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　US TodayやNew York Timesの記事タイトルが鮮明なんですが、多くはこれはブッシュの対北朝鮮政策の転換、ハードル強化であると受け止めており、その背景にあるのはシリアへの機材や技術移転の疑惑というよりも事実、それによるタカ派の圧力であるという観測が主流のようです。

　僕は結果が我々にとって良ければ良いんですが、残念だったね古森さん！！

2007年12月6日ホワイトハウス　プレス・ブリーフィング

QUESTION: Thanks. On this letter to North Korea today from the President, clearly the message was tough: Meet the deadline, follow through with your commitments. But does this not also represent somewhat of a carrot for North Korea, with the kind of leader-to-leader dialogue and recognition of status that North Korea has always wanted?
MS. PERINO: I think that it is -- I would read it as a reminder that coming up at the end of this month, the end of December, that the DPRK, on this October 3rd, reiterated its commitment to provide a complete and accurate declaration of all of its nuclear programs by the end of this year. And so the President sent a letter to all the members of the six-party talks -- separate to himself -- on December 1st, saying this is the agreement that we have. And to the North Koreans, the letter was slightly different -- this is the agreement that you have agreed to; you have a commitment for this full and accurate declaration. The declaration was to include all nuclear facilities, materials and programs. They had also agreed to address concerns related to any uranium enrichment programs and activities. I got asked that earlier this morning, so I found that out. And the President also said that he expects the North to address any proliferation issues.
QUESTION: How tough is the language? And will you release the letter?
MS. PERINO: I don't believe we will release the private correspondence, but I'll check. I would describe it as a presidential letter to another leader of a country. I was asked this morning how the letter was addressed. He is addressed as "Dear Mr. Chairman," as he is the Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea. It's on White House letterhead and signed, "Sincerely," dated December 1st. The President did hand-write -- hand-sign the letter.
QUESTION: And what do you say to those who see it as a carrot, as a -- what it symbolically represents?
MS. PERINO: Well, remember, we entered into -- I would tell them that the President started this six-party process in order to getting the leverage that we would get from having other partners involved, and not having unilateral -- I'm sorry, bilateral negotiation with North Korea. And that has worked so far. But what the President wanted to remind everybody is that the next step in this is a complete and accurate declaration by the North, and we -- the President expects for it to be accurate. Paul.
QUESTION: But the President has shunned Kim Jong-il for years. He's called him a tyrant on several occasions. Is this not, as well as an attempt to put pressure on North Korea, a way of saying -- showing there's a potential opening of dialogue, at a very high level, even?
MS. PERINO: Remember, I think that you're missing the point of the six-party talks. The origination of the six-party talks was to solve this diplomatically, was to give them a path to get out of the isolation that they have put themselves in, and to change their behavior, but only if they make this complete and accurate declaration; it was conditional. And so the President was reminding everybody that this is where we are; we have this agreement in terms of the six-party talks, everyone should be going towards the same goal, but it is up to you, North Korea, to make a complete and accurate declaration; and if you don't, we will know that you're not.

2007年12月6日国務省プレス・ブリーフィング

QUESTION: The letter, again, from President Bush --
MR. CASEY: I was wondering when we'd get back to that.
QUESTION: Do you know if there was any mention of the State Sponsor of Terrorism list and normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea?
MR. CASEY: Look, I would refer you to my colleagues at the White House. I note Dana was speaking to this issue shortly before I came out here, but what I would encourage you to take from this is that this letter is not a negotiating document. It is a reiteration of longstanding U.S. policy concerning the six-party talks. So what is the value of having that come from the President? Well, it clearly indicates -- and again, these are letters that went not just to North Korea, but to all the members of the talks. It reiterates, from the highest level in our government, our commitment to the six-party talks, our commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and it also indicates the seriousness with which we take the current state of the process and the need for a clear, full, and complete declaration from the North Koreans. But I wouldn't steer you in the direction that this letter contains specific references to the very extensive host of other issues that are more properly dealt with in negotiations by the six parties. Charlie.
QUESTION: To what extent, though, from your vantage point, is the State Department concerned that the deadline is slipping away, that the deadline will go unmet -- the December 31st deadline for the declaration?
MR. CASEY: Well, I think Chris has spoken to this and others have as well. Look, all the parties made commitments to complete this second disablement phase by December 31st. Chris has said that he believes that the North Koreans can meet their commitments, including producing such a declaration, by the 31st. And I don't have any reason at this point to believe they can't. So we look forward to seeing the declaration provided in the timeframe that everyone agreed to, which means before the end of the year.
QUESTION: But did this -- did Secretary Rice urge President Bush to become so directly personally involved, to make this rare demonstration of interest?
MR. CASEY: You know, look, I'll let the White House speak to the reasons behind this. I think that's probably an over-dramatic reading of the situation. I think this was deemed to be an appropriate moment for there to be a clear communication of U.S. policy, again, from the highest levels of our government. And while I know it's certainly unique to have such a high-level communication go between our government and the Government of North Korea, there are, in fact, these kinds of correspondences from the presidential level to any number of other countries on any number of issues. And generally, the main reason for it is to show very clearly that the policies we're pursuing have the highest level of support in our government and that we are very serious about moving forward on the issues involved. And so I would look at these letters very much as reinforcing documents. They were designed to, again, make absolutely clear what our policies were and show that that -- those policies have the personal attention and support of the President.
QUESTION: Would you dissuade us from a belief that one of the underlying reasons for the letter is that you are worried that the North Koreans may not provide a full and complete declaration by the end of the year, as they agreed to do?
MR. CASEY: I would actually dissuade you from that. I think at least my understanding based on Chris's comments and the feedback that we have gotten from him is that we do believe that the North Koreans can and will be able to produce this document in the timeframe suggested. I certainly don't want to not stress the fact that we do think this is a very critical piece of the overall efforts at dismantlement. And why is it important? Well, it's important because that declaration, in a full and complete form, then becomes the basis for which you negotiate the third phase of this, which means the dismantlement of those programs. And so knowing the full extent and nature of the programs in a clear and consistent and complete way allows you to then move forward with your negotiations in good faith on fully dismantling the program and on absolutely assuring all the parties involved that we get to where we intended, which is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

Bush makes personal appeal to NKorean leader

The latest nuclear crisis began in late 2002 when Washington accused North Korea of having a secret HEU program in addition to its declared plutonium operation. Pyongyang has never admitted such a program. Hill has said Washington has "credible evidence" of North Korea purchasing equipment and materials that could be used in a HEU program, and Pyongyang must account for this before any steps to establish bilateral diplomatic ties.

Bush's letter to Kim Jong Il reflects policy change

A U.S. official told the AP that the letter to North Korea refers to a need to resolve three main sticking points: the exact amount of weapons-grade nuclear material the North produced, the number of warheads it built and whether and how North Korea may have passed nuclear material or knowledge to others. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to describe details of the delicate diplomacy, said the letter underscored Bush's desire to resolve the nuclear dispute, and made plain that North Korea cannot skirt requirements to fully explain the extent, use and possible spread of nuclear material and technology.
中略
The correspondence also serves a domestic political purpose - signaling to conservative critics of the North Korea deal that the United States will not roll back its requirements or accept less than a full declaration of the North's nuclear program. The question of proliferation has taken on greater significance, and become a political hurdle for the Bush administration, since Israel's airstrike on a suspected Syrian nuclear site Sept. 6. Intelligence reports suggested Syria was cooperating in some fashion with North Korea in building the site. The news that North Korea may have been working with others as recently as this year, after it had agreed to give up its weapons, reinvigorated U.S. domestic opposition to what some conservatives in Congress see as an overly generous deal with an unreliable country.

A new Bush tack on North Korea

President Bush, directly engaging the man he publicly called a "tyrant," wrote a letter to North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-il, in which he held out the prospect of normalized relations with the United States if North Korea fully disclosed its nuclear programs and dismantled its nuclear reactor, administration officials said Thursday. The high-level personal missive from Mr. Bush to the leader of the country he placed in his "axis of evil" in 2002 was sent as American negotiators struggle to get the secretive North Korean government to fully explain and disclose the extent, use and spread of its nuclear material and technology. At the same time, the United States is also urging other nations to maintain pressure on Iran in the wake of a new assessment that Tehran halted nuclear weapons work in 2003.
中略
While administration officials described the letter as straightforward, its very existence underscores just how much the White House wants to ensure that one of the administration's scarce, tangible diplomatic accomplishments does not slip away.

George W Bush makes plea to Kim Jong-Il

以下2007年12月8日の9:12追記
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