なんだが、やっぱね、理解も出来ていないことを書き散らかすのはやめて欲しいしさ、せめて諸外国ではどうかって事例も併記しながらやってもらいたいもんなんだが、これも、日本語すら人並みには使いこなせないこの婆さんに英語やフランス語やドイツ語のソースをあたれってなことになるわけでさ、どだい無理な話だ罠。
■2007/11/04 (日) 日本にはスパイ法ないからスパイごろごろ
鳩山また衝撃発言…秘書時代は「米国のスパイ」だったそれにしても．．．
田中首相当時
http://www.zakzak.co.jp/top/2007_11/t2007110101_all.html
鳩山法相、「日本にテロリストうろうろ」と発言
http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1104/TKY200711030239.html
馬鹿丸出しだな、これは．．．
参考記事
Rice subpoenaed in spying trial
Press Conference at Japan National Press Club
Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Tokyo, Japan November 3, 2007
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to see you all. I guess I was misinformed. I thought was coming here to give my views on next year's baseball season. But maybe we'll do that on another occasion. Let me just say that -- let me talk about where we are in the Six-Party process, where we hope to be by the end of the year and, I'd like to say, where we must be in '08 -- which is that two days ago we had an American team go in to the DPRK. I talked to the head of that team, Sung Kim, a few hours ago. They are in Pyongyang and tomorrow will be going to Yongbyon, the site of the nuclear installation. And they will begin the process of disabling the DPRK plutonium production facilities in Yongbyon. This will be the first time those facilities have ever been disabled. And, of course, the idea of disablement is to create a situation where it is very difficult to bring those facilities back online and certainly a very expensive, difficult prospect of ever bringing them back online. So this will be, I think, an important moment when it's done. They'll be going to Yongbyon tomorrow, and by Monday they'll begin their work. We anticipate; indeed, we welcome the other Six-Party members taking part in these disabling actions. I know the Japanese Government is currently considering how it will take part in this process. So it is our hope that by the end of this year we will have a Yongbyon facility that is substantially disabled and that from disabling we will go in a seamless continuum toward dismantlement -- that is, toward taking these facilities apart and making sure that they are irreversibly, that they're never again used for the purpose that they were used for before. In addition, we look forward -- probably in the next week or two -- to begin to discuss with the DPRK a list of all of their nuclear programs that must be disabled and dismantled pursuant to the requirements set forth in the September '05 agreement, where the DPRK undertook the obligation to abandon all of its nuclear programs and nuclear weapons. So we look forward to beginning the process of the North Koreans providing us with a full declaration of their programs. This needs to be done through the Six-Party process. So probably the Chinese hosts will be convening some kind of meeting of the denuclearization working group to look at this full list, and we'll continue to proceed on that. So in addition, as part of the process of providing us with a full list, we will be continuing our efforts with the DPRK and the dialogue that is already underway to deal with our concerns -- very real concerns -- about the status of their uranium enrichment. Clearly, we have to make sure that -- as we get to the end of this process -- not only is there no plutonium being produced, but we also need to make sure that there's no uranium being enriched. So that is also an ongoing process. So by the end of year, we hope to be -- in terms of the road toward complete denuclearization -- we hope to have arrived at an important milestone, where there is a complete disablement of the Yongbyon facilities, where there is a full list of additional facilities which also need to be disabled, and the uranium enrichment is also resolved to mutual satisfaction. This means that as we begin '08, we need to focus very much on the fact that North Korea has already produced some 30, 40, 50 -- we will know precisely from the declaration -- kilos of weaponized plutonium. So that is something that the DPRK needs to abandon pursuant to the September '05 agreement. In addition, we would look, as I mentioned earlier, to move from disabling to dismantling of the nuclear facilities. In order to get something like this you have to give something. This is a negotiation. So it is a tough negotiation. I've done a number of these in my diplomatic career. None were as difficult as this. So we have agreed -- the Six Parties have agreed -- to provide an additional 950,000 tons of fuel oil for the disablement phase. And as we go forward to the dismantlement and abandonment phase, we can anticipate additional energy requests from the DPRK. In addition, a number of us have agreed to move ahead on our bilateral relationships. Japan and the DPRK have an ongoing bilateral working group, as does the United States. From the U.S. perspective, we made very clear to the DPRK that we are prepared to achieve normalization of our relations, but we will not normalize relations with the DPRK until the DPRK is fully denuclearized. That is, there will be no normalization of relations with a nuclear DPRK. But we are prepared to move along this road. It doesn't mean that all our disagreements with the DPRK will be over, but it does mean that if they denuclearize, we can have a normal relationship, where we will continue our dialogue as we deal with disagreements as we do with many other states in the world. In addition, the United States has agreed to participate in an effort to end the Korean War by replacing the Armistice with some sort of peace process. We are prepared to begin our participation on substantial disablement by the end of this year, but we are not prepared to conclude a peace process, a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. We are not prepared to conclude that until there is denuclearization. That is, again, we cannot get to the end until the DPRK gets to the end of denuclearization. Finally, the United States is also prepared to participate in the overall creation of a Northeast Asian peace and security dialogue or forum. The purpose of this is to begin the process of building a neighborhood in Northeast Asia. In no way is it designed to replace the very key bilateral relationships, the bilateral alliances that the United States has and is very proud to have with a number of countries in Asia, including with Japan and with the Republic of Korea. But it is an effort to begin, I think, a long-term project building a sense of neighborhood in Northeast Asia. And I do like to believe that the Six-Party process, as difficult and is frustrating as it has been over the months and years, has gotten a start on getting countries in the region to work together toward a common goal. And so we would look to see that -- once this denuclearization is achieved -- we can continue to build on the foundation of the Six-Party process, so that we can have a more permanent forum on the landscape of Northeast Asia. So with those sorts of introductory comments, let me maybe go to questions.
QUESTION: Nakai of Mainichi newspaper company. Ambassador Hill, thank you for coming. DPRK transfer of nuclear technology to Syria or proliferation to Syria is emerging as an issue. In your negotiations with DPRK, have they guaranteed that they are not proliferating nuclear technology to Syria? Have you ever obtained that guarantee from DPRK? Now without such guarantee, if you have not obtained such commitment, assurance from DPRK, will this be linked to the Six-Party Talks? Or will the Six-Party Talks not consider this Syria issue as one of the obstacles?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, first of all, our interest in being engaged in a Six-Party process stems from our concern about the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons and what it means in the region -- to the stability of Northeast Asia -- but also [what it] means in terms of proliferation. Proliferation has been a primary concern of ours all along. We have approached the DPRK on the subject many times. We have received assurances that they will not transfer and have not been transferring or engaging in proliferation. On the other hand, we have to be vigilant about this. And we have to be really continuing to watch closely areas of concern, areas of the world where we have our concerns, including in Syria. So we have to be very much on top of this matter. I think as much as we value the DPRK making a declaration -- and you saw in the October 3 agreement that they did make a declaration of no transfer -- I think that's not enough for us. I think we have to be very vigilant and continue to watch for this problem. I believe the Six-Party process is the appropriate process for dealing with proliferation. The issue one faces when one hears reports of this is, what are you going to do about it? Do you stay engaged? Do you keep working on it diplomatically? Or do you somehow pull back from the diplomatic process? And we feel it's very necessary to stay engaged -- because when you pull back from something, you have to ask yourself the question, where are you going? What is the strategy you are trying to devise in order to achieve a goal? And so as we stay in the process, our strategy is to be diplomatically active -- to work with our partners, to continue to work with partners in the Six-Party process, but also to emphasize the various counterproliferation measures that we have, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. So we feel that staying engaged is the way to keep other countries also engaged, and ultimately is the way to deal with the threat posed by proliferation.
QUESTION: Hayashi of NHK. I have two questions. First of all, very shortly the (delisting) process will begin. Specifically, what will this process involve? Japan is very interested in delisting of DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It seems that what you're explaining to Japan and what you're explaining to DPRK may or may not be different. `Are they truly consistent, what you are explaining to DPRK and Japan? Those are the two questions.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, they are consistent. `The DPRK wants very much to be delisted, and we are prepared to work with them. Indeed, we are obligated according to the February agreement to have begun this process, which we have begun. And whether or not we get to the end of this process, of course, depends on future developments. It's not just dependent on denuclearization;it's also dependent on the statutory requirements of this U.S. law with respect to the terrorism list. I think it's important to understand that this is a U.S. list, U.S. law passed by the U.S. Congress, supported by the U.S. President. So what we are doing in the U.S. is to work with the DPRK to ensure that, if they want to be delisted, that they have to qualify to be delisted. Now you don't delist a country because they have done something in some other area where you want them to do something. They have to address the terrorism concerns that put them on the list in the first place. So we will be working with them on that. I think it's in our interest that when there are countries on the terrorism list, it needs to be understood that they are on the list for a reason. They are on the list because they've been supporting terrorism in some respect. So it's in our interest to get countries to stop supporting terrorism and therefore to get off the list. So we are working with them. I don't want to make a prediction now of where we end up on this. But I will say that we understand very well the great sensitivity of this terrorism list. We understand that -- even though it is a U.S. list and a U.S. law passed by a U.S. Congress and signed by a U.S. President -- that nonetheless it has international repercussions, including in some countries;in Japan itself. We are in very close contact with Japan on this issue. We are in very close contact with Japan on our mutual efforts to achieve progress, achieve meaningful progress on the matter of the Japanese citizens so brutally abducted some years ago by the DPRK. So we will continue to work very closely with Japan on this issue of delisting and the relationship of this issue to the abduction issue.
QUESTION:Could you repeat the first question with regard to disablement? What's the actual process involved in disablement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Sorry. What was the first part of your question? On disablement, we have agreed on a number of measures. We met in a denuclearization working group in Shenyang;I think it was August 16. And we came up with a list of measures that were designed to make sure that, in shutting down the nuclear facilities, that they couldn't easily be turned on again. So we negotiated the list with the North Koreans. It was one of these tough negotiations. They wanted us to do less, and we wanted them to do more. But we came up with a list of measures which in their totality, we believe, will make sure that even if on a certain day the North Koreans wanted to restart the plutonium -- which, by the way, would be a very bad day for all of us -- that it would take them well over a year to do that. So we have a concept that disabling should be something that, in order to reverse the disabling, you would need more than a year. So the disabling involves measures, very technical measures, in the three parts of the Yongbyon complex. First, the fuel fabrication facility. Second, the actual 5-megawatt reactor. Thirdly, the reprocessing facility, where the spent fuel rods would be taken from the 5-megawatt reactor. So these are technical measures that we will work with North Korean engineers on. One of the first that needs to be done is, we need to do some cleanup of the pond where the discharged fuel from the reactor needs to go -- because eventually we want the discharged fuel to be canned and sent out of North Korea. And so, in order to do that, we're going to have to clean the pond up. So that's one of the things that's going to get done in the next couple of days -- or started to get done, because discharging fuel will take many weeks. We also, I think, will begin with some measures that are fairly easy to accomplish in the reprocessing facility. And we will continue from there. Altogether, I think the process is going to take a full two months. And even at the end of December, when we will have substantial disabling, we need to be careful not to hurry things in a way that could cause any health risk to anyone working on the process. So we'll have to be careful on that. But, I think, by the end of all this you'll see that we have a Yongbyon that is disabled and ready for the next stage, which is to be dismantled. And so far, I'm pleased to say, we've had good cooperation from the DPRK technicians and experts on the spot.
QUESTION:Miyata of Asahi newspaper company. I have a question with regard to plutonium. By the end of the year, you said, Ambassador Hill, in the declaration list already the plutonium extracted, the nuclear-bomb substances, will probably be included. What is the attitude on the part of DPRK with regard to this list? And if they have agreed to include that in the list, then what would be the process to follow? In other words, will plutonium be included as a subject of denuclearization? And what is the position of the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:We are expecting to get the list, the initial list, very soon. And so I'll be able to answer your question a little better when I actually see the list. But one thing that we have had considerable discussions about already is the need that -- the full list of nuclear programs needs to include nuclear material. And the DPRK, at the working group on denuclearization -- the Six-Party working group on denuclearization in Shenyang on the 16th of August -- told us it would include the material. That is, all of the fissile material;that is, the separated plutonium. This is going to be very important, because what we will need to see on the fissile material is a list that we can verify. Because, again, this is the crucial question. Do they have 30 kilograms? Do they have 40? Do they have 50? How much of that was used during the nuclear test that they made in October '06? And when we come up with the figure, we need to verify that figure. So the answer to your question is, yes, this is expected to be on the list. And I would argue that there are a number of other nuclear programs not at Yongbyon that also need to be on the list. And remember, we started with Yongbyon because we thought that was the most achievable objective by the end of this year. But it's not the only nuclear facility that needs to be put out of commission. I would expect that as we get this list of plutonium, we'll be able to verify it. And then we'll know what we are dealing with as we get to what I hope will be the final phase in '08.
QUESTION: [Inaudible] from Italian Sky 24 News. Two small questions. The first one is, did you know ? since you mentioned that the Japanese authorities are considering sending their own team to check about the disablement of Yongbyon -- do you feel that there has been a change in the new government toward more constructivity and pragmatism compared with the last Abe Administration? And the second one is, since we are almost the last year of the Bush Administration, you know that in 2000 that Clinton was very close to deliver a deal with North Korea. How would be your prediction, if you can give us a prediction, about the possible delivering by the Bush Administration right before elections?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I only make predictions in baseball. (Laughter) So I don't know if I can make a prediction on your point there, except to say I've had a lot of discussions with the DPRK representatives on my concern -- I think everybody's concern -- that we not run out of time. And I think if you look at what happened in 2000, we ran out of time. And I don't want that to happen. That's one of the reasons we're pushing this thing to try to get disablement through by December 31 -- because a lot of people point out, well wait a minute;can you really get it done by December 31? Aren't there other things you need to disable? I need to make sure the dismantlement/abandonment phase starts on January 1, if not on January 2, so that we have a chance to get through that. So I'm very mindful of the concern about the running out of time. I've had those conversations with the DPRK, and I believe they understand why we are pushing these deadlines. And they support the idea of getting through this in '08. But those are expressions of support in a general sense. And nuclear weapons and things like that are real proof of the old adage, "the devil is in the details" -- because there are a lot of details in this issue, and we've got to get through a lot of those. Let me just say with respect to dealing with the Japanese, I don't think there's a negotiating team that we've had closer relationships with than the Japanese negotiating team. And this has gone on for me since the Koizumi premiership. So I've worked very closely with Sasae-san on these issues. These are tough issues for everybody. You know, having a Six-Party process -- I mean, Japan is in a very special place, because not only is it really in the shadow of some of these nuclear threats, it's also in the shadow of missile threats. And it's very much burdened by the shadow of this terrible abduction matter. So we have to fully factor in and fully understand Japanese sensitivities on this, and that's why I spend a lot of time with my Japanese counterparts. You should see my phone bill. You know, I'm calling Tokyo. So I think we have good cooperation. It's not for me to talk about Japanese Government attitudes to their own negotiations. You know, they have a bilateral process the way we do. It's not for me to say, should they give more or should they give less? How flexible should they be? That's really for them to do. Except to say that I can assure you we have very good relations with Japan, and we are not engaged in a Six-Party process in order see our relationship with Japan worsen. On the contrary, we see this as a real example where the U.S. and Japan, with a common interest -- the number-one, number-two economies in the world -- we ought to work together. And I think together we're going to solve this.
QUESTION:Nishimura of Hokkaido Newspaper. Ambassador Hill, last month at Congress when you testified (about) fuel oil supplied to DPRK -- 50,000 by South Korea, next China, and thirdly U.S., and fourthly Russia. That is the expectation, you said. And with regard to Japan, because of the abduction issue, Japan has not yet participated. I think that's what you reported to the Congress last month. Now Japan and DPRK, without the abduction issue being settled, fuel oil will stop at Russia? Or will there be a second round starting once again with South Korea? So what is the position of Japan in fuel-oil aid?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Well, I can't really talk about the position of Japan on this. But what I can do is tell you that when we agreed that we would provide 50,000 tons of oil for the shutdown, and then if the DPRK wanted more oil -- which they did -- we said, "Well then, shutdown is not enough. Freezing is not enough. We have to go to disabling." And so we agreed that they would disable the facilities for an additional 950,000 tons. Now the South Koreans took the first shipment, the 50,000, which was the shipment of oil in return for which the DPRK froze or shut down for the purpose of eventual abandonment the nuclear facilities. And so the South Koreans didn't want to be the only people supplying oil. So we did an addendum to the agreement in February '07 in which four countries agreed to participate. And Japan agreed to participate once its concerns were met. And, as I've just mentioned to the previous question, I think Japan has a lot of particular issues, namely the abduction issue, that it feels it needs to make progress on. And so it was agreed that Japan would join as its concerns were met. So we have done tranches of oil -- that is, 50,000 tons each. Now why 50,000 tons? That seems to be the maximum that the ports will take in the DPRK. So after we go through this first round, we would anticipate just going through a second round and a third round. Again, when Japan is able to participate -- I'm sure Japan will participate, but, you know, it's not for me to be advising Japan on that. I think we understand that Japan has some very special issues here. So we will continue to proceed on this. I might note, too, that other countries have inquired about whether they can participate in this process. And we've welcomed other countries, and I think we'll look to see if other countries can come in. What's important, I might mention -- a little pause to mention a little more on this oil situation -- we are not paying oil in order for North Korea to do nothing, to stand in place. We're giving them oil in order for them to go deeper into denuclearization. If they want more oil, they need to do more denuclearization. So when the 950,000 tons finishes, if they want more of that, they need to move to the next phase. And we've been working very hard on that. It is not in our interest or anyone's interest to starve the DPRK of energy. On the contrary, it's to show the DPRK that they can get out of this nuclear business -- which has been very, very harmful for their position -- and can get energy through other means and can eventually be in a better position with energy thanks to giving up their nuclear ambitions.
QUESTION:Blaine Hardin, Washington Post. I have a question about the diplomatic efforts of North Korea in recent weeks. They've sent envoys to a number of countries where they haven't been recently, trying to open up more to the West and the rest of the world. Do you see this of a piece with the agreements that are occurring in the denuclearization issue? In other words, do you have a judgement about something changing in North Korea that is opening up and trying to change their position vis-a-vis the rest of the world?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Yes. You know, I saw that article. I can't remember if it was in the Post or the Times -- probably both. But -- AP, okay. I saw that article. I read it with great interest -- because the notion that their cooperation in the Six-Party process is being accompanied by a diplomatic effort to expand their recognition, it's an interesting concept. I can't say that I've seen how it is linked. Except to say that as they participate in the Six-Party process there does appear to be, in the context as we talk to them in the Six-Party process, the desire to overcome their isolation and an understanding that -- whereas in the past North Korea often spoke of their isolation as a great benefit for their country -- I think they've understood it now as something that is actually harming them, and that the best-case scenario for what they're doing is to believe that perhaps it is part of an overall effort to open up. I do believe that the DPRK understands that isolation in the 21st Century is not a ticket to the future. Quite to the contrary, it will leave the DPRK further behind. It's so interesting to look at economic growth statistics in East Asia and see that the two countries in East Asia that did not grow last year, that had negative growth, were the DPRK and Burma. And if you look at the degree of interaction that those countries have with abroad, you'll see that both of them are really very isolated. Burma's trade, for example, is a tiny fraction of Vietnam's trade. So I think there is an understanding. It's the sort of thing that, if you had sort of wide open North Korean interlocutors, you would ask them. You'd say, "Well, what's this about?" But, alas, they kind of keep pretty much task-oriented. And if they're there to talk about denuclearization, they talk about denuclearization. They don't engage in a broader discussion on that, unfortunately. But I do have the sense that they understand that they need to open up. I also have the sense that they are doing this with great care -- that not everyone in the DPRK agrees with this position and that it's going to be a slow process. But I think it's a very necessary process. And I might add that the Chinese, who probably know the DPRK best, believe that there is an effort on the part of the DPRK to open. The Chinese believe that some of their efforts to show DPRK officials the new economy are providing some kind of incentive for the DPRK to open up. So I think it's an interesting development.
I might just mention one other point:I thought it was very interesting that they have done so much with Vietnam, because Vietnam is a country which also was very closed with a very stagnant economy. And now it's opening up, and it's made an awful lot of progress. The DPRK and Vietnam went through a very rough patch a few years ago, when Vietnam helped get some DPRK refugees on to South Korea. So it is interesting that they've reached out again to Vietnam. And I think it's something to keep our eye on, and I believe it's a positive development.
And one other thing:I think it's positive because we have been very diplomatically active in making sure every country understands:one, we are doing all we can to get this thing solved, this denuclearization issue solved;and, two, we need all the help we can get to make sure that every message coming from every country that the DPRK engages with is the same message -- which is that you get out of the nuclear business, and you'll have a much better future.
QUESTION:Chio Nakamoto, Financial Times. You mentioned the many requirements for the DPRK to be delisted from the list of countries that support terrorism. How far would you say they are to the end of the road? Are they midway? Are they way down the road? How far do you think they are to the end?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:I don't know. I think -- You know, these requirements are embedded in U.S. law. So we've had some of our lawyers actually talk to them about what they need to do to achieve the US statutory requirements. I think they have to come out with some kind of declaration. So I think the answer to your question would be -- has to await their declaration, to see whether they have taken the steps they need to take. But these steps are embedded in U.S. law. They're for all to see, and so we have to see if the North Koreans are prepared to take them. You know, there are a couple of steps that we know they have taken, which are very important. That is, the UN covenants on terrorism, and they acceded to those in the 1990's. But, clearly, there will be other things. But we're working with them -- again, with U.S. lawyers, because this is a matter of U.S. law.
QUESTION: Deguchi of Kyodo News. It's a related question to the previous one. The Department of State comes up with its country reports on terrorism on an annual basis. And in terrorism state sponsors there was one item -- that they continue to protect the hijackers of the airplane. And in order for them to be delisted, the sending of those criminals back to Japan, that extraditing is also a requirement? And have you required that to the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Let me just say, that issue has come up. I think we can reach a satisfactory result on that. I'm not sure -- I really should have a State Department lawyer here to answer the question of whether it's a statutory requirement that they would have to return the Japanese Red Army terrorists from the 1970 hijacking. So I'm not sure if it's a statutory requirement. I should check with our legal people on that. The issue has come up. I must say, what I've been careful to do on dealing with this is, you know, we'd like to see progress on this abduction issue. And I would like to focus to the extent that there would be people coming out of the DPRK and back to Japan. I would like it to be abductees. That's sort of our focus. I don't want any thoughts that, you know, they could satisfy one request by fulfilling another. So I think that we'll work through that issue. But, again, I don't feel comfortable answering your question on the legal issue. Again, I can't emphasize enough. This is U.S. domestic law. It's in our Congress. It's not an international law. It's a U.S. law that has created this terrorism list.
QUESTION: Inoue of TBS. The timing of taking them off of the terrorism list -- is there any understanding with the North Koreans if there is a notification to the Congress, which is 45 days prior to the actual removal, the notification to the Congress is equivalent to the actual removal from the list?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: First of all, I can tell you're a Washington correspondent, because you know our law better than many Americans do. So congratulations. The 45 days is a notice period. It goes to Congress. Now we have notice periods in a lot of U.S. laws. So the point of a notice period is to give some opportunity for the Congress to express its views on a decision that the Administration is prepared to take. Now once the federal government has sent a notice to Congress, it means that all -- that the federal government has made a decision that everything is done and ready to go. That is, whatever issue it is. Often, for example, we have notice requirements for foreign military sales. So let's say you have a foreign military sale, and you're going to send weapon system X to country Y. You have essentially gone through all of your requirements. And then, when you send it to Congress, it means that you are ready to go, and you're just giving Congress their right to comment. So once we would send a notice on something like the terrorism list -- on change to the terrorism list, adding a country or subtracting a country -- we would have completely done our homework and completely been prepared such that, in effect, the notice to Congress becomes the effective period, the effective date that we're dealing with. Now I think that's important to understand -- because when you look at the terrorism list, the terrorism list is essentially a set of restrictions on the U.S. Government. For example, the U.S. Government is not permitted by the statute, the terrorism list statute, the U.S. government is not permitted to provide or to sell to a country on the list any military equipment. Now there might be many other reasons you would not sell military equipment to a country on the list. But the statute makes clear -- if a country is on the list, you cannot sell them military equipment. Another issue is, if a country is on the list, you will not, for example, vote in favor of an international financial institution loan to that country. So these are a set of restrictions on the U.S. That's what the terrorism list is. So when we provide a notice to Congress, it means that we believe that the country fulfills all the objectives.
So I would say the day we provide the notice is the most important day.
QUESTION:Did you talk to the North Koreans about that? Is there an understanding?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Again, we have explained to them what these procedures are. But we have still to go through with them what their statutory requirements are in terms of affirming no connections with terrorists, with terrorist groups, and that sort of thing. And we plan to do that very soon, probably through what we call the New York channel. We will probably have some State Department lawyers do this, because, again, it's a legal matter in U.S. law.
QUESTION:Ukai from Asahi newspaper company. Disablement -- removal of the fuel rods is included? This is beyond the '94 Framework agreement, you have said that. But the removal of fuel rods was also included in that '94 Framework. So when you say "beyond the '94 Framework," what are the measures actually that go beyond that Framework agreement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:We've agreed on several measures that would make the reprocessing facility unusable. And, again, it's technical things. It's cutting chains;it's taking apart equipment. Things like that. I'm not in a position to stand here and give you precisely what they are. But in the opinion of our experts, they make it unusable -- and unusable for a period of a year, even if you wanted to reverse it. We've also taken some measures in the other two facilities -- the reactor and the fuel fabrication plant -- again, cutting chains, this sort of thing. The removing the fuel rods is important, although, you correctly point out, it's not unprecedented. Because what we want to do is, as you remove the fuel from the reactor, we want a situation where they have nothing to put back into the reactor. And that has to do with the so-called fresh fuel rods, and we have an agreement. There are some details to be worked out, but we have an agreement which would mean that they cannot put back any fresh fuel rods. So this is important -- because whereas in 2002, when they restarted the facilities, they were able within 60 days to get them going because they had the fresh fuel rods available. And what we would be doing is making sure they don't have those fresh fuel rods available and therefore cannot restart the reactor, even if that were the only step that we're taking. But I want to emphasize, it's not the only one. I think what we want to do, in terms of the actual measures that we take, is that we have there about 10 of them. And what we would like to do is get going on them, get through them, see whether there are some additional ones, see whether there are some of those that we might not feel are worth doing. But what we want to do is once we go through these -- and, by the way, as I said earlier, we will welcome other participants from other Six-Party countries to participate on this -- once we are done with this, then I think that's an appropriate time to explain precisely what has been done, and why it was done, and how much disabling it contributes to. Now I would like to make one other point, which is that if we are in the position where everything has fallen apart and the DPRK starts trying to reconstitute the nuclear facilities again -- whether it takes them 12 months, 14 months, 16 months, or even 24 months -- we've got a big problem. So we don't think we should get too hung up on the question of whether it's 12 or 14. That would be a huge problem. What we're trying to do is make sure we have a disabling so that that disabling will be overtaken by events -- events that are scheduled for '08, when we would go to dismantling and, importantly, abandonment of the separated plutonium. So I think disabling is a necessary step, without which we can't go further. But we can't stop at disabling.
MODERATOR:Ambassador Hill is Assistant Secretary in charge of East Asia and not specifically the DPRK, but is there any question related to that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:There's more to East Asia than the DPRK? (Laughter)
QUESTION:Aiko Doden from NHK. In your region of responsibility, Myanmar remains a politically and diplomatically challenging issue. In light of the situation where neither soft-line policy nor hard-line policy seems to have brought about any change, would providing any incremental incentives to Myanmar be an option for the U.S.?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:You know, I think I'd be careful of trying to put together incentives at this point for Burma. I mean, we have a government there that has just engaged in one of the most horrendous crackdowns on dissent that we've seen in several years. And I think to respond to this terrible crackdown by coming up with incentives, I think would send the wrong message. Indeed,. I think this is a time when we all need to be a little firm and, most importantly, united. I think we need to make sure that all countries, first of all, analyze the conditions on the ground in the way we do and to try to work in a broad diplomatic strategy -- so that when Burma gets pressure from ASEAN, they don't go run to China, because they'll get the same pressure from China. And if they get the pressure from China, they won't go run to India or some other country. So I think what's very important is, we need to create a diplomatic strategy where we can try to get all countries to understand that the situation in Burma is not only intolerable for the Burmese people, but it's intolerable for the region. And you know, I'm a pragmatist in foreign policy. And, frankly, I'm proud of that. I've been in this game for 30 years. And part of pragmatism is, you don't start setting up incentives for governments that have just behaved in the way they have -- because they will immediately misread it, and they will see it as a sign;they will see these incentives as a sign of weakness. So I think this is not the time to be reaching around and looking for new strategies. It's a time for a little patience, but most of all for a lot of resolve. It's a time to see diplomatic opportunities. I believe that, given this horrendous crackdown, this loss of life, the terrible spectacle of a Japanese journalist being shot to death on the street in front of us all -- I mean, a spectacle that should haunt all of us for the rest of our lives -- this is a time when we need to be a little tough-minded and understand that we can, with diplomacy, get one strategy, so that there is no sense among the Burmese junta that they can run off and hide behind some country and avoid the reckoning with the rest of the world. So we're going to support the Gambari plan, Mr. Gambari's approach. We're going to make sure that, as he goes forward, that China supports him, India supports him, ASEAN, U.S., Japan -- everybody supports him. And let's use this as an opportunity to come together, be unified, and have a lot of resolve. And let's get through this. And we will.
QUESTION:Dejima of Nikkei newspaper. Under Ambassador Kelly, CVID was one of the phrases used. Disablement -- you said that it means for at least one year they cannot resume the activity. Why this one-year benchmark? What's the reason behind it? And if, assuming that they resume within one year, how will you try to once again terminate their activities? One point I wish to confirm on the previous comments you made -- '08 process, or you have been saying the plan for '08, or eight year;can you elaborate on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Yes. First of all, when I talk about disablement, as I tried to suggest to the last question, this is an intermediate process -- disablement. We want to move to dismantlement, and we would like the measures we've taken to disable turned into measures to dismantle. Now, for example, a disabling measure might be, you take a piece of equipment out and you put it somewhere so it's hard to put back in. Dismantlement would be, you take the piece of equipment and it's impossible to put back in and you can't find a substitute piece of equipment. So that would be taking a disabling measure and going to dismantlement. So the D in CVID is dismantlement. And we want to get going on that. The I is, of course, irreversible. And so we want to make sure that, as we dismantle, they don't feel that they can reverse the dismantlement. So you take some piece of equipment out. You destroy it. You make sure there's no substitute for it. And that creates a sense of irreversible. So then the V, of course, is verifiable. Of course it has to be verified. This is not a game of "trust me." I mean, this is not a game where they pretend to disable or dismantle, and we pretend to believe them. We need for this to be verifiable. And finally, of course it needs to be complete. I mean, what's the point of stopping a plutonium program if you might have a uranium enrichment facility? So that's why we have to go after that issue too. So why we have done this on a step-by-step basis has to do with how you negotiate this. Believe me, I would love for this all to be done in one day. I would love to sit down in the Six Parties, and everyone agrees, "Well, let's just get this over today." I would love for it to be done in one day. It's not, because there are a lot of factors -- cultural, you name it. There are a bunch of reasons that the North Koreans don't want to just give up these weapons in a day. So what we have to do is a step-by-step process. You know, believe me, as that question about Burma suggested, there are other problems in the world I'd like to be working on as well, because I feel very strongly about those problems. But we've got to get through this, and I think the best way to do it is step-by-step. But I don't want these steps to be endless. So we have these timeframes, and we made December 31. It's a bit arbitrary, you know. We could have said December 30, or January 2, or something. But we made that there, and then we're trying to get through the final stage in '08. Now I'd like to see us get it through in the current U.S. administration, because I think if -- We started this process;I'd like to see us finish it. And that's our time schedule. So, you know, CVID is all there. Sometimes it's not -- You know, you have to ask yourself the question, does repeating "CVID" help the situation? Does it help to keep repeating the same term? Maybe it does;maybe it doesn't. But I'm just trying to get through this. I'm trying to get through it as pragmatically and, by the way, as quickly as possible.
Released on November 3, 2007
Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Tokyo, Japan November 3, 2007
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to see you all. I guess I was misinformed. I thought was coming here to give my views on next year's baseball season. But maybe we'll do that on another occasion. Let me just say that -- let me talk about where we are in the Six-Party process, where we hope to be by the end of the year and, I'd like to say, where we must be in '08 -- which is that two days ago we had an American team go in to the DPRK. I talked to the head of that team, Sung Kim, a few hours ago. They are in Pyongyang and tomorrow will be going to Yongbyon, the site of the nuclear installation. And they will begin the process of disabling the DPRK plutonium production facilities in Yongbyon. This will be the first time those facilities have ever been disabled. And, of course, the idea of disablement is to create a situation where it is very difficult to bring those facilities back online and certainly a very expensive, difficult prospect of ever bringing them back online. So this will be, I think, an important moment when it's done. They'll be going to Yongbyon tomorrow, and by Monday they'll begin their work. We anticipate; indeed, we welcome the other Six-Party members taking part in these disabling actions. I know the Japanese Government is currently considering how it will take part in this process. So it is our hope that by the end of this year we will have a Yongbyon facility that is substantially disabled and that from disabling we will go in a seamless continuum toward dismantlement -- that is, toward taking these facilities apart and making sure that they are irreversibly, that they're never again used for the purpose that they were used for before. In addition, we look forward -- probably in the next week or two -- to begin to discuss with the DPRK a list of all of their nuclear programs that must be disabled and dismantled pursuant to the requirements set forth in the September '05 agreement, where the DPRK undertook the obligation to abandon all of its nuclear programs and nuclear weapons. So we look forward to beginning the process of the North Koreans providing us with a full declaration of their programs. This needs to be done through the Six-Party process. So probably the Chinese hosts will be convening some kind of meeting of the denuclearization working group to look at this full list, and we'll continue to proceed on that. So in addition, as part of the process of providing us with a full list, we will be continuing our efforts with the DPRK and the dialogue that is already underway to deal with our concerns -- very real concerns -- about the status of their uranium enrichment. Clearly, we have to make sure that -- as we get to the end of this process -- not only is there no plutonium being produced, but we also need to make sure that there's no uranium being enriched. So that is also an ongoing process. So by the end of year, we hope to be -- in terms of the road toward complete denuclearization -- we hope to have arrived at an important milestone, where there is a complete disablement of the Yongbyon facilities, where there is a full list of additional facilities which also need to be disabled, and the uranium enrichment is also resolved to mutual satisfaction. This means that as we begin '08, we need to focus very much on the fact that North Korea has already produced some 30, 40, 50 -- we will know precisely from the declaration -- kilos of weaponized plutonium. So that is something that the DPRK needs to abandon pursuant to the September '05 agreement. In addition, we would look, as I mentioned earlier, to move from disabling to dismantling of the nuclear facilities. In order to get something like this you have to give something. This is a negotiation. So it is a tough negotiation. I've done a number of these in my diplomatic career. None were as difficult as this. So we have agreed -- the Six Parties have agreed -- to provide an additional 950,000 tons of fuel oil for the disablement phase. And as we go forward to the dismantlement and abandonment phase, we can anticipate additional energy requests from the DPRK. In addition, a number of us have agreed to move ahead on our bilateral relationships. Japan and the DPRK have an ongoing bilateral working group, as does the United States. From the U.S. perspective, we made very clear to the DPRK that we are prepared to achieve normalization of our relations, but we will not normalize relations with the DPRK until the DPRK is fully denuclearized. That is, there will be no normalization of relations with a nuclear DPRK. But we are prepared to move along this road. It doesn't mean that all our disagreements with the DPRK will be over, but it does mean that if they denuclearize, we can have a normal relationship, where we will continue our dialogue as we deal with disagreements as we do with many other states in the world. In addition, the United States has agreed to participate in an effort to end the Korean War by replacing the Armistice with some sort of peace process. We are prepared to begin our participation on substantial disablement by the end of this year, but we are not prepared to conclude a peace process, a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. We are not prepared to conclude that until there is denuclearization. That is, again, we cannot get to the end until the DPRK gets to the end of denuclearization. Finally, the United States is also prepared to participate in the overall creation of a Northeast Asian peace and security dialogue or forum. The purpose of this is to begin the process of building a neighborhood in Northeast Asia. In no way is it designed to replace the very key bilateral relationships, the bilateral alliances that the United States has and is very proud to have with a number of countries in Asia, including with Japan and with the Republic of Korea. But it is an effort to begin, I think, a long-term project building a sense of neighborhood in Northeast Asia. And I do like to believe that the Six-Party process, as difficult and is frustrating as it has been over the months and years, has gotten a start on getting countries in the region to work together toward a common goal. And so we would look to see that -- once this denuclearization is achieved -- we can continue to build on the foundation of the Six-Party process, so that we can have a more permanent forum on the landscape of Northeast Asia. So with those sorts of introductory comments, let me maybe go to questions.
QUESTION: Nakai of Mainichi newspaper company. Ambassador Hill, thank you for coming. DPRK transfer of nuclear technology to Syria or proliferation to Syria is emerging as an issue. In your negotiations with DPRK, have they guaranteed that they are not proliferating nuclear technology to Syria? Have you ever obtained that guarantee from DPRK? Now without such guarantee, if you have not obtained such commitment, assurance from DPRK, will this be linked to the Six-Party Talks? Or will the Six-Party Talks not consider this Syria issue as one of the obstacles?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, first of all, our interest in being engaged in a Six-Party process stems from our concern about the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons and what it means in the region -- to the stability of Northeast Asia -- but also [what it] means in terms of proliferation. Proliferation has been a primary concern of ours all along. We have approached the DPRK on the subject many times. We have received assurances that they will not transfer and have not been transferring or engaging in proliferation. On the other hand, we have to be vigilant about this. And we have to be really continuing to watch closely areas of concern, areas of the world where we have our concerns, including in Syria. So we have to be very much on top of this matter. I think as much as we value the DPRK making a declaration -- and you saw in the October 3 agreement that they did make a declaration of no transfer -- I think that's not enough for us. I think we have to be very vigilant and continue to watch for this problem. I believe the Six-Party process is the appropriate process for dealing with proliferation. The issue one faces when one hears reports of this is, what are you going to do about it? Do you stay engaged? Do you keep working on it diplomatically? Or do you somehow pull back from the diplomatic process? And we feel it's very necessary to stay engaged -- because when you pull back from something, you have to ask yourself the question, where are you going? What is the strategy you are trying to devise in order to achieve a goal? And so as we stay in the process, our strategy is to be diplomatically active -- to work with our partners, to continue to work with partners in the Six-Party process, but also to emphasize the various counterproliferation measures that we have, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. So we feel that staying engaged is the way to keep other countries also engaged, and ultimately is the way to deal with the threat posed by proliferation.
QUESTION: Hayashi of NHK. I have two questions. First of all, very shortly the (delisting) process will begin. Specifically, what will this process involve? Japan is very interested in delisting of DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It seems that what you're explaining to Japan and what you're explaining to DPRK may or may not be different. `Are they truly consistent, what you are explaining to DPRK and Japan? Those are the two questions.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, they are consistent. `The DPRK wants very much to be delisted, and we are prepared to work with them. Indeed, we are obligated according to the February agreement to have begun this process, which we have begun. And whether or not we get to the end of this process, of course, depends on future developments. It's not just dependent on denuclearization;it's also dependent on the statutory requirements of this U.S. law with respect to the terrorism list. I think it's important to understand that this is a U.S. list, U.S. law passed by the U.S. Congress, supported by the U.S. President. So what we are doing in the U.S. is to work with the DPRK to ensure that, if they want to be delisted, that they have to qualify to be delisted. Now you don't delist a country because they have done something in some other area where you want them to do something. They have to address the terrorism concerns that put them on the list in the first place. So we will be working with them on that. I think it's in our interest that when there are countries on the terrorism list, it needs to be understood that they are on the list for a reason. They are on the list because they've been supporting terrorism in some respect. So it's in our interest to get countries to stop supporting terrorism and therefore to get off the list. So we are working with them. I don't want to make a prediction now of where we end up on this. But I will say that we understand very well the great sensitivity of this terrorism list. We understand that -- even though it is a U.S. list and a U.S. law passed by a U.S. Congress and signed by a U.S. President -- that nonetheless it has international repercussions, including in some countries;in Japan itself. We are in very close contact with Japan on this issue. We are in very close contact with Japan on our mutual efforts to achieve progress, achieve meaningful progress on the matter of the Japanese citizens so brutally abducted some years ago by the DPRK. So we will continue to work very closely with Japan on this issue of delisting and the relationship of this issue to the abduction issue.
QUESTION:Could you repeat the first question with regard to disablement? What's the actual process involved in disablement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Sorry. What was the first part of your question? On disablement, we have agreed on a number of measures. We met in a denuclearization working group in Shenyang;I think it was August 16. And we came up with a list of measures that were designed to make sure that, in shutting down the nuclear facilities, that they couldn't easily be turned on again. So we negotiated the list with the North Koreans. It was one of these tough negotiations. They wanted us to do less, and we wanted them to do more. But we came up with a list of measures which in their totality, we believe, will make sure that even if on a certain day the North Koreans wanted to restart the plutonium -- which, by the way, would be a very bad day for all of us -- that it would take them well over a year to do that. So we have a concept that disabling should be something that, in order to reverse the disabling, you would need more than a year. So the disabling involves measures, very technical measures, in the three parts of the Yongbyon complex. First, the fuel fabrication facility. Second, the actual 5-megawatt reactor. Thirdly, the reprocessing facility, where the spent fuel rods would be taken from the 5-megawatt reactor. So these are technical measures that we will work with North Korean engineers on. One of the first that needs to be done is, we need to do some cleanup of the pond where the discharged fuel from the reactor needs to go -- because eventually we want the discharged fuel to be canned and sent out of North Korea. And so, in order to do that, we're going to have to clean the pond up. So that's one of the things that's going to get done in the next couple of days -- or started to get done, because discharging fuel will take many weeks. We also, I think, will begin with some measures that are fairly easy to accomplish in the reprocessing facility. And we will continue from there. Altogether, I think the process is going to take a full two months. And even at the end of December, when we will have substantial disabling, we need to be careful not to hurry things in a way that could cause any health risk to anyone working on the process. So we'll have to be careful on that. But, I think, by the end of all this you'll see that we have a Yongbyon that is disabled and ready for the next stage, which is to be dismantled. And so far, I'm pleased to say, we've had good cooperation from the DPRK technicians and experts on the spot.
QUESTION:Miyata of Asahi newspaper company. I have a question with regard to plutonium. By the end of the year, you said, Ambassador Hill, in the declaration list already the plutonium extracted, the nuclear-bomb substances, will probably be included. What is the attitude on the part of DPRK with regard to this list? And if they have agreed to include that in the list, then what would be the process to follow? In other words, will plutonium be included as a subject of denuclearization? And what is the position of the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:We are expecting to get the list, the initial list, very soon. And so I'll be able to answer your question a little better when I actually see the list. But one thing that we have had considerable discussions about already is the need that -- the full list of nuclear programs needs to include nuclear material. And the DPRK, at the working group on denuclearization -- the Six-Party working group on denuclearization in Shenyang on the 16th of August -- told us it would include the material. That is, all of the fissile material;that is, the separated plutonium. This is going to be very important, because what we will need to see on the fissile material is a list that we can verify. Because, again, this is the crucial question. Do they have 30 kilograms? Do they have 40? Do they have 50? How much of that was used during the nuclear test that they made in October '06? And when we come up with the figure, we need to verify that figure. So the answer to your question is, yes, this is expected to be on the list. And I would argue that there are a number of other nuclear programs not at Yongbyon that also need to be on the list. And remember, we started with Yongbyon because we thought that was the most achievable objective by the end of this year. But it's not the only nuclear facility that needs to be put out of commission. I would expect that as we get this list of plutonium, we'll be able to verify it. And then we'll know what we are dealing with as we get to what I hope will be the final phase in '08.
QUESTION: [Inaudible] from Italian Sky 24 News. Two small questions. The first one is, did you know ? since you mentioned that the Japanese authorities are considering sending their own team to check about the disablement of Yongbyon -- do you feel that there has been a change in the new government toward more constructivity and pragmatism compared with the last Abe Administration? And the second one is, since we are almost the last year of the Bush Administration, you know that in 2000 that Clinton was very close to deliver a deal with North Korea. How would be your prediction, if you can give us a prediction, about the possible delivering by the Bush Administration right before elections?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I only make predictions in baseball. (Laughter) So I don't know if I can make a prediction on your point there, except to say I've had a lot of discussions with the DPRK representatives on my concern -- I think everybody's concern -- that we not run out of time. And I think if you look at what happened in 2000, we ran out of time. And I don't want that to happen. That's one of the reasons we're pushing this thing to try to get disablement through by December 31 -- because a lot of people point out, well wait a minute;can you really get it done by December 31? Aren't there other things you need to disable? I need to make sure the dismantlement/abandonment phase starts on January 1, if not on January 2, so that we have a chance to get through that. So I'm very mindful of the concern about the running out of time. I've had those conversations with the DPRK, and I believe they understand why we are pushing these deadlines. And they support the idea of getting through this in '08. But those are expressions of support in a general sense. And nuclear weapons and things like that are real proof of the old adage, "the devil is in the details" -- because there are a lot of details in this issue, and we've got to get through a lot of those. Let me just say with respect to dealing with the Japanese, I don't think there's a negotiating team that we've had closer relationships with than the Japanese negotiating team. And this has gone on for me since the Koizumi premiership. So I've worked very closely with Sasae-san on these issues. These are tough issues for everybody. You know, having a Six-Party process -- I mean, Japan is in a very special place, because not only is it really in the shadow of some of these nuclear threats, it's also in the shadow of missile threats. And it's very much burdened by the shadow of this terrible abduction matter. So we have to fully factor in and fully understand Japanese sensitivities on this, and that's why I spend a lot of time with my Japanese counterparts. You should see my phone bill. You know, I'm calling Tokyo. So I think we have good cooperation. It's not for me to talk about Japanese Government attitudes to their own negotiations. You know, they have a bilateral process the way we do. It's not for me to say, should they give more or should they give less? How flexible should they be? That's really for them to do. Except to say that I can assure you we have very good relations with Japan, and we are not engaged in a Six-Party process in order see our relationship with Japan worsen. On the contrary, we see this as a real example where the U.S. and Japan, with a common interest -- the number-one, number-two economies in the world -- we ought to work together. And I think together we're going to solve this.
QUESTION:Nishimura of Hokkaido Newspaper. Ambassador Hill, last month at Congress when you testified (about) fuel oil supplied to DPRK -- 50,000 by South Korea, next China, and thirdly U.S., and fourthly Russia. That is the expectation, you said. And with regard to Japan, because of the abduction issue, Japan has not yet participated. I think that's what you reported to the Congress last month. Now Japan and DPRK, without the abduction issue being settled, fuel oil will stop at Russia? Or will there be a second round starting once again with South Korea? So what is the position of Japan in fuel-oil aid?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Well, I can't really talk about the position of Japan on this. But what I can do is tell you that when we agreed that we would provide 50,000 tons of oil for the shutdown, and then if the DPRK wanted more oil -- which they did -- we said, "Well then, shutdown is not enough. Freezing is not enough. We have to go to disabling." And so we agreed that they would disable the facilities for an additional 950,000 tons. Now the South Koreans took the first shipment, the 50,000, which was the shipment of oil in return for which the DPRK froze or shut down for the purpose of eventual abandonment the nuclear facilities. And so the South Koreans didn't want to be the only people supplying oil. So we did an addendum to the agreement in February '07 in which four countries agreed to participate. And Japan agreed to participate once its concerns were met. And, as I've just mentioned to the previous question, I think Japan has a lot of particular issues, namely the abduction issue, that it feels it needs to make progress on. And so it was agreed that Japan would join as its concerns were met. So we have done tranches of oil -- that is, 50,000 tons each. Now why 50,000 tons? That seems to be the maximum that the ports will take in the DPRK. So after we go through this first round, we would anticipate just going through a second round and a third round. Again, when Japan is able to participate -- I'm sure Japan will participate, but, you know, it's not for me to be advising Japan on that. I think we understand that Japan has some very special issues here. So we will continue to proceed on this. I might note, too, that other countries have inquired about whether they can participate in this process. And we've welcomed other countries, and I think we'll look to see if other countries can come in. What's important, I might mention -- a little pause to mention a little more on this oil situation -- we are not paying oil in order for North Korea to do nothing, to stand in place. We're giving them oil in order for them to go deeper into denuclearization. If they want more oil, they need to do more denuclearization. So when the 950,000 tons finishes, if they want more of that, they need to move to the next phase. And we've been working very hard on that. It is not in our interest or anyone's interest to starve the DPRK of energy. On the contrary, it's to show the DPRK that they can get out of this nuclear business -- which has been very, very harmful for their position -- and can get energy through other means and can eventually be in a better position with energy thanks to giving up their nuclear ambitions.
QUESTION:Blaine Hardin, Washington Post. I have a question about the diplomatic efforts of North Korea in recent weeks. They've sent envoys to a number of countries where they haven't been recently, trying to open up more to the West and the rest of the world. Do you see this of a piece with the agreements that are occurring in the denuclearization issue? In other words, do you have a judgement about something changing in North Korea that is opening up and trying to change their position vis-a-vis the rest of the world?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Yes. You know, I saw that article. I can't remember if it was in the Post or the Times -- probably both. But -- AP, okay. I saw that article. I read it with great interest -- because the notion that their cooperation in the Six-Party process is being accompanied by a diplomatic effort to expand their recognition, it's an interesting concept. I can't say that I've seen how it is linked. Except to say that as they participate in the Six-Party process there does appear to be, in the context as we talk to them in the Six-Party process, the desire to overcome their isolation and an understanding that -- whereas in the past North Korea often spoke of their isolation as a great benefit for their country -- I think they've understood it now as something that is actually harming them, and that the best-case scenario for what they're doing is to believe that perhaps it is part of an overall effort to open up. I do believe that the DPRK understands that isolation in the 21st Century is not a ticket to the future. Quite to the contrary, it will leave the DPRK further behind. It's so interesting to look at economic growth statistics in East Asia and see that the two countries in East Asia that did not grow last year, that had negative growth, were the DPRK and Burma. And if you look at the degree of interaction that those countries have with abroad, you'll see that both of them are really very isolated. Burma's trade, for example, is a tiny fraction of Vietnam's trade. So I think there is an understanding. It's the sort of thing that, if you had sort of wide open North Korean interlocutors, you would ask them. You'd say, "Well, what's this about?" But, alas, they kind of keep pretty much task-oriented. And if they're there to talk about denuclearization, they talk about denuclearization. They don't engage in a broader discussion on that, unfortunately. But I do have the sense that they understand that they need to open up. I also have the sense that they are doing this with great care -- that not everyone in the DPRK agrees with this position and that it's going to be a slow process. But I think it's a very necessary process. And I might add that the Chinese, who probably know the DPRK best, believe that there is an effort on the part of the DPRK to open. The Chinese believe that some of their efforts to show DPRK officials the new economy are providing some kind of incentive for the DPRK to open up. So I think it's an interesting development.
I might just mention one other point:I thought it was very interesting that they have done so much with Vietnam, because Vietnam is a country which also was very closed with a very stagnant economy. And now it's opening up, and it's made an awful lot of progress. The DPRK and Vietnam went through a very rough patch a few years ago, when Vietnam helped get some DPRK refugees on to South Korea. So it is interesting that they've reached out again to Vietnam. And I think it's something to keep our eye on, and I believe it's a positive development.
And one other thing:I think it's positive because we have been very diplomatically active in making sure every country understands:one, we are doing all we can to get this thing solved, this denuclearization issue solved;and, two, we need all the help we can get to make sure that every message coming from every country that the DPRK engages with is the same message -- which is that you get out of the nuclear business, and you'll have a much better future.
QUESTION:Chio Nakamoto, Financial Times. You mentioned the many requirements for the DPRK to be delisted from the list of countries that support terrorism. How far would you say they are to the end of the road? Are they midway? Are they way down the road? How far do you think they are to the end?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:I don't know. I think -- You know, these requirements are embedded in U.S. law. So we've had some of our lawyers actually talk to them about what they need to do to achieve the US statutory requirements. I think they have to come out with some kind of declaration. So I think the answer to your question would be -- has to await their declaration, to see whether they have taken the steps they need to take. But these steps are embedded in U.S. law. They're for all to see, and so we have to see if the North Koreans are prepared to take them. You know, there are a couple of steps that we know they have taken, which are very important. That is, the UN covenants on terrorism, and they acceded to those in the 1990's. But, clearly, there will be other things. But we're working with them -- again, with U.S. lawyers, because this is a matter of U.S. law.
QUESTION: Deguchi of Kyodo News. It's a related question to the previous one. The Department of State comes up with its country reports on terrorism on an annual basis. And in terrorism state sponsors there was one item -- that they continue to protect the hijackers of the airplane. And in order for them to be delisted, the sending of those criminals back to Japan, that extraditing is also a requirement? And have you required that to the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Let me just say, that issue has come up. I think we can reach a satisfactory result on that. I'm not sure -- I really should have a State Department lawyer here to answer the question of whether it's a statutory requirement that they would have to return the Japanese Red Army terrorists from the 1970 hijacking. So I'm not sure if it's a statutory requirement. I should check with our legal people on that. The issue has come up. I must say, what I've been careful to do on dealing with this is, you know, we'd like to see progress on this abduction issue. And I would like to focus to the extent that there would be people coming out of the DPRK and back to Japan. I would like it to be abductees. That's sort of our focus. I don't want any thoughts that, you know, they could satisfy one request by fulfilling another. So I think that we'll work through that issue. But, again, I don't feel comfortable answering your question on the legal issue. Again, I can't emphasize enough. This is U.S. domestic law. It's in our Congress. It's not an international law. It's a U.S. law that has created this terrorism list.
QUESTION: Inoue of TBS. The timing of taking them off of the terrorism list -- is there any understanding with the North Koreans if there is a notification to the Congress, which is 45 days prior to the actual removal, the notification to the Congress is equivalent to the actual removal from the list?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: First of all, I can tell you're a Washington correspondent, because you know our law better than many Americans do. So congratulations. The 45 days is a notice period. It goes to Congress. Now we have notice periods in a lot of U.S. laws. So the point of a notice period is to give some opportunity for the Congress to express its views on a decision that the Administration is prepared to take. Now once the federal government has sent a notice to Congress, it means that all -- that the federal government has made a decision that everything is done and ready to go. That is, whatever issue it is. Often, for example, we have notice requirements for foreign military sales. So let's say you have a foreign military sale, and you're going to send weapon system X to country Y. You have essentially gone through all of your requirements. And then, when you send it to Congress, it means that you are ready to go, and you're just giving Congress their right to comment. So once we would send a notice on something like the terrorism list -- on change to the terrorism list, adding a country or subtracting a country -- we would have completely done our homework and completely been prepared such that, in effect, the notice to Congress becomes the effective period, the effective date that we're dealing with. Now I think that's important to understand -- because when you look at the terrorism list, the terrorism list is essentially a set of restrictions on the U.S. Government. For example, the U.S. Government is not permitted by the statute, the terrorism list statute, the U.S. government is not permitted to provide or to sell to a country on the list any military equipment. Now there might be many other reasons you would not sell military equipment to a country on the list. But the statute makes clear -- if a country is on the list, you cannot sell them military equipment. Another issue is, if a country is on the list, you will not, for example, vote in favor of an international financial institution loan to that country. So these are a set of restrictions on the U.S. That's what the terrorism list is. So when we provide a notice to Congress, it means that we believe that the country fulfills all the objectives.
So I would say the day we provide the notice is the most important day.
QUESTION:Did you talk to the North Koreans about that? Is there an understanding?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Again, we have explained to them what these procedures are. But we have still to go through with them what their statutory requirements are in terms of affirming no connections with terrorists, with terrorist groups, and that sort of thing. And we plan to do that very soon, probably through what we call the New York channel. We will probably have some State Department lawyers do this, because, again, it's a legal matter in U.S. law.
QUESTION:Ukai from Asahi newspaper company. Disablement -- removal of the fuel rods is included? This is beyond the '94 Framework agreement, you have said that. But the removal of fuel rods was also included in that '94 Framework. So when you say "beyond the '94 Framework," what are the measures actually that go beyond that Framework agreement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:We've agreed on several measures that would make the reprocessing facility unusable. And, again, it's technical things. It's cutting chains;it's taking apart equipment. Things like that. I'm not in a position to stand here and give you precisely what they are. But in the opinion of our experts, they make it unusable -- and unusable for a period of a year, even if you wanted to reverse it. We've also taken some measures in the other two facilities -- the reactor and the fuel fabrication plant -- again, cutting chains, this sort of thing. The removing the fuel rods is important, although, you correctly point out, it's not unprecedented. Because what we want to do is, as you remove the fuel from the reactor, we want a situation where they have nothing to put back into the reactor. And that has to do with the so-called fresh fuel rods, and we have an agreement. There are some details to be worked out, but we have an agreement which would mean that they cannot put back any fresh fuel rods. So this is important -- because whereas in 2002, when they restarted the facilities, they were able within 60 days to get them going because they had the fresh fuel rods available. And what we would be doing is making sure they don't have those fresh fuel rods available and therefore cannot restart the reactor, even if that were the only step that we're taking. But I want to emphasize, it's not the only one. I think what we want to do, in terms of the actual measures that we take, is that we have there about 10 of them. And what we would like to do is get going on them, get through them, see whether there are some additional ones, see whether there are some of those that we might not feel are worth doing. But what we want to do is once we go through these -- and, by the way, as I said earlier, we will welcome other participants from other Six-Party countries to participate on this -- once we are done with this, then I think that's an appropriate time to explain precisely what has been done, and why it was done, and how much disabling it contributes to. Now I would like to make one other point, which is that if we are in the position where everything has fallen apart and the DPRK starts trying to reconstitute the nuclear facilities again -- whether it takes them 12 months, 14 months, 16 months, or even 24 months -- we've got a big problem. So we don't think we should get too hung up on the question of whether it's 12 or 14. That would be a huge problem. What we're trying to do is make sure we have a disabling so that that disabling will be overtaken by events -- events that are scheduled for '08, when we would go to dismantling and, importantly, abandonment of the separated plutonium. So I think disabling is a necessary step, without which we can't go further. But we can't stop at disabling.
MODERATOR:Ambassador Hill is Assistant Secretary in charge of East Asia and not specifically the DPRK, but is there any question related to that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:There's more to East Asia than the DPRK? (Laughter)
QUESTION:Aiko Doden from NHK. In your region of responsibility, Myanmar remains a politically and diplomatically challenging issue. In light of the situation where neither soft-line policy nor hard-line policy seems to have brought about any change, would providing any incremental incentives to Myanmar be an option for the U.S.?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:You know, I think I'd be careful of trying to put together incentives at this point for Burma. I mean, we have a government there that has just engaged in one of the most horrendous crackdowns on dissent that we've seen in several years. And I think to respond to this terrible crackdown by coming up with incentives, I think would send the wrong message. Indeed,. I think this is a time when we all need to be a little firm and, most importantly, united. I think we need to make sure that all countries, first of all, analyze the conditions on the ground in the way we do and to try to work in a broad diplomatic strategy -- so that when Burma gets pressure from ASEAN, they don't go run to China, because they'll get the same pressure from China. And if they get the pressure from China, they won't go run to India or some other country. So I think what's very important is, we need to create a diplomatic strategy where we can try to get all countries to understand that the situation in Burma is not only intolerable for the Burmese people, but it's intolerable for the region. And you know, I'm a pragmatist in foreign policy. And, frankly, I'm proud of that. I've been in this game for 30 years. And part of pragmatism is, you don't start setting up incentives for governments that have just behaved in the way they have -- because they will immediately misread it, and they will see it as a sign;they will see these incentives as a sign of weakness. So I think this is not the time to be reaching around and looking for new strategies. It's a time for a little patience, but most of all for a lot of resolve. It's a time to see diplomatic opportunities. I believe that, given this horrendous crackdown, this loss of life, the terrible spectacle of a Japanese journalist being shot to death on the street in front of us all -- I mean, a spectacle that should haunt all of us for the rest of our lives -- this is a time when we need to be a little tough-minded and understand that we can, with diplomacy, get one strategy, so that there is no sense among the Burmese junta that they can run off and hide behind some country and avoid the reckoning with the rest of the world. So we're going to support the Gambari plan, Mr. Gambari's approach. We're going to make sure that, as he goes forward, that China supports him, India supports him, ASEAN, U.S., Japan -- everybody supports him. And let's use this as an opportunity to come together, be unified, and have a lot of resolve. And let's get through this. And we will.
QUESTION:Dejima of Nikkei newspaper. Under Ambassador Kelly, CVID was one of the phrases used. Disablement -- you said that it means for at least one year they cannot resume the activity. Why this one-year benchmark? What's the reason behind it? And if, assuming that they resume within one year, how will you try to once again terminate their activities? One point I wish to confirm on the previous comments you made -- '08 process, or you have been saying the plan for '08, or eight year;can you elaborate on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Yes. First of all, when I talk about disablement, as I tried to suggest to the last question, this is an intermediate process -- disablement. We want to move to dismantlement, and we would like the measures we've taken to disable turned into measures to dismantle. Now, for example, a disabling measure might be, you take a piece of equipment out and you put it somewhere so it's hard to put back in. Dismantlement would be, you take the piece of equipment and it's impossible to put back in and you can't find a substitute piece of equipment. So that would be taking a disabling measure and going to dismantlement. So the D in CVID is dismantlement. And we want to get going on that. The I is, of course, irreversible. And so we want to make sure that, as we dismantle, they don't feel that they can reverse the dismantlement. So you take some piece of equipment out. You destroy it. You make sure there's no substitute for it. And that creates a sense of irreversible. So then the V, of course, is verifiable. Of course it has to be verified. This is not a game of "trust me." I mean, this is not a game where they pretend to disable or dismantle, and we pretend to believe them. We need for this to be verifiable. And finally, of course it needs to be complete. I mean, what's the point of stopping a plutonium program if you might have a uranium enrichment facility? So that's why we have to go after that issue too. So why we have done this on a step-by-step basis has to do with how you negotiate this. Believe me, I would love for this all to be done in one day. I would love to sit down in the Six Parties, and everyone agrees, "Well, let's just get this over today." I would love for it to be done in one day. It's not, because there are a lot of factors -- cultural, you name it. There are a bunch of reasons that the North Koreans don't want to just give up these weapons in a day. So what we have to do is a step-by-step process. You know, believe me, as that question about Burma suggested, there are other problems in the world I'd like to be working on as well, because I feel very strongly about those problems. But we've got to get through this, and I think the best way to do it is step-by-step. But I don't want these steps to be endless. So we have these timeframes, and we made December 31. It's a bit arbitrary, you know. We could have said December 30, or January 2, or something. But we made that there, and then we're trying to get through the final stage in '08. Now I'd like to see us get it through in the current U.S. administration, because I think if -- We started this process;I'd like to see us finish it. And that's our time schedule. So, you know, CVID is all there. Sometimes it's not -- You know, you have to ask yourself the question, does repeating "CVID" help the situation? Does it help to keep repeating the same term? Maybe it does;maybe it doesn't. But I'm just trying to get through this. I'm trying to get through it as pragmatically and, by the way, as quickly as possible.
Released on November 3, 2007
友達の友達がアルカーイダ？
人間落ち目になるとこうなんだろうが、それにしても．．．
これで思い出したのは、カフェで見ただけなのにまるでメルケルと顔なじみでもあるかのように吹聴したアホな婆さんだが、きっと合えば意気投合するんだろう、この二人は。ｗ
人間落ち目になるとこうなんだろうが、それにしても．．．
これで思い出したのは、カフェで見ただけなのにまるでメルケルと顔なじみでもあるかのように吹聴したアホな婆さんだが、きっと合えば意気投合するんだろう、この二人は。ｗ
世の中には色々の人がいるわけだしいるから面白いんだろうけれどもこういうのは願い下げだというのがこの婆さん。
この婆さんはprincipleとかprinzipということを知りも理解も出来ないままに、侮蔑に塗れてほどなく死んでゆくんだろうが、思えば哀れなことだ。
この婆さんはprincipleとかprinzipということを知りも理解も出来ないままに、侮蔑に塗れてほどなく死んでゆくんだろうが、思えば哀れなことだ。
ソースが聯合なんで話は6掛けか8掛けだと思うんだが、長引く原油価格の高止まりと更なる上昇気配で朝鮮人民軍の艦艇や航空機が動かせない状況に陥っているらしい。
それを引いたBBCの記事へのURLは末尾に貼っておくけれども、なんとも物凄いレトロな兵器ばっかだな。ｗ
そしてさ、こういう話を聞くとますます、人道支援ちゅう美名で北朝鮮に重油を送るちゅうのも如何なもんかと思うぞ。
米朝協議も6カ国協議も停止して野垂れ死にするのをまちゃいい、そんな感じじゃないの？
先週「アメリカはイランの核施設を空爆するか？」で取り上げた超弩級バンカーバスター。
あれは、イランの核施設を前提にした仮説に基づくABCの記事がソースなんだけどさ、仮にもそういうものが既に実用レベルにあるなら、中朝友好協力相互援助条約という悩ましい問題はあるにしろ、これについては中国自身が修正あるいは破棄したがっている条約でもあり、そこは政治解決可能な情勢なんだろうから、いざとなったらそれ使って叩く、これの方が金かからんし現実的だろ？
なお、ソースをあたるってのを基本にはしていますが、ソースは聯合通信。
なにしろガセが多いんであたる意味もなかろうと言うことで、今回は無視します。
参照記事
Oil price 'grounds' N Korea fleet
それを引いたBBCの記事へのURLは末尾に貼っておくけれども、なんとも物凄いレトロな兵器ばっかだな。ｗ
そしてさ、こういう話を聞くとますます、人道支援ちゅう美名で北朝鮮に重油を送るちゅうのも如何なもんかと思うぞ。
米朝協議も6カ国協議も停止して野垂れ死にするのをまちゃいい、そんな感じじゃないの？
先週「アメリカはイランの核施設を空爆するか？」で取り上げた超弩級バンカーバスター。
あれは、イランの核施設を前提にした仮説に基づくABCの記事がソースなんだけどさ、仮にもそういうものが既に実用レベルにあるなら、中朝友好協力相互援助条約という悩ましい問題はあるにしろ、これについては中国自身が修正あるいは破棄したがっている条約でもあり、そこは政治解決可能な情勢なんだろうから、いざとなったらそれ使って叩く、これの方が金かからんし現実的だろ？
なお、ソースをあたるってのを基本にはしていますが、ソースは聯合通信。
なにしろガセが多いんであたる意味もなかろうと言うことで、今回は無視します。
参照記事
Oil price 'grounds' N Korea fleet
産経の記事だけ読むと単なる猟奇事件の被告に対する死刑判決でしかないんだけど、この被告の弁護人は精神病を主張したんだな。
被告の実母による精神的な虐待と継父による性的虐待が原因で精神を病んでいるちゅうよな論旨だそうだが、
参照記事
Jury: Execution in Stolen-Baby Case
被告の実母による精神的な虐待と継父による性的虐待が原因で精神を病んでいるちゅうよな論旨だそうだが、
He（弁護士） said emotional abuse from her mother and sexual abuse from her stepfather "killed Lisa's soul."これに対して検察は、殺人犯の中でそういう虐待の中で育った人間は少数だちゅうよな反論をし、陪審員は全員有罪の評決をした、
Prosecutors claimed Montgomery was faking mental illness to aid her defense.事件の猟奇性よりゃ寧ろこんなところがポイントでしょ。
They（陪審員） also noted that few of the many people who have been sexually abused go on to kill.
参照記事
Jury: Execution in Stolen-Baby Case
僕はこの流れには当初から批判的なんですが、先週のＩＭＦに続いて国連の機関への報告書でも否定的な見解が出されましたね。
ＩＭＦのケースは、転作による穀物価格の高騰は世界の貧者に対して深刻な影響を与える、こんな感じですが、国連の報告書の場合にはcrime against humanityですから、人道に対する罪とまで言い切ってます。
関連過去記事
なんでブッシュが｢受け容れる｣と発言したか？
バイオ燃料狂騒
イオエタノールと熱帯雨林破壊
燃料の高騰のツケを食料に回したバイオエタノールマンセ～
いまごろ何言ってまんねん？＞牛のゲップと地球温暖化
ＩＭＦのケースは、転作による穀物価格の高騰は世界の貧者に対して深刻な影響を与える、こんな感じですが、国連の報告書の場合にはcrime against humanityですから、人道に対する罪とまで言い切ってます。
関連過去記事
なんでブッシュが｢受け容れる｣と発言したか？
バイオ燃料狂騒
イオエタノールと熱帯雨林破壊
燃料の高騰のツケを食料に回したバイオエタノールマンセ～
いまごろ何言ってまんねん？＞牛のゲップと地球温暖化
今日の産経新聞の主張【主張】拉致と指定解除 米大使の進言を生かそう を読んだら頭痛がしてきた。
そして、シーファーがこんなものを送らなきゃいけない状況であるということは、心強いどころか、逆に悲観すべきことだと思う。
で、どこも詳しい話は書いていないんだけど、シーファーの懸念の中核は自民党政権の転覆だろうと思うんだが、そういう意味では、熱湯浴や媚米似而非保守は小沢一郎を批判するが、対米外交の駆け引きには貢献していることになる。
それにしても媚米似而非保守や熱湯欲のオツムはどうしてこうも単純でアメリカの｢俺様正義｣に盲目的なのか？と思うのは、アメリカがある時期まで拉致問題に積極的にコミットしたのは、それが日本国内の親米世論の動員や国際的な北朝鮮非難の盛り上げに利用可能だったからで、いまやその拉致がアメリカ、とりわけライスの足を引っ張る形になってきているから見切り発車をしようとしている、そんだけのことで、トルコを離反させないためにクルドを見殺しにしようとしていることと同じだと思うぞ。
いつもの馬鹿もこの産経の主張同様かんじんの問題には踏み込むことをせずに一つ覚えの「北の拉致問題解決は日本外交の原点」などという意味不明の標語を振りかざしているんだが、日本外交死滅の原点は日本国憲法と日米安保体制の抱える矛盾だろうが？
関連過去記事
シーファーがブッシュに電報を送ったという件
参照記事
US Envoy Questioned on Disarming N.Korea
U.S. envoy predicts end to N.Korea nuclear threat
シーファー大使は昨年３月、横田めぐみさんが拉致された新潟市を訪れ、「私の一生で一番悲しい話だ。あの通りを歩いて心を動かされない人はいないと思う。本当にひどいことが行われたということを身近に感じた」と語った。翌４月に横田さんの母親とブッシュ大統領の面会が実現したのも、同大使の働きかけがあったからだといわれる。なんだそうだが、確かにさ、シーファーの電報は利用できるならとことん利用すべきだが、それだけの話だろ？
拉致問題に理解のあるシーファー大使の進言は、拉致問題の進展がないままの安易な指定解除に懸念を示している日本政府にとって、心強いメッセージである。大使の進言を対米外交に生かすべきだ。
そして、シーファーがこんなものを送らなきゃいけない状況であるということは、心強いどころか、逆に悲観すべきことだと思う。
で、どこも詳しい話は書いていないんだけど、シーファーの懸念の中核は自民党政権の転覆だろうと思うんだが、そういう意味では、熱湯浴や媚米似而非保守は小沢一郎を批判するが、対米外交の駆け引きには貢献していることになる。
それにしても媚米似而非保守や熱湯欲のオツムはどうしてこうも単純でアメリカの｢俺様正義｣に盲目的なのか？と思うのは、アメリカがある時期まで拉致問題に積極的にコミットしたのは、それが日本国内の親米世論の動員や国際的な北朝鮮非難の盛り上げに利用可能だったからで、いまやその拉致がアメリカ、とりわけライスの足を引っ張る形になってきているから見切り発車をしようとしている、そんだけのことで、トルコを離反させないためにクルドを見殺しにしようとしていることと同じだと思うぞ。
いつもの馬鹿もこの産経の主張同様かんじんの問題には踏み込むことをせずに一つ覚えの「北の拉致問題解決は日本外交の原点」などという意味不明の標語を振りかざしているんだが、日本外交死滅の原点は日本国憲法と日米安保体制の抱える矛盾だろうが？
関連過去記事
シーファーがブッシュに電報を送ったという件
参照記事
US Envoy Questioned on Disarming N.Korea
U.S. envoy predicts end to N.Korea nuclear threat
ダメ晋三の細君のブログなんだが、まだある．．．
ただ少々変わったところがあって、「晋ちゃんが総理大臣になっちゃったもんで．．」ちゅう嬉しそうな扉書きがなくなってる。
そしてプロフィールが以下のように書き換わっている。
ただ少々変わったところがあって、「晋ちゃんが総理大臣になっちゃったもんで．．」ちゅう嬉しそうな扉書きがなくなってる。
そしてプロフィールが以下のように書き換わっている。
前総理大臣「安倍晋三」の妻。1987年、職場の上司の紹介で安倍晋太郎元外相(故人)の秘書を務めていた安倍晋三と結婚。ちゅうことはだぞ、まだこんなクソブログ残す気？
昨日「産経の？？な記事」で取り上げたトーマス・シーファー駐日アメリカ大使がブッシュに送ったとされる電報に関する記事がWashington Postに上がっていますのでご紹介します。
タイトルはEnvoy Warns of N. Korea Deal Falloutですから、ざっくり、大使は北朝鮮との取引の予期せぬ結果を警告する、こんな感じで良いと思います。
そして副題がAmbassador to Japan Cables Bush to Outline Concerns Over Relations With Tokyoですから、駐日大使は電報でブッシュに、東京との絆に関する懸念の概要を伝えた、ちゅうよな感じですね。
以下全文ですが、就中笑えるのは、シーファーが国務省が北朝鮮との交渉過程で駐日大使館を聾桟敷に置いていることを詰る内容があったとされる
まあね、末尾には
なにより、イスラエル情報筋から提起されているシリアの核施設と北朝鮮の関係について、ホワイトハウスは聞こえないふりをしているわけで、
Envoy Warns of N. Korea Deal Fallout
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, October 26, 2007; J. Thomas Schieffer, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, sent President Bush an unusual private cable this week warning that the pending nuclear deal with North Korea could harm relations with Japan.
He also complained that the U.S. Embassy had been left in the dark while the deal -- which could include North Korea's removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism -- was negotiated by top State Department officials.
Schieffer's cable was described by sources who had read it.
Both Schieffer and the White House acknowledged the existence of the cable, which was numbered Tokyo 004947, but they declined to discuss it in detail.
"Communications between myself and the President are privileged," Schieffer said in an e-mailed statement Wednesday night. "I never discuss them with others."
Schieffer's cable appears to be another sign of the unease in some parts of the administration over the North Korea agreement, which sets out a step-by-step process of disabling and accounting for North Korean nuclear programs, in exchange for incentives and economic assistance from the United States and North Korea's neighbors.
Pyongyang has long sought removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but Japan has insisted that North Korea first provide details on the abductions of Japanese citizens by the reclusive nation during the 1970s and '80s.
Ambassadors generally do not send diplomatic cables directly to the president, but Schieffer has unusual status as a longtime friend of Bush's.
He was an investor in the partnership that -- along with Bush -- purchased the Texas Rangers baseball team in 1989.
He is also the brother of CBS broadcaster Bob Schieffer.
J. Thomas Schieffer was ambassador to Australia in Bush's first term and then was given the high-profile post of Tokyo envoy in the second term.
The North Korea deal has come under attack from conservatives, especially Republicans on Capitol Hill, but Schieffer is a Democrat who served three terms in the Texas House of Representatives.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has made the six-nation accord one of her top priorities, having persuaded the president to put the agreement on a fast track earlier this year.
In his cable, sources said, Schieffer stressed that he does not believe that Japanese interests should dictate U.S. policy toward North Korea.
But he warned the president that rumors were flying in Tokyo that the talks on removing North Korea from the terror list were progressing rapidly, which he suggested could potentially harm U.S. relations with its closest ally in the Pacific.
He noted that Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill had assured him that North Korea needed to first show substantial progress on the abduction issue before any action was taken, but Schieffer said he was seeking direction and clarification in part because the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo appeared cut out of the process.
"Ambassador Schieffer was clarifying what he sees on the ground and that the abduction issue was something we need to continue to emphasize in the six-party talks," said National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe.
The new Japanese prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, will visit Washington in the coming weeks, Johndroe added.
During that meeting, "President Bush will reiterate our commitment to help Japanese efforts to resolve the abduction issue with North Korea," he said.
その他参照記事
Photos Show Cleansing of Suspect Syrian Site
タイトルはEnvoy Warns of N. Korea Deal Falloutですから、ざっくり、大使は北朝鮮との取引の予期せぬ結果を警告する、こんな感じで良いと思います。
そして副題がAmbassador to Japan Cables Bush to Outline Concerns Over Relations With Tokyoですから、駐日大使は電報でブッシュに、東京との絆に関する懸念の概要を伝えた、ちゅうよな感じですね。
以下全文ですが、就中笑えるのは、シーファーが国務省が北朝鮮との交渉過程で駐日大使館を聾桟敷に置いていることを詰る内容があったとされる
He also complained that the U.S. Embassy had been left in the dark while the dealという記述で、これはある意味、昨日僕が
なんちゅう演歌もどきの装飾を施しているんだが、ブッシュとシーファーの関係はまあいいとして、問題はブッシュとコンドリーザ・ライスの関係よ。っと書いたブッシュのプライオリティーを能くあらわしていると思うし、こういうことをブッシュに言わなくちゃいけないほどにコケにされているシーファーにそれほど、つまり産経新聞ワシントン駐在だそうな有元隆志さん書いたような期待が出来るのか？ちゅうことですわ。
ワシントン駐在なんだからあんた知ってんべ？ 本当は国防長官になりたかったライスがなんで国務長官になったかは？
知らないなら「ワシントン駐在」ちゅう肩書きで記事書くのやめた方が良いと思うぞ。
まあね、末尾には
During that meeting, "President Bush will reiterate our commitment to help Japanese efforts to resolve the abduction issue with North Korea," he said.というNSCのジョンドローの話が引用はされているんだけど、それはジョンドローが言っているのであってブッシュが言っている訳じゃないし、春から話題になっている「拉致問題の進展」における「進展」、これすらも、｢解決｣がいつの間にかすり替えられているんだが、その定義に関する圧力は相当あり、それが高村外相の軽はずみな発言につながっている、というより、そういう調整が既に日朝、日米、米朝間で行われている、そういうことの証左だと考える方がまともでしょうよ？
なにより、イスラエル情報筋から提起されているシリアの核施設と北朝鮮の関係について、ホワイトハウスは聞こえないふりをしているわけで、
American officials still refuse to publicly confirm that the satellite photos show the site that Israel bombed. But the senior intelligence official said it was indeed the same location. Gordon D. Johndroe, a White House spokesman, declined to comment on the satellite pictures.（末尾のNew York Timesの記事より引用）それは何故かといえば、イラクの幕引きにアサドの協力を得たいということより寧ろ、北朝鮮が国連決議に違反しているという事実を公式に認めることを避けている、こう考えるってもんじゃない？
Envoy Warns of N. Korea Deal Fallout
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, October 26, 2007; J. Thomas Schieffer, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, sent President Bush an unusual private cable this week warning that the pending nuclear deal with North Korea could harm relations with Japan.
He also complained that the U.S. Embassy had been left in the dark while the deal -- which could include North Korea's removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism -- was negotiated by top State Department officials.
Schieffer's cable was described by sources who had read it.
Both Schieffer and the White House acknowledged the existence of the cable, which was numbered Tokyo 004947, but they declined to discuss it in detail.
"Communications between myself and the President are privileged," Schieffer said in an e-mailed statement Wednesday night. "I never discuss them with others."
Schieffer's cable appears to be another sign of the unease in some parts of the administration over the North Korea agreement, which sets out a step-by-step process of disabling and accounting for North Korean nuclear programs, in exchange for incentives and economic assistance from the United States and North Korea's neighbors.
Pyongyang has long sought removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but Japan has insisted that North Korea first provide details on the abductions of Japanese citizens by the reclusive nation during the 1970s and '80s.
Ambassadors generally do not send diplomatic cables directly to the president, but Schieffer has unusual status as a longtime friend of Bush's.
He was an investor in the partnership that -- along with Bush -- purchased the Texas Rangers baseball team in 1989.
He is also the brother of CBS broadcaster Bob Schieffer.
J. Thomas Schieffer was ambassador to Australia in Bush's first term and then was given the high-profile post of Tokyo envoy in the second term.
The North Korea deal has come under attack from conservatives, especially Republicans on Capitol Hill, but Schieffer is a Democrat who served three terms in the Texas House of Representatives.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has made the six-nation accord one of her top priorities, having persuaded the president to put the agreement on a fast track earlier this year.
In his cable, sources said, Schieffer stressed that he does not believe that Japanese interests should dictate U.S. policy toward North Korea.
But he warned the president that rumors were flying in Tokyo that the talks on removing North Korea from the terror list were progressing rapidly, which he suggested could potentially harm U.S. relations with its closest ally in the Pacific.
He noted that Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill had assured him that North Korea needed to first show substantial progress on the abduction issue before any action was taken, but Schieffer said he was seeking direction and clarification in part because the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo appeared cut out of the process.
"Ambassador Schieffer was clarifying what he sees on the ground and that the abduction issue was something we need to continue to emphasize in the six-party talks," said National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe.
The new Japanese prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, will visit Washington in the coming weeks, Johndroe added.
During that meeting, "President Bush will reiterate our commitment to help Japanese efforts to resolve the abduction issue with North Korea," he said.
その他参照記事
Photos Show Cleansing of Suspect Syrian Site
産経izaに昨晩こんな記事が上がった。
テロ支援国家指定解除で米政府分裂…カギ握る駐日大使
率直な感想は「ホントにこの記者ワシントンにいて記事書いてんのかよ？」ですが、その理由は幾つかあって、
仮に解除延期があるとしてもそりゃほかの理由、たとえば最近アメリカ国内で喧伝されたシリアに対する核・大量破壊兵器の移転の可能性による懐疑論の台頭が主たる理由となるんじゃないの、これもブッシュや国務省は聞こえないふりで可能性低気だしさ。
そして次は
そりゃ言ったのはシーファーかも知れんけど、普通の頭してりゃ、この文脈では、シーファーの語った「ブッシュとの特別な関係」肝腎なところで｢聾桟敷におかれる｣関係ちゅうことになりゃせんか？
こういう展開のしかたは実に胸くそ悪いんだが、あんたは更に
ワシントン駐在なんだからあんた知ってんべ？ 本当は国防長官になりたかったライスがなんで国務長官になったかは？
知らないなら｢ワシントン駐在｣ちゅう肩書きで記事書くのやめた方が良いと思うぞ。
まあそれもどこかのバカが「国際ぢゃ～なりすと」ちゅう肩書きで出鱈目書き散らかしてるのよりはましかもしれんが．．．
まあいずれにしても、いい加減なこと書いてizaに集う似而非保守や熱湯浴に間違った希望を持たせるようなことは感心せん罠。
テロ支援国家指定解除で米政府分裂…カギ握る駐日大使
率直な感想は「ホントにこの記者ワシントンにいて記事書いてんのかよ？」ですが、その理由は幾つかあって、
まずブッシュ政権は年内にも指定解除に踏み切るとみられていたが、大統領に最も近いとされる大使の“直言”で、対北融和の流れに変化が生じる可能性もありそうだ。ちゅう行で、こりゃドイツ在住の婆さん同様の希望的観測と独断に充ち満ちた妄想ですよ。
仮に解除延期があるとしてもそりゃほかの理由、たとえば最近アメリカ国内で喧伝されたシリアに対する核・大量破壊兵器の移転の可能性による懐疑論の台頭が主たる理由となるんじゃないの、これもブッシュや国務省は聞こえないふりで可能性低気だしさ。
そして次は
大使が今回“直言”したのは、米政府が核で進展があれば、拉致問題に関係なく指定解除に踏み切るとされていることへの強い懸念があるからだ。さらにテロ支援国家指定解除をめぐる米朝交渉が“密室”で進められ、日本に関わる問題なのに、駐日大使である自分に正確な情報が伝えられないことへの苛立ちもありそうだ。ちゅう行なんだけど、あんたさ、この上の段で
報道について大使は、産経新聞に対し、「大統領と私の間の連絡は特別なもので、それについて他の人と論議することは決してない」とコメントした。なんちゅうこと書いてんだぜ？
そりゃ言ったのはシーファーかも知れんけど、普通の頭してりゃ、この文脈では、シーファーの語った「ブッシュとの特別な関係」肝腎なところで｢聾桟敷におかれる｣関係ちゅうことになりゃせんか？
こういう展開のしかたは実に胸くそ悪いんだが、あんたは更に
それだけに、同じテキサス育ちで、大リーグ球団テキサス・レンジャーズを共同経営するなど、大統領との個人的なつながりが強く「大統領の寝室に直接電話ができる」（米外交筋）とされるシーファー大使の行動は、今後の米国の対北外交を左右する重要なファクターとなりそうだ。なんちゅう演歌もどきの装飾を施しているんだが、ブッシュとシーファーの関係はまあいいとして、問題はブッシュとコンドリーザ・ライスの関係よ。
ワシントン駐在なんだからあんた知ってんべ？ 本当は国防長官になりたかったライスがなんで国務長官になったかは？
知らないなら｢ワシントン駐在｣ちゅう肩書きで記事書くのやめた方が良いと思うぞ。
まあそれもどこかのバカが「国際ぢゃ～なりすと」ちゅう肩書きで出鱈目書き散らかしてるのよりはましかもしれんが．．．
まあいずれにしても、いい加減なこと書いてizaに集う似而非保守や熱湯浴に間違った希望を持たせるようなことは感心せん罠。
別に隠すつもりもないから文体はそのままだし、過去につながるようなことも構わず書いているんだな。
だから、僕が既に知っているだけでも、僕が僕だということを知っている人はこのブログの読者の中には何人もいる。
だからさ、5Zh5ZuXg0さん。
本名も含めて書かれても構わないけど、僕のような無名人のことなどそうとりたてて書くほどのことでもないと思うよ。（微笑
だから、僕が既に知っているだけでも、僕が僕だということを知っている人はこのブログの読者の中には何人もいる。
だからさ、5Zh5ZuXg0さん。
本名も含めて書かれても構わないけど、僕のような無名人のことなどそうとりたてて書くほどのことでもないと思うよ。（微笑
ABCのニュースによれば、ブッシュ政権が要求している1960億ドルの緊急予算の中に、B-2スティルス爆撃機に超大型バンカーバスター（30000ポンド≒13トン)を搭載することが可能となるように改造する費用として8800万ドルが含まれているちゅうような話があるようだな。
あくまでもこれは可能性の話として語られているんだけども、その超大型バンカーバスターの重さについてはいま書いたとおりだが、長さが20フィート（≒6ｍ）で、地下61ｍに到達して爆発するように作られてんだそうで、「一体こんなもんなんに使うねん？」っと辿ってゆくとイランの核施設に到達するしかない、こういうことのようだ。
ただ、本当にこれを使うか？っということになると、僕はいまアメリカにはそんな新たな戦端を開くゆとりはないと思うし、残り少ない任期のブッシュがとりうるギャンブルでもないような気がする。
しかし、現実にそういうバンカーバスターがノースロップ・グラマンとボーイングによって開発されて、米軍は持っている。
このことが喧伝されることにこそ意味がある、そういう話ではないのか、そうでなければブッシュはアホだろ？
参照記事
Bomb Iran- U.S. Requests Bunker-Buster Bombs
Turkey: US Will Not Stop Iraq Incursion
あくまでもこれは可能性の話として語られているんだけども、その超大型バンカーバスターの重さについてはいま書いたとおりだが、長さが20フィート（≒6ｍ）で、地下61ｍに到達して爆発するように作られてんだそうで、「一体こんなもんなんに使うねん？」っと辿ってゆくとイランの核施設に到達するしかない、こういうことのようだ。
ただ、本当にこれを使うか？っということになると、僕はいまアメリカにはそんな新たな戦端を開くゆとりはないと思うし、残り少ない任期のブッシュがとりうるギャンブルでもないような気がする。
しかし、現実にそういうバンカーバスターがノースロップ・グラマンとボーイングによって開発されて、米軍は持っている。
このことが喧伝されることにこそ意味がある、そういう話ではないのか、そうでなければブッシュはアホだろ？
参照記事
Bomb Iran- U.S. Requests Bunker-Buster Bombs
Turkey: US Will Not Stop Iraq Incursion
まず「下にまいりますぅ」
■2006/11/28 (火) 中川・ＶＳ平沼抗争は前者の作戦勝ち？（２）
そしてなお「下にまいりますぅ」
■2006/12/02 (土) 造反復党問題、 甘えているのは世襲議員？（１）では
そして嘘かホントかはしらんがさ、誰かに紹介された駄文を引用している。
で今度は一番最近のなんだが、なんの前ぶれもなく「上に参りますぅ」だとさ。
でもなあ婆さん、この時期小泉マンセーにいそしんでたからこう書くんだろうけど、書くにしてもタイトルが変だぞ。
世襲議員といえばね、平沼赳夫だけではなく小泉も、あんたが小泉の次にマンセーしたヘタレの晋ちゃんも世襲議員なんだぞ、知ってる？
■2007/10/25 (木) 今こそ、自民・民主の若手、立ち上がるべき！
「そのエネルギーがあったかどうか、これ疑問」な平沼赳夫なんだろ？
ぽっか～ん．．．
それで光明！？
要するに期待感の表明なんだが、婆さん。
せめて一年前になに書いたかくらいおぼえてろよ。
一段と壊れたか？
それとも日本会議の内部抗争か？(爆
参考:クライン孝子 日本会議女性の会 副会長
平沼赳夫 日本会議国会議員懇談会 会長
■2006/11/28 (火) 中川・ＶＳ平沼抗争は前者の作戦勝ち？（２）
平沼氏を中心に新党作り構想をという意見もあるにはあったが、氏にそのエネルギーがあったかどうか、これ疑問です。これは明らかに全面否定だ罠。
もしあったとしても、それが実現できないのは氏のみならず１１人がもっとも熟知していたろうと思う。
そしてなお「下にまいりますぅ」
■2006/12/02 (土) 造反復党問題、 甘えているのは世襲議員？（１）では
小泉前首相ＶＳ平沼氏についての一文、転載して下さいました。「言い得て妙」と前置き、つまり同意見であると前置きした上で、勘と憶測ってのは日本語として全然違う意味なんだが、この婆さんにそれは言っても解るまい。
私の勘＝推測と近いものでした。
一部、ご紹介いたします、
そして嘘かホントかはしらんがさ、誰かに紹介された駄文を引用している。
安倍晋三の同士である平沼赳夫を、おかしな人と斬って捨てたのである。ちゅうんだからこのやたらに背伸びをした頭の悪そうな文体と粗末で粗雑な中身はさておき、明らかに否定的。
まさに喧嘩師、こういう男に喧嘩を売った平沼赳夫。
余りにも見る目がなさ過ぎたのである”
で今度は一番最近のなんだが、なんの前ぶれもなく「上に参りますぅ」だとさ。
でもなあ婆さん、この時期小泉マンセーにいそしんでたからこう書くんだろうけど、書くにしてもタイトルが変だぞ。
世襲議員といえばね、平沼赳夫だけではなく小泉も、あんたが小泉の次にマンセーしたヘタレの晋ちゃんも世襲議員なんだぞ、知ってる？
■2007/10/25 (木) 今こそ、自民・民主の若手、立ち上がるべき！
そこへいきなり飛び込んできたニュースが一体こりゃなんなんだ？
平沼氏 新党結成を示唆
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/071024/stt0710242240003-n1.htm
でした。
このニュースに接した時、一瞬雷にうたれたような、一種の光明がさしてきたような気持ちになりました。
とにかく、この新しい動きですが、今後、どう展開していくものか、私なりに見守り、注視して行こうと思っております。
「そのエネルギーがあったかどうか、これ疑問」な平沼赳夫なんだろ？
ぽっか～ん．．．
それで光明！？
要するに期待感の表明なんだが、婆さん。
せめて一年前になに書いたかくらいおぼえてろよ。
一段と壊れたか？
それとも日本会議の内部抗争か？(爆
参考:クライン孝子 日本会議女性の会 副会長
平沼赳夫 日本会議国会議員懇談会 会長
そうかい。
これくらいの歳になると、ここまで生きながらえてしまったことがめでたいのかめでたくないのか、そこは微妙だけど、これは当方の問題。
そちらの事情はめでたそうだからとりあえず祝っておこう。
「おめれと！！」
これくらいの歳になると、ここまで生きながらえてしまったことがめでたいのかめでたくないのか、そこは微妙だけど、これは当方の問題。
そちらの事情はめでたそうだからとりあえず祝っておこう。
「おめれと！！」
「Let's Blow! 毒吐き＠てっく」が閉鎖になったという話を聞いたので覗いてみたんだが、なんだよ！！
まだ更新続いてんぢゃんか。
それにしてもなにだ罠、あのクラインですらが山拓に関する総括をしたというのに、このにいちゃんはそれ以下だぞ。
まだ更新続いてんぢゃんか。
それにしてもなにだ罠、あのクラインですらが山拓に関する総括をしたというのに、このにいちゃんはそれ以下だぞ。
日本文化だ愛国心だなんちゅうことを喚くこの婆さんは同時に出鱈目な日本語も撒き散らしているんだけれども、今日もまた笑わせてくれている。
仮に自称にしろあんた作家だろ？ であるなら「生き残りを掛けた」はねんぢゃね？
ふつう「生き残り」ちゅうのは「賭ける」もんだと思うが？
■2007/10/23 (火) 異常な防衛省パッシングの首謀者は一体誰？
ドイツに住んでいながらドイツのこともわからんようだが、先般のメルケル訪中には200人規模の経済ミッションが同行して経済関係強化が図られてるわけで、ドイツに限らずどこでも「政治は政治」「経済は経済」なわけよ。
そしてよしゃいいのに「テロとの戦い」に言及しているわけなんだが、こんなもんは同床異夢でね、イラクから退く口実としてアフガンを持ち出す亡国もあれば、そのアフガンに関してもNATOとアメリカには温度差がかなりありNATOは全体としてネガティブだぞ。
イギリスあたりがしきりに日本のテロ特後退に警鐘を鳴らすのも椅子取りゲームみたいなもんさ。
ポーランドも政権かわりゃわからないしオーストラリアも選挙の結果ではわからん。
ババ引いて置き去りにされるのが国益とでも言う気か？
Phone cable to link China and US
仮に自称にしろあんた作家だろ？ であるなら「生き残りを掛けた」はねんぢゃね？
ふつう「生き残り」ちゅうのは「賭ける」もんだと思うが？
■2007/10/23 (火) 異常な防衛省パッシングの首謀者は一体誰？
最近、とくに中国は欧米諸国から警戒されているだけに、ここで日本が欧米諸国と歩調を合わせないよう、日米＋日欧離間工作に狂奔することは中国にとっては実に生き残りを掛けた重要な課題だからです。そして中身なんだが、こりゃもう明白に日本語メディアしか読んでいない人間の認識だと思うぞ。
ドイツに住んでいながらドイツのこともわからんようだが、先般のメルケル訪中には200人規模の経済ミッションが同行して経済関係強化が図られてるわけで、ドイツに限らずどこでも「政治は政治」「経済は経済」なわけよ。
Verizon has previously said that the cable will extend more than 18,000 kilometres and will cost the consortium about $500m (￡244m).ブッシュやメルケルがダライラマを招待したからってアメリカやドイツが反中国なんてのはあまりにもオツムがお粗末すぎやせんか？
It will terminate in Nedonna Beach, Oregon on the US west coast with connections to Taiwan and South Korea, but none to Japan.
Current cable links between China and the US run through Japan, but observers note that regional rivalry has been a key motivator in China wanting an independent trans-Pacific connection.
そしてよしゃいいのに「テロとの戦い」に言及しているわけなんだが、こんなもんは同床異夢でね、イラクから退く口実としてアフガンを持ち出す亡国もあれば、そのアフガンに関してもNATOとアメリカには温度差がかなりありNATOは全体としてネガティブだぞ。
イギリスあたりがしきりに日本のテロ特後退に警鐘を鳴らすのも椅子取りゲームみたいなもんさ。
ポーランドも政権かわりゃわからないしオーストラリアも選挙の結果ではわからん。
ババ引いて置き去りにされるのが国益とでも言う気か？
Phone cable to link China and US
なにこれ！？
■2007/10/22 (月) 今に日本人の危機感欠乏の「付け」が来る（７）
こういう低俗な連中が日本をここまで蝕んでいると思うとぞっとする罠。
補追
23日現在、ここで自慢げに紹介されている偽書との判定の多い「日本解放第二期工作要綱」のベタ貼りを中心にした「日本の政治家責任回避体質が又はじまったあ(5)」は既に削除されていますが、この人物の頭の悪さを象徴するかのように、その自ら削除した、偽書中心の日記に関する自画自賛日記「■2007/10/22 (月) 今に日本人の危機感欠乏の「付け」が来る（７）」は大幅加筆の上まだ残っている、なんとも嗤えますわ。
■2007/10/22 (月) 今に日本人の危機感欠乏の「付け」が来る（７）
橋本氏よりこんなものを読んで真に受ける人がいるのを知って空恐ろしくなったぞ。
＜＜本日の日記
日本の政治家責任回避体質が又はじまったあ(5)
での中華人民共和国の我が国に対する工作を読んで、空恐ろしくなりました。
今回の参議院選挙もその過程でしょうか、マスコミは、年金問題を大々的に取り上げ、選挙が終わった途端に、取り上げなくなりました。
これ等は、民主党の支持母体の自治労が大きく関与していたのに、その事は一言も取り上げず、というか自民党は年金問題の尻拭いをやっていて、汗水流してるのに、そのことは無視して自民党たたきオンパレードです。
中国の工作が、ひしひしと日本を蝕んでいるかと思うと、ゾ～ッとします。
こういう低俗な連中が日本をここまで蝕んでいると思うとぞっとする罠。
補追
23日現在、ここで自慢げに紹介されている偽書との判定の多い「日本解放第二期工作要綱」のベタ貼りを中心にした「日本の政治家責任回避体質が又はじまったあ(5)」は既に削除されていますが、この人物の頭の悪さを象徴するかのように、その自ら削除した、偽書中心の日記に関する自画自賛日記「■2007/10/22 (月) 今に日本人の危機感欠乏の「付け」が来る（７）」は大幅加筆の上まだ残っている、なんとも嗤えますわ。
安倍っちが政権を投げ出し、福田政権が発足したわけだが、安倍はアメリカに墜とされたという奴はいても王毅に言及する奴が殆どいないんだな。
外交部の副部長で対日工作の総括責任者だった王毅が、物凄い分かりやすいタイミングで特命全権駐日大使として赴任してきた。
そして同じく物凄く分かりやすいタイミングで任を離れた。
福田政権発足はある意味自然な流れなんだが、ポイントは、なんで普通に無理に決まってた安倍政権が成立したかなのであり、此処いらのところは親中＝左翼ちゅうステレオタイプ捨てないとわからんのじゃないの？
関連過去記事
北京週報が掲載したナベツネへのインタビュー
安倍政権の虚構：西尾幹二さんの産経新聞・正論
外交部の副部長で対日工作の総括責任者だった王毅が、物凄い分かりやすいタイミングで特命全権駐日大使として赴任してきた。
そして同じく物凄く分かりやすいタイミングで任を離れた。
福田政権発足はある意味自然な流れなんだが、ポイントは、なんで普通に無理に決まってた安倍政権が成立したかなのであり、此処いらのところは親中＝左翼ちゅうステレオタイプ捨てないとわからんのじゃないの？
関連過去記事
北京週報が掲載したナベツネへのインタビュー
安倍政権の虚構：西尾幹二さんの産経新聞・正論
ミートホープの時と同じ感想だな。
まやるやつが悪いことは言うまでもないんだけど、僕がこの件を耳にして咄嗟に思ったのは、このインチキ燻製や卵食って「さすがに比内地鶏はうまい!!」と言ってしまった奴がどれくらいいるかなんだなｗ
これは一億総中産階級なんてなアホな時代を出発点とするんだろうが、「相當」ということが分かりもしない連中が分かったような顔をするために他者の判定に判断を委ねる、そういう結果なんだろうよ。
比内鶏偽装、生肉賞味期限も 元従業員「幹部の指示」
比内地鶏、社長が偽装指示…おでん用煮卵など４品も
比内鶏偽装：高齢の廃鶏を使用 肉硬く安く取引
ニセ比内地鶏は「廃鶏」…仕入れ値はタダ同然で
まやるやつが悪いことは言うまでもないんだけど、僕がこの件を耳にして咄嗟に思ったのは、このインチキ燻製や卵食って「さすがに比内地鶏はうまい!!」と言ってしまった奴がどれくらいいるかなんだなｗ
これは一億総中産階級なんてなアホな時代を出発点とするんだろうが、「相當」ということが分かりもしない連中が分かったような顔をするために他者の判定に判断を委ねる、そういう結果なんだろうよ。
比内鶏偽装、生肉賞味期限も 元従業員「幹部の指示」
比内地鶏、社長が偽装指示…おでん用煮卵など４品も
比内鶏偽装：高齢の廃鶏を使用 肉硬く安く取引
ニセ比内地鶏は「廃鶏」…仕入れ値はタダ同然で
> (￣□￣；) ぎょっ！！・・・
> わ・た・し？違った、自意識過剰にて赤面す。
ぶっはっは。
あんたのことを書くなら婆さんではなく、もっと親近の情をこめて「くそ婆」とか書くんじゃないの？
さて、問題の婆さんなんだがね、最新の更新■2007/10/21 (日) 今、この重要な時期になぜ小池氏暴露本なのか？にこうある。
でこのいかれた婆さんはといえば、安部擁護の論陣、論陣といえるほどの論理性や格調は当然無かったが、まあ少なくとも親安部の立場を標榜していながら、本間さん叩きを誰よりもやったわけよ。
しかし今回は収賄、軽くみても服務規程違反、本間さんのスキャンダルなんてのはこれと比べれば取るに足りいない話なんだが、これを「国益のために放念しろ」という。
しかし一体、この守屋スキャンダルを隠蔽することによって保たれる国益中のはなに？（大爆
これでこのばあさんを「アホ」と言わずになんと言う?
さて更にこの更新は続くんだな、しかも得意のわけわかめな「投稿メール」だ。
僕はやっぱし馬鹿なのだろうか？
なにが言いたいのかさっぱりわからないんだが、これについては２ちゃんねるに既にこういうコメントが上がっていた。205 ：文責・名無しさん：2007/10/21(日) 10:24:04 ID:KViWuSm60
内容を理解しようと思うことが無理なんだろう。ｗ
この婆さんの「お猿さん日記」の末尾は
> わ・た・し？違った、自意識過剰にて赤面す。
ぶっはっは。
あんたのことを書くなら婆さんではなく、もっと親近の情をこめて「くそ婆」とか書くんじゃないの？
さて、問題の婆さんなんだがね、最新の更新■2007/10/21 (日) 今、この重要な時期になぜ小池氏暴露本なのか？にこうある。
本来なら少なくとも元防衛相という立場上、大局的な視点に立脚し、この時期ことさら守屋前防衛次官の業者とのゴルフ疑惑問題を大きく取り上げて、姑息な手段でインド洋の給油活動を阻止する民主党に対し、その誤謬を指摘し毅然と対峙するのが小池氏の責務なのに・・・真相を知っていそうにはないんだが数日前に、守屋スキャンダルは利権の紐の付け替えだちゅうよなこと書いていた、これがその本人の言とは思えんのだが、そして守屋のスキャンダルが国益に関わるとすれば、収賄による利益誘導で国庫の金を無用に減ぜしめたという反国家行為があるわけでさ、既にある官舎の使途を巡る本間正明さんのスキャンダルとは重みも質も全然違う。
にも拘らず、氏は明らかに国益を二の次にし、私怨を優先してしまった。
これでは一種の売国議員と烙印をおされても、仕方がなく、そればかりか、国際社会で日本国会議員として、恥をさらしているようなもので、多くの良識ある日本女性たちの失望はいかんともしがたく、「情けない」の一言に尽き、その見識を疑ってしまいます。
でこのいかれた婆さんはといえば、安部擁護の論陣、論陣といえるほどの論理性や格調は当然無かったが、まあ少なくとも親安部の立場を標榜していながら、本間さん叩きを誰よりもやったわけよ。
しかし今回は収賄、軽くみても服務規程違反、本間さんのスキャンダルなんてのはこれと比べれば取るに足りいない話なんだが、これを「国益のために放念しろ」という。
しかし一体、この守屋スキャンダルを隠蔽することによって保たれる国益中のはなに？（大爆
これでこのばあさんを「アホ」と言わずになんと言う?
さて更にこの更新は続くんだな、しかも得意のわけわかめな「投稿メール」だ。
そこで、奥中正之氏から、ぽっか～ん？？？？？
＜＜「早ければ年内に解散・総選挙があるのではないか。
いつあってもおかしくない」などと発言し、官房長官から厳重注意されて、「慎重さを欠いていた」などと陳謝する大臣がいる。
これが世界の経済大国の大臣である。
衆議院の解散・総選挙への決断は首相の専決に属する聖域であること、そして今そのような発言をすれば民主党につけこまれ政局が益々混乱する懸念が大きく、そうなれば下記に指摘されている勢力が喜ぶだけである、という情勢判断すら出来ない。
政治家がこのようなレベルでは日本を陥れようとする諸外国にとっては、付け入る隙はいくらでもあるというこがとになる。
ちなみに、その大臣は国際政治の学者だと聞いている。
これは「専門バカ」とも言えず、どのように表現すればよいのか？
奥中 正之＞＞
僕はやっぱし馬鹿なのだろうか？
なにが言いたいのかさっぱりわからないんだが、これについては２ちゃんねるに既にこういうコメントが上がっていた。205 ：文責・名無しさん：2007/10/21(日) 10:24:04 ID:KViWuSm60
＞これは「専門バカ」とも言えず、どのように表現すればよいのか？おそらくこの所感が簡潔且つ率直で正しいと思う。
＞ ＞奥中 正之＞＞ ＞
＞そう、この苦言を、小池氏にも呈したいと思います。、
＞皆さん、いかがでしょう？
「専門のないただのバカ」よりまし
内容を理解しようと思うことが無理なんだろう。ｗ
この婆さんの「お猿さん日記」の末尾は
そう、この苦言を、小池氏にも呈したいと思います。、と締めくくられているんだが、逆に僕は、この２ちゃんねるの指摘をこの婆さんとそのお仲間に呈したいと思うんだが、皆さん、いかがだろうか？
皆さん、いかがでしょう？
黒石市民をとりたてて馬鹿にする気はないけどもさ、これほどチープな発想ちゅうのも憲政史上そんなになかったと思う。
時の内閣は竹下内閣だったと思うんだけど、剰余金を出さないために一律に金をばらまく、いかにも官僚的なものの考え方。
そして一億円なんちゅう中途半端な金なうえに使途まで制限されりゃもらった方もこまる罠。
そして今民主党のみならず与党の一部までが言う地域間格差是正の処方とこの竹下の創生事業、キャッチは違うけどボディーコピーは同じなような気がすんのよね。
参照記事
さようなら「純金こけし」 きょう見納め
時の内閣は竹下内閣だったと思うんだけど、剰余金を出さないために一律に金をばらまく、いかにも官僚的なものの考え方。
そして一億円なんちゅう中途半端な金なうえに使途まで制限されりゃもらった方もこまる罠。
そして今民主党のみならず与党の一部までが言う地域間格差是正の処方とこの竹下の創生事業、キャッチは違うけどボディーコピーは同じなような気がすんのよね。
参照記事
さようなら「純金こけし」 きょう見納め
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