安部ちゃんのアラブ歴訪を扱き下ろすフィナンシャルタイムズ

　これもの凄い率直な嫌味なんだけど、そしてアタリではあるんだけど、だからなんだよ？
イギリスの既得権領域に日本が食い込んでいくのはそりゃ面白くはなかろう、けどな、イランにちょっかい掛けりゃアメリカに怒られる。（爆
ロシアにでたらめされたって歯が立たんしね。（号泣
なんせ世界のみなさまがご存じのように日本はヘタレだから．．．

　となりゃ行くとこはここらしかないじゃんかよ！！

Japan’s rhetoric masks energy policy failure
By David Pilling
Published: May 1 2007 01:32 Last updated: May 1 2007 01:32
When Shinzo Abe was in Washington last week he spent much time talking George W. Bush through the merits of bio-ethanol, “emissions free nuclear power” and energy-saving technology. But lest anyone imagine Japan can somehow swap its dependence on Middle Eastern oil for an alternative energy policy, Japan’s prime minister set the record straight by flying immediately to Saudi Arabia for a whirlwind tour of the Gulf.
Well he might. In spite of years of trying to wean itself off Middle Eastern oil, Japan remains as dependent as ever. The Gulf states provide 76 per cent of Japan’s hefty oil requirements. Of its main suppliers Mr Abe neglected to visit only Iran, from which it imports 11 per cent of its oil.
Speaking in Saudi Arabia, which alone accounts for 30 per cent of Tokyo’s oil imports, Mr Abe said: “We do not need any words to say how important the Middle East is for Japan.” Launching his so-called “look east policy”, he called for a “new era of Japan’s relations”.
Behind the rhetoric lies the failure of Japan’s recent energy strategy. Projects intended to wean Japan off traditional Gulf suppliers have come un-stuck. Last October its 75 per cent stake in Iran’s Azadegan oilfield, a project on which it had devoted years of painstaking diplomatic effort, was slashed to 10 per cent.
Something similar happened in Sakhalin, in far eastern Russia, where Mitsui and Mitsubishi have been forced by the Kremlin to dilute their stakes in a massive liquefied natural gas project. A pipeline Japanese bureaucrats had hoped would bring oil from Siberia to within short shipping distance of Japan appears more likely to go to China, now a formidable global competitor for energy resources.
Even in the Middle East Tokyo has suffered. In 2000 Japan’s Arabian Oil lost its concession to the Khafji oilfield, a huge blow followed in 2003 by termination of a 40-year concession in Kuwait.
Such setbacks have caused disquiet at home, where energy dependence has been a hypersensitive issue since before the second world war. In a recent biting editorial the conservative Yomiuri newspaper blamed lack of a comprehensive energy policy” and endorsed a government plan to raise the amount of oil in which Japan has a direct concession from 15 per cent of im-ports to 40 per cent by 2030.
Mr Abe’s engagement of the Middle East appears to have at least three prongs. The first is to get the Japanese government more directly involved in oil-related projects. Tokyo on Saturday signed a deal to store Saudi oil on the island of Okinawa. In return, Japan would get preferential access in times of emergency.
The following day, in Abu Dhabi, the Japan Bank for International Co-operation said it would lend an initial $1bn to the emirate in return for longer-term oil contracts. Tokyo is also hoping Abu Dhabi will look favourably on renewing Japanese concessions. The emirate accounts for no less than half of Japan’s independent oil development worldwide.
The second prong is to diversify Japan’s regional investment. In a policy described by one foreign ministry official as “enlightened self-interest”, Tokyo hopes that greater investments by Japanese industrials will foster political stability by helping the Middle East in its efforts to graduate from oil-only economies.
Mr Abe told a business forum in Riyadh: “We need multi-layer economic relations beyond those based simply on oil.” He came with nearly 180 top businessmen.
Since 2001 Japanese businesses have indeed invested billions in transport, gas pipeline and petrochemicals projects. The Keidanren, the powerful business lobby, is urging Tokyo to conclude a bilateral trade agreement with the six-country Gulf Co-operation Council, which it says would lead to further investment.
The third prong is political. Japan has always liked to stress its supposedly subtle understanding of the region and has put itself forward as a potential mediator in peace efforts. Until it lost control of the Azadegan oil concession, Tokyo also took a more moderate position on Iran.
Mr Abe has been at pains to emphasise that Japan’s involvement in Iraq, where it deployed ground forces, was motivated by purely humanitarian aims. But, whether or not it is made explicit, lurking below the surface will be the age-old subject of oil.