ゲルマンのレイシズム

　先週はドイツのヘッセン州知事ローランド・コッホの移民の少年犯罪に関する粗っぽい発言が物議を醸し、挙げ句の果てに大連立の危機迄云々されているわけですが、今度はオーストリアですわ。
　これはグラーツ市議会議員候補のようですがSusanne Winterちゅう50歳のおばさんです。
そしてこのおばさんはかつてハイダーが率いた極右のオーストリア自由党(FPO)の候補なんだそうですが、とにかく凄いですわｗ
なにしろ、ムハンマドを「child molester」と罵倒し、「Muhammad wrote the Koran in "epileptic fits"」とまで言ったちゅうんだから、これは僕にとっては爆笑ネタだけどイスラム教徒にとっちゃお約束の「死刑執行指令」の対象でっしゃろな。(※　child molester/ein Kinderschänder=児童に性的いたずらをする変態、Muhammad wrote the Koran in "epileptic fits"=ムハンマドは癲癇の発作中にコーランを書いた）

　ちなみにこのおばさんのこの発言に対して検察が扇動の罪での訴追の検討に入っているちゅうことのようですが、コッホの言を更に発展させて「it is time for Islam to be "thrown back where it came from, behind the Mediterranean.」とまで言っているんだが、昔ユダヤで今イスラム、この道は何時か来た道だな。（※今こそイスラム教徒を地中海の向こう側に追い返せ！）

補足（2008/01/15　17:55）
少々説明不足ですので補足しますが、このオバサンがムハンマドをchild molesterと罵倒したちゅうのは、唐突にそうしたのではなく、ムハンマドが６歳の女の子（第三婦人Aischa）を妻にしたことを挙げて、これは現代の仕組みの中では幼児虐待に当たる行為だと言った、こういうことですね。

"Im heutigen System" wäre Mohammed "ein Kinderschänder". Winter spielt damit auf die angebliche Ehe des Propheten mit einem sechsjährigen Mädchen an und zieht eine Linie zu kriminellem Verhalten in der Gegenwart: Es gebe "einen weit verbreiteten Kindesmissbrauch durch islamische Männer", sagt sie.

参照記事
Austrian Politician Calls Prophet Muhammad a 'Child Molester'
Fears for German coalition after crime row -media
Koalitionskrach um Jugendkriminalitat Kanzlerin ruft SPD zur Vernunft
Der offene Brief an Merkel
SPD-WAHLKAMPFPLANE Aufregung um Anti-Angie-AG
Rechtspopulistin nennt Mohammed einen Kinderschänder

独逸出羽：ドイツでアルカイダのテロの危険ちゅうんだが．．．

　情報源がレバノン当局だちゅうからいまひとつ乗りきれないんだが、可能性やら蓋然性ちゅうのは、嘘こきの独逸出羽守クライン孝子がなにをほざこうが十分にはあるわな。

　伝えられるところでは、昨年9月に米軍施設に対するテロ準備の容疑で逮捕されたイスラム転向者 Fritz Gelowiczとその一派の起訴に対する報復テロだちゅうんだが、使用される爆薬一トンは陸路ロシア～フィンランドを経由してロストックに向かっていると思われる、こんな感じですわな。

　さて、爆薬一トンちゅうのが一体どれほどの容積になるのか？
これは僕には想像出来ないが、これが国境を突破して入ってしまうってことになるとドイツの保安当局は面目丸潰れ、仮に爆弾が現実に使用されるなんてことになると、只でさえ選挙モードで不安定化している大連立、人気に支えられているアンジーも危うし、こんな感じですかｗ

参照記事
Warnung vor al-Qaida-Attacken in Berlin
Fears of terror attack in Germany

ヒラリー卿死す

　享年88歳。
　本来彼らはアタック隊ではなかったんだけど、一番手の酸素がトラブって、二番手だった彼とシェルパのテンジンが急遽アタックすることになった、そういう意味ではヒラリー卿の栄誉は僥倖であったわけだけど、それにしても60年も前の装備で登ったわけだから凄い。

　謹んでヒラリー卿の冥福を祈ります。

　なお、参考までに書いておくと、日本の新テロ特が議会を通過したニュースも取り上げられてはいるものの、扱いは断然各紙ともヒラリー卿の死の方が大きいｗ

参照記事
Edmund Hillary, first to conquer Everest, dead at 88
Edmund Hillary, first to climb Mt. Everest, dies
Everest legend Edmund Hillary dies
Edmund Hillary, First on Everest, Dies at 88
Everest legend Edmund Hillary dies

旅行に行くならナポリっしょ

　ゴミの捨て場が満杯になった挙げ句に新しい捨て場が見つからない。
そんな次第で昨年末から路肩に収集未了の生ゴミが110万トンも溢れかえりとんでもない惨状を呈しているらしい。

　昨年末には操業を開始するはずだったゴミ焼却場も2009年まで完成がずれ込む、この2年というスパンが僕にはわからんのだけど、まあとにかくそういうことらしく、お手上げ状態で、ペスビオ山の周辺には不法投棄が相次いで深刻な環境汚染を引き起こしているとか。

　おきゃくさん！！
　行くなら今ですよ！！（但しガスマスク持参のこと）

参照記事
Neapels Müllkrise Bankrott der Institutionen
Italy "trash tsar" takes charge of Naples crisis

糠に釘を打つアメリカの『テロとの闘い』

　いよいよ以て拡散が深刻なんだけど、アメリカは全体的な作戦が奏功していると糊塗することに必死だな。
しかしアフガンには三千名規模の海兵隊増派だろ？　余剰戦力はないからイラクから転戦するちゅうことなんだろうが、イラクの実態ってのは以下にあるようなお寒い実態だからまるきりモグラ叩きなわけで、飛び火はパキスタンの主要都市にまで及んでるから一番戦々恐々としてるのはインドだろうな。

US Bombers, Jets Unleash 40,000 Pounds of Bombs in 10 Minutes South of Baghdad

Al-Qaida fighters retreated north from Diyala, presumably to Salahuddin, the top U.S. commander in northern Iraq, Maj. Gen. Mark P. Hertling, told reporters in Baghdad on Wednesday. "Operational security in Iraq is a problem," he said, noting that the Iraqi army uses unsecured cell phones and radios. "I'm sure there is active leaking of communication."

　ヘルトリングが言っているような暗号化されない電波の使用ちゅう問題点もあるのかも知れないけど、そんなのは寧ろ些末な問題で、もっと根本的な問題はイラクの治安警察や軍に採用された奴等が正体不明だちゅうことでしょ？
で何故こういうことが起きたかと言えば、アメリカが撤退を焦るあまりに枯れ木も山の賑わいで頭数だけを集めた結果でしょうが。

　この先益々アメリカの供与品で横流しされた武器だけじゃなくて、正式ルートで供与された武器までもがアメリカ兵攻撃に使用されるこんな笑えない事態に至っていくんだろうな。
そして使用された銃器がAK47ちゅうとまた熱湯浴や媚米家は中国やロシア、北朝鮮の暗躍を言うんだろうが、アメリカがイラクの治安部隊に供与した小銃はAK47なんだよ、なんでと言えば一挺あたりが安いからさ。

Suicide Bombing Strikes High Court in Pakistan

中国はコンビニバッグ禁止だとさ

　国務院がコンビニバッグの無料提供とその生産用のフィルムの生産を6月1日から禁止することに決めたそうだ。
　当然これは環境に配慮するというような綺麗事で決まったわけではなく、石油資源の台所事情によるところが大なんだろうけども、いずれにしても独裁国家はこういうことが素軽くやれるところだけはいいなｗ

China: crackdown on plastic bags

By REUTERS
Published: January 9, 2008
The State Council, China's cabinet, banned the production of thin plastic bags and will forbid China's supermarkets to offer them free beginning June 1, saying they cause pollution and waste resources. The council said shoppers should return to using cloth bags. The Chinese use up to three billion plastic bags a day and the country has to refine 37 million barrels of crude oil every year to make plastics used for packaging, according to a report on the Web site of China Trade News.

China announces plastic bag ban

Last Updated: Wednesday, 9 January 2008, 07:38 GMT
The Chinese government says it is banning shops from handing out free plastic bags from June this year, in a bid to curb pollution. Production of ultra-thin plastic bags will also be banned, the State Council said in a statement. Instead, people will be encouraged to use baskets or reusable cloth bags for their shopping, the council said. The move comes amid growing concern about pollution and environmental degradation in China. China was using huge quantities of plastic bags each year, the State Council, China's cabinet, said in its directive, posted on the main government website. "Plastic shopping bags, due to reasons such as excessive use and inefficient recycling, have caused serious energy and resources waste and environment pollution," it said. Easily discarded Of particular concern were cheap, flimsy bags that many shopkeepers routinely handed out to customers. "The super-thin bags have especially become a main source of plastic pollution as they are easy to break and thus disposed of carelessly," the statement said. Shops that violated the new rules could be fined or have their goods confiscated, it said. The council also called for greater recycling efforts from rubbish collectors, and suggested financial authorities should consider higher taxes on the production and sale of plastic bags. In recent years, China's rapid development has triggered concerns over pollution and use of resources. But correspondents say that there is a growing awareness that more needs to be done to protect the environment.

偽物は中国や日本に限らず：フロリダ州の場合

　フロリダ界隈ではマハタが名物料理だそうだけど、マハタの供給が間に合わないのでナマズとかテラピアをマハタと偽って供給するレストランや流通業者が摘発されたっと。
ここにはいろんな背景があるようで、近海の漁獲制限の限度に対して需要が多すぎる、偽者を掴ませることで流通業者（仲卸）が暴利を得られる、こんなんが主なようです。

　ある立ち入りの結果、偽者の一等賞はマハタ、二等賞はカニ、三等賞はマグロとかで、マハタを除くと日本と変わらんな、そんな気がします。

Fake grouper Turns Up Around Florida

サンフランシスコの虎が人を食った件の人を食った原因説明

　水曜だか木曜だかにサンフランシスコの動物園で、脱走した虎が観客三人を襲って、そのうち一人が死亡したちゅう事件が報じられましたが、その原因がわかったようです。

　この原因を読んだ瞬間、死んだ彼には申し訳ないが、僕は吹き出してしまった。
その吹き出してしまった理由とわ！！
ぬわんと！！fence,too low！！（フェンスが低すぎた）だったのだ！！

　CNNニュースによれば

San Francisco Zoo Director Manuel A. Mollinedo acknowledged that the wall around the animal's pen was just 12½ feet high, after previously saying it was 18 feet. According to the Association of Zoos & Aquariums, the walls around a tiger exhibit should be at least 16.4 feet high.

だそうだから、動物園・水族館協会ちゅうのの基準では16.4フィート（5m）なくちゃいけないフェンスの高さが12.5（3.8m）フィートしかなかったっと。

　そしてここの所長はは当初、フェンスは18フィート（5.5m）あると嘘こいてたようだ。
この所長は

"When the AZA came out and inspected our zoo three years ago, they never noted that as a deficiency," he said. "Obviously now that something's happened, we're going to be revisiting the actual height."

とも述べているらしい、ざっくり、3年前に動物園・水族館協会の検査員が検査に来たけどフェンスの高さ不足は指摘しなかった。　問題が起きちゃった以上実際の高さを再調査しなくちゃね！！、こんな感じ？
　こら船場吉兆よりタチ悪いな。

　ちなみにこの事件を報じるAPの記事には

In the latest attack, Mandel said: "I find it hard to accept the fact that they weren't even aware that the wall didn't meet the standard set by the association. They're not even aware of their own deficiencies."

っとの被害者の弁護士のコメントが紹介されているんだが、まったくその通り。

参照記事
Tiger Attack at SF Zoo Latest Blow
Sources: Brothers mauled in fatal tiger attack

ブット女史暗殺さる

　ブットが自爆テロで殺された。
SPIEGELの伝えるREUTERSでは

"Der Mann schoss zuerst auf Bhuttos Wagen. Sie suchte Schutz, dann sprengte sich der Mann in die Luft"

とあるから、銃撃失敗の後に自爆、これで死んだ、こういうことのようですが、まあこりゃ連れ戻したアメリカが殺したようなもんだぞ。
※TIME｢Where Bhutto's Death Leaves the U.S.｣より部分引用

Hussain Haqqani, a former top aide to Bhutto and now a professor at Boston University, thinks the U.S., which has counted Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as a key ally against terrorism since 9/11, bears some of the responsibility.
"Washington will have to answer a lot of questions, especially the Administration," he says.
"People like me have been making specific requests to American officials to intervene and ask for particular security arrangements be made for her, and they have been constantly just trusting the Musharraf Administration." U.S. officials said they were leery of intervening in another nation's internal affairs, and didn't want to give Bhutto Washington's imprimatur.

そしてこれでもっともピンチに陥ったのも連れ戻したアメリカなんだが、やっぱ学習能力ないわ。
※TIME｢Where Bhutto's Death Leaves the U.S.｣より部分引用

The U.S. has few options in Pakistan. One thing is clear, says Peter Galbraith, senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: It is "not a good idea to have 70 nuclear weapons in the hands of a country that is falling apart." Some observers believe that U.S. policy in Pakistan has favored personalities over principles.
"We have a bad habit of always personalizing our foreign policy," says P.J.

ともあれ謹んでブット女史の冥福を祈ります。

※部分は2007/12/28の10:37加筆

関連過去記事
ムシャラフの断末魔と日米関係の近未来、そしてアホ満載の産経寄稿者
ブット女史キレた！！ムシャラフもキレた！！
深まるパキスタンの混迷：アフガンに続き世界のイスラム武装勢力の草刈り場

参照記事
Benazir Bhutto bei Anschlag getötet
Benazir Bhutto killed in suicide bomb attack
Former premier Benazir Bhutto assassinated in Pakistan
Benazir Bhutto assassinated
Latest: Benazir Bhutto killed in suicide bombing
Benazir Bhutto bei Anschlag getötet
Attentäter ermordet Benazir Bhutto

おまけ：クロフォードにおけるブッシュの声明質問を受け付けない約束で行われた記者会見
President and Mrs. Bush Extend Condolences Regarding Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, Condemns Violence

Prairie Chapel Ranch
Crawford, Texas
9:55 A.M. CST
THE PRESIDENT: Laura and I extend our deepest condolences to the family of Benazir Bhutto, to her friends, to her supporters.
We send our condolences to the families of the others who were killed in today's violence. And we send our condolences to all the people of Pakistan on this tragic occasion.
The United States strongly condemns this cowardly act by murderous extremists who are trying to undermine Pakistan's democracy. Those who committed this crime must be brought to justice.
Mrs. Bhutto served her nation twice as Prime Minister and she knew that her return to Pakistan earlier this year put her life at risk. Yet she refused to allow assassins to dictate the course of her country.
We stand with the people of Pakistan in their struggle against the forces of terror and extremism. We urge them to honor Benazir Bhutto's memory by continuing with the democratic process for which she so bravely gave her life.
END 9:57 A.M. CST

ケーシー副報道官が代読したライスの声明

On behalf of the United States, I want to express our deepest sympathy on the tragic death of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. We extend our sincere condolences to the Bhutto family and to the family -- families of others who were killed and wounded in this attack. We condemn in the strongest possible terms this cowardly and murderous attack. Ms. Bhutto's passing is a great loss for Pakistan.
I knew her as a woman of great courage and had been impressed by her dedication and commitment to democracy and the future of Pakistan itself.
As President Bush said earlier today, the perpetrators of this crime must be brought to justice. The deadly results of this attack will no doubt test the will and patience of the people of Pakistan. We urge the Pakistani people, political leaders and civil society to maintain calm and to work together to build a more moderate, peaceful and democratic future.

ディエゴ・マラドーナがアフマディネジャドに会いたいという件

　ミハエル・シューマッハが飛行機に遅れそうになり、空港までタクシーを運転しちゃったなんちゅう笑える話があったばかりだが、今度はアルゼンチンで笑える話だ。
　僕は知らなかったんだけど、マラドーナはカストロの崇拝者らしく反米なんだそうで、ただの薬中じゃなかったんだな。
でなんだか知らんが、先日は連帯のために「チャベスの入れ墨を入れる」なんちゅうことも言ったちゅうんだが、そのマラドーナが、ミニマッチを見に来ていたイランの外交官にサイン入りのシャツを贈って、反米連帯のためにアフマディネジャドに会いたいちゅうことを言ったそうな。

　日本にいてこういう話を聞くと「落ち目にゃなりたくねぇもんだ」くらいにしか思わんけどアルゼンチンじゃやっぱまだ英雄なんだろう。

Maradona wants to meet Iranian president

「鉄のカーテン」とシェンゲン協定加盟国拡大

　産経に「鉄のカーテン」事実上撤廃　シェンゲン協定拡大ちゅう記事がある、書いたのは黒沢さんだ。

　「鉄のカーテン」と言えばにウィンストン・チャーチルが1946年にフルトン校で行った演説の

It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you.
It is my duty to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe.

の部分に端を発するんだが、この記事の

シェンゲン協定が２１日、東欧など９カ国にも拡大された。旅券なしで東・西欧間を移動することが可能となり、冷戦時代に欧州を東西に分断した総延長約２０００キロの「鉄のカーテン」が事実上、取り払われた形となった。

　欧州１５カ国の協定に参加したのはポーランド▽チェコ▽スロバキア▽ハンガリー▽スロベニア▽エストニア▽ラトビア▽リトアニア▽マルタ。２１日には、ドイツ、ポーランド、チェコの国境地帯にある独東部ツィタウで式典が行われ、３カ国首脳が握手を交わした。

って扱いは少々切り口を間違えてんじゃないの？
ボーダーレス化は更に進んだとは言えようけれども、歴史的側面からも時代的要請の面からもこれは「鉄のカーテン」とは関係ないよ。

　「鉄のカーテン」が事実上撤廃というのであればゴルバチョフによるブレジネフ・ドクトリン否定で良いんじゃないの？

笑っちゃいかんのだろうけど：棺桶屋があがったりという件

　これは日本ではなくバグダットの話ですが、ここしばらくの米軍の作戦が奏功して、テロが域外のあちこちに拡散しているという事実はあるものの、バグダットに関してははとりあえず平穏が訪れつつある、で棺桶作ってボロ儲けしてた家具職人が家具職人に戻り、葬儀屋が商売あがったりになり、結婚式に軸足を移したちゅう話です。

　たとえば棺桶なんだけど、数ヶ月前までは2～3週ごとに7～10この棺桶を作ってた、キリスト教徒用の棺桶の場合には1ヶ月あたり50個も作ってた大工もいるそうなんだけど、この差は死者の差ではなく、棺桶ごと埋めてしまうキリスト教徒と、棺桶はモスクから墓場までの間の死体の入れ物としてしか使用しないバグダットの習俗の違い、つまりリユースするちゅうことなんだけど、そんなことのようで、注目すべきは、リユースするにも絶対数が足らずに増産を強いられたっと。
いずれにしろこれはこれで笑いの止まらない商売だったようなんだが、最近では月に一個も作らなくなった。
でもともとの家具製作に戻ったちゅうことのようだね。

　さて葬儀屋ですが、死者が多く出ていた頃には葬式セットの基本的なレンタルパターンで200ドル/3日、これがいい商売だったんだ。
しかし、これも需要が減っちゃったんで葬祭から冠婚にシフトしたようなんだが、これが基本セットの貸出料が2～3時間で50ドル、しかも数ヶ月前までは月に3件くらいしかなかった結婚式なんだが、このところ週に10～15件はあるちゅうんだから、葬儀屋は結婚式にシフトしても収入減はない。
翻って可愛そうなのは大工で、棺桶は50ドル取れたんだが、家具ではこうは取れない。

　それでも20歳代の大工は「平和にしくものなし、神に感謝してるよん！！」と語ったそうな。ｗ

参照記事
Some Iraqi businesses decline with deaths

The Congressional Research Serviceレポートの余波

　The Congressional Research Serviceの報告書をWebで探してみたんですが、僕自身まだその生報告書にたどり着けてはいないので、あくまでもREUTERSの報道内容が間違いではないという前提で参考にします。

　まずこの記事は

North Korea may have given arms to Lebanon's Hezbollah and Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, according to a report compiled for Congress that could complicate U.S. plans to drop Pyongyang from its terrorism blacklist.

と書きだしており、ざっくり訳すと「北朝鮮がレバノンのヒズボラやスリランカのタミル・イーラム解放の虎に武器援助を与えたかも知れないという議会報告は、北朝鮮をテロ支援国家リストから除外しようというアメリカ政府の目論見を困難にした。」ってな内容ですが、これまでアメリカ政府と言うよりもブッシュとライスは、対北朝鮮懐柔策を突っ走るための方便の一つとして、1987年の大韓航空機爆破事件以後北朝鮮はテロに関わっていないって大義名分を掲げてきたわけですが、だから、最近のシリアに対する核援助疑惑に対してもミサイル技術移出疑惑に対しても聞こえないふりを通してきたわけです。
しかしこの報告書はその大義名分を崩すに足る報告書だちゅうことですね。

　ただ、このCRS報告書の中身はあくまでも伝聞のようで、たとえばレバノンのヒズボラに関する件に関してはこう書かれている。

It said that in September 2006, Paris Intelligence Online, a French Internet publication that specializes in political and economic intelligence, had published details of an extensive North Korean program to give arms and training to Hezbollah.

つまり、ソースはIntelligence onlineであり、そこには「その計画は、1980年代のヒズボラメンバーの北朝鮮国内での訓練に始まり、200年代に入ってからは北朝鮮要員をレバノンに派遣し、武器や医薬品、食料を蓄えるための地下基地の建設を指導するまでに拡大した。」ちゅうよなことが書かれているそうで、つまりこれを引用したCRS報告書が言いたいのは、この北朝鮮によるヒズボラ支援が1987年より後の話であると同時に、ヒズボラはアメリカの指定するテロ組織であるちゅうことです。
でタミルイーラム解放の虎に対する支援に関するCRS報告書の記述のソースは産経新聞の記事だそうで

the Sankei Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, in September 2007 published a report that North Korea had shipped arms to the Tamil Tigers.

「日本の産経新聞は2007年の9月に、北朝鮮がタミルイーラム解放の虎に武器を送ったとの報道を行った。」とのことです。

　つまりCRS報告書が上げたのは全て伝聞情報だちゅうことなんですが、国務省の13日の定例記者会見でこの件に関する質問が出てます。

QUESTION: -- suggesting that North Korea had provided arms to Hezbollah --
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: -- as well as the Tamil Tigers. Do you have anything more on that?
MR. MCCORMACK: Only to the extent that we are aware of the report and aware of its contents. It's safe to say that we stand behind the Patterns of Global Terrorism report, which says that North Korea has not been engaged in any terrorist activity since 1987, at least that we have been able to detect. There is currently ongoing an assessment of North Korea and its presence on the terrorist list. That's an ongoing assessment. It hasn't been finalized yet. It looks at activity right up to the most recent months. And we are going to make sure that that assessment is done in full compliance with U.S. law with respect to the letter and the spirit of the law and we'll see where it comes out. We'll see what the result is. I am not in a position to verify that information. I'm not sure what the source of the information was that was contained in the report.
QUESTION: Will this assessment that you're talking about take into account the CRS report?
MR. MCCORMACK: It will take into account all available sources of information. Again, I can't -- I know that the particular news report that you're referencing sources the CRS report. I can't tell -- I can't tell you from where or vouch for the source of the information that led to that -- include this allegation in the report. Yeah.

　まぁマコーマックも「伝聞でしょ？」ちゅうよなのらりくらりでんな。

　ただ、全体にブッシュとライスの態度が変わったことは事実であり、僕にはこのCRS報告がそこに寄与したとは思えませんが、BDA問題の当時から議会内はおろか政権内にもあった対北融和路線に批判的な勢力がまたしても力をつけてきた。
そこに働いているのは「クリントンの轍を踏むな」という懸念であり、イスラエルロビーの暗躍、そんな気がします。

サウジのレイプ判決：キリスト教徒の驕慢だろ、こりゃ？

　これは今日の産経の記事なんだけど

レイプ被害者にむち打ち刑　サウジ司法で国際論議
　だが、欧米メディアは女性の権利や司法制度の問題点に焦点を当て大々的に報じ、ブッシュ米大統領も４日の記者会見で「同じことが娘の身に起きたら、私は被害者を助けない国家に怒りを抱く」と批判。サウジのサウド外相は「判決は見直される」と述べ、沈静化に乗り出している。

この件は外信では既に先月の上旬に報じられており、なんで今頃、そんな気がするな。

　さて、概ね批判的な論調が多く、王族もこの判決を批判してるんですが、僕はこれはこれでイスラムの文化なんだからいたずらにキリスト教徒に阿る必要はないと思うな。
　前にダルフールの強姦被害者の件を紹介し、こりゃひどいぞちゅうよなことを書きました。
そのあらましは、ダルフール難民の婦女子がジャンジャウィードに暴行陵辱されるケースが頻発しており、その被害者であるはずの婦女子が、難民キャンプに帰ったら帰ったで仲間の難民、就中男性から差別迫害を受ける、こんな話です。

　じゃ同じじゃねぇかよっと思う人がいるかも知れませんが、ダルフールの被害者は不倫関係にあったわけでもなんでもなく、只キャンプから離れた森に薪をとりに行く道中を待ち伏せるジャンジャウィードに暴行された挙げ句に強姦されてる。
この婦女子を同じ部族の男達は護り切れていないくせに、強姦されて帰ってくりゃ親族一丸となって卑しめ、差別するわけですね。
でその根底にあるのも実は部族のルールではあるんですが、これはどうも僕には理不尽に思える、ちゅうより僕の美学と噛み合わないんだな。
そんな卑怯な文化は認めえないちゅうのか．．．

　それに比したらこのケースの場合、僕はイスラムルールを尊重出来る。

関連過去記事
Cruel Darfur
The unbelievable circumstances of Darfur
北京オリンピックボイコット、Mia Farrow

讀賣新聞のダナ・ペリーノの炎上報道

　讀賣の批判続出、米３５歳女性報道官「キューバ危機」を知らずちゅうタイトルが目に入ったので本文を読んでみた。
以下がその全文なんだが

　【ワシントン＝坂元隆】「キューバ・ミサイル危機のことを（記者から）質問されてパニックになった。実は、キューバ危機って何だか知らなかったから」――。

　米ホワイトハウスの女性報道官、ダナ・ペリノさん（３５）が、世界を核戦争の瀬戸際まで追いやった冷戦期の重大事件を知らなかったと、８日放送の公共ラジオの番組で告白、話題を呼んでいる。

　ペリノさんによると、記者会見で、ミサイル防衛をめぐる米露間の対立と、１９６２年のキューバ・ミサイル危機を比較する質問が出たが、「危機はキューバとミサイルに関することだろう」と想像はついたものの、歴史的事実をなにも知らなかったため、答えようがなかったという。

　ペリノさんが生まれる１０年前の大事件とはいえ、発言後、「歴史に学ばないブッシュ政権を象徴する話」などと厳しい批判が続出。

　ペリノさんは１１日の定例記者会見で、「バラエティー番組だから誇張した」などと、弁明に追われた。

（2007年12月12日19時3分 読売新聞）

　全然弁明に追われてなんかいね～ぢゃん！！
プレス・ブリーフィングでのやりとりはたったこんだけだ。

Ｑ：Has the President teased you about the Cuban Missile Crisis at all?
MS. PERINO: No. It was a humorous show and I was exaggerating. Tell your host of your late-night show that.

　しかも単なるギャグだよ。
外信ベースの捏造は産経お家芸かと思ったが読売もそうなんだ。ｗ

　僕はダナ・ペリーノってのはブスだけど頭の回転が速くて応答にそつがなくて好きなんだよ、だからこそこういうろくでもない話を針小棒大に誇張するやつは許せんのよね。ｗ

　それにしても、学歴はイマイチであることは確かだが、キューバ危機を知らんとは．．．．
でも許す。


Dana Perino

性的異常者が看護助手として働き、脳卒中患者を強姦したちゅう件

　信じがたい話なんだが、患者に対する虐待で有罪判決を受け、強姦容疑で2回取り調べを受け、変態行為で3回患者から訴えられた経歴を持つ40歳の看護助手が、資格を剥奪されることもなく13年の間勤務を続け、ついに脳卒中患者を強姦して8年6ヶ月の有罪判決を受けたそうだ。

　まあ不幸中の幸いなのは、これは我が国の話ではなくイチローのいるシアトルの出来事だということだろう。

参照記事
Former nursing assistant sentenced for raping stroke victim

ドイツではクヌート、日本ではピース

　共にネグレクト北極熊なんだが一昨日だったか、とべ動物園のピースが八歳の誕生日を迎え、そしてきょうベルリン動物園のクヌートが満一歳の誕生日を迎えたそうだ。

NIE解禁文書に関するハドリー補佐官会見全文その他

以下ハドリー補佐官会見全文
Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
For Immediate Release December 3, 2007
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room
3:35 P.M. EST
MR. HADLEY: Good afternoon, I'm Steve Hadley, the President's National Security Advisor. I want to talk a little bit about the recent National Intelligence Estimate that was released to the executive branch and to the Congress today.
There was an earlier briefing this afternoon by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Don Kerr, and also by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mike Hayden.
And I wanted to give a little bit more context and set the findings of the NIE in a broader historical perspective.
The introduction is going to go on a little bit; there's a lot to tell. This is a complicated estimate.
The unclassified key judgments that were released today are a little difficult to sort through and I want to try and lay this out for everybody, so I'll have an opening statement, probably 15-20 minutes, but there will be lots of time to answer questions at the end.
The Director of National Intelligence has today released the unclassified key judgments from the intelligence community's latest estimate of Iran's nuclear weapons efforts and its uranium enrichment program.
The classified version of this National Intelligence Estimate was briefed to the President last Wednesday, November 28, and has been delivered to relevant congressional committees this morning.
On balance, the estimate is good news.
On one hand, it confirms that we were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, it tells us that we have made some progress in trying to ensure that that does not happen.
But it also tells us that the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a very serious problem.
The estimate offers grounds for hope that the problem can be solved diplomatically, without the use of force, as the administration has been trying to do. And it suggests we have the right strategy: intensified international pressure, along with a willingness to negotiate a solution that serves Iranian interests while ensuring the world that it will never have to face a nuclear-armed Iran.
But the bottom line is that for that strategy to succeed, the international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran -- with diplomatic isolation, United Nations sanctions, and with other financial pressure.
And Iran has to decide that it wants to negotiate a solution.
This is a complicated subject and the new Intelligence Estimate is a complicated document.
Let me summarize the key judgments and then try and walk you through it and answer your questions.
First, let me summarize the key judgments.
The IC has high confidence -- high confidence -- that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program that it has never acknowledged and continues to deny.
The intelligence community has high confidence that Iran halted its covert nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003.
And they have moderate confidence that it had not restarted that program as of mid-2007.
They judge with high confidence that the halt in other nuclear-related decisions was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure, resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work involving uranium enrichment.
The intelligence community says they do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, but they assess with moderate to high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
And the intelligence community assesses with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult.
Let me see if I can unpack this a bit and put it in context.
First, remember how we got here.
A little background: If a state is looking to become a nuclear-weaponed state, it needs three things.
It needs weapons-grade nuclear material.
It needs the technical know-how to fashion this nuclear material into a weapon.
And it needs a means to deliver the weapon on a target, like a ballistic missile.
The hardest step in today's world is acquiring weapons-grade nuclear material.
Unless you steal it, there are two ways to get it: If you have a nuclear power reactor you can reprocess spent fuel coming out of that reactor, or you can create nuclear material by a process called uranium enrichment.
This process produces fuel for nuclear power reactors, but it can also create weapons-grade nuclear material for a nuclear bomb.
In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and pledged never to seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
That's what Iran undertook to do. It signed what is called a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, under which it was to declare all its nuclear-related activities and open itself up to inspections by the IAEA.
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of a secret uranium enrichment plant in Iran at a place called Natans.
The plant was secret.
It had not been declared, as required, to the IAEA.
Iran at that time had no operational nuclear power reactors, so why did it need a uranium enrichment plant?
Iran was actively developing ballistic missiles.
These facts raised a real concern that this was all part of an effort to develop nuclear weapons.
So the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, backed by the international community, began a vigorous effort to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment activity, and thus reassure the world that it did not intend to develop nuclear weapons.
And the pressure seemed to work.
In October 2003, Iran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA and suspend its uranium enrichment activities.
Considerable further diplomacy involving both the IAEA and what's called the EU-3 -- representatives of Britain, France and Germany -- resulted in what's called the Paris Agreement of November 2004.
In this agreement, Iran reaffirmed and extended the suspension of its enrichment activities.
And the EU-3 agreed to negotiate long-term technology, economic and security arrangements for Iran.
Despite this progress, the intelligence community in May of 2005 assessed with high confidence that Iran currently was determined to develop nuclear weapons.
The intelligence community maintained this assessment throughout this year, 2007.
Indeed, Director of National Intelligence Negroponte told an open session of the House intelligence community on January 1, 2007, that, "our assessment is that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons." DNI McConnell later told a Senate panel in open session on February 27 that, "We assess that Tehran seeks to develop nuclear weapons."
The irony is that one month after the intelligence community released this assessment, in June of 2005, Ahmadinejad wins a runoff election and becomes Iran's President.
On August 1, 2005, just two months after taking power, Ahmadinejad informs the IAEA that he has decided to resume uranium enrichment, and does so beginning in January 2006.
For the next two years, through a whole series of IAEA Board of Governors resolutions urging Iranian compliance, through two U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions, sweetened by negotiating offers by the EU-3 and the promise that the United States would join those negotiations, the international community tried unsuccessfully to get Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and those efforts to get the suspension continue today.
Also during this period, the President directs the intelligence community to enhance its capabilities to gather intelligence on Iran's nuclear programs.
Earlier this year, Congress called for a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.
It is in part delayed in order to process -- the finalization of that NIE is delayed in part in order to process new intelligence, some of which has been received in the last few months.
The National Intelligence Estimate released today reveals that there was a covert nuclear weapons program.
It also reveals that, unknown to us, that program was halted in the fall of 2003.
So the covert nuclear weapons program was unknown to us, suspected, unknown; now confirmed.
But what was also unknown was that the program was halted in the fall of 2003.
That secret -- that covert nuclear weapons program was halted at the same time the Iranians publicly announced that they were suspending their public and declared uranium enrichment program.
So where does that leave us?
One, we have good reason to continue to be concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon, even after this most recent National Intelligence Estimate.
In the words of the NIE, "Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so." For example, Iran's civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing.
And as you know, once a country masters the technology to enrich uranium for use even in a civilian nuclear power program, it could readily use the same technology to produce weapons-grade uranium.
As we have said, weapons-grade uranium is the long pole in the tent for a nuclear weapon.
And Iran continues to develop, test and deploy ballistic missiles -- a very attractive delivery system for a nuclear weapon.
For example, the Iranian Defense Minister publicly acknowledged a medium-range ballistic missile called the Ashura, which could reach much of Eastern Europe.
Finally, we are very unsure of Iran's attentions [sic], even with respect to the covert nuclear weapons program that Iran has halted.
Again, let me quote the National Intelligence Estimate: "We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidentially whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program."
Again from the NIE: "We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran's key national security and foreign policy objectives."
But the NIE gives us reason to believe that our current strategy stands the best chance of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions.
Again, let me quote for a final time from the NIE: "Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003, primarily in response to international pressure, indicates Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach, rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of political, economic and military costs.
This in turn suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige and goals for regional influence in other ways might, if perceived by Iran's leaders as credible, prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify just what such a combination might be."
We have been pursuing this very strategy for over two years, since Iran resumed its nuclear enrichment.
If we are to avoid the grim choice between accepting an Iran on the path to nuclear weapons or considering the use of force, we need to intensify our pressure on Iran, while making clear that if they do suspend enrichment, there is an opportunity for better relations with the international community.
And with that, I'll stop and I'd be pleased to answer your questions.
Q It is troubling that the United States was so wrong about what Iran was doing or what its intentions were?
MR. HADLEY: I don't think we were wrong about what it's doing or what its intentions were.
Our concern was that they were pursuing a nuclear weapon.
We saw the enrichment, which we couldn't really explain; we saw the ballistic missiles.
And it led people to conclude: We are concerned that they were pursuing a nuclear weapons program and might have a covert program to actually weaponize highly-enriched uranium in order to be a nuclear weapon.
And that's what the NIE has now discovered.
The President said some months ago, probably over a year ago, we need to have better intelligence on Iran's nuclear program; we have these suspicions, we have this concern, we need better intelligence to get greater certainty.
The intelligence community increased their efforts, and lo and behold, in the last few months we get credible evidence that gives them a high confidence that they had a covert nuclear weapons program to weaponize weapons grade highly-enriched uranium into a weapon.
Q But in 2005 you thought that they had a nuclear weapons program, whereas you now think they abandoned it, or put it aside in 2003.
MR. HADLEY: We thought they had that program, we did indeed, in 2005.
Q So that's what I meant when I said, wrong.
MR. HADLEY: We have looked at it and we have determined that, indeed, they did have a program, and a covert program, which we had not been able to detect, but we also determined that they had suspended it in -- or halted it -- which is the term of art -- in fall of 2003 in response to international pressure.
That's exactly right.
Q But, Steve, the question is, how did the government get it wrong?
And isn't that troubling that it got so wrong over that two-year span?
MR. HADLEY: I don't think it is so wrong. I think it is right.
If they had been saying in 2005 not to worry, Iran has no nuclear weapons ambitions, then we would have clearly got it wrong, because they did have such a program.
I would say to you, they got it right, in terms of being concerned about Iran seeking a nuclear weapon.
And we continue to be concerned about a nuclear weapon.
Remember, Iran is one of a handful of the hardest intelligence targets going.
They are very good at this business of keeping secrets.
And there's probably no secret that will be more closely kept by Iran than what it's doing on nuclear weapons.
So I think the fact that we have got this additional information is an indication that we are succeeding in learning more about this program.
And I think you have to recognize we're going to continue to dig, continue to learn more, and that's a good thing.
That's --
Q Steve, let me follow on this point.
If we now estimate with high confidence that it was shut down as of 2003, that it was halted, in October of this year, in 2007, the President is speaking about the Iranian threat, in terms of World War III.
Why wouldn't you conclude that this President is hyping the threat?
MR. HADLEY: Because he was describing the threat as the intelligence community itself had been describing the threat both publicly and in their briefings to him.
The President, as I think if you look at the testimony that was given by Don Kerr and Mike Hayden today, they basically said that the intelligence community finally came to the judgments that they came to on this issue Tuesday of last week.
The President was briefed on Wednesday.
So this is challenging information.
The intelligence community had to decide what they thought about it.
They were sufficiently uncertain about it that they delayed the publication of the NIE until they could come to the bottom of it, reach their conclusions, present it to the President, as they did on Wednesday, and then at that point, obviously, we wanted to get it out quickly.
Q They describe the Iranian threat today differently than the President would have even a month ago.
MR. HADLEY: Because our intelligence community has told us effective today that their assessment is somewhat different than it was before.
That's correct.
Q How does this -- how does this not undercut the effort to get an international coalition?
The urgency of doing that -- I would think all the international partners would say, wait a minute, they haven't had a program since 2003, so let's back off a little with the urgency.
MR. HADLEY: I think there is going to be a tendency or a lot of people to say, the problem is less bad than we thought, let's relax.
And I think our view is that would be a mistake.
Why?
Because, as we said, in today's world the critical problem for making a nuclear weapon is getting the weapons-grade nuclear material.
And for Iran, they are trying to get the capability to do that.
Let me put it this way, their path to getting that capability is the enrichment program.
This is the program that they agreed to shut down in 2003, 2004, but restarted in 2005.
It has been championed by Ahmadinejad.
He is now making public announcements that they have 3,000 centrifuges and have mastered that technology.
You don't need to take those assertions to the bank to be concerned that Iran is getting to the point where it will have mastered the ability to enrich uranium.
And having mastered that ability to enrich uranium, they have the -- they will have the capacity to make weapons-grade nuclear uranium.
That is the long pole in the tent, and that's what the international community has been trying, in a pretty united way, for the last three or four years to get the Iranians to suspend.
Q What do you know about the program that you say now you have confirmed the Iranians were conducting, that they suspended in 2003?
What do you know about that program now?
How long had that program been in place?
How effective, how far along before they halted?
MR. HADLEY: Those are good questions.
They are questions that I think Don Kerr and Mike Hayden should address.
Some of this gets into portions of these materials that are still classified.
Let me read you, though, I think as a starting point, a footnote that appears in the declassified key judgments that were put out today.
When you talk about a nuclear weapons program, what the intelligence community says they mean is Iran's nuclear weapon design -- that is to say, an effort to design a nuclear weapon.
And weaponization work -- that is to say, taking weapons-grade uranium and adapting it so that it can be an operational nuclear weapon.
And covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work.
And that suggests that part of the program was a covert uranium enrichment facility.
And why would we worry about that?
Because we would worry about it that in -- paired with an overt, declared uranium enrichment program, the information and know-how gleaned by that -- from that public uranium enrichment program could be passed at some time -- in the past or in the future -- to a covert uranium enrichment program, which could be used to develop and produce nuclear weapons grade material for a nuclear weapon.
Q There had to be more than an inkling before today that this information, this intelligence, that the Iranians had an ongoing nuclear weapons program was incorrect.
So why wasn't -- why then would the President allow it or advise to go ahead with ratcheting up the rhetoric, instead of toning it down, when right now this obviously raises issues of credibility with the American public and with American allies about U.S. intelligence?
MR. HADLEY: Two things.
One, when the President was told that we had some additional information, he was basically told:
stand down; needs to be evaluated; we'll come to you and tell you what we think it means.
So this was basically -- as we said, this is information that came in the last few months, and the intelligence community spent a lot time to get on top of it.
Secondly, I would disagree with you that the President has ratcheted up the rhetoric.
We have said -- he has said, I have said, other administration officials have said many times, look, we want diplomacy to work.
Because, as I said in my statement, we don't want to be in a situation where the only two choices this or a future President has is to accept Iran on a path to a nuclear weapon or to have to contemplate the use of nuclear force -- sorry, use of military force.
Because that in the context of today's Middle East is a big move.
And so the President, in that statement -- as he said before and as he explained afterwards -- was trying to give a wake-up call to the international community that we needed to step up the diplomacy and step up the pressure to get Iran to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program.
And that still is the case today, because that is the path to weapons-grade material which would give Iran the option in the future to produce a nuclear weapon.
Q The President -- you said the President was told to stand down on that --
MR. HADLEY: No, I said just the opposite.
I said the President was told, we have some information, we have some new information not to stand down -- said, we have some new information;
give us some time to analyze it, and we will come to you and tell you what we think it means.
Q Was he told that before or after --
MR. HADLEY: And that's what he was told, and they -- as was briefed by the intelligence community today, they came to their final judgments on Tuesday of last week, and they told the President of the United States on Wednesday.
Q But was he given that advice before or after the World War III comment?
MR. HADLEY: I'll have to -- I'll have to look.
Q Which was on October 20th.
MR. HADLEY: From my mind, it doesn't make any difference, because the World War III comment you characterize as stepping up the rhetoric.
I would say it was making a point that the President and we have been making for two or three years, that the international community has to exert more pressure because Iran needs to suspend its enrichment program.
That was the position of our policy before the National Intelligence Estimate, and for the reasons I said.
That continues to be our policy after this latest National Intelligence Estimate.
Q Steve, just to clarify.
MR. HADLEY: Sure.
Q Is it fair to say that the intelligence came in, in recent weeks, not recent months?
Because this -- as was pointed out, the press briefing was late October when the President was asked definitively, do you believe Iran wants to build a nuclear bomb?
And that's where you get, in the second part of that answer, the World War III comment.
MR. HADLEY: Correct.
Q So was it recent weeks that this intelligence came in?
MR. HADLEY: What the intelligence community has said is in the last few months.
And again I would say, if they were working on this information before that quote in October, again, in terms of the point the President was making, he would have made that comment before we got -- the intelligence community got this information.
He would have made that, I believe, that comment after.
I just made it in this statement, which is, the international community has to understand that if we want to avoid a situation where we either have to accept Iran on the road to a nuclear weapon, with a path to a nuclear weapon, or the possibility of having to use force to stop it, with all the connotations of World War III, then we need to step up the diplomacy, step up the pressure to get Iran to stop their civilian -- so-called civilian uranium enrichment program.
That was our policy before his October comment, that was the policy between October -- his October comment and today, and that's our policy going forward;
no change.
Q Steve, you just said you would describe it quite different.
Just a minute ago --
MR. HADLEY: I think that's right.
And we would describe it --
Q Are you being consistent?
I don't think you're being consistent.
MR. HADLEY: I am being consistent, because what we can say now is, that they actually had -- which we did not know at the time of 2005 -- they actually had a covert weapons program, which means we were right to be concerned;
it was probably worse than we thought.
We would also say now, but that program, that covert nuclear weapon program has been suspended.
And therefore it is important for our policy to continue to put diplomatic pressure on Iran so that the suspension -- the halting, excuse me -- the halting of their covert nuclear weapons program continues and that they suspend their uranium enrichment program.
Because if you can do both of those things, maintain the halting of the nuclear weapons program and obtain the suspension of the uranium enrichment program, you've got some real assurance that Iran is not going to be on the path towards a nuclear weapon -- assuming they don't steal the weapon, they don't get weapons-grade nuclear material from some other source.
And it still leaves the worrisome fact that they're working and developing ballistic missiles.
But it is a -- so I would describe our posture differently.
I would describe our assessment -- the intelligence community would describe the assessment in a different way.
But in terms of our policy, it continues to be one.
And I would say it both underscores the urgency of the policy, and also gives us some confidence that it actually can work, but only if we pick up the pace.
Yes, ma'am.
Q Given the halting, as you described it, does this strengthen the position of Russia and China on sanctions, specifically?
MR. HADLEY: Well, we hope not, because as I said, the problem presented by the continuing uranium enrichment program continues, because that is the long pole for a country like Iran on the way towards having a path towards a nuclear weapon.
That's something that Russia has said clearly they don't want Iran to do;
that's something we think, less clearly, China has said the same thing.
So again, as the President says many times, we're asking people to do hard things.
We're asking people to put pressure on Iran, and it has consequences for their diplomacy, it has consequences for their companies doing business with Iran.
People don't like to do that.
So I'm sure some people will try and use this as an excuse or a pretext for flagging on the effort.
Our argument is, actually, it should be just the reverse, because we need to keep the halting of the nuclear weapons program in place;
we need to achieve the suspension of the enrichment program;
and the only way -- what this NIE says is that the best path to do that is to continue what we've been doing, which is diplomatic isolation, U.N. sanctions and other financial pressure, plus the option for negotiations.
Q Second question.
When did the Vice President get briefed on this?
Because he was warning of serious consequences just last month, too.
MR. HADLEY: I've just got a note from him -- I did it once, I'll do it again.
In terms of stand down, they did not tell the President to stand down and stop talking about Iran's nuclear program;
they told him just the opposite:
Mr. President, we have new information.
Or let me put it this way, not just the opposite, let me be precise.
He was not told to stop talking about Iran's nuclear weapons program.
He was not told to change what he says about it.
What he was told was, we have new information;
it is interesting;
it is going to take us some time to understand it, to assess it, to know what it means, and to know how credible it is, and we will come back to you when that process is done. And they did.
And they came back to him Wednesday, and the results of their work is included in this estimate. Is that okay? (Laughter.)
I'm sorry, you asked a question and I didn't answer. Could you restate it, please?
Q When was the Vice President briefed on this?
You mentioned when the President was, what about the Vice President?
MR. HADLEY: He, of course, can answer that for himself.
I will say that the week before the Tuesday/Wednesday, there was a meeting that was held with the principals -- including the Vice President, myself and others -- to get a preliminary look at this information, to get some sense of it, and to give us an opportunity to test it and ask questions about it, and probe it a little bit, as part -- and we thought, one, so we would understand it, and two, as part of the process for the intelligence community, you know, coming to its conclusion about what this all meant.
And those were the conclusions that they reached on Tuesday, and which were briefed to the President on Wednesday of last week. Peter.
Q Steve, when was the first time the President was given the inkling of something?
I'm not clear on this.
Was this months ago, when the first information started to become available to intelligence agencies?
MR. HADLEY: You ought to go back to the intelligence community.
We will get you an answer on that.
There's two questions: one, when did they first get the information?
-- you ought to ask that to them -- two, when was the President notified that there was new information available?
We'll try and get you a precise answer.
As I say, it was, in my recollection, is in the last few months.
Whether that is October -- August, September, we'll try and get you an answer to that.
Q What about the -- I mean, in your view, for a lot of people will sound like echoes of Iraq, what we thought they -- we talked about what programs we thought they had -- in fact they suspended it or stopped it and so forth.
I mean, how does this affect the credibility of everything you want to say about this or any other threat that might be out there in the world today?
MR. HADLEY: Well, I think all we can do is try and -- and I think all the intelligence community can do -- is try and get the best information they can, to try and be straight with the Congress and the President about how they assess that information, with what level of confidence, and to continue to get additional information.
And when they get that additional information, if it changes their assessment, to come out and so inform people.
You know, these are not puzzles that once you solve them, you have solved them for all times.
These are challenges that are ongoing against very hard targets that lie, that try and prevent things from becoming public, and that try and mislead.
And it is a very difficult intelligence channel.
So I think the answer is, in some sense, you know, welcome to the real world.
And so the challenge for the intelligence community is to say, in all of this work -- and it's very challenging -- what they know, what they assess, what's the confidence of their assessment, and what they don't know.
And that's what the intelligence community tries to do, and I think in some sense the unclassified key judgments -- if you read them with care -- show very clearly that that's what they're trying to do. And I will tell you, I'm sure we are going to -- I hope we are going to learn more, and that's probably going to change what we know and probably change our assessments, probably change our confidence level, because this is going to be something that this administration and future administrations are working with for a long time.
Q Just to turn your premise around a little bit, you said that you should keep the pressure up on the international -- with the international community.
But doesn't the fact that Iran halted its program, even if it was covert, suggest that perhaps there is room for a negotiated settlement that would keep nuclear weapons out of the government --
MR. HADLEY: Yes, I said two things.
I said we need to keep the pressure up, but also make clear there is a path for negotiation that will assess Iranian concerns.
Our job is to keep up the pressure, but also to offer this negotiating path.
But in the end of the day, the Iranians have to signal that they're willing to accept a negotiation path.
And as you know, there have been now almost three years of off-and-on meetings -- two years probably -- off-and-on meetings between an Iranian negotiator -- for the longest time that was Larijani -- and with the EU-3, in terms of Javier Solana;
that various offers have been put down for the EU-3 about how to address Iran's security, economic and diplomatic concerns;
a path where Iran could reliably know that it could have a purely civil nuclear power program.
There have been several offers of that sort.
So the combination that the intelligence community says is most likely to work is pressure, plus a negotiating option.
That continues to be the case to this day.
But at some point, Iran has to indicate a willingness to sit down and negotiate.
And that's what we have not yet seen.
Thank you very much.
END 4:14 P.M. EST

以下12月4日の国務省ブリーフィングにおける質疑応答抜粋
Daily Press Briefing
Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC　December 4, 2007

QUESTION: And given all the outreach, both on the part of the President and the Secretary and Under Secretary Burns, does that reflect a fear that the NIE might undercut your diplomatic effort to persuade Iran to abandon what you regard as its pursuit of nuclear weapons?
MR. CASEY: Well, I think the NIE is a significant document and it is the latest and best assessment, a snapshot, if you will, of our intelligence community's understanding of Iran's nuclear program and of the nature of it.
So clearly, it's something that is of interest and of significance to our partners as we all try and move forward with efforts to try and get the Iranians to change their behavior and to come to the negotiating table with us.
So I think it is certainly reflective of our desire to make sure that our best understanding is an understanding that we explain and share with our friends and allies, since it concerns them and concerns their interest as much as it concerns ours.
I will say, too, that I think, as the President said, this does, in many ways, serve as a reminder or a continued warning to the international community.
Saying that Iran, for many years too -- as certainly as the intelligence community can determine -- has pursued a nuclear weapons program, even though it may have been in suspension for the last several years, shouldn't be a great comfort for anybody;
having someone standing around with a book of matches and some tinder there, but just not actually going ahead and trying to light it shouldn't be a lot of comfort for people.
So I think it is important that we took this opportunity to explain to our friends in the international community exactly what our understanding of their program was.
And I do think when you look at what is required to have a nuclear weapon, we still see Iran progressing on what has been described by various people as the long pole in the tent, which is producing through uranium enrichment enough fissile material to be able to turn that into a weapon.
And certainly the fact that they have suspended their weaponization program does not in any way indicate that they have made some sort of definitive decision to forego a nuclear weapon.
In fact, I think the language in the NIE makes clear that that's not a determination we've made.
And the NIE also makes clear that this is a program that they could restart at any time.
So even though it's a positive thing, the international pressure, we believe, has caused them to suspend the weaponization program;
the fact that they are continuing to pursue, in defiance of UN resolutions and the will of the international community, the most important and often most difficult component of producing a nuclear weapon -- again, getting enough highly enriched uranium to be able to turn into a nuclear device, I don't think should provide people with comfort.
And again, I think the NIE in its conclusions bears out the logic of our diplomatic strategy, and we certainly hope that our friends in the international community, including the members of the P-5+1, will continue to see the advantage and the benefit of continuing to keep this pressure on Iran so that we can, in fact, keep them both from returning to a weaponization program as well as making sure that we prevent them from obtaining the major piece of know-how required to ultimately produce such a weapon.

QUESTION: And I can't speak about everybody else. (Laughter.)
But look, surely, the U.S. intelligence community's judgment that they ceased work on the actual weaponization in 2003 should provide some kind of a view on the part of the U.S. Government that perhaps this problem is not as acute or as imminent as you had previously thought.
MR. CASEY: Well, I think that when you look at, whether it's this NIE or any other judgments of the intelligence community, they're a snapshot.
And they're a snapshot based on everybody's best understanding of the information that's available.
And people in the community as well as Steve Hadley spoke yesterday about the fact that there's constant information coming in and that this information -- some of the information involved in these latest judgments is relatively new.
But I don't think it decreases our sense of urgency about the need to respond in an appropriate way to Iran's nuclear program and about our desire to see Iran take up the opportunity provided to engage in negotiations with us.
Again, it doesn't, I don't think, provide people with any great comfort to know that Iran, in fact, has had a clandestine nuclear weapons program and that while in suspension it certainly hasn't been dismantled, disabled, to use a phrase from another nuclear issue we've talked about, and that Iran certainly has not made any admission that it even had this program or has this program in the first place.
So there are still a tremendous number of questions out there, and I think one thing the NIE affirms is that this is a serious question and a serious problem.
Estimates will always vary between exactly when this concern would turn into an actual nuclear weapon on the part of Iran, but I think from our perspective it only reinforces our desire to take action on this now and to work in concert with the international community, because no one wants to see Iran get to the point where it is capable of building a nuclear weapon.

　こうしてみると現実の脅威を否定はしていない点が、昨日あたりにしきりに国内で流布された共同電の記述とは多少異なる印象ではあるんだが、いずれにしてもブッシュ政権はイラクでもインチキ情報で国際社会を引っ張ったわけでさ、これでも日米安保強化と言うのかね、媚米似而非保守は？

マクドナルド炎上！！

　ったってアメリカの話だけど、ワシントン州のレントンのマックが燃えたっと。
それにしても大雪が降ったりなんだりと忙しいな。

テディーベアの女性教師：特赦

　バシル大統領の特赦特権で特赦になるようだ、ちゅうかもうなったろ？
　昨日の段階でイギリスのイスラム教徒の上院議員二人がスーダンに飛んだって話は報じられたたんだけれども、スーダン世論の反発が凄そうだったんで、果たして上手くゆくもんかいな？
こんな感じで見守ってたんだけど、AFPの2007/12/03の8:27発では、バシルの顧問の談話として

Sudanese President Omar al-Beshir on Monday pardoned a British woman teacher jailed for 15 days for insulting religion and she will be released in an hour, a presidential advisor told AFP.

っと書かれているんで日本時間の17時頃には釈放されてんだろうな。

　以下はGUARDIANの伝える話で、コメントとったのはREUTERSのようだけど

Asked whether Gibbons had been pardoned, a presidential adviser told Reuters: "Definitely, yes."

参照記事
British parliamentarians in Sudan
Sudan pardons British teacher, to be freed in hour: presidential advisor
Teddy teacher pardoned in Sudan
Teddy row teacher to be released
Sudan to free teddy row teacher

またウクライナのザシャチコ炭鉱

　11月の中旬にメタンガス爆発で100人が死んだウクライナのザシャチコ炭鉱でまたしてもメタン爆発が起きたそうだ。
今回は今のところ5人が重傷で行方不明が35人ちゅうことなんだけども、とにかく世界的に炭鉱ってのは老朽化してんだな、でここんところのエネルギー需要の急な高まりで稼働率だけは上がってる。

　ザシャチコ以外では記憶にあるだけでも今年に入って中国の露天掘りじゃない炭鉱で2件の事故、アメリカでも1件の事故。
全部安全設備の老朽化に起因するんだけど、このザシャチコの場合は更に悪い要素が重なっており、とにかく深いとこ掘ってんだそうだ。
この記事に拠れば地下900ｍ以上の深さだそうで、これはヨーロッパの一般的な炭鉱の約2倍の深さであり、且つまたメタン層ちゅうのがこの深さに密集してんだそうだ。

　それにしてもこの短期間に2回重大事故ちゅうんだからもう少しなんとかしる！！

参照記事
Interfax: Blast Shakes Ukrainian Mine
Reports: Blast shakes Ukrainian mine

テディベアにムハンマドの女性教師：結論

　一昨日あたりの報道ではスーダン外務省のコメントが引用されて「無罪放免」って空気だったんですが、結局懲役15日、服役後国外退去という判決が下りたそうです。
幸いなことに鞭打ち40回は免除されたようですが、背景は容易に想像出来るわけで、いわゆる宗教指導者の発言と世論ですね。

　スーダンで最高位の宗教指導者はこの事件に関して「神に対する許し難い冒涜だ！！」ちゅう発言をしてまして、政府はそれを無視することが出来なかった。

（以下2007/11/30 23:47加筆）
　その後、BBCニュースに「Shoot UK teacher, say protesters」ちゅう記事があがったんですが、その中に

Thousands of people have marched in the Sudanese capital Khartoum to call for UK teacher Gillian Gibbons to be shot.

The marchers took to the streets after Friday prayers to denounce the sentence as too lenient. The protesters gathered in Martyrs Square, outside the presidential palace in the capital, many of them carrying knives and sticks. Marchers chanted "Shame, shame on the UK", "No tolerance - execution" and "Kill her, kill her by firing squad". Hundreds of riot police were deployed but they did not break up the demonstration.

とあります。

　数千の群衆が、判決が寛大すぎるちゅうことで抗議のデモをおこなったっと。
デモ隊は「撃ち殺せ！！」っとシュプレヒコールを叫んだちゅうことですが、そこに配備された数百の警官隊はデモ隊を解散させなかった、つまりはなにもしなかった、こういうことなんですが、ここにはスーダン政府の政治利用ちゅうかガス抜きを感じますね。


参照記事
UK teacher jailed over teddy row

テディベアで逮捕された気の毒なおばさんのその後

　僕がテディベアで逮捕された気の毒なおばさん で

なんで逮捕されたかちゅうと、7歳の生徒がテディーベアの縫いぐるみに「ムハンマド」ちゅう名前をつけることを容認したからだそうで、

つまり「容認」と書いたかというと、彼女はテディベアにムハンマドという名をつけるよう指導も命令もしておらず、単に子供達が投票でムハンマドという名前をつけることを止めなかったから、これはこの人がまだここに赴任して間もないためにイスラム圏の文化であるとか習俗に対する知識が圧倒的に不足しており、イギリスの指導要領に従ってしまった、こういうことによって起きた悲劇的な事件だからなのであって、初報の直後に一部国内報道が書いたような「教師が生徒にムハンマドと名付けさせた。」というような印象とはまったく事実誤認、あるいは誤訳ですね。

　さてその後海外では色々報じられており、まず昨日のDaily Telegraphに顔写真が出ましたしかし．．．率直に言ってメタボでぶちゃいくなおばさんです。

　記事は「Teddy slur teacher 'may face sedition charge'」ですが、初報、こりゃたしたREUTERSだったんだけど、それよりゃ深い内容になっており、タイトルからして「sedition charge」って書いてますね。
要するに「命じた」のではなく「煽った」という廉で訴追を受ける可能性があると。
僕はスーダンの法は知らないし興味もありませんが、26日のREUTERSの記事「British teacher held in Sudan over teddy bear's name」によれば

charges were being prepared "under article 125 of the criminal law" which covers insults against faith and religion.

刑法125条の信仰と宗教に対する侮辱の罪なんだそうだ。
そしてこれがどの程度の量刑になるのかということはDaily Telegraphの「Teddy slur teacher 'may face sedition charge'」に

40 lashes and months in jail

If found guilty, she could face up to six months in prison, according to the Sudanese Ministry of Religious Affairs.

っとありますから、鞭打ち40回と最高6ヶ月の懲役ちゅうことなんでしょうが、イギリス政府は外交圧力をかけ始めているようですが、実際のこの事件の調査を担当しているサラヘディン・アブ・ズエイド検事は

"Questioning started yesterday and is continuing today. We are also questioning witnesses and if witnesses bring new elements to light, the charges could become more serious,"

と語っているそうで、居合わせた人間への聴取からもっと深刻な事実、これは「扇動」の事実を言っているんですが、これが出てくれば更に重い罪に問われる場合があ、「扇動」はより重罪だちゅうことを言っているんですね。

　でこの「扇動」がなんで出て来ているか、これは初報の段階では知れなかった事実なんですが、父兄の一部が「先生が、ある生徒に、テディベアにムハンマドという名前をつけるよう生徒をまとめることを依頼する手紙を送った。」と証言し、それでムスリムの父兄が騒ぎ出した、これが事件の端緒だちゅうことのようなんですが、これに対して、生徒の父兄は

However, a parent of one of the children in the class described the whole incident as "a silly mistake" and said she had not received any letter from Miss Gibbons.

事件そのものを「愚かな過ち」と断じ、手紙の存在も否定してますね。
そして今日（28日）のGUARDIAN　の記事「Pupil defends teacher in Muhammad teddy furore」にはスーダン人の7歳の生徒、これは、ムハンマドと名付けることを提起した生徒なんですが、そのコメント

he had suggested calling the class teddy bear Muhammad because it was his own name.

が引用されてまして、ザックリ「彼は、テディベアを彼自身の名前であるムハンマドと呼ぶことを提起した、と語っている。」という内容。
つまりこの場合のムハンマドはその生徒の名前であるちゅうこと。
そして

The boy, who said he was not thinking about the prophet when he put forward his choice, described Gibbons as "very nice".

そして、彼自身はこの際に開祖としてのムハンマドのことに思いを及ぼしてはいなかった、そしてギボンズ（女性教師）は素晴らしい教師だと語っている、こんな内容です、そして、この呼称の決定は、この生徒の提案がクラスの多数決で圧倒的に支持された結果だということのようです。

　こうしてみるとある疑念が湧いてくるんですが、この7歳の生徒、下手をすればこの生徒がスーダン刑法に触れることをしたことになるわけで、それを回避するために生徒の両親が「扇動」で告発した、そういう背景ってのが想像出来るんですが、そこに関して具体的言及は今のところ見あたりません。

　そしてこれが最新報だと思いますが、CNNに「Bid to stop whipping over toy bear」という記事があり、その中にスーダン外務相次官の

"If the intentions are good, definitely she will be absolved and will be cautioned not to repeat this thing again," Mutrif Siddig, Sudan's under secretary for foreign affairs, said.

との談話が引用されています。
ザックリ「彼女に悪意がないことが分かれば、再発防止に努めるよう注意されるだけで間違いなく訴追は免除されるだろう。」ってな感じですが、スーダンが外交解決に動いているちゅうことでしょう。

以下2007/11/28の17:44追記

　さて、その後の展開ですがBBCニュースの「Sudan 'could free teacher soon'」によると

Dr Khalid al Mubarak, a spokesman for the Sudan embassy in London, said he was confident that Ms Gibbons would be cleared quickly. He told BBC News: "We have Christian schools in the Sudan, we have Christian teachers who teach Muslim children, which shows a great deal of tolerance. "The vice-president of our country is a Christian, we have many ministers who are Christian, and historically we became Christians round about the same time as England. "Our relationship with Britain is so good that we wouldn't like such a minute event to be overblown."
He said what was happening was standard procedure because one of the parents had complained and the police were bound to investigate. He added: "I am pretty certain that this minute incident will be clarified very quickly and this teacher who has been helping us with the teaching of children will be safe and will be cleared."

ですからイギリスの外交圧力が奏功したようで、彼女は程なく釈放となるようです。

　ですげーと思うのは、GUARDIANの記事に紹介された7歳の生徒が

But a seven-year-old pupil in Ms Gibbons' class at the Christian, fee-paying school has jumped to his teacher's defence.

っとヒーロー扱いなんですわｗ


その他参照記事
Diplomatic row erupts over teddy teacher
Teddy bear row teacher could be spared jail

テディベアで逮捕された気の毒なおばさん

　スーダンはハルツームの小高一貫学校でイギリス人の女性教師が逮捕されたそうだ。
なんで逮捕されたかちゅうと、7歳の生徒がテディーベアの縫いぐるみに「ムハンマド」ちゅう名前をつけることを容認したからだそうで、こんな話を聞くとどはずれて無神経な僕なんかもイスラム圏には行かない方が良いような気がするな。

　キリスト教圏でイスラム教徒がテディーベアに「ジーザス」って名前つけても逮捕はされんだろうし仏教国では尚更だろ？　なんでこうもイスラムってのは非寛容なんだろか？

　逮捕された教師は8月に赴任したばっかのジリアン・ギボンズちゅう54歳で独身の先生らしいんだが、この学校ちゅうのがまたややこやしくて、設立したのはキリスト教団体らしいんだが生徒はキリスト教徒もいればイスラム教徒もいるっと。

サルコジ中国でボロ儲け

“実利関係”強化へ　中仏首脳会談

　サルコジ大統領には、フランスの企業代表４８人が随行してきた。フランス通信（ＡＦＰ）などによると両国は同日、北京の人民大会堂で、原発や航空機などを中国に売却する総額３兆３０００億円の大型契約に調印。フランスの第３世代原子炉の２基売却契約のほか、エアバスＡ３２０型とＡ３３０型の計１６０機受注などが含まれている。中国は２０２０年までに最大３２基の原発新設を計画している。

　欧州連合（ＥＵ）は１９８９年の天安門事件以降、対中武器禁輸を実施してきた。中国は禁輸解除を目指しているがドイツが慎重姿勢を示してきたため、「サルコジ大統領の今後の役割に強く期待」（中国の軍事専門家）している。

20ビリオンユーロだから20億ユーロ、まぁざっくり3兆2千5百億円だな。

　メルケルにしてもサルコジにしてもふんとにヨーロッパの連中ちゅうのはこすからいな。
で今回のサルコジが前回のメルケルより大きなお土産を手にしたのは、西側の大国で唯一ダライラマを呼ばなかった国だからなんだな。

　まあそのうち日本海をミラージュが飛ぶ日が来るんだろうさ。