軍国少年の半世紀、そして結局...
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以下讀賣の昨日の記事と今朝の社説ですが、テロとの戦いの真実の姿ってのはアメリカの敵との戦いだちゅう視点はどこにもない。
そして、アメリカの敵はとりもなおさず日本の敵だちゅう媚米保守独特の目の曇りを感じさせるんだが、まあそれは読売に限ったことでも産経に限ったことでもなく、広く世の中に横溢するステレオタイプなんだろう。
「給油活動の早期再開に努力」首相が米国防長官に説明
米国防長官来日 同盟強化へ個別課題を解決せよ(11月9日付・読売社説)
しかしアメリカのせいで数多の石油利権を失ったいることも事実だし、アラブの急進派やイスラム原理主義者が敵としているのは日本ではなくキリスト教徒でありイスラエルの庇護者であるアメリカだちゅうのも真実なんだな。
さすがにゲイツは、石破がたびたび言うような、日本が給油艦をインド洋に出していることによってマラッカ海峡の海賊が減ったなんてなアホな三段論法は繰り出しちゃ来ていないが、中心的な論旨は似たようなもんだ。
僕がイラク派兵に賛成したのはあくまでも対朝鮮の交渉力の担保としてアメリカの存在が必要だと思ったからなのであり、そこが崩れようとしている今、イラク派兵にしてもインド洋は兵にしても、これはアメリカに対する恫喝手段として使うべきなのであり、そういう文脈で小沢一郎のてろ特反対を支持したわけよ。
であるのにかんじんの政府関係者がこれだ。
拉致には触れているものの讀賣の記事にも社説にも書かれてはいないが、ガチャ目の石破はこんなことを言ってしまったらしい。
ちなみにこれも讀賣は書いてないんだけど、高村外相はゲイツに対して
あいつの胸にくっついてるブルーリボンバッヂはやっぱただのアクセサリーなんだろ。
Gates: Japan, Others Must Address NKorea
その他参照記事
Gates Urges More Japanese Action on Global Security
そして、アメリカの敵はとりもなおさず日本の敵だちゅう媚米保守独特の目の曇りを感じさせるんだが、まあそれは読売に限ったことでも産経に限ったことでもなく、広く世の中に横溢するステレオタイプなんだろう。
「給油活動の早期再開に努力」首相が米国防長官に説明
福田首相は8日、首相官邸でゲーツ米国防長官と約30分間会談し、インド洋における海上自衛隊の給油活動再開に向け、新テロ対策特別措置法案の成立に全力をあげる考えを伝えた。
首相は「早期再開に最大限努力している」と説明し、ゲーツ長官は日本政府の取り組みに期待感を表明した。
首相は今月中旬の訪米を控え、「日米同盟は日本の安全、地域の平和と安定のため不可欠だ。今後とも強化したい」と述べ、日米関係を重視する方針を強調した。長官は「米軍再編など日本との防衛協力を着実に進めたい。米国は日本と協力しながらアジア外交を進めていく」と応じた。
ゲーツ長官は、町村官房長官、高村外相、石破防衛相とも相次ぎ会談した。
石破防衛相は会談で、自衛隊の海外派遣の在り方を定める恒久法(一般法)の整備を目指す考えを伝えた。会談終了後に記者会見した防衛相は「政府、国会で取り組む課題だと申し上げた」と述べた。
高村外相と長官の会談では、北朝鮮の核開発をめぐる6か国協議が「年末に向け重要な局面を迎える」との認識で一致。日米が協力して北朝鮮問題に取り組む方針を確認した。
在日米軍駐留経費の日本側負担(思いやり予算)の見直しについては、来年3月の期限までに交渉を終えることで合意した。
(2007年11月8日22時38分 読売新聞)
米国防長官来日 同盟強化へ個別課題を解決せよ(11月9日付・読売社説)
日米同盟を揺るぎないものとするため、相互の信頼を損ないかねない様々な懸案を着実に解決しなければならない。以下のAPの報道に拠れば、上智大学で講演したゲイツは、日本人はすべての石油需要の80%を中東に依存していることを思い出すべきだちゅうよなことをこいたらしいんだが(※1)、確かに依存はしている。
インド洋で給油活動に従事していた海上自衛隊の撤収、北朝鮮のテロ支援国指定の解除、在日米軍駐留経費の日本側負担(思いやり予算)の削減、在日米軍再編、米国産牛肉の輸入条件緩和――などである。
ゲーツ米国防長官が初めて来日し、福田首相、石破防衛相、高村外相らと会談した。ゲーツ長官は、海自の給油活動を「国際社会全体に対する貢献」と評価し、早期再開への期待を表明した。福田首相らは「最大限の努力」を約束した。
「テロとの戦い」を主導する米国は、海自のインド洋からの撤収について表だった批判や要求を控えている。過去の経験から、露骨な外圧は逆効果と判断しているのだろう。だが、強い「失望」は多くのルートで日本に伝えられている。
外交は結果重視の冷徹な世界だ。衆参ねじれ国会の下で、新テロ対策特別措置法案の成立が困難な国内事情をいくら説明しても、同情はともかく、評価はされない。日本は、「努力」だけでなく、「結果」を出す必要がある。
日本は、北朝鮮のテロ支援国指定を解除しないよう米国に求めている。拉致問題に進展がない段階で解除されれば、日本側にくすぶる対米不信が一気に高まりかねない。
米国は「拉致問題を考慮する」と言明しているが、年内に解除を決定するとの観測も強い。給油の中断が長期化すれば、米国の判断に影響する恐れがある。
在日米軍への思いやり予算について、ゲーツ長官と高村外相は、来年3月に期限が切れる特別協定の日米事務レベル交渉を加速することで合意した。
日本側は交渉で、年2170億円の思いやり予算の削減を主張し、現状維持を求める米側と対立している。
米軍基地の日本人労働者の給与・手当水準は国家公務員と比較して高すぎるとの指摘がある。無駄な経費の節減は当然だし、冷静で実務的な議論が必要だ。だが、数十億円程度の削減幅をめぐる対立で、日米関係を損なってはなるまい。
米国防総省は今年、アジア太平洋担当の次官補ポストを新設し、アジア重視の姿勢を打ち出した。急速に軍事大国化する中国や、北朝鮮の核の脅威に対処する体制を整える狙いだろう。
日本としても、今後の地域情勢の変化を展望すれば、能動的に日米同盟の戦略的な強化を図ることが重要だ。福田首相の来週の初訪米を、そのための好機と位置づけるべきである。
(2007年11月9日1時33分 読売新聞)
しかしアメリカのせいで数多の石油利権を失ったいることも事実だし、アラブの急進派やイスラム原理主義者が敵としているのは日本ではなくキリスト教徒でありイスラエルの庇護者であるアメリカだちゅうのも真実なんだな。
さすがにゲイツは、石破がたびたび言うような、日本が給油艦をインド洋に出していることによってマラッカ海峡の海賊が減ったなんてなアホな三段論法は繰り出しちゃ来ていないが、中心的な論旨は似たようなもんだ。
僕がイラク派兵に賛成したのはあくまでも対朝鮮の交渉力の担保としてアメリカの存在が必要だと思ったからなのであり、そこが崩れようとしている今、イラク派兵にしてもインド洋は兵にしても、これはアメリカに対する恫喝手段として使うべきなのであり、そういう文脈で小沢一郎のてろ特反対を支持したわけよ。
であるのにかんじんの政府関係者がこれだ。
拉致には触れているものの讀賣の記事にも社説にも書かれてはいないが、ガチャ目の石破はこんなことを言ってしまったらしい。
ちなみにこれも讀賣は書いてないんだけど、高村外相はゲイツに対して
The Japanese have expressed concerns about the possibility that North Korea may eventually be taken off the U.S. list of countries that support terrorism.ちゅうんだから、アメリカが北朝鮮をテロ支援国家リストから外すことに関する懸念を表明したらしんだが、石破は「北朝鮮をテロ支援国家から除外する件を遅らせることに関する保障をゲイツに求めない。」(※2)と言ってるそうだ。
あいつの胸にくっついてるブルーリボンバッヂはやっぱただのアクセサリーなんだろ。
Gates: Japan, Others Must Address NKorea
"It is worth remembering that Japan imports 80 percent of its oil from the gulf to power its economy."(※1)
Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura said Thursday that he and Gates reaffirmed international efforts to get North Korea to accomplish its obligations to disable its atomic weapons programs. "In the meantime, Japan and the U.S. will steadily continue our joint missile defense programs," Komura said. The Japanese have expressed concerns about the possibility that North Korea may eventually be taken off the U.S. list of countries that support terrorism. But on Thursday, Ishiba said he did not seek any specific assurances from Gates that such a decision be delayed.(※2)
その他参照記事
Gates Urges More Japanese Action on Global Security
PR
Press Conference at Japan National Press Club
Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Tokyo, Japan November 3, 2007
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to see you all. I guess I was misinformed. I thought was coming here to give my views on next year's baseball season. But maybe we'll do that on another occasion. Let me just say that -- let me talk about where we are in the Six-Party process, where we hope to be by the end of the year and, I'd like to say, where we must be in '08 -- which is that two days ago we had an American team go in to the DPRK. I talked to the head of that team, Sung Kim, a few hours ago. They are in Pyongyang and tomorrow will be going to Yongbyon, the site of the nuclear installation. And they will begin the process of disabling the DPRK plutonium production facilities in Yongbyon. This will be the first time those facilities have ever been disabled. And, of course, the idea of disablement is to create a situation where it is very difficult to bring those facilities back online and certainly a very expensive, difficult prospect of ever bringing them back online. So this will be, I think, an important moment when it's done. They'll be going to Yongbyon tomorrow, and by Monday they'll begin their work. We anticipate; indeed, we welcome the other Six-Party members taking part in these disabling actions. I know the Japanese Government is currently considering how it will take part in this process. So it is our hope that by the end of this year we will have a Yongbyon facility that is substantially disabled and that from disabling we will go in a seamless continuum toward dismantlement -- that is, toward taking these facilities apart and making sure that they are irreversibly, that they're never again used for the purpose that they were used for before. In addition, we look forward -- probably in the next week or two -- to begin to discuss with the DPRK a list of all of their nuclear programs that must be disabled and dismantled pursuant to the requirements set forth in the September '05 agreement, where the DPRK undertook the obligation to abandon all of its nuclear programs and nuclear weapons. So we look forward to beginning the process of the North Koreans providing us with a full declaration of their programs. This needs to be done through the Six-Party process. So probably the Chinese hosts will be convening some kind of meeting of the denuclearization working group to look at this full list, and we'll continue to proceed on that. So in addition, as part of the process of providing us with a full list, we will be continuing our efforts with the DPRK and the dialogue that is already underway to deal with our concerns -- very real concerns -- about the status of their uranium enrichment. Clearly, we have to make sure that -- as we get to the end of this process -- not only is there no plutonium being produced, but we also need to make sure that there's no uranium being enriched. So that is also an ongoing process. So by the end of year, we hope to be -- in terms of the road toward complete denuclearization -- we hope to have arrived at an important milestone, where there is a complete disablement of the Yongbyon facilities, where there is a full list of additional facilities which also need to be disabled, and the uranium enrichment is also resolved to mutual satisfaction. This means that as we begin '08, we need to focus very much on the fact that North Korea has already produced some 30, 40, 50 -- we will know precisely from the declaration -- kilos of weaponized plutonium. So that is something that the DPRK needs to abandon pursuant to the September '05 agreement. In addition, we would look, as I mentioned earlier, to move from disabling to dismantling of the nuclear facilities. In order to get something like this you have to give something. This is a negotiation. So it is a tough negotiation. I've done a number of these in my diplomatic career. None were as difficult as this. So we have agreed -- the Six Parties have agreed -- to provide an additional 950,000 tons of fuel oil for the disablement phase. And as we go forward to the dismantlement and abandonment phase, we can anticipate additional energy requests from the DPRK. In addition, a number of us have agreed to move ahead on our bilateral relationships. Japan and the DPRK have an ongoing bilateral working group, as does the United States. From the U.S. perspective, we made very clear to the DPRK that we are prepared to achieve normalization of our relations, but we will not normalize relations with the DPRK until the DPRK is fully denuclearized. That is, there will be no normalization of relations with a nuclear DPRK. But we are prepared to move along this road. It doesn't mean that all our disagreements with the DPRK will be over, but it does mean that if they denuclearize, we can have a normal relationship, where we will continue our dialogue as we deal with disagreements as we do with many other states in the world. In addition, the United States has agreed to participate in an effort to end the Korean War by replacing the Armistice with some sort of peace process. We are prepared to begin our participation on substantial disablement by the end of this year, but we are not prepared to conclude a peace process, a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. We are not prepared to conclude that until there is denuclearization. That is, again, we cannot get to the end until the DPRK gets to the end of denuclearization. Finally, the United States is also prepared to participate in the overall creation of a Northeast Asian peace and security dialogue or forum. The purpose of this is to begin the process of building a neighborhood in Northeast Asia. In no way is it designed to replace the very key bilateral relationships, the bilateral alliances that the United States has and is very proud to have with a number of countries in Asia, including with Japan and with the Republic of Korea. But it is an effort to begin, I think, a long-term project building a sense of neighborhood in Northeast Asia. And I do like to believe that the Six-Party process, as difficult and is frustrating as it has been over the months and years, has gotten a start on getting countries in the region to work together toward a common goal. And so we would look to see that -- once this denuclearization is achieved -- we can continue to build on the foundation of the Six-Party process, so that we can have a more permanent forum on the landscape of Northeast Asia. So with those sorts of introductory comments, let me maybe go to questions.
QUESTION: Nakai of Mainichi newspaper company. Ambassador Hill, thank you for coming. DPRK transfer of nuclear technology to Syria or proliferation to Syria is emerging as an issue. In your negotiations with DPRK, have they guaranteed that they are not proliferating nuclear technology to Syria? Have you ever obtained that guarantee from DPRK? Now without such guarantee, if you have not obtained such commitment, assurance from DPRK, will this be linked to the Six-Party Talks? Or will the Six-Party Talks not consider this Syria issue as one of the obstacles?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, first of all, our interest in being engaged in a Six-Party process stems from our concern about the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons and what it means in the region -- to the stability of Northeast Asia -- but also [what it] means in terms of proliferation. Proliferation has been a primary concern of ours all along. We have approached the DPRK on the subject many times. We have received assurances that they will not transfer and have not been transferring or engaging in proliferation. On the other hand, we have to be vigilant about this. And we have to be really continuing to watch closely areas of concern, areas of the world where we have our concerns, including in Syria. So we have to be very much on top of this matter. I think as much as we value the DPRK making a declaration -- and you saw in the October 3 agreement that they did make a declaration of no transfer -- I think that's not enough for us. I think we have to be very vigilant and continue to watch for this problem. I believe the Six-Party process is the appropriate process for dealing with proliferation. The issue one faces when one hears reports of this is, what are you going to do about it? Do you stay engaged? Do you keep working on it diplomatically? Or do you somehow pull back from the diplomatic process? And we feel it's very necessary to stay engaged -- because when you pull back from something, you have to ask yourself the question, where are you going? What is the strategy you are trying to devise in order to achieve a goal? And so as we stay in the process, our strategy is to be diplomatically active -- to work with our partners, to continue to work with partners in the Six-Party process, but also to emphasize the various counterproliferation measures that we have, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. So we feel that staying engaged is the way to keep other countries also engaged, and ultimately is the way to deal with the threat posed by proliferation.
QUESTION: Hayashi of NHK. I have two questions. First of all, very shortly the (delisting) process will begin. Specifically, what will this process involve? Japan is very interested in delisting of DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It seems that what you're explaining to Japan and what you're explaining to DPRK may or may not be different. `Are they truly consistent, what you are explaining to DPRK and Japan? Those are the two questions.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, they are consistent. `The DPRK wants very much to be delisted, and we are prepared to work with them. Indeed, we are obligated according to the February agreement to have begun this process, which we have begun. And whether or not we get to the end of this process, of course, depends on future developments. It's not just dependent on denuclearization;it's also dependent on the statutory requirements of this U.S. law with respect to the terrorism list. I think it's important to understand that this is a U.S. list, U.S. law passed by the U.S. Congress, supported by the U.S. President. So what we are doing in the U.S. is to work with the DPRK to ensure that, if they want to be delisted, that they have to qualify to be delisted. Now you don't delist a country because they have done something in some other area where you want them to do something. They have to address the terrorism concerns that put them on the list in the first place. So we will be working with them on that. I think it's in our interest that when there are countries on the terrorism list, it needs to be understood that they are on the list for a reason. They are on the list because they've been supporting terrorism in some respect. So it's in our interest to get countries to stop supporting terrorism and therefore to get off the list. So we are working with them. I don't want to make a prediction now of where we end up on this. But I will say that we understand very well the great sensitivity of this terrorism list. We understand that -- even though it is a U.S. list and a U.S. law passed by a U.S. Congress and signed by a U.S. President -- that nonetheless it has international repercussions, including in some countries;in Japan itself. We are in very close contact with Japan on this issue. We are in very close contact with Japan on our mutual efforts to achieve progress, achieve meaningful progress on the matter of the Japanese citizens so brutally abducted some years ago by the DPRK. So we will continue to work very closely with Japan on this issue of delisting and the relationship of this issue to the abduction issue.
QUESTION:Could you repeat the first question with regard to disablement? What's the actual process involved in disablement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Sorry. What was the first part of your question? On disablement, we have agreed on a number of measures. We met in a denuclearization working group in Shenyang;I think it was August 16. And we came up with a list of measures that were designed to make sure that, in shutting down the nuclear facilities, that they couldn't easily be turned on again. So we negotiated the list with the North Koreans. It was one of these tough negotiations. They wanted us to do less, and we wanted them to do more. But we came up with a list of measures which in their totality, we believe, will make sure that even if on a certain day the North Koreans wanted to restart the plutonium -- which, by the way, would be a very bad day for all of us -- that it would take them well over a year to do that. So we have a concept that disabling should be something that, in order to reverse the disabling, you would need more than a year. So the disabling involves measures, very technical measures, in the three parts of the Yongbyon complex. First, the fuel fabrication facility. Second, the actual 5-megawatt reactor. Thirdly, the reprocessing facility, where the spent fuel rods would be taken from the 5-megawatt reactor. So these are technical measures that we will work with North Korean engineers on. One of the first that needs to be done is, we need to do some cleanup of the pond where the discharged fuel from the reactor needs to go -- because eventually we want the discharged fuel to be canned and sent out of North Korea. And so, in order to do that, we're going to have to clean the pond up. So that's one of the things that's going to get done in the next couple of days -- or started to get done, because discharging fuel will take many weeks. We also, I think, will begin with some measures that are fairly easy to accomplish in the reprocessing facility. And we will continue from there. Altogether, I think the process is going to take a full two months. And even at the end of December, when we will have substantial disabling, we need to be careful not to hurry things in a way that could cause any health risk to anyone working on the process. So we'll have to be careful on that. But, I think, by the end of all this you'll see that we have a Yongbyon that is disabled and ready for the next stage, which is to be dismantled. And so far, I'm pleased to say, we've had good cooperation from the DPRK technicians and experts on the spot.
QUESTION:Miyata of Asahi newspaper company. I have a question with regard to plutonium. By the end of the year, you said, Ambassador Hill, in the declaration list already the plutonium extracted, the nuclear-bomb substances, will probably be included. What is the attitude on the part of DPRK with regard to this list? And if they have agreed to include that in the list, then what would be the process to follow? In other words, will plutonium be included as a subject of denuclearization? And what is the position of the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:We are expecting to get the list, the initial list, very soon. And so I'll be able to answer your question a little better when I actually see the list. But one thing that we have had considerable discussions about already is the need that -- the full list of nuclear programs needs to include nuclear material. And the DPRK, at the working group on denuclearization -- the Six-Party working group on denuclearization in Shenyang on the 16th of August -- told us it would include the material. That is, all of the fissile material;that is, the separated plutonium. This is going to be very important, because what we will need to see on the fissile material is a list that we can verify. Because, again, this is the crucial question. Do they have 30 kilograms? Do they have 40? Do they have 50? How much of that was used during the nuclear test that they made in October '06? And when we come up with the figure, we need to verify that figure. So the answer to your question is, yes, this is expected to be on the list. And I would argue that there are a number of other nuclear programs not at Yongbyon that also need to be on the list. And remember, we started with Yongbyon because we thought that was the most achievable objective by the end of this year. But it's not the only nuclear facility that needs to be put out of commission. I would expect that as we get this list of plutonium, we'll be able to verify it. And then we'll know what we are dealing with as we get to what I hope will be the final phase in '08.
QUESTION: [Inaudible] from Italian Sky 24 News. Two small questions. The first one is, did you know ? since you mentioned that the Japanese authorities are considering sending their own team to check about the disablement of Yongbyon -- do you feel that there has been a change in the new government toward more constructivity and pragmatism compared with the last Abe Administration? And the second one is, since we are almost the last year of the Bush Administration, you know that in 2000 that Clinton was very close to deliver a deal with North Korea. How would be your prediction, if you can give us a prediction, about the possible delivering by the Bush Administration right before elections?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I only make predictions in baseball. (Laughter) So I don't know if I can make a prediction on your point there, except to say I've had a lot of discussions with the DPRK representatives on my concern -- I think everybody's concern -- that we not run out of time. And I think if you look at what happened in 2000, we ran out of time. And I don't want that to happen. That's one of the reasons we're pushing this thing to try to get disablement through by December 31 -- because a lot of people point out, well wait a minute;can you really get it done by December 31? Aren't there other things you need to disable? I need to make sure the dismantlement/abandonment phase starts on January 1, if not on January 2, so that we have a chance to get through that. So I'm very mindful of the concern about the running out of time. I've had those conversations with the DPRK, and I believe they understand why we are pushing these deadlines. And they support the idea of getting through this in '08. But those are expressions of support in a general sense. And nuclear weapons and things like that are real proof of the old adage, "the devil is in the details" -- because there are a lot of details in this issue, and we've got to get through a lot of those. Let me just say with respect to dealing with the Japanese, I don't think there's a negotiating team that we've had closer relationships with than the Japanese negotiating team. And this has gone on for me since the Koizumi premiership. So I've worked very closely with Sasae-san on these issues. These are tough issues for everybody. You know, having a Six-Party process -- I mean, Japan is in a very special place, because not only is it really in the shadow of some of these nuclear threats, it's also in the shadow of missile threats. And it's very much burdened by the shadow of this terrible abduction matter. So we have to fully factor in and fully understand Japanese sensitivities on this, and that's why I spend a lot of time with my Japanese counterparts. You should see my phone bill. You know, I'm calling Tokyo. So I think we have good cooperation. It's not for me to talk about Japanese Government attitudes to their own negotiations. You know, they have a bilateral process the way we do. It's not for me to say, should they give more or should they give less? How flexible should they be? That's really for them to do. Except to say that I can assure you we have very good relations with Japan, and we are not engaged in a Six-Party process in order see our relationship with Japan worsen. On the contrary, we see this as a real example where the U.S. and Japan, with a common interest -- the number-one, number-two economies in the world -- we ought to work together. And I think together we're going to solve this.
QUESTION:Nishimura of Hokkaido Newspaper. Ambassador Hill, last month at Congress when you testified (about) fuel oil supplied to DPRK -- 50,000 by South Korea, next China, and thirdly U.S., and fourthly Russia. That is the expectation, you said. And with regard to Japan, because of the abduction issue, Japan has not yet participated. I think that's what you reported to the Congress last month. Now Japan and DPRK, without the abduction issue being settled, fuel oil will stop at Russia? Or will there be a second round starting once again with South Korea? So what is the position of Japan in fuel-oil aid?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Well, I can't really talk about the position of Japan on this. But what I can do is tell you that when we agreed that we would provide 50,000 tons of oil for the shutdown, and then if the DPRK wanted more oil -- which they did -- we said, "Well then, shutdown is not enough. Freezing is not enough. We have to go to disabling." And so we agreed that they would disable the facilities for an additional 950,000 tons. Now the South Koreans took the first shipment, the 50,000, which was the shipment of oil in return for which the DPRK froze or shut down for the purpose of eventual abandonment the nuclear facilities. And so the South Koreans didn't want to be the only people supplying oil. So we did an addendum to the agreement in February '07 in which four countries agreed to participate. And Japan agreed to participate once its concerns were met. And, as I've just mentioned to the previous question, I think Japan has a lot of particular issues, namely the abduction issue, that it feels it needs to make progress on. And so it was agreed that Japan would join as its concerns were met. So we have done tranches of oil -- that is, 50,000 tons each. Now why 50,000 tons? That seems to be the maximum that the ports will take in the DPRK. So after we go through this first round, we would anticipate just going through a second round and a third round. Again, when Japan is able to participate -- I'm sure Japan will participate, but, you know, it's not for me to be advising Japan on that. I think we understand that Japan has some very special issues here. So we will continue to proceed on this. I might note, too, that other countries have inquired about whether they can participate in this process. And we've welcomed other countries, and I think we'll look to see if other countries can come in. What's important, I might mention -- a little pause to mention a little more on this oil situation -- we are not paying oil in order for North Korea to do nothing, to stand in place. We're giving them oil in order for them to go deeper into denuclearization. If they want more oil, they need to do more denuclearization. So when the 950,000 tons finishes, if they want more of that, they need to move to the next phase. And we've been working very hard on that. It is not in our interest or anyone's interest to starve the DPRK of energy. On the contrary, it's to show the DPRK that they can get out of this nuclear business -- which has been very, very harmful for their position -- and can get energy through other means and can eventually be in a better position with energy thanks to giving up their nuclear ambitions.
QUESTION:Blaine Hardin, Washington Post. I have a question about the diplomatic efforts of North Korea in recent weeks. They've sent envoys to a number of countries where they haven't been recently, trying to open up more to the West and the rest of the world. Do you see this of a piece with the agreements that are occurring in the denuclearization issue? In other words, do you have a judgement about something changing in North Korea that is opening up and trying to change their position vis-a-vis the rest of the world?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Yes. You know, I saw that article. I can't remember if it was in the Post or the Times -- probably both. But -- AP, okay. I saw that article. I read it with great interest -- because the notion that their cooperation in the Six-Party process is being accompanied by a diplomatic effort to expand their recognition, it's an interesting concept. I can't say that I've seen how it is linked. Except to say that as they participate in the Six-Party process there does appear to be, in the context as we talk to them in the Six-Party process, the desire to overcome their isolation and an understanding that -- whereas in the past North Korea often spoke of their isolation as a great benefit for their country -- I think they've understood it now as something that is actually harming them, and that the best-case scenario for what they're doing is to believe that perhaps it is part of an overall effort to open up. I do believe that the DPRK understands that isolation in the 21st Century is not a ticket to the future. Quite to the contrary, it will leave the DPRK further behind. It's so interesting to look at economic growth statistics in East Asia and see that the two countries in East Asia that did not grow last year, that had negative growth, were the DPRK and Burma. And if you look at the degree of interaction that those countries have with abroad, you'll see that both of them are really very isolated. Burma's trade, for example, is a tiny fraction of Vietnam's trade. So I think there is an understanding. It's the sort of thing that, if you had sort of wide open North Korean interlocutors, you would ask them. You'd say, "Well, what's this about?" But, alas, they kind of keep pretty much task-oriented. And if they're there to talk about denuclearization, they talk about denuclearization. They don't engage in a broader discussion on that, unfortunately. But I do have the sense that they understand that they need to open up. I also have the sense that they are doing this with great care -- that not everyone in the DPRK agrees with this position and that it's going to be a slow process. But I think it's a very necessary process. And I might add that the Chinese, who probably know the DPRK best, believe that there is an effort on the part of the DPRK to open. The Chinese believe that some of their efforts to show DPRK officials the new economy are providing some kind of incentive for the DPRK to open up. So I think it's an interesting development.
I might just mention one other point:I thought it was very interesting that they have done so much with Vietnam, because Vietnam is a country which also was very closed with a very stagnant economy. And now it's opening up, and it's made an awful lot of progress. The DPRK and Vietnam went through a very rough patch a few years ago, when Vietnam helped get some DPRK refugees on to South Korea. So it is interesting that they've reached out again to Vietnam. And I think it's something to keep our eye on, and I believe it's a positive development.
And one other thing:I think it's positive because we have been very diplomatically active in making sure every country understands:one, we are doing all we can to get this thing solved, this denuclearization issue solved;and, two, we need all the help we can get to make sure that every message coming from every country that the DPRK engages with is the same message -- which is that you get out of the nuclear business, and you'll have a much better future.
QUESTION:Chio Nakamoto, Financial Times. You mentioned the many requirements for the DPRK to be delisted from the list of countries that support terrorism. How far would you say they are to the end of the road? Are they midway? Are they way down the road? How far do you think they are to the end?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:I don't know. I think -- You know, these requirements are embedded in U.S. law. So we've had some of our lawyers actually talk to them about what they need to do to achieve the US statutory requirements. I think they have to come out with some kind of declaration. So I think the answer to your question would be -- has to await their declaration, to see whether they have taken the steps they need to take. But these steps are embedded in U.S. law. They're for all to see, and so we have to see if the North Koreans are prepared to take them. You know, there are a couple of steps that we know they have taken, which are very important. That is, the UN covenants on terrorism, and they acceded to those in the 1990's. But, clearly, there will be other things. But we're working with them -- again, with U.S. lawyers, because this is a matter of U.S. law.
QUESTION: Deguchi of Kyodo News. It's a related question to the previous one. The Department of State comes up with its country reports on terrorism on an annual basis. And in terrorism state sponsors there was one item -- that they continue to protect the hijackers of the airplane. And in order for them to be delisted, the sending of those criminals back to Japan, that extraditing is also a requirement? And have you required that to the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Let me just say, that issue has come up. I think we can reach a satisfactory result on that. I'm not sure -- I really should have a State Department lawyer here to answer the question of whether it's a statutory requirement that they would have to return the Japanese Red Army terrorists from the 1970 hijacking. So I'm not sure if it's a statutory requirement. I should check with our legal people on that. The issue has come up. I must say, what I've been careful to do on dealing with this is, you know, we'd like to see progress on this abduction issue. And I would like to focus to the extent that there would be people coming out of the DPRK and back to Japan. I would like it to be abductees. That's sort of our focus. I don't want any thoughts that, you know, they could satisfy one request by fulfilling another. So I think that we'll work through that issue. But, again, I don't feel comfortable answering your question on the legal issue. Again, I can't emphasize enough. This is U.S. domestic law. It's in our Congress. It's not an international law. It's a U.S. law that has created this terrorism list.
QUESTION: Inoue of TBS. The timing of taking them off of the terrorism list -- is there any understanding with the North Koreans if there is a notification to the Congress, which is 45 days prior to the actual removal, the notification to the Congress is equivalent to the actual removal from the list?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: First of all, I can tell you're a Washington correspondent, because you know our law better than many Americans do. So congratulations. The 45 days is a notice period. It goes to Congress. Now we have notice periods in a lot of U.S. laws. So the point of a notice period is to give some opportunity for the Congress to express its views on a decision that the Administration is prepared to take. Now once the federal government has sent a notice to Congress, it means that all -- that the federal government has made a decision that everything is done and ready to go. That is, whatever issue it is. Often, for example, we have notice requirements for foreign military sales. So let's say you have a foreign military sale, and you're going to send weapon system X to country Y. You have essentially gone through all of your requirements. And then, when you send it to Congress, it means that you are ready to go, and you're just giving Congress their right to comment. So once we would send a notice on something like the terrorism list -- on change to the terrorism list, adding a country or subtracting a country -- we would have completely done our homework and completely been prepared such that, in effect, the notice to Congress becomes the effective period, the effective date that we're dealing with. Now I think that's important to understand -- because when you look at the terrorism list, the terrorism list is essentially a set of restrictions on the U.S. Government. For example, the U.S. Government is not permitted by the statute, the terrorism list statute, the U.S. government is not permitted to provide or to sell to a country on the list any military equipment. Now there might be many other reasons you would not sell military equipment to a country on the list. But the statute makes clear -- if a country is on the list, you cannot sell them military equipment. Another issue is, if a country is on the list, you will not, for example, vote in favor of an international financial institution loan to that country. So these are a set of restrictions on the U.S. That's what the terrorism list is. So when we provide a notice to Congress, it means that we believe that the country fulfills all the objectives.
So I would say the day we provide the notice is the most important day.
QUESTION:Did you talk to the North Koreans about that? Is there an understanding?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Again, we have explained to them what these procedures are. But we have still to go through with them what their statutory requirements are in terms of affirming no connections with terrorists, with terrorist groups, and that sort of thing. And we plan to do that very soon, probably through what we call the New York channel. We will probably have some State Department lawyers do this, because, again, it's a legal matter in U.S. law.
QUESTION:Ukai from Asahi newspaper company. Disablement -- removal of the fuel rods is included? This is beyond the '94 Framework agreement, you have said that. But the removal of fuel rods was also included in that '94 Framework. So when you say "beyond the '94 Framework," what are the measures actually that go beyond that Framework agreement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:We've agreed on several measures that would make the reprocessing facility unusable. And, again, it's technical things. It's cutting chains;it's taking apart equipment. Things like that. I'm not in a position to stand here and give you precisely what they are. But in the opinion of our experts, they make it unusable -- and unusable for a period of a year, even if you wanted to reverse it. We've also taken some measures in the other two facilities -- the reactor and the fuel fabrication plant -- again, cutting chains, this sort of thing. The removing the fuel rods is important, although, you correctly point out, it's not unprecedented. Because what we want to do is, as you remove the fuel from the reactor, we want a situation where they have nothing to put back into the reactor. And that has to do with the so-called fresh fuel rods, and we have an agreement. There are some details to be worked out, but we have an agreement which would mean that they cannot put back any fresh fuel rods. So this is important -- because whereas in 2002, when they restarted the facilities, they were able within 60 days to get them going because they had the fresh fuel rods available. And what we would be doing is making sure they don't have those fresh fuel rods available and therefore cannot restart the reactor, even if that were the only step that we're taking. But I want to emphasize, it's not the only one. I think what we want to do, in terms of the actual measures that we take, is that we have there about 10 of them. And what we would like to do is get going on them, get through them, see whether there are some additional ones, see whether there are some of those that we might not feel are worth doing. But what we want to do is once we go through these -- and, by the way, as I said earlier, we will welcome other participants from other Six-Party countries to participate on this -- once we are done with this, then I think that's an appropriate time to explain precisely what has been done, and why it was done, and how much disabling it contributes to. Now I would like to make one other point, which is that if we are in the position where everything has fallen apart and the DPRK starts trying to reconstitute the nuclear facilities again -- whether it takes them 12 months, 14 months, 16 months, or even 24 months -- we've got a big problem. So we don't think we should get too hung up on the question of whether it's 12 or 14. That would be a huge problem. What we're trying to do is make sure we have a disabling so that that disabling will be overtaken by events -- events that are scheduled for '08, when we would go to dismantling and, importantly, abandonment of the separated plutonium. So I think disabling is a necessary step, without which we can't go further. But we can't stop at disabling.
MODERATOR:Ambassador Hill is Assistant Secretary in charge of East Asia and not specifically the DPRK, but is there any question related to that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:There's more to East Asia than the DPRK? (Laughter)
QUESTION:Aiko Doden from NHK. In your region of responsibility, Myanmar remains a politically and diplomatically challenging issue. In light of the situation where neither soft-line policy nor hard-line policy seems to have brought about any change, would providing any incremental incentives to Myanmar be an option for the U.S.?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:You know, I think I'd be careful of trying to put together incentives at this point for Burma. I mean, we have a government there that has just engaged in one of the most horrendous crackdowns on dissent that we've seen in several years. And I think to respond to this terrible crackdown by coming up with incentives, I think would send the wrong message. Indeed,. I think this is a time when we all need to be a little firm and, most importantly, united. I think we need to make sure that all countries, first of all, analyze the conditions on the ground in the way we do and to try to work in a broad diplomatic strategy -- so that when Burma gets pressure from ASEAN, they don't go run to China, because they'll get the same pressure from China. And if they get the pressure from China, they won't go run to India or some other country. So I think what's very important is, we need to create a diplomatic strategy where we can try to get all countries to understand that the situation in Burma is not only intolerable for the Burmese people, but it's intolerable for the region. And you know, I'm a pragmatist in foreign policy. And, frankly, I'm proud of that. I've been in this game for 30 years. And part of pragmatism is, you don't start setting up incentives for governments that have just behaved in the way they have -- because they will immediately misread it, and they will see it as a sign;they will see these incentives as a sign of weakness. So I think this is not the time to be reaching around and looking for new strategies. It's a time for a little patience, but most of all for a lot of resolve. It's a time to see diplomatic opportunities. I believe that, given this horrendous crackdown, this loss of life, the terrible spectacle of a Japanese journalist being shot to death on the street in front of us all -- I mean, a spectacle that should haunt all of us for the rest of our lives -- this is a time when we need to be a little tough-minded and understand that we can, with diplomacy, get one strategy, so that there is no sense among the Burmese junta that they can run off and hide behind some country and avoid the reckoning with the rest of the world. So we're going to support the Gambari plan, Mr. Gambari's approach. We're going to make sure that, as he goes forward, that China supports him, India supports him, ASEAN, U.S., Japan -- everybody supports him. And let's use this as an opportunity to come together, be unified, and have a lot of resolve. And let's get through this. And we will.
QUESTION:Dejima of Nikkei newspaper. Under Ambassador Kelly, CVID was one of the phrases used. Disablement -- you said that it means for at least one year they cannot resume the activity. Why this one-year benchmark? What's the reason behind it? And if, assuming that they resume within one year, how will you try to once again terminate their activities? One point I wish to confirm on the previous comments you made -- '08 process, or you have been saying the plan for '08, or eight year;can you elaborate on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Yes. First of all, when I talk about disablement, as I tried to suggest to the last question, this is an intermediate process -- disablement. We want to move to dismantlement, and we would like the measures we've taken to disable turned into measures to dismantle. Now, for example, a disabling measure might be, you take a piece of equipment out and you put it somewhere so it's hard to put back in. Dismantlement would be, you take the piece of equipment and it's impossible to put back in and you can't find a substitute piece of equipment. So that would be taking a disabling measure and going to dismantlement. So the D in CVID is dismantlement. And we want to get going on that. The I is, of course, irreversible. And so we want to make sure that, as we dismantle, they don't feel that they can reverse the dismantlement. So you take some piece of equipment out. You destroy it. You make sure there's no substitute for it. And that creates a sense of irreversible. So then the V, of course, is verifiable. Of course it has to be verified. This is not a game of "trust me." I mean, this is not a game where they pretend to disable or dismantle, and we pretend to believe them. We need for this to be verifiable. And finally, of course it needs to be complete. I mean, what's the point of stopping a plutonium program if you might have a uranium enrichment facility? So that's why we have to go after that issue too. So why we have done this on a step-by-step basis has to do with how you negotiate this. Believe me, I would love for this all to be done in one day. I would love to sit down in the Six Parties, and everyone agrees, "Well, let's just get this over today." I would love for it to be done in one day. It's not, because there are a lot of factors -- cultural, you name it. There are a bunch of reasons that the North Koreans don't want to just give up these weapons in a day. So what we have to do is a step-by-step process. You know, believe me, as that question about Burma suggested, there are other problems in the world I'd like to be working on as well, because I feel very strongly about those problems. But we've got to get through this, and I think the best way to do it is step-by-step. But I don't want these steps to be endless. So we have these timeframes, and we made December 31. It's a bit arbitrary, you know. We could have said December 30, or January 2, or something. But we made that there, and then we're trying to get through the final stage in '08. Now I'd like to see us get it through in the current U.S. administration, because I think if -- We started this process;I'd like to see us finish it. And that's our time schedule. So, you know, CVID is all there. Sometimes it's not -- You know, you have to ask yourself the question, does repeating "CVID" help the situation? Does it help to keep repeating the same term? Maybe it does;maybe it doesn't. But I'm just trying to get through this. I'm trying to get through it as pragmatically and, by the way, as quickly as possible.
Released on November 3, 2007
Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Tokyo, Japan November 3, 2007
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to see you all. I guess I was misinformed. I thought was coming here to give my views on next year's baseball season. But maybe we'll do that on another occasion. Let me just say that -- let me talk about where we are in the Six-Party process, where we hope to be by the end of the year and, I'd like to say, where we must be in '08 -- which is that two days ago we had an American team go in to the DPRK. I talked to the head of that team, Sung Kim, a few hours ago. They are in Pyongyang and tomorrow will be going to Yongbyon, the site of the nuclear installation. And they will begin the process of disabling the DPRK plutonium production facilities in Yongbyon. This will be the first time those facilities have ever been disabled. And, of course, the idea of disablement is to create a situation where it is very difficult to bring those facilities back online and certainly a very expensive, difficult prospect of ever bringing them back online. So this will be, I think, an important moment when it's done. They'll be going to Yongbyon tomorrow, and by Monday they'll begin their work. We anticipate; indeed, we welcome the other Six-Party members taking part in these disabling actions. I know the Japanese Government is currently considering how it will take part in this process. So it is our hope that by the end of this year we will have a Yongbyon facility that is substantially disabled and that from disabling we will go in a seamless continuum toward dismantlement -- that is, toward taking these facilities apart and making sure that they are irreversibly, that they're never again used for the purpose that they were used for before. In addition, we look forward -- probably in the next week or two -- to begin to discuss with the DPRK a list of all of their nuclear programs that must be disabled and dismantled pursuant to the requirements set forth in the September '05 agreement, where the DPRK undertook the obligation to abandon all of its nuclear programs and nuclear weapons. So we look forward to beginning the process of the North Koreans providing us with a full declaration of their programs. This needs to be done through the Six-Party process. So probably the Chinese hosts will be convening some kind of meeting of the denuclearization working group to look at this full list, and we'll continue to proceed on that. So in addition, as part of the process of providing us with a full list, we will be continuing our efforts with the DPRK and the dialogue that is already underway to deal with our concerns -- very real concerns -- about the status of their uranium enrichment. Clearly, we have to make sure that -- as we get to the end of this process -- not only is there no plutonium being produced, but we also need to make sure that there's no uranium being enriched. So that is also an ongoing process. So by the end of year, we hope to be -- in terms of the road toward complete denuclearization -- we hope to have arrived at an important milestone, where there is a complete disablement of the Yongbyon facilities, where there is a full list of additional facilities which also need to be disabled, and the uranium enrichment is also resolved to mutual satisfaction. This means that as we begin '08, we need to focus very much on the fact that North Korea has already produced some 30, 40, 50 -- we will know precisely from the declaration -- kilos of weaponized plutonium. So that is something that the DPRK needs to abandon pursuant to the September '05 agreement. In addition, we would look, as I mentioned earlier, to move from disabling to dismantling of the nuclear facilities. In order to get something like this you have to give something. This is a negotiation. So it is a tough negotiation. I've done a number of these in my diplomatic career. None were as difficult as this. So we have agreed -- the Six Parties have agreed -- to provide an additional 950,000 tons of fuel oil for the disablement phase. And as we go forward to the dismantlement and abandonment phase, we can anticipate additional energy requests from the DPRK. In addition, a number of us have agreed to move ahead on our bilateral relationships. Japan and the DPRK have an ongoing bilateral working group, as does the United States. From the U.S. perspective, we made very clear to the DPRK that we are prepared to achieve normalization of our relations, but we will not normalize relations with the DPRK until the DPRK is fully denuclearized. That is, there will be no normalization of relations with a nuclear DPRK. But we are prepared to move along this road. It doesn't mean that all our disagreements with the DPRK will be over, but it does mean that if they denuclearize, we can have a normal relationship, where we will continue our dialogue as we deal with disagreements as we do with many other states in the world. In addition, the United States has agreed to participate in an effort to end the Korean War by replacing the Armistice with some sort of peace process. We are prepared to begin our participation on substantial disablement by the end of this year, but we are not prepared to conclude a peace process, a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. We are not prepared to conclude that until there is denuclearization. That is, again, we cannot get to the end until the DPRK gets to the end of denuclearization. Finally, the United States is also prepared to participate in the overall creation of a Northeast Asian peace and security dialogue or forum. The purpose of this is to begin the process of building a neighborhood in Northeast Asia. In no way is it designed to replace the very key bilateral relationships, the bilateral alliances that the United States has and is very proud to have with a number of countries in Asia, including with Japan and with the Republic of Korea. But it is an effort to begin, I think, a long-term project building a sense of neighborhood in Northeast Asia. And I do like to believe that the Six-Party process, as difficult and is frustrating as it has been over the months and years, has gotten a start on getting countries in the region to work together toward a common goal. And so we would look to see that -- once this denuclearization is achieved -- we can continue to build on the foundation of the Six-Party process, so that we can have a more permanent forum on the landscape of Northeast Asia. So with those sorts of introductory comments, let me maybe go to questions.
QUESTION: Nakai of Mainichi newspaper company. Ambassador Hill, thank you for coming. DPRK transfer of nuclear technology to Syria or proliferation to Syria is emerging as an issue. In your negotiations with DPRK, have they guaranteed that they are not proliferating nuclear technology to Syria? Have you ever obtained that guarantee from DPRK? Now without such guarantee, if you have not obtained such commitment, assurance from DPRK, will this be linked to the Six-Party Talks? Or will the Six-Party Talks not consider this Syria issue as one of the obstacles?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, first of all, our interest in being engaged in a Six-Party process stems from our concern about the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons and what it means in the region -- to the stability of Northeast Asia -- but also [what it] means in terms of proliferation. Proliferation has been a primary concern of ours all along. We have approached the DPRK on the subject many times. We have received assurances that they will not transfer and have not been transferring or engaging in proliferation. On the other hand, we have to be vigilant about this. And we have to be really continuing to watch closely areas of concern, areas of the world where we have our concerns, including in Syria. So we have to be very much on top of this matter. I think as much as we value the DPRK making a declaration -- and you saw in the October 3 agreement that they did make a declaration of no transfer -- I think that's not enough for us. I think we have to be very vigilant and continue to watch for this problem. I believe the Six-Party process is the appropriate process for dealing with proliferation. The issue one faces when one hears reports of this is, what are you going to do about it? Do you stay engaged? Do you keep working on it diplomatically? Or do you somehow pull back from the diplomatic process? And we feel it's very necessary to stay engaged -- because when you pull back from something, you have to ask yourself the question, where are you going? What is the strategy you are trying to devise in order to achieve a goal? And so as we stay in the process, our strategy is to be diplomatically active -- to work with our partners, to continue to work with partners in the Six-Party process, but also to emphasize the various counterproliferation measures that we have, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. So we feel that staying engaged is the way to keep other countries also engaged, and ultimately is the way to deal with the threat posed by proliferation.
QUESTION: Hayashi of NHK. I have two questions. First of all, very shortly the (delisting) process will begin. Specifically, what will this process involve? Japan is very interested in delisting of DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It seems that what you're explaining to Japan and what you're explaining to DPRK may or may not be different. `Are they truly consistent, what you are explaining to DPRK and Japan? Those are the two questions.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, they are consistent. `The DPRK wants very much to be delisted, and we are prepared to work with them. Indeed, we are obligated according to the February agreement to have begun this process, which we have begun. And whether or not we get to the end of this process, of course, depends on future developments. It's not just dependent on denuclearization;it's also dependent on the statutory requirements of this U.S. law with respect to the terrorism list. I think it's important to understand that this is a U.S. list, U.S. law passed by the U.S. Congress, supported by the U.S. President. So what we are doing in the U.S. is to work with the DPRK to ensure that, if they want to be delisted, that they have to qualify to be delisted. Now you don't delist a country because they have done something in some other area where you want them to do something. They have to address the terrorism concerns that put them on the list in the first place. So we will be working with them on that. I think it's in our interest that when there are countries on the terrorism list, it needs to be understood that they are on the list for a reason. They are on the list because they've been supporting terrorism in some respect. So it's in our interest to get countries to stop supporting terrorism and therefore to get off the list. So we are working with them. I don't want to make a prediction now of where we end up on this. But I will say that we understand very well the great sensitivity of this terrorism list. We understand that -- even though it is a U.S. list and a U.S. law passed by a U.S. Congress and signed by a U.S. President -- that nonetheless it has international repercussions, including in some countries;in Japan itself. We are in very close contact with Japan on this issue. We are in very close contact with Japan on our mutual efforts to achieve progress, achieve meaningful progress on the matter of the Japanese citizens so brutally abducted some years ago by the DPRK. So we will continue to work very closely with Japan on this issue of delisting and the relationship of this issue to the abduction issue.
QUESTION:Could you repeat the first question with regard to disablement? What's the actual process involved in disablement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Sorry. What was the first part of your question? On disablement, we have agreed on a number of measures. We met in a denuclearization working group in Shenyang;I think it was August 16. And we came up with a list of measures that were designed to make sure that, in shutting down the nuclear facilities, that they couldn't easily be turned on again. So we negotiated the list with the North Koreans. It was one of these tough negotiations. They wanted us to do less, and we wanted them to do more. But we came up with a list of measures which in their totality, we believe, will make sure that even if on a certain day the North Koreans wanted to restart the plutonium -- which, by the way, would be a very bad day for all of us -- that it would take them well over a year to do that. So we have a concept that disabling should be something that, in order to reverse the disabling, you would need more than a year. So the disabling involves measures, very technical measures, in the three parts of the Yongbyon complex. First, the fuel fabrication facility. Second, the actual 5-megawatt reactor. Thirdly, the reprocessing facility, where the spent fuel rods would be taken from the 5-megawatt reactor. So these are technical measures that we will work with North Korean engineers on. One of the first that needs to be done is, we need to do some cleanup of the pond where the discharged fuel from the reactor needs to go -- because eventually we want the discharged fuel to be canned and sent out of North Korea. And so, in order to do that, we're going to have to clean the pond up. So that's one of the things that's going to get done in the next couple of days -- or started to get done, because discharging fuel will take many weeks. We also, I think, will begin with some measures that are fairly easy to accomplish in the reprocessing facility. And we will continue from there. Altogether, I think the process is going to take a full two months. And even at the end of December, when we will have substantial disabling, we need to be careful not to hurry things in a way that could cause any health risk to anyone working on the process. So we'll have to be careful on that. But, I think, by the end of all this you'll see that we have a Yongbyon that is disabled and ready for the next stage, which is to be dismantled. And so far, I'm pleased to say, we've had good cooperation from the DPRK technicians and experts on the spot.
QUESTION:Miyata of Asahi newspaper company. I have a question with regard to plutonium. By the end of the year, you said, Ambassador Hill, in the declaration list already the plutonium extracted, the nuclear-bomb substances, will probably be included. What is the attitude on the part of DPRK with regard to this list? And if they have agreed to include that in the list, then what would be the process to follow? In other words, will plutonium be included as a subject of denuclearization? And what is the position of the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:We are expecting to get the list, the initial list, very soon. And so I'll be able to answer your question a little better when I actually see the list. But one thing that we have had considerable discussions about already is the need that -- the full list of nuclear programs needs to include nuclear material. And the DPRK, at the working group on denuclearization -- the Six-Party working group on denuclearization in Shenyang on the 16th of August -- told us it would include the material. That is, all of the fissile material;that is, the separated plutonium. This is going to be very important, because what we will need to see on the fissile material is a list that we can verify. Because, again, this is the crucial question. Do they have 30 kilograms? Do they have 40? Do they have 50? How much of that was used during the nuclear test that they made in October '06? And when we come up with the figure, we need to verify that figure. So the answer to your question is, yes, this is expected to be on the list. And I would argue that there are a number of other nuclear programs not at Yongbyon that also need to be on the list. And remember, we started with Yongbyon because we thought that was the most achievable objective by the end of this year. But it's not the only nuclear facility that needs to be put out of commission. I would expect that as we get this list of plutonium, we'll be able to verify it. And then we'll know what we are dealing with as we get to what I hope will be the final phase in '08.
QUESTION: [Inaudible] from Italian Sky 24 News. Two small questions. The first one is, did you know ? since you mentioned that the Japanese authorities are considering sending their own team to check about the disablement of Yongbyon -- do you feel that there has been a change in the new government toward more constructivity and pragmatism compared with the last Abe Administration? And the second one is, since we are almost the last year of the Bush Administration, you know that in 2000 that Clinton was very close to deliver a deal with North Korea. How would be your prediction, if you can give us a prediction, about the possible delivering by the Bush Administration right before elections?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I only make predictions in baseball. (Laughter) So I don't know if I can make a prediction on your point there, except to say I've had a lot of discussions with the DPRK representatives on my concern -- I think everybody's concern -- that we not run out of time. And I think if you look at what happened in 2000, we ran out of time. And I don't want that to happen. That's one of the reasons we're pushing this thing to try to get disablement through by December 31 -- because a lot of people point out, well wait a minute;can you really get it done by December 31? Aren't there other things you need to disable? I need to make sure the dismantlement/abandonment phase starts on January 1, if not on January 2, so that we have a chance to get through that. So I'm very mindful of the concern about the running out of time. I've had those conversations with the DPRK, and I believe they understand why we are pushing these deadlines. And they support the idea of getting through this in '08. But those are expressions of support in a general sense. And nuclear weapons and things like that are real proof of the old adage, "the devil is in the details" -- because there are a lot of details in this issue, and we've got to get through a lot of those. Let me just say with respect to dealing with the Japanese, I don't think there's a negotiating team that we've had closer relationships with than the Japanese negotiating team. And this has gone on for me since the Koizumi premiership. So I've worked very closely with Sasae-san on these issues. These are tough issues for everybody. You know, having a Six-Party process -- I mean, Japan is in a very special place, because not only is it really in the shadow of some of these nuclear threats, it's also in the shadow of missile threats. And it's very much burdened by the shadow of this terrible abduction matter. So we have to fully factor in and fully understand Japanese sensitivities on this, and that's why I spend a lot of time with my Japanese counterparts. You should see my phone bill. You know, I'm calling Tokyo. So I think we have good cooperation. It's not for me to talk about Japanese Government attitudes to their own negotiations. You know, they have a bilateral process the way we do. It's not for me to say, should they give more or should they give less? How flexible should they be? That's really for them to do. Except to say that I can assure you we have very good relations with Japan, and we are not engaged in a Six-Party process in order see our relationship with Japan worsen. On the contrary, we see this as a real example where the U.S. and Japan, with a common interest -- the number-one, number-two economies in the world -- we ought to work together. And I think together we're going to solve this.
QUESTION:Nishimura of Hokkaido Newspaper. Ambassador Hill, last month at Congress when you testified (about) fuel oil supplied to DPRK -- 50,000 by South Korea, next China, and thirdly U.S., and fourthly Russia. That is the expectation, you said. And with regard to Japan, because of the abduction issue, Japan has not yet participated. I think that's what you reported to the Congress last month. Now Japan and DPRK, without the abduction issue being settled, fuel oil will stop at Russia? Or will there be a second round starting once again with South Korea? So what is the position of Japan in fuel-oil aid?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Well, I can't really talk about the position of Japan on this. But what I can do is tell you that when we agreed that we would provide 50,000 tons of oil for the shutdown, and then if the DPRK wanted more oil -- which they did -- we said, "Well then, shutdown is not enough. Freezing is not enough. We have to go to disabling." And so we agreed that they would disable the facilities for an additional 950,000 tons. Now the South Koreans took the first shipment, the 50,000, which was the shipment of oil in return for which the DPRK froze or shut down for the purpose of eventual abandonment the nuclear facilities. And so the South Koreans didn't want to be the only people supplying oil. So we did an addendum to the agreement in February '07 in which four countries agreed to participate. And Japan agreed to participate once its concerns were met. And, as I've just mentioned to the previous question, I think Japan has a lot of particular issues, namely the abduction issue, that it feels it needs to make progress on. And so it was agreed that Japan would join as its concerns were met. So we have done tranches of oil -- that is, 50,000 tons each. Now why 50,000 tons? That seems to be the maximum that the ports will take in the DPRK. So after we go through this first round, we would anticipate just going through a second round and a third round. Again, when Japan is able to participate -- I'm sure Japan will participate, but, you know, it's not for me to be advising Japan on that. I think we understand that Japan has some very special issues here. So we will continue to proceed on this. I might note, too, that other countries have inquired about whether they can participate in this process. And we've welcomed other countries, and I think we'll look to see if other countries can come in. What's important, I might mention -- a little pause to mention a little more on this oil situation -- we are not paying oil in order for North Korea to do nothing, to stand in place. We're giving them oil in order for them to go deeper into denuclearization. If they want more oil, they need to do more denuclearization. So when the 950,000 tons finishes, if they want more of that, they need to move to the next phase. And we've been working very hard on that. It is not in our interest or anyone's interest to starve the DPRK of energy. On the contrary, it's to show the DPRK that they can get out of this nuclear business -- which has been very, very harmful for their position -- and can get energy through other means and can eventually be in a better position with energy thanks to giving up their nuclear ambitions.
QUESTION:Blaine Hardin, Washington Post. I have a question about the diplomatic efforts of North Korea in recent weeks. They've sent envoys to a number of countries where they haven't been recently, trying to open up more to the West and the rest of the world. Do you see this of a piece with the agreements that are occurring in the denuclearization issue? In other words, do you have a judgement about something changing in North Korea that is opening up and trying to change their position vis-a-vis the rest of the world?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Yes. You know, I saw that article. I can't remember if it was in the Post or the Times -- probably both. But -- AP, okay. I saw that article. I read it with great interest -- because the notion that their cooperation in the Six-Party process is being accompanied by a diplomatic effort to expand their recognition, it's an interesting concept. I can't say that I've seen how it is linked. Except to say that as they participate in the Six-Party process there does appear to be, in the context as we talk to them in the Six-Party process, the desire to overcome their isolation and an understanding that -- whereas in the past North Korea often spoke of their isolation as a great benefit for their country -- I think they've understood it now as something that is actually harming them, and that the best-case scenario for what they're doing is to believe that perhaps it is part of an overall effort to open up. I do believe that the DPRK understands that isolation in the 21st Century is not a ticket to the future. Quite to the contrary, it will leave the DPRK further behind. It's so interesting to look at economic growth statistics in East Asia and see that the two countries in East Asia that did not grow last year, that had negative growth, were the DPRK and Burma. And if you look at the degree of interaction that those countries have with abroad, you'll see that both of them are really very isolated. Burma's trade, for example, is a tiny fraction of Vietnam's trade. So I think there is an understanding. It's the sort of thing that, if you had sort of wide open North Korean interlocutors, you would ask them. You'd say, "Well, what's this about?" But, alas, they kind of keep pretty much task-oriented. And if they're there to talk about denuclearization, they talk about denuclearization. They don't engage in a broader discussion on that, unfortunately. But I do have the sense that they understand that they need to open up. I also have the sense that they are doing this with great care -- that not everyone in the DPRK agrees with this position and that it's going to be a slow process. But I think it's a very necessary process. And I might add that the Chinese, who probably know the DPRK best, believe that there is an effort on the part of the DPRK to open. The Chinese believe that some of their efforts to show DPRK officials the new economy are providing some kind of incentive for the DPRK to open up. So I think it's an interesting development.
I might just mention one other point:I thought it was very interesting that they have done so much with Vietnam, because Vietnam is a country which also was very closed with a very stagnant economy. And now it's opening up, and it's made an awful lot of progress. The DPRK and Vietnam went through a very rough patch a few years ago, when Vietnam helped get some DPRK refugees on to South Korea. So it is interesting that they've reached out again to Vietnam. And I think it's something to keep our eye on, and I believe it's a positive development.
And one other thing:I think it's positive because we have been very diplomatically active in making sure every country understands:one, we are doing all we can to get this thing solved, this denuclearization issue solved;and, two, we need all the help we can get to make sure that every message coming from every country that the DPRK engages with is the same message -- which is that you get out of the nuclear business, and you'll have a much better future.
QUESTION:Chio Nakamoto, Financial Times. You mentioned the many requirements for the DPRK to be delisted from the list of countries that support terrorism. How far would you say they are to the end of the road? Are they midway? Are they way down the road? How far do you think they are to the end?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:I don't know. I think -- You know, these requirements are embedded in U.S. law. So we've had some of our lawyers actually talk to them about what they need to do to achieve the US statutory requirements. I think they have to come out with some kind of declaration. So I think the answer to your question would be -- has to await their declaration, to see whether they have taken the steps they need to take. But these steps are embedded in U.S. law. They're for all to see, and so we have to see if the North Koreans are prepared to take them. You know, there are a couple of steps that we know they have taken, which are very important. That is, the UN covenants on terrorism, and they acceded to those in the 1990's. But, clearly, there will be other things. But we're working with them -- again, with U.S. lawyers, because this is a matter of U.S. law.
QUESTION: Deguchi of Kyodo News. It's a related question to the previous one. The Department of State comes up with its country reports on terrorism on an annual basis. And in terrorism state sponsors there was one item -- that they continue to protect the hijackers of the airplane. And in order for them to be delisted, the sending of those criminals back to Japan, that extraditing is also a requirement? And have you required that to the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Let me just say, that issue has come up. I think we can reach a satisfactory result on that. I'm not sure -- I really should have a State Department lawyer here to answer the question of whether it's a statutory requirement that they would have to return the Japanese Red Army terrorists from the 1970 hijacking. So I'm not sure if it's a statutory requirement. I should check with our legal people on that. The issue has come up. I must say, what I've been careful to do on dealing with this is, you know, we'd like to see progress on this abduction issue. And I would like to focus to the extent that there would be people coming out of the DPRK and back to Japan. I would like it to be abductees. That's sort of our focus. I don't want any thoughts that, you know, they could satisfy one request by fulfilling another. So I think that we'll work through that issue. But, again, I don't feel comfortable answering your question on the legal issue. Again, I can't emphasize enough. This is U.S. domestic law. It's in our Congress. It's not an international law. It's a U.S. law that has created this terrorism list.
QUESTION: Inoue of TBS. The timing of taking them off of the terrorism list -- is there any understanding with the North Koreans if there is a notification to the Congress, which is 45 days prior to the actual removal, the notification to the Congress is equivalent to the actual removal from the list?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: First of all, I can tell you're a Washington correspondent, because you know our law better than many Americans do. So congratulations. The 45 days is a notice period. It goes to Congress. Now we have notice periods in a lot of U.S. laws. So the point of a notice period is to give some opportunity for the Congress to express its views on a decision that the Administration is prepared to take. Now once the federal government has sent a notice to Congress, it means that all -- that the federal government has made a decision that everything is done and ready to go. That is, whatever issue it is. Often, for example, we have notice requirements for foreign military sales. So let's say you have a foreign military sale, and you're going to send weapon system X to country Y. You have essentially gone through all of your requirements. And then, when you send it to Congress, it means that you are ready to go, and you're just giving Congress their right to comment. So once we would send a notice on something like the terrorism list -- on change to the terrorism list, adding a country or subtracting a country -- we would have completely done our homework and completely been prepared such that, in effect, the notice to Congress becomes the effective period, the effective date that we're dealing with. Now I think that's important to understand -- because when you look at the terrorism list, the terrorism list is essentially a set of restrictions on the U.S. Government. For example, the U.S. Government is not permitted by the statute, the terrorism list statute, the U.S. government is not permitted to provide or to sell to a country on the list any military equipment. Now there might be many other reasons you would not sell military equipment to a country on the list. But the statute makes clear -- if a country is on the list, you cannot sell them military equipment. Another issue is, if a country is on the list, you will not, for example, vote in favor of an international financial institution loan to that country. So these are a set of restrictions on the U.S. That's what the terrorism list is. So when we provide a notice to Congress, it means that we believe that the country fulfills all the objectives.
So I would say the day we provide the notice is the most important day.
QUESTION:Did you talk to the North Koreans about that? Is there an understanding?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Again, we have explained to them what these procedures are. But we have still to go through with them what their statutory requirements are in terms of affirming no connections with terrorists, with terrorist groups, and that sort of thing. And we plan to do that very soon, probably through what we call the New York channel. We will probably have some State Department lawyers do this, because, again, it's a legal matter in U.S. law.
QUESTION:Ukai from Asahi newspaper company. Disablement -- removal of the fuel rods is included? This is beyond the '94 Framework agreement, you have said that. But the removal of fuel rods was also included in that '94 Framework. So when you say "beyond the '94 Framework," what are the measures actually that go beyond that Framework agreement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:We've agreed on several measures that would make the reprocessing facility unusable. And, again, it's technical things. It's cutting chains;it's taking apart equipment. Things like that. I'm not in a position to stand here and give you precisely what they are. But in the opinion of our experts, they make it unusable -- and unusable for a period of a year, even if you wanted to reverse it. We've also taken some measures in the other two facilities -- the reactor and the fuel fabrication plant -- again, cutting chains, this sort of thing. The removing the fuel rods is important, although, you correctly point out, it's not unprecedented. Because what we want to do is, as you remove the fuel from the reactor, we want a situation where they have nothing to put back into the reactor. And that has to do with the so-called fresh fuel rods, and we have an agreement. There are some details to be worked out, but we have an agreement which would mean that they cannot put back any fresh fuel rods. So this is important -- because whereas in 2002, when they restarted the facilities, they were able within 60 days to get them going because they had the fresh fuel rods available. And what we would be doing is making sure they don't have those fresh fuel rods available and therefore cannot restart the reactor, even if that were the only step that we're taking. But I want to emphasize, it's not the only one. I think what we want to do, in terms of the actual measures that we take, is that we have there about 10 of them. And what we would like to do is get going on them, get through them, see whether there are some additional ones, see whether there are some of those that we might not feel are worth doing. But what we want to do is once we go through these -- and, by the way, as I said earlier, we will welcome other participants from other Six-Party countries to participate on this -- once we are done with this, then I think that's an appropriate time to explain precisely what has been done, and why it was done, and how much disabling it contributes to. Now I would like to make one other point, which is that if we are in the position where everything has fallen apart and the DPRK starts trying to reconstitute the nuclear facilities again -- whether it takes them 12 months, 14 months, 16 months, or even 24 months -- we've got a big problem. So we don't think we should get too hung up on the question of whether it's 12 or 14. That would be a huge problem. What we're trying to do is make sure we have a disabling so that that disabling will be overtaken by events -- events that are scheduled for '08, when we would go to dismantling and, importantly, abandonment of the separated plutonium. So I think disabling is a necessary step, without which we can't go further. But we can't stop at disabling.
MODERATOR:Ambassador Hill is Assistant Secretary in charge of East Asia and not specifically the DPRK, but is there any question related to that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:There's more to East Asia than the DPRK? (Laughter)
QUESTION:Aiko Doden from NHK. In your region of responsibility, Myanmar remains a politically and diplomatically challenging issue. In light of the situation where neither soft-line policy nor hard-line policy seems to have brought about any change, would providing any incremental incentives to Myanmar be an option for the U.S.?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:You know, I think I'd be careful of trying to put together incentives at this point for Burma. I mean, we have a government there that has just engaged in one of the most horrendous crackdowns on dissent that we've seen in several years. And I think to respond to this terrible crackdown by coming up with incentives, I think would send the wrong message. Indeed,. I think this is a time when we all need to be a little firm and, most importantly, united. I think we need to make sure that all countries, first of all, analyze the conditions on the ground in the way we do and to try to work in a broad diplomatic strategy -- so that when Burma gets pressure from ASEAN, they don't go run to China, because they'll get the same pressure from China. And if they get the pressure from China, they won't go run to India or some other country. So I think what's very important is, we need to create a diplomatic strategy where we can try to get all countries to understand that the situation in Burma is not only intolerable for the Burmese people, but it's intolerable for the region. And you know, I'm a pragmatist in foreign policy. And, frankly, I'm proud of that. I've been in this game for 30 years. And part of pragmatism is, you don't start setting up incentives for governments that have just behaved in the way they have -- because they will immediately misread it, and they will see it as a sign;they will see these incentives as a sign of weakness. So I think this is not the time to be reaching around and looking for new strategies. It's a time for a little patience, but most of all for a lot of resolve. It's a time to see diplomatic opportunities. I believe that, given this horrendous crackdown, this loss of life, the terrible spectacle of a Japanese journalist being shot to death on the street in front of us all -- I mean, a spectacle that should haunt all of us for the rest of our lives -- this is a time when we need to be a little tough-minded and understand that we can, with diplomacy, get one strategy, so that there is no sense among the Burmese junta that they can run off and hide behind some country and avoid the reckoning with the rest of the world. So we're going to support the Gambari plan, Mr. Gambari's approach. We're going to make sure that, as he goes forward, that China supports him, India supports him, ASEAN, U.S., Japan -- everybody supports him. And let's use this as an opportunity to come together, be unified, and have a lot of resolve. And let's get through this. And we will.
QUESTION:Dejima of Nikkei newspaper. Under Ambassador Kelly, CVID was one of the phrases used. Disablement -- you said that it means for at least one year they cannot resume the activity. Why this one-year benchmark? What's the reason behind it? And if, assuming that they resume within one year, how will you try to once again terminate their activities? One point I wish to confirm on the previous comments you made -- '08 process, or you have been saying the plan for '08, or eight year;can you elaborate on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL:Yes. First of all, when I talk about disablement, as I tried to suggest to the last question, this is an intermediate process -- disablement. We want to move to dismantlement, and we would like the measures we've taken to disable turned into measures to dismantle. Now, for example, a disabling measure might be, you take a piece of equipment out and you put it somewhere so it's hard to put back in. Dismantlement would be, you take the piece of equipment and it's impossible to put back in and you can't find a substitute piece of equipment. So that would be taking a disabling measure and going to dismantlement. So the D in CVID is dismantlement. And we want to get going on that. The I is, of course, irreversible. And so we want to make sure that, as we dismantle, they don't feel that they can reverse the dismantlement. So you take some piece of equipment out. You destroy it. You make sure there's no substitute for it. And that creates a sense of irreversible. So then the V, of course, is verifiable. Of course it has to be verified. This is not a game of "trust me." I mean, this is not a game where they pretend to disable or dismantle, and we pretend to believe them. We need for this to be verifiable. And finally, of course it needs to be complete. I mean, what's the point of stopping a plutonium program if you might have a uranium enrichment facility? So that's why we have to go after that issue too. So why we have done this on a step-by-step basis has to do with how you negotiate this. Believe me, I would love for this all to be done in one day. I would love to sit down in the Six Parties, and everyone agrees, "Well, let's just get this over today." I would love for it to be done in one day. It's not, because there are a lot of factors -- cultural, you name it. There are a bunch of reasons that the North Koreans don't want to just give up these weapons in a day. So what we have to do is a step-by-step process. You know, believe me, as that question about Burma suggested, there are other problems in the world I'd like to be working on as well, because I feel very strongly about those problems. But we've got to get through this, and I think the best way to do it is step-by-step. But I don't want these steps to be endless. So we have these timeframes, and we made December 31. It's a bit arbitrary, you know. We could have said December 30, or January 2, or something. But we made that there, and then we're trying to get through the final stage in '08. Now I'd like to see us get it through in the current U.S. administration, because I think if -- We started this process;I'd like to see us finish it. And that's our time schedule. So, you know, CVID is all there. Sometimes it's not -- You know, you have to ask yourself the question, does repeating "CVID" help the situation? Does it help to keep repeating the same term? Maybe it does;maybe it doesn't. But I'm just trying to get through this. I'm trying to get through it as pragmatically and, by the way, as quickly as possible.
Released on November 3, 2007
昨日「産経の??な記事」で取り上げたトーマス・シーファー駐日アメリカ大使がブッシュに送ったとされる電報に関する記事がWashington Postに上がっていますのでご紹介します。
タイトルはEnvoy Warns of N. Korea Deal Falloutですから、ざっくり、大使は北朝鮮との取引の予期せぬ結果を警告する、こんな感じで良いと思います。
そして副題がAmbassador to Japan Cables Bush to Outline Concerns Over Relations With Tokyoですから、駐日大使は電報でブッシュに、東京との絆に関する懸念の概要を伝えた、ちゅうよな感じですね。
以下全文ですが、就中笑えるのは、シーファーが国務省が北朝鮮との交渉過程で駐日大使館を聾桟敷に置いていることを詰る内容があったとされる
まあね、末尾には
なにより、イスラエル情報筋から提起されているシリアの核施設と北朝鮮の関係について、ホワイトハウスは聞こえないふりをしているわけで、
Envoy Warns of N. Korea Deal Fallout
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, October 26, 2007; J. Thomas Schieffer, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, sent President Bush an unusual private cable this week warning that the pending nuclear deal with North Korea could harm relations with Japan.
He also complained that the U.S. Embassy had been left in the dark while the deal -- which could include North Korea's removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism -- was negotiated by top State Department officials.
Schieffer's cable was described by sources who had read it.
Both Schieffer and the White House acknowledged the existence of the cable, which was numbered Tokyo 004947, but they declined to discuss it in detail.
"Communications between myself and the President are privileged," Schieffer said in an e-mailed statement Wednesday night. "I never discuss them with others."
Schieffer's cable appears to be another sign of the unease in some parts of the administration over the North Korea agreement, which sets out a step-by-step process of disabling and accounting for North Korean nuclear programs, in exchange for incentives and economic assistance from the United States and North Korea's neighbors.
Pyongyang has long sought removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but Japan has insisted that North Korea first provide details on the abductions of Japanese citizens by the reclusive nation during the 1970s and '80s.
Ambassadors generally do not send diplomatic cables directly to the president, but Schieffer has unusual status as a longtime friend of Bush's.
He was an investor in the partnership that -- along with Bush -- purchased the Texas Rangers baseball team in 1989.
He is also the brother of CBS broadcaster Bob Schieffer.
J. Thomas Schieffer was ambassador to Australia in Bush's first term and then was given the high-profile post of Tokyo envoy in the second term.
The North Korea deal has come under attack from conservatives, especially Republicans on Capitol Hill, but Schieffer is a Democrat who served three terms in the Texas House of Representatives.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has made the six-nation accord one of her top priorities, having persuaded the president to put the agreement on a fast track earlier this year.
In his cable, sources said, Schieffer stressed that he does not believe that Japanese interests should dictate U.S. policy toward North Korea.
But he warned the president that rumors were flying in Tokyo that the talks on removing North Korea from the terror list were progressing rapidly, which he suggested could potentially harm U.S. relations with its closest ally in the Pacific.
He noted that Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill had assured him that North Korea needed to first show substantial progress on the abduction issue before any action was taken, but Schieffer said he was seeking direction and clarification in part because the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo appeared cut out of the process.
"Ambassador Schieffer was clarifying what he sees on the ground and that the abduction issue was something we need to continue to emphasize in the six-party talks," said National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe.
The new Japanese prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, will visit Washington in the coming weeks, Johndroe added.
During that meeting, "President Bush will reiterate our commitment to help Japanese efforts to resolve the abduction issue with North Korea," he said.
その他参照記事
Photos Show Cleansing of Suspect Syrian Site
タイトルはEnvoy Warns of N. Korea Deal Falloutですから、ざっくり、大使は北朝鮮との取引の予期せぬ結果を警告する、こんな感じで良いと思います。
そして副題がAmbassador to Japan Cables Bush to Outline Concerns Over Relations With Tokyoですから、駐日大使は電報でブッシュに、東京との絆に関する懸念の概要を伝えた、ちゅうよな感じですね。
以下全文ですが、就中笑えるのは、シーファーが国務省が北朝鮮との交渉過程で駐日大使館を聾桟敷に置いていることを詰る内容があったとされる
He also complained that the U.S. Embassy had been left in the dark while the dealという記述で、これはある意味、昨日僕が
なんちゅう演歌もどきの装飾を施しているんだが、ブッシュとシーファーの関係はまあいいとして、問題はブッシュとコンドリーザ・ライスの関係よ。っと書いたブッシュのプライオリティーを能くあらわしていると思うし、こういうことをブッシュに言わなくちゃいけないほどにコケにされているシーファーにそれほど、つまり産経新聞ワシントン駐在だそうな有元隆志さん書いたような期待が出来るのか?ちゅうことですわ。
ワシントン駐在なんだからあんた知ってんべ? 本当は国防長官になりたかったライスがなんで国務長官になったかは?
知らないなら「ワシントン駐在」ちゅう肩書きで記事書くのやめた方が良いと思うぞ。
まあね、末尾には
During that meeting, "President Bush will reiterate our commitment to help Japanese efforts to resolve the abduction issue with North Korea," he said.というNSCのジョンドローの話が引用はされているんだけど、それはジョンドローが言っているのであってブッシュが言っている訳じゃないし、春から話題になっている「拉致問題の進展」における「進展」、これすらも、「解決」がいつの間にかすり替えられているんだが、その定義に関する圧力は相当あり、それが高村外相の軽はずみな発言につながっている、というより、そういう調整が既に日朝、日米、米朝間で行われている、そういうことの証左だと考える方がまともでしょうよ?
なにより、イスラエル情報筋から提起されているシリアの核施設と北朝鮮の関係について、ホワイトハウスは聞こえないふりをしているわけで、
American officials still refuse to publicly confirm that the satellite photos show the site that Israel bombed. But the senior intelligence official said it was indeed the same location. Gordon D. Johndroe, a White House spokesman, declined to comment on the satellite pictures.(末尾のNew York Timesの記事より引用)それは何故かといえば、イラクの幕引きにアサドの協力を得たいということより寧ろ、北朝鮮が国連決議に違反しているという事実を公式に認めることを避けている、こう考えるってもんじゃない?
Envoy Warns of N. Korea Deal Fallout
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, October 26, 2007; J. Thomas Schieffer, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, sent President Bush an unusual private cable this week warning that the pending nuclear deal with North Korea could harm relations with Japan.
He also complained that the U.S. Embassy had been left in the dark while the deal -- which could include North Korea's removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism -- was negotiated by top State Department officials.
Schieffer's cable was described by sources who had read it.
Both Schieffer and the White House acknowledged the existence of the cable, which was numbered Tokyo 004947, but they declined to discuss it in detail.
"Communications between myself and the President are privileged," Schieffer said in an e-mailed statement Wednesday night. "I never discuss them with others."
Schieffer's cable appears to be another sign of the unease in some parts of the administration over the North Korea agreement, which sets out a step-by-step process of disabling and accounting for North Korean nuclear programs, in exchange for incentives and economic assistance from the United States and North Korea's neighbors.
Pyongyang has long sought removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but Japan has insisted that North Korea first provide details on the abductions of Japanese citizens by the reclusive nation during the 1970s and '80s.
Ambassadors generally do not send diplomatic cables directly to the president, but Schieffer has unusual status as a longtime friend of Bush's.
He was an investor in the partnership that -- along with Bush -- purchased the Texas Rangers baseball team in 1989.
He is also the brother of CBS broadcaster Bob Schieffer.
J. Thomas Schieffer was ambassador to Australia in Bush's first term and then was given the high-profile post of Tokyo envoy in the second term.
The North Korea deal has come under attack from conservatives, especially Republicans on Capitol Hill, but Schieffer is a Democrat who served three terms in the Texas House of Representatives.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has made the six-nation accord one of her top priorities, having persuaded the president to put the agreement on a fast track earlier this year.
In his cable, sources said, Schieffer stressed that he does not believe that Japanese interests should dictate U.S. policy toward North Korea.
But he warned the president that rumors were flying in Tokyo that the talks on removing North Korea from the terror list were progressing rapidly, which he suggested could potentially harm U.S. relations with its closest ally in the Pacific.
He noted that Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill had assured him that North Korea needed to first show substantial progress on the abduction issue before any action was taken, but Schieffer said he was seeking direction and clarification in part because the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo appeared cut out of the process.
"Ambassador Schieffer was clarifying what he sees on the ground and that the abduction issue was something we need to continue to emphasize in the six-party talks," said National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe.
The new Japanese prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, will visit Washington in the coming weeks, Johndroe added.
During that meeting, "President Bush will reiterate our commitment to help Japanese efforts to resolve the abduction issue with North Korea," he said.
その他参照記事
Photos Show Cleansing of Suspect Syrian Site
産経izaに昨晩こんな記事が上がった。
テロ支援国家指定解除で米政府分裂…カギ握る駐日大使
率直な感想は「ホントにこの記者ワシントンにいて記事書いてんのかよ?」ですが、その理由は幾つかあって、
仮に解除延期があるとしてもそりゃほかの理由、たとえば最近アメリカ国内で喧伝されたシリアに対する核・大量破壊兵器の移転の可能性による懐疑論の台頭が主たる理由となるんじゃないの、これもブッシュや国務省は聞こえないふりで可能性低気だしさ。
そして次は
そりゃ言ったのはシーファーかも知れんけど、普通の頭してりゃ、この文脈では、シーファーの語った「ブッシュとの特別な関係」肝腎なところで「聾桟敷におかれる」関係ちゅうことになりゃせんか?
こういう展開のしかたは実に胸くそ悪いんだが、あんたは更に
ワシントン駐在なんだからあんた知ってんべ? 本当は国防長官になりたかったライスがなんで国務長官になったかは?
知らないなら「ワシントン駐在」ちゅう肩書きで記事書くのやめた方が良いと思うぞ。
まあそれもどこかのバカが「国際ぢゃ~なりすと」ちゅう肩書きで出鱈目書き散らかしてるのよりはましかもしれんが...
まあいずれにしても、いい加減なこと書いてizaに集う似而非保守や熱湯浴に間違った希望を持たせるようなことは感心せん罠。
テロ支援国家指定解除で米政府分裂…カギ握る駐日大使
率直な感想は「ホントにこの記者ワシントンにいて記事書いてんのかよ?」ですが、その理由は幾つかあって、
まずブッシュ政権は年内にも指定解除に踏み切るとみられていたが、大統領に最も近いとされる大使の“直言”で、対北融和の流れに変化が生じる可能性もありそうだ。ちゅう行で、こりゃドイツ在住の婆さん同様の希望的観測と独断に充ち満ちた妄想ですよ。
仮に解除延期があるとしてもそりゃほかの理由、たとえば最近アメリカ国内で喧伝されたシリアに対する核・大量破壊兵器の移転の可能性による懐疑論の台頭が主たる理由となるんじゃないの、これもブッシュや国務省は聞こえないふりで可能性低気だしさ。
そして次は
大使が今回“直言”したのは、米政府が核で進展があれば、拉致問題に関係なく指定解除に踏み切るとされていることへの強い懸念があるからだ。さらにテロ支援国家指定解除をめぐる米朝交渉が“密室”で進められ、日本に関わる問題なのに、駐日大使である自分に正確な情報が伝えられないことへの苛立ちもありそうだ。ちゅう行なんだけど、あんたさ、この上の段で
報道について大使は、産経新聞に対し、「大統領と私の間の連絡は特別なもので、それについて他の人と論議することは決してない」とコメントした。なんちゅうこと書いてんだぜ?
そりゃ言ったのはシーファーかも知れんけど、普通の頭してりゃ、この文脈では、シーファーの語った「ブッシュとの特別な関係」肝腎なところで「聾桟敷におかれる」関係ちゅうことになりゃせんか?
こういう展開のしかたは実に胸くそ悪いんだが、あんたは更に
それだけに、同じテキサス育ちで、大リーグ球団テキサス・レンジャーズを共同経営するなど、大統領との個人的なつながりが強く「大統領の寝室に直接電話ができる」(米外交筋)とされるシーファー大使の行動は、今後の米国の対北外交を左右する重要なファクターとなりそうだ。なんちゅう演歌もどきの装飾を施しているんだが、ブッシュとシーファーの関係はまあいいとして、問題はブッシュとコンドリーザ・ライスの関係よ。
ワシントン駐在なんだからあんた知ってんべ? 本当は国防長官になりたかったライスがなんで国務長官になったかは?
知らないなら「ワシントン駐在」ちゅう肩書きで記事書くのやめた方が良いと思うぞ。
まあそれもどこかのバカが「国際ぢゃ~なりすと」ちゅう肩書きで出鱈目書き散らかしてるのよりはましかもしれんが...
まあいずれにしても、いい加減なこと書いてizaに集う似而非保守や熱湯浴に間違った希望を持たせるようなことは感心せん罠。
以下は朝鮮中央通信の配信Japan's Hostile Policy towards DPRK Denouncedの内容なんだけど、
このところの流れをみていると、国務省の態度ちゅうのかアメリカの政権の態度ちゅうのは我が国のテロ特の行く末を横目で見ていて、我が国の世論を刺激するようなトーンには極めて抑制的で言葉を濁している。
ということは換言すれば、どういう形であれ、テロ特延長の落とし所が見えた段階で旗幟を鮮明にするということなんでしょうが、是々非々はさておき、この限りにおいて小沢一郎は少なくともクライン孝子達のような似而非保守に比べれば国益に寄与をしているっと、こういうことになるのかと思います。(藁
さて、同じくアメリカ政府、そして盧武鉉の前のめりに懸念を表明しているのが今日(13日)付のWashington Postの社説Change in North Korea?です。
タイトルからして既に懐疑的なんですが、「北朝鮮に変化がみられるかよ?」っと振っておいて、"So far, there's little sign of it."ですから「兆候はほとんど無いけどね」っと落としておいて
北朝鮮の非核化、それ自体は追うべきもテーマではあるけれども、後のないブッシュと盧武鉉が、北朝鮮の術中、つまりは、核を保有する限りはこの取引が有効であることを承知している北朝鮮の、ブッシュと盧武鉉の足元を見た狡猾な戦術ですが、に堕ちていっている。
つまりそうである限り北朝鮮が非核化などするはずはないという断定に近い悲観論ですね。
さて、ブッシュや盧武鉉よりも更に無為無策なのが我が国、なんの勝算も有りもしないくせに首相訪朝なんてのが話題として既に一人歩きしているんだが、馬鹿は休み休みにでもやって欲しくない罠。
参考までに紹介しておくと、やはり朝鮮中央通信の9月29日のリリースにJapan's Pernicious Pillage of Gold Resources in Koreaちゅう記事があるんだが、これに書かれているのは、日本統治時代に我が国が朝鮮からどれほどの金を奪い取ったかという話で
そして1937年から1944年にかけて上記6カ所の精錬所で生産される延べ約135トン超の金を搾取した、
まあこれは噂される首相訪朝に向けたある種のヒントでしょうや。
つまり、それらの補償に相当する金払えや、そうすれば....そういうことを言いたいわけなんだろうけど、そんなもんやるか!!
よしんばやるとしても、その後がどうなるなんてことはぢぇんぢぇん信用なりませんてば。
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さて、アメリカは北朝鮮をテロ支援国家リストから外すか?
「テロ支援国家指定解除は拉致被害者解放など条件」ちゅうんだけどさ
さて、アメリカ?これでも北朝鮮をテロ支援国家指定から除外するか?
拉致未解決でも北朝鮮のテロ国家指定解除 ライス米国務長官示唆
6カ国協議の進捗(28日現在)
Pyongyang, October 11 (KCNA) -- Japan recently decided to ask the countries concerned to help it in its efforts to have a resolution on the non-existent "north Korea's human rights issue" adopted at the United Nations in a bid to press for the solution of the "abduction issue." Meanwhile, it is begging the U.S. not to de-list north Korea as a "sponsor of terrorism" unless the "abduction issue" is solved. In this regard, Rodong Sinmun today observes in a signed commentary: It is shameless and ridiculous, indeed, for the Japanese reactionaries to take issue with somebody's "human rights issue" instead of honestly admitting, apologizing and compensating for their past human rights abuses. As far as the "abduction issue" is concerned, it had already found a solution thanks to the sincere and humanitarian efforts of the DPRK. It is a far-fetched assertion for Japan to persistently raise a hue and cry over the "abduction issue," demanding the DPRK bring the dead persons to life and send them back to Japan. It is nothing but a clumsy ploy to use the "abduction issue" as a card to achieve its sinister political purpose. The present Japanese authorities would be well advised to draw a lesson from the miserable end of the preceding "Cabinet" which staked its political fate on the solution of the "abduction issue." Nevertheless, the present Japanese authorities are behaving quite contrary to this. Some days ago, the chief Cabinet secretary of Japan said the regime was replaced by a new one but the basic stand on the policy towards the DPRK would remain unchanged. This goes to clearly prove the wrong intention of Japan. The present Japanese authorities are keen to use the "abduction issue" as a sort of lever. This only reveals their intention to follow in the footsteps of the preceding "Cabinet" which regarded it as its policy to have the "abduction issue" settled. If the six-party talks aimed at discussing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are to make progress, it is important, above all, for the participating nations to earnestly approach the talks with a sincere attitude and stance on the main purport of the talks. Japan is now persistently considering the "abduction issue" as part of the agenda of the six-party talks. This attitude and stand compel the DPRK to reconsider whether Japan is qualified to participate in the talks. Japan seems to be keen on deliberately throwing obstacles in the way of the six-party talks and thus bar the peninsula from being denuclearized in a bid to secure a justification for nuclear weaponization and realize its ambition to become a military power and launch overseas aggression. Such trite artifice will only invite derision and criticism from the world people and precipitate Japan's isolation and destruction.ほぼ全面、拉致に拘る日本批判、6カ国協議の障碍、悪玉説の羅列なんですが、アメリカがどうにも心許ない。
このところの流れをみていると、国務省の態度ちゅうのかアメリカの政権の態度ちゅうのは我が国のテロ特の行く末を横目で見ていて、我が国の世論を刺激するようなトーンには極めて抑制的で言葉を濁している。
ということは換言すれば、どういう形であれ、テロ特延長の落とし所が見えた段階で旗幟を鮮明にするということなんでしょうが、是々非々はさておき、この限りにおいて小沢一郎は少なくともクライン孝子達のような似而非保守に比べれば国益に寄与をしているっと、こういうことになるのかと思います。(藁
さて、同じくアメリカ政府、そして盧武鉉の前のめりに懸念を表明しているのが今日(13日)付のWashington Postの社説Change in North Korea?です。
タイトルからして既に懐疑的なんですが、「北朝鮮に変化がみられるかよ?」っと振っておいて、"So far, there's little sign of it."ですから「兆候はほとんど無いけどね」っと落としておいて
If Mr. Kim genuinely intends to change his regime, the proof will come not this fall but next year, when the Bush administration hopes he will accept the complete dismantlement of North Korean nuclear facilities and give up his weapons. Mr. Bush clearly hopes to make such a breakthrough part of his legacy. Certainly it is worth pursuing. But the danger is that the regime's strategy is not to transform itself but to take advantage of weak and waning U.S. and South Korean administrations to extract economic and political payoffs while keeping its nuclear bombs.と結んでいますね。
北朝鮮の非核化、それ自体は追うべきもテーマではあるけれども、後のないブッシュと盧武鉉が、北朝鮮の術中、つまりは、核を保有する限りはこの取引が有効であることを承知している北朝鮮の、ブッシュと盧武鉉の足元を見た狡猾な戦術ですが、に堕ちていっている。
つまりそうである限り北朝鮮が非核化などするはずはないという断定に近い悲観論ですね。
さて、ブッシュや盧武鉉よりも更に無為無策なのが我が国、なんの勝算も有りもしないくせに首相訪朝なんてのが話題として既に一人歩きしているんだが、馬鹿は休み休みにでもやって欲しくない罠。
参考までに紹介しておくと、やはり朝鮮中央通信の9月29日のリリースにJapan's Pernicious Pillage of Gold Resources in Koreaちゅう記事があるんだが、これに書かれているのは、日本統治時代に我が国が朝鮮からどれほどの金を奪い取ったかという話で
the Japanese imperialists took away over 19,813kg of gold in 1937 and 25,759kg of gold in 1939 and more than 134,527kg of gold produced by the Nampho, Munphyong, Hungnam, Janghang, Haeju and Ryongampho Smelteries in the period from 1937 to 1944.ちゅうんだから、1937年に約20トン、1939年に26トン。
そして1937年から1944年にかけて上記6カ所の精錬所で生産される延べ約135トン超の金を搾取した、
Japan should apologize honestly and compensate for the brutal crimes in Korea in the bygone days.ちゅうんだから、その金とその金を採掘精錬するために使役した朝鮮人労働者の補償をしろちゅうことですがな。
まあこれは噂される首相訪朝に向けたある種のヒントでしょうや。
つまり、それらの補償に相当する金払えや、そうすれば....そういうことを言いたいわけなんだろうけど、そんなもんやるか!!
よしんばやるとしても、その後がどうなるなんてことはぢぇんぢぇん信用なりませんてば。
関連過去記事
北朝鮮ペースで形骸化が進む6カ国協議
媚中と媚米似而非保守には差がないという恰好の例
なぜ今頃になってColin McAskillの話を書くんだ?>産経新聞
さて、アメリカは北朝鮮をテロ支援国家リストから外すか?
「テロ支援国家指定解除は拉致被害者解放など条件」ちゅうんだけどさ
さて、アメリカ?これでも北朝鮮をテロ支援国家指定から除外するか?
拉致未解決でも北朝鮮のテロ国家指定解除 ライス米国務長官示唆
6カ国協議の進捗(28日現在)
野党、新法案の協議拒否 給油継続で与党が骨子提示
自民、公明両党は5日夕、国会内で開いた与野党国対委員長会談で、民主、共産、社民、国民新の野党4党に対し、インド洋での海上自衛隊の給油活動を継続するための政府の新法案骨子を提示、政策協議を呼び掛けた。しかし野党側は「国会の委員会で審議するべきだ」などとして協議入りを拒否した。
政府、与党は9日からの衆院予算委員会などで政府案を積極的に取り上げ、事実上の「与野党協議」としたい考え。審議での野党側の意見も踏まえて新法案を最終的に決定し、10月中旬にも国会提出する方針だ。
政府案は、活動内容を給油・給水に限定し、国会承認条項がない代わりに、活動内容や地域を法案に詳細に規定。法律の期限を2年とし、1年後に活動内容の国会報告を義務付けるとしている。
2007/10/05 17:49 【共同通信】
なんだそうだが、フォーカスのあてどころが両方とも違う罠。
基本的に僕はテロ特延長にもイラク派兵継続にも反対するけれども、民主党の反対根拠である国連中心主義にも反対。
イラクに関しては既にイギリスは撤兵準備を開始し、オーストラリアも時間の問題。
盲目的ちゅうのか無批判ちゅうのか、そんな対米追従と国益とは似ずして非なる物なわけで、なんでそうならざるを得ないかと言えばやはり憲法の平和主義っしょ?
独自の外交路線を持ち得ないのも同根だと思うんだが、それにしてもここに至るまでの6カ国協議の推移の中から「日米安保改訂!!」ちゅう声が保守層のどこからも出てこないことなんとも不思議だ。
まずYOMIURI ONLINEですが、北朝鮮の「核無能力化」費、日本政府が一部負担を検討
これで納得する奴はそうはいないと思うぞ?
そしてこの記事の前にやはりYOMIURI ONLINEに上がっているのが「核無能力化」で対立続く、合意文書採択は微妙
そして同時に、冒頭の外務省幹部の話と関連するのが
さて、なんで合意文書の作成の見通しが暗いかと言えば、北朝鮮がテロ支援国家リストからの除外に集中しているからで(He(Christopher Hill) said that a "key concern" of North Korea was being lifted from the U.S. list of terrorist-sponsoring states.)、それに関しては国務省がかなり前のめりではあるんですが、イラクやアフガン撤兵を左右する日本の国民感情への配慮もあるし、アメリカ議会や政府部内にも慎重論は根強い。
ヒルとしても、余程に中身の濃い合意内容を得ない限りはそこには踏み込めない。
これに関してたとえばAPのNKorean Nuclear Talks Hit Bumpy Roadにこんな記述があります。
まあしかし、それも要因の一つではあるんでしょう。
そして、ブッシュは残り少ない任期中になんか一つでも成果を残して、後世に「クリントン政権を批判したくせにそれ以下」と酷評される政権となることを避けたい。
同時に、いま微妙な日本の政情をテロ支援国家リストで刺激したくはない、そんな折衷的な流れが冒頭の外務省首脳の発言ということなんでしょうが、ここで日本が金を出そうが出すまいが、ブッシュ政権は、中身のある合意が出来そうだと判断した瞬間に日本を切り捨てて突っ走りますよ。
【北京=小川聡】日本政府は28日、北朝鮮の核問題を巡る6か国協議で、北朝鮮の核関連施設の無能力化と核計画の申告からなる「次の段階」について合意した場合、無能力化のための作業費用の一部を負担する方向で検討に入った。話は別でも根っこは同じだろ?
外務省幹部は28日、「核無能力化に向け、日本も資金負担するよう他の5か国に求められた場合、今後の情勢を見て判断する。北朝鮮への重油支援と核無能力化への協力は話が別だ」と語り、前向きに検討する考えを示した。
これで納得する奴はそうはいないと思うぞ?
そしてこの記事の前にやはりYOMIURI ONLINEに上がっているのが「核無能力化」で対立続く、合意文書採択は微妙
これまでの討議で進展がないことから、最終日の30日までに履行手順を盛り込んだ合意文書を採択できるかどうかは、微妙な情勢となってきた。そしてこの対立点の内容に関してもう少し踏み込んだ記事が毎日インタラクティブの6カ国協議:核の部品外しで「無能力化」?北朝鮮は反発にあり
米首席代表のクリストファー・ヒル国務次官補は28日夜、記者団に、「無能力化の範囲、寧辺(ヨンビョン)以外の核施設を対象に含めるか、申告の規模など様々な問題がある」と述べ、進展がないことを認めた。
日本の首席代表、佐々江賢一郎・外務省アジア大洋州局長も、「無能力化をどの程度行うかで(北朝鮮の主張は)十分でない」と指摘。「合意される見通しは立っていない」と述べた。
無能力化については、核施設から主要部品を取り外す方法を中心に議論を進めているという。ただ、除去された主要部品について、米国が第三国に搬出するよう主張しているのに対し、北朝鮮は「国外持ち出しは無能力化ではなく廃棄と同じだ」と反発、国内に残すよう求めたとされる。となっています。
折衷案として、主要部品を北朝鮮内に保管して国際原子力機関(IAEA)などが管理し、北朝鮮関係者の取り扱いを制限する方法が浮上しているとされる。
主要部品として、黒鉛減速炉では核分裂反応を制御する「制御棒駆動装置」や「冷却ポンプ」など、使用済み核燃料再処理施設では燃料棒を移すクレーンなど、核燃料加工施設ではウランと化学物質を混ぜる装置などがそれぞれ想定されているとみられる。
そして同時に、冒頭の外務省幹部の話と関連するのが
無能力化の実施主体を北朝鮮1カ国とするか、核兵器保有国の米中露3カ国、または日韓を加えた5カ国にするかについて協議したほか、費用負担についても断続的に話し合われているという。という記述です。
さて、なんで合意文書の作成の見通しが暗いかと言えば、北朝鮮がテロ支援国家リストからの除外に集中しているからで(He(Christopher Hill) said that a "key concern" of North Korea was being lifted from the U.S. list of terrorist-sponsoring states.)、それに関しては国務省がかなり前のめりではあるんですが、イラクやアフガン撤兵を左右する日本の国民感情への配慮もあるし、アメリカ議会や政府部内にも慎重論は根強い。
ヒルとしても、余程に中身の濃い合意内容を得ない限りはそこには踏み込めない。
これに関してたとえばAPのNKorean Nuclear Talks Hit Bumpy Roadにこんな記述があります。
Another issue during talks Friday was North Korea's goal of being removed from a U.S. list of countries that sponsor terrorism, which would make it eligible for various benefits. Hill said the topic came up during a bilateral discussion, but he did not elaborate. Various U.S. officials and lawmakers have said it is much too early for that to happen.そして、この記事には、国内紙には見あたらない内容の記述があります。
A sticking point has been Tokyo's focus on the issue of Japanese citizens kidnapped by the North.つまり、行き詰まりの原因は日本が拉致問題に拘泥するからだちゅうんですが、参考までに、この記事を書いたのは署名からして中国系アメリカ人と思われます。
まあしかし、それも要因の一つではあるんでしょう。
そして、ブッシュは残り少ない任期中になんか一つでも成果を残して、後世に「クリントン政権を批判したくせにそれ以下」と酷評される政権となることを避けたい。
同時に、いま微妙な日本の政情をテロ支援国家リストで刺激したくはない、そんな折衷的な流れが冒頭の外務省首脳の発言ということなんでしょうが、ここで日本が金を出そうが出すまいが、ブッシュ政権は、中身のある合意が出来そうだと判断した瞬間に日本を切り捨てて突っ走りますよ。
さて、「アメリカ?これでも北朝鮮をテロ支援国家指定から除外するか? 」の続編になりますが産経に「拉致未解決でも北朝鮮のテロ国家指定解除 ライス米国務長官示唆 」って記事があります。
これに拠れば
よってREUTERSをあたってきたんですが、North Korea nuclear talks face uncertain hurdlesしか見つからなかった、というより探すのが面倒だったので国務省のサイトでREUTERSとの会見録を探し出してきましたが、とりあえずREUTERの記事の記述は以下です。
Condoleezza Riceは、掻い摘んで言うならば、「やるときゃ拉致なんかとっとと忘れてやりまっせ!!」(超意訳)と言っております。
では我々が掟破りの自衛隊派兵で追求した国益は達成されない可能性が濃厚ということになるので、まずクエート~イラク間の空の無料ハイヤー・C-130を全機撤収しましょう。
補追:超意訳があまりにも超意訳だという非常にごもっともなご指摘をいただいたので少しだけ真面目に追記します。
まあライスとしてはですね、テロ支援国家から北朝鮮を除外するしないについて特定の言明をこの段階で行うことは、そのカードの有効性を損ねるからしないっと、拉致問題の推移にかかわらず除外するという選択肢は放棄しないぞ、こういうことであり、裏返せば、やるときにはやるぞということですね。
これはアメリカの立場に立った場合と北朝鮮の立場に立った場合、日本の立場に立った場合、それぞれに聞こえ方の違う言い回しなのであり玉虫色の発言ちゅうことでんな。
さて、外務省の受け止め方ですが、ちなみに26日の高村外相会見録にはこうあります。
これに拠れば
ロイター通信は24日、ライス米国務長官が同通信とのインタビューで、日本人拉致問題が完全に解決しない場合でも、北朝鮮のテロ支援国家指定の解除ができることを示唆したと伝えた。ちゅうことなんですが、産経の記事は意図的誤訳や超意訳が多くて信用できない。
長官は拉致問題について「恐ろしい人権問題であり、解決しなければならない」と強調。日本政府には「拉致問題を忘れない」という米国の立場を繰り返し示しているとして、北朝鮮に対しては「これからも強く(解決を促す)圧力をかけ続ける」と言明した。
その上で「しかし、北朝鮮に関連したすべてのステップが動かなくなるような状況には陥りたくない。米国は(北朝鮮に対し)適切な見返り措置を使うことができるようにしておかなければならない」と述べ、拉致問題とテロ支援国家指定解除問題を切り離して考える方針を示唆した。
よってREUTERSをあたってきたんですが、North Korea nuclear talks face uncertain hurdlesしか見つからなかった、というより探すのが面倒だったので国務省のサイトでREUTERSとの会見録を探し出してきましたが、とりあえずREUTERの記事の記述は以下です。
On Monday, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hinted that North Korea could be dropped from a U.S. terrorism blacklist before fully accounting for the Japanese citizens it abducted in the 1970s and 1980s, a move that could upset Japan. U.S. envoy Chris Hill said in Tokyo on Tuesday that "no decisions have been made" on the blacklist.そして以下がREUTERSとの会見録抜粋です。
QUESTION: Can we go to North Korea for a sec? The six-party talks are going to start this week again. Chris Hill recently suggested that North Korea could be taken off the state sponsors of terrorism list before it completely denuclearizes. Is the United States willing to consider removing North Korea from the state sponsors list even if it has not fully addressed the Japanese concerns about their abductees? Can you do that without a full accounting on the abductees?今回は産経の記事には意図的誤訳も超意訳もなく、正しく伝えていると思います。
SECRETARY RICE: Well, the state sponsor of terrorism list has a kind of internal logic;in other words, there's a set of measures, a set of indices that are supposed to be met in order to come off the state sponsor of terrorism list. And I think we need to look at those. And we are going through the process of seeing if North Korea meets those tests. There is obviously some advantage to doing something like that in conjunction with the next phase of North Korean - of the six-party talks, and the next phase, of course, is disablement and declaration. We have been very clear with the Japanese - and we have very good cooperation and coordination on this - that we are not going to forget the abduction issue. In fact, it is a subject for discussion every time Chris speaks with the North Koreans. We're going to keep pressing it. It's a really horrible humanitarian situation. It was a terrible thing to do and it needs to be resolved. We've also been very active in pressing for and I think helping to move forward the bilateral DPRK-Japan track, which is really where this has to be resolved. But I don't think that we want to get into a situation in which we have locked all of the steps that we might take with the North Koreans and lock them into a certain sequence with other steps that we think need to be taken. We have to be able to use whatever incentives we have that are appropriate to the stage at which we are with the North Koreans. But if we get to that point, it will be a very fortunate thing, so right now I think we're just concentrating on trying to get a disablement schedule and a declaration that is full and complete.
QUESTION: It sounds like what you're saying is that, in fact, you would consider taking them off, even if you don't drop the abductee issue, even if it's not fully resolved, you've got to be able to --
SECRETARY RICE: We'll consider the right sequence and the right set of steps as we approach the reality - hopefully the reality - of a disablement schedule.
QUESTION: Do you think you're going to be able to get to a disablement schedule and possibly - and among the other incentives that you have is the fuel oil -- in this next meeting in Beijing - is that something you're hoping to pull off?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I certainly hope after what were pretty fruitful discussions that the three expert teams had when they went to North Korea - the Russians, the Chinese and the United States went to look at the - survey the facilities there - they obviously had good cooperation. They had good meetings. So that gives some hope that there is going to be a good outcome on disablement, but the proof will be in the pudding. It's important never can count that - to count those chickens before they - before you're in the room with the North Koreans.
Condoleezza Riceは、掻い摘んで言うならば、「やるときゃ拉致なんかとっとと忘れてやりまっせ!!」(超意訳)と言っております。
では我々が掟破りの自衛隊派兵で追求した国益は達成されない可能性が濃厚ということになるので、まずクエート~イラク間の空の無料ハイヤー・C-130を全機撤収しましょう。
補追:超意訳があまりにも超意訳だという非常にごもっともなご指摘をいただいたので少しだけ真面目に追記します。
まあライスとしてはですね、テロ支援国家から北朝鮮を除外するしないについて特定の言明をこの段階で行うことは、そのカードの有効性を損ねるからしないっと、拉致問題の推移にかかわらず除外するという選択肢は放棄しないぞ、こういうことであり、裏返せば、やるときにはやるぞということですね。
これはアメリカの立場に立った場合と北朝鮮の立場に立った場合、日本の立場に立った場合、それぞれに聞こえ方の違う言い回しなのであり玉虫色の発言ちゅうことでんな。
さて、外務省の受け止め方ですが、ちなみに26日の高村外相会見録にはこうあります。
北朝鮮問題
(問)北朝鮮問題について2点お伺いします。1点目は明日から六者会合に臨む姿勢を改めてお聞かせ頂きたいということ。もう1点は、米国議会でテロ支援国家指定解除に拉致の解決というものを加えるべきだという動きが出ましたが、これに対する大臣としての評価、この2つをお願いします。
(外務大臣)後の質問から言いますと、日本政府は一貫して米国に拉致問題を解決しない限り、テロ支援国家指定を解除してくれるなと言っている訳ですから、その日本政府と同じ方向の動きがあるということは、非常に結構なことだと思っております。
六者会合に関わる我が国の姿勢ですが、それは核、ミサイル、拉致といったものを同時に解決する、そして、その上で過去の問題を清算して、国交正常化に向かうという方向に、六者会合の中で少しでも前進出来れば良いなという姿勢で臨みたいと思っております。
(問)そこの方針は、前体制と新しい高村大臣の体制は、基本的に変わらないのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)基本的に変わらないでしょうね。やはり、外交というのは、ある原理原則と状況対応ということがありますから、状況を見て対応する中で、それぞれ、実行する人間によって若干の差が出て来るかも知れない。それは何とも言えませんが、原則は変わらないと思います。
(問)新内閣が発足して間もないですが、総理から六者会合に臨むに当たって、何か指示があったのか、或いは対処方針について総理と話し合う、協議するような時間があったのか、その辺をお聞かせ願えますか。
(外務大臣)残念ながら、まだ協議するような時間はありません。福田総理もこの問題についてずっと、最近はともかく、携わって来た方です。私としても、最近、具体的に携わって来た訳ではありませんが、かなり前から色々携わって来た訳ですから、基本原則においては変わることはありません
なんとも嬉しそうな記事だこと。
拉致被害者解放など条件、北のテロ支援国家指定解除 米共和党主導で
さて、問題の疑惑中のはこれなんだが
N Korean ship 'linked to Israel's strike on Syria'
そしてその三日後にイスラエルがシリアの核関連施設かも知れない施設を爆撃した、こんな話ですね。
そして北朝鮮船がスエズ運河を通過する際には恒常的に韓国船を偽装しているそうですわ、なにやってんだかね国連加盟国は。(爆
ロイターの記事に拠れば
でアメリカですが、先に書いたように今のところこの法案はニュースにはなってない。
関連した記述があるのは、下に貼ったNew York Timesの「Bush Declines to Lift Veil of Secrecy Over Israeli Airstrike on Syria」という記事に
また、 以下はホワイトハウスのブリーフィングでのやりとりすが、「クリントンの政策を批判しまくったブッシュ政権が同じドツボにいるんじゃないのか?」という鋭い質問に報道官Dana Perinoはひたすら逃げまくっておりますなw
関連記事
NKorea's No. 2 Man Meets Syrian Official
North Korea Nuclear Talks Set For Sept 27 - 30
Bush Declines to Lift Veil of Secrecy Over Israeli Airstrike on Syria
Israel, U.S. Shared Data On Suspected Nuclear Site
拉致被害者解放など条件、北のテロ支援国家指定解除 米共和党主導で
複数の議会筋によると、法案は指定解除の「基準」として(1)日本人拉致被害者の解放(2)シリアやイランなどテロ支援国家への核・ミサイル関連物資・技術の移転禁止(3)恒久的で検証可能な形での核計画廃棄-などを盛り込んでいる。けどさ、今のところこの法案が目立って騒ぎになっているという風はないんだな。
北朝鮮がシリアの核開発を支援、イスラエル軍がシリアの核開発関連施設を空爆したとの疑惑が浮上する中、親イスラエルの民主党議員が新法案に同調する動きも出ているという。
さて、問題の疑惑中のはこれなんだが
N Korean ship 'linked to Israel's strike on Syria'
A suspicious North Korean freighter that re-flagged itself as South Korean before off-loading an unknown cargo at the Syrian port of Tartous is at the centre of efforts today to investigate Israel's recent airstrike on Syria.
This was three days before Israeli jets attacked a site in the north eastern desert of Syria, not far from its border with Iraq. Since leaving Tartous, one of Syria's main ports on the Mediterranean, the ship's trace has disappeared and it is not known whether western intelligence agencies are tracking the vessel.
"There were five ships but the interesting one was the one with a connection to North Korea - the Al Hamed." He said he cross-referred to other maritime databases to establish the ship was not a regular visitor to the Mediterranean but had come through the Suez Canal in late June. It had registered itself for the Suez transit as a South Korean vessel but Mr Solomon said this was standard procedure for North Korean ships seeking to avoid international constraints on North Korea.
Last week, US officials suggested that North Korea had sought to export some of its nuclear technology and equipment to Syria but the Israelis had been tipped off, so they arranged a pre-emptive strike on a sensitive shipment. Mr Solomon said the Al Hamed was owned by a North Korean business until a few months ago when ownership changed hands to an as yet unidentified new owner.韓国船であるように偽装した北朝鮮の船がシリアの港に入ったっと。
そしてその三日後にイスラエルがシリアの核関連施設かも知れない施設を爆撃した、こんな話ですね。
そして北朝鮮船がスエズ運河を通過する際には恒常的に韓国船を偽装しているそうですわ、なにやってんだかね国連加盟国は。(爆
ロイターの記事に拠れば
The Washington Post, citing unnamed sources, last week reported that intelligence gathered over the past six months had led some U.S. officials to believe Syria was receiving help from North Korea on some sort of nuclear facility. The intelligence, including satellite imagery, suggested the facility could be used to produce material for nuclear weapons, the Post said.ということなんで、核開発施設であることは疑いはなさそうですが、北朝鮮はそういう事実を否定している、まあするだろうけど...
でアメリカですが、先に書いたように今のところこの法案はニュースにはなってない。
関連した記述があるのは、下に貼ったNew York Timesの「Bush Declines to Lift Veil of Secrecy Over Israeli Airstrike on Syria」という記事に
He emphasized that he was speaking generally, not specifically, about whether North Korea provided assistance to Syria. "I'm not going to comment on the matter," Mr. Bush repeated twice when asked about the strike at a news conference at the White House. When pressed, he added, "Saying I'm not going to comment on the matter means I'm not going to comment on the matter." Mr. Bush's remarks - a relatively rare instance of a president flatly declining to comment - also reflected the extraordinary secrecy here in Washington surrounding the raid.と、そしてWashington Postの「Israel, U.S. Shared Data On Suspected Nuclear Site」という記事に
Bush refused to comment yesterday on the attack, but he issued a blunt warning to North Korea that "the exportation of information and/or materials" would affect negotiations under which North Korea would give up its nuclear programs in exchanges for energy aid and diplomatic recognition. "To the extent that they are proliferating, we expect them to stop that proliferation, if they want the six-party talks to be successful," he said at a news conference, referring to negotiations that also include China, Japan, South Korea and Russia.とあるだけです。
また、 以下はホワイトハウスのブリーフィングでのやりとりすが、「クリントンの政策を批判しまくったブッシュ政権が同じドツボにいるんじゃないのか?」という鋭い質問に報道官Dana Perinoはひたすら逃げまくっておりますなw
Q Dana, the White House is very dedicated to setting the record straight, as we all know, on reporting that you deem to be inaccurate. Is the reporting about the strike against Syria by Israel as reported by The Washington Post today accurate?
MS. PERINO: David, I'm not able to comment, as much as -- I don't know, and I'm not able to comment. I don't know.
Q Were you going to say, "as much as you'd like to"?
MS. PERINO: As much as I'd like to be able to --
Q Really?
MS. PERINO: -- let some air out of the balloon on this story, I don't know and I just can't comment.
Q But there's nothing inaccurate about that, as far as you know?
MS. PERINO: I'm not saying one way or the other whether it's accurate.
Q Do you think that this administration has been naive about the North Koreans while pursuing an effort to get them to abandon their weapons program; that it didn't realize that just as you all accused the Clinton people of being naive, that you were being double-dealt by the North Koreans; that they might have been saying one thing and doing another in this case, as well?
MS. PERINO: No, I think we've been very clear-eyed about the North Koreans, and I think that Ambassador Chris Hill, who has helped shepherd the six-party talk process, has brought some accountability to them. I think we've started to see some success. But we're clear-eyed about the situation and the dangers. And that's one of the reasons the President set up the Proliferation Security Initiative, not just in regards to North Korea, but other countries. We need to continue to push on that.
Many countries are participating now. One of the things the President talked about in many of these bilateral meetings is more and continued participation in that, so we can stop proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Q Does the administration suspect or know for certain that the North Koreans helped the Syrians in any way?
MS. PERINO: I'm not going to comment, and I don't know.
関連記事
NKorea's No. 2 Man Meets Syrian Official
North Korea Nuclear Talks Set For Sept 27 - 30
Bush Declines to Lift Veil of Secrecy Over Israeli Airstrike on Syria
Israel, U.S. Shared Data On Suspected Nuclear Site
今日は永田町の星陵会館で「金正日テロ政権を糾弾する緊急集会」が開かれた。
事前にご案内は頂戴はしていたんだけれども、今回は愛知県で葬祭があったためお邪魔できなかった。
司会は櫻井よしこさんで主催は家族会、救う会、拉致議連なんだが、この拉致議連という議連も数年前までは集会が開かれるたびに与野党を問わず多数の出席者、登壇者があったもんだがいまやふぐの薄造りのような存在だな。
さて、麻生太郎が飛び入りで登壇し威勢の良いことを言ったらしいんだが、麻生なんてのはこれまでなにか目立った行動をしたか?
総裁選で無風楽勝の予定が翌日に壊れ去っていまや国内外の報道で福田康夫の当て馬扱い、退勢挽回に利用できるものはといえば拉致問題しかないからちゅうことなんだろうが、
これじゃ小泉以来政治利用され続ける家族会が気の毒すぎる罠。
でなんだ? 与謝野が「新しい内閣ができても全く変わることはない」と言った?
人を馬鹿にするにもほどがあるわけでさ、麻生が総裁選で勝って首班指名が無事に終わったとすれば与謝野の続投はあるかも知れんが福田がそうなった場合には交替だろう。
そんな奴が言うことなんぞ交通安全の御札ほどの値打ちもないだろうよ?
そしてさ、なにも変わることがないってのは最悪の一歩手前の次悪で、換言すれば「アメリカ次第で積極的にはなにもしない」ってことに他ならんのじゃないの?
既に広く報じられるところでは、福田は6カ国協議の枠組みの中で譲歩を考慮、麻生は圧力のないところに対話はない、ちゅうことのようなんだが、いまより譲歩するなんぞはもってのほか。
そして圧力というのは容易いんだけど、我が国が今更北鮮にかけられる軍事以外の圧力ってなにがある?
6カ国協議のフレームの中に居続ける限り、圧力として有効なのは対米圧力なんであって、これまでで一番有効だった圧力は小沢一郎の「テロ特報延長反対宣言」、自民党はなにもできてないんだぜ。
そんな麻生がジリ貧挽回のために付け焼き刃的に何を言ったところで虚しいし、石原の馬鹿息子が今更「6者協議から日本が離脱するくらいあっていい。米国の北朝鮮政策はひどい」なんてことを言ってみたところでこんなものは小沢一郎の二番煎じ、なんの新鮮味もないし、同じことを言うなら国交相の時代に言って見せて欲しかった。
今頃言うなヴォケ!!
いまをときめくテロ特措法、その延長根拠の一つとして与党側は、9/11の犠牲者に日本人がいたからアメリカと日本はテロとの戦いを共有すべきだという胡乱なことを言うわけだが、9/11の攻撃目標はアメリカであり、攻撃者はアメリカの敵なんだが、それに対しては我が国政府は軍を出せるこういうわけだな。
翻って拉致はどうだ?
拉致は北朝鮮の我が国に対する攻撃であり、北朝鮮は我が国に対する敵対国家なわけだが、それに対しては軍を出すという声すらない。
勿論ここには憲法上の制約があることは百も承知はしているが、その同じ憲法上の制約は、イラクに対する派兵にもインド洋(ペルシャ湾含む)にも及んでいる、にもかかわらず、こういう奇妙奇天烈な詭弁を繰り出す政府、そしてそれに易々と騙された挙げ句に「テロ特延長は国益重視」なんちゅう妄言を吐きまくる媚米似而非保守、聞くほどに情けなくなるわさ。
さて、こんな中から見えてくるのは、次期総裁選で福田が勝ち、首班指名を得た場合、ガス抜きのために麻生は外相に留任、こんな図式だべ?
事前にご案内は頂戴はしていたんだけれども、今回は愛知県で葬祭があったためお邪魔できなかった。
司会は櫻井よしこさんで主催は家族会、救う会、拉致議連なんだが、この拉致議連という議連も数年前までは集会が開かれるたびに与野党を問わず多数の出席者、登壇者があったもんだがいまやふぐの薄造りのような存在だな。
さて、麻生太郎が飛び入りで登壇し威勢の良いことを言ったらしいんだが、麻生なんてのはこれまでなにか目立った行動をしたか?
総裁選で無風楽勝の予定が翌日に壊れ去っていまや国内外の報道で福田康夫の当て馬扱い、退勢挽回に利用できるものはといえば拉致問題しかないからちゅうことなんだろうが、
これじゃ小泉以来政治利用され続ける家族会が気の毒すぎる罠。
でなんだ? 与謝野が「新しい内閣ができても全く変わることはない」と言った?
人を馬鹿にするにもほどがあるわけでさ、麻生が総裁選で勝って首班指名が無事に終わったとすれば与謝野の続投はあるかも知れんが福田がそうなった場合には交替だろう。
そんな奴が言うことなんぞ交通安全の御札ほどの値打ちもないだろうよ?
そしてさ、なにも変わることがないってのは最悪の一歩手前の次悪で、換言すれば「アメリカ次第で積極的にはなにもしない」ってことに他ならんのじゃないの?
既に広く報じられるところでは、福田は6カ国協議の枠組みの中で譲歩を考慮、麻生は圧力のないところに対話はない、ちゅうことのようなんだが、いまより譲歩するなんぞはもってのほか。
そして圧力というのは容易いんだけど、我が国が今更北鮮にかけられる軍事以外の圧力ってなにがある?
6カ国協議のフレームの中に居続ける限り、圧力として有効なのは対米圧力なんであって、これまでで一番有効だった圧力は小沢一郎の「テロ特報延長反対宣言」、自民党はなにもできてないんだぜ。
そんな麻生がジリ貧挽回のために付け焼き刃的に何を言ったところで虚しいし、石原の馬鹿息子が今更「6者協議から日本が離脱するくらいあっていい。米国の北朝鮮政策はひどい」なんてことを言ってみたところでこんなものは小沢一郎の二番煎じ、なんの新鮮味もないし、同じことを言うなら国交相の時代に言って見せて欲しかった。
今頃言うなヴォケ!!
いまをときめくテロ特措法、その延長根拠の一つとして与党側は、9/11の犠牲者に日本人がいたからアメリカと日本はテロとの戦いを共有すべきだという胡乱なことを言うわけだが、9/11の攻撃目標はアメリカであり、攻撃者はアメリカの敵なんだが、それに対しては我が国政府は軍を出せるこういうわけだな。
翻って拉致はどうだ?
拉致は北朝鮮の我が国に対する攻撃であり、北朝鮮は我が国に対する敵対国家なわけだが、それに対しては軍を出すという声すらない。
勿論ここには憲法上の制約があることは百も承知はしているが、その同じ憲法上の制約は、イラクに対する派兵にもインド洋(ペルシャ湾含む)にも及んでいる、にもかかわらず、こういう奇妙奇天烈な詭弁を繰り出す政府、そしてそれに易々と騙された挙げ句に「テロ特延長は国益重視」なんちゅう妄言を吐きまくる媚米似而非保守、聞くほどに情けなくなるわさ。
さて、こんな中から見えてくるのは、次期総裁選で福田が勝ち、首班指名を得た場合、ガス抜きのために麻生は外相に留任、こんな図式だべ?
拉致被害者家族らが緊急集会 日朝首脳会談から5年で
2007年09月16日19時54分
北朝鮮が「5人生存、8人死亡」と拉致を認めた初の日朝首脳会談から5年がたつのを前に、拉致被害者家族会と、支援団体の「救う会」、拉致議連の3者が16日、東京・永田町で緊急集会を開き、約500人が参加した。被害者家族18人が進展がほとんどなかった5年間へのいらだちを語り、いっそうの協力を訴えた。会場で、北朝鮮へのさらなる制裁強化を政府に求める決議をした。
拉致被害者、松木薫さんの姉、斉藤文代さん(62)は北朝鮮側から「死亡」が伝えられた後、2度も松木さんのものとされた偽の遺骨を渡された経験を話した。
「5人が戻ってくるなか、骨を2度も持たされるつらさ。最近、入院中の母が手紙を出したいというので相手を尋ねると、昔の首相の名を挙げる。それから何代、政権が変わったのか」と訴えた。
家族会の飯塚繁雄副代表(69)は、横田滋代表(74)が15日まで胆石の手術で入院していたことを明かしたうえで、「家族が拉致されて30年。救出運動を始めて10年。そしてあの日からすでに5年。あまりにも長い。待っている家族も相当疲れている。一緒に戦ってください」と呼びかけた。
自民党総裁選に立候補した麻生幹事長も飛び入りし、「拉致問題は私たちが解決しなければならない大切な問題。核もミサイルももちろんだが、主権の侵害でこれに勝る問題はない」と語った。
北朝鮮拉致:日朝会談5年の節目に集会 被害者家族会など
北朝鮮が拉致を認めた日朝首脳会談(02年9月17日)から5年となる節目を前に、拉致被害者家族会などは16日、東京都内で集会を開いた。支援者ら500人以上が詰めかけ、拉致被害者の全員帰国や制裁強化などを求める決議案を承認した。
集会では、家族の高齢化から「時間がない」と訴える声が続出。「にせの遺骨を出されて『ああそうですか』という親がどこにいるのか。怒らない親はいない」(横田早紀江さん)、「入院中の母は『大平(正芳)首相に手紙を出す』と言い、時代が止まったまま。首相が何人も代わってしまったが、早く動いてほしいと毎日願っている」(松木薫さんの姉、斉藤文代さん)などと声を詰まらせた。
集会には、自民党総裁選で遊説中の麻生太郎幹事長が駆けつけ「圧力がなければ対話にならない」と安倍政権の強硬路線維持を強調。集会に先立ち家族会メンバーらと面会した与謝野馨官房長官は、新首相下の対応について「何ら政府の姿勢に変わりはない。きちんと申し渡し、引き継いでやっていく」と語った。
記者会見で家族らは、新首相に対し拉致問題対策本部の強化や制裁期限の延長などを要望する考えを示した。また、横田早紀江さんは、胆のう切除手術を受けるため入院していた滋さんが15日に退院したことを明らかにした。【工藤哲、西田進一郎】
毎日新聞 2007年9月16日 20時25分
拉致被害者家族ら集会「1日も早い解決を」
北朝鮮が拉致を認めた日朝首脳会談から17日で丸5年を迎えるのを前に、拉致被害者の家族会などが16日、東京都内で拉致問題の早期解決を求める集会を開いた。500人を超える支援者らが参加する中、家族からは「残された時間は少なくなってきている。1日も早く再会したい」との訴えが相次いだ。
拉致被害者の横田めぐみさん(失跡当時13)の母、横田早紀江さん(71)は「本当に長い年月がたったが、皆さんの支援の中で頑張ってこられた」と感謝の言葉を述べ、「(めぐみさんが拉致された)新潟時代の海、雪、桜のことを思い出すだけでも悲しいが、解決まで訴え続ける」と強調した。
増元るみ子さん(同24)の弟で同会の増元照明事務局長(51)は「この5年間で、それまで小さかった救出活動が、大きく、太くなった。我々は闘いを休むわけにはいかない」と宣言。田口八重子さん(同22)の兄の飯塚繁雄副代表(69)も「どれだけ時間がかかるか分からないが、今後も一緒に闘ってほしい」と呼びかけた。(19:04)
新内閣でも拉致問題への姿勢変わらず、家族会に官房長官 与謝野官房長官は16日、拉致被害者家族会メンバーらと都内で懇談し、拉致問題に対する政府の姿勢について、「安倍首相が体調不良のため退陣を決意したが、新しい内閣ができても全く変わることはない」と強調した。家族会からは、「一抹の不安を持っている」との意見が出た。
与謝野長官は懇談で、北朝鮮の核問題をめぐる6か国協議が19日にも始まるとの見通しを伝えた上で、「拉致問題の解決がすべての前提という立場で交渉に臨んでいく」と語った。
(2007年9月16日19時33分 読売新聞)
「6者協議離脱も」 北朝鮮鮮問題で石原政調会長
2007年09月16日19時09分
自民党の石原伸晃政調会長は16日のテレビ朝日の番組で、北朝鮮の核問題をめぐる6者協議について、「6者協議から日本が離脱するくらいあっていい。米国の北朝鮮政策はひどい」と述べた。6者協議からの離脱は現実には難しいが、拉致問題解決の展望が開けないまま米朝間協議が進むことへの懸念を示した発言だ。また、石原氏は拉致問題について、「小泉、安倍両首相が(道筋を)つけた問題が忘れ去られることは、絶対にあってはならない」とも強調した。
上から昨日のホワイトハウス(スノー報道官)、国務省(マコーマック報道官)の会見録抜粋です。
テレビでも報じられているように、基本的には「日本の内政問題である」というスタンス、当たり前だけど、です。
そしてこれも当たり前ですが、新しい政府がこれまで同様に「親米的」であることを願うっと。
さて、先稿では書き忘れましたが、安倍辞任とは符合することなく、少日前に王毅在日本中国大使の異動が公表されています。
王毅は小泉時代に日本の反中感情慰撫のために特命で、外交部長から格下ポストの駐日大使になってきていたわけですが、安倍政権成立で親中政権を樹立をみた、中国側はそういう判断をしているんでしょう、だから王毅は引き上げた。
このあたりにも媚米、嫌中、似而非保守、熱湯浴の認識のとの捻れを感じますね。
Press Briefing by Tony Snow
Daily Press Briefing
関連過去記事
安倍晋三総理が自慰
安倍晋三自慰に関する海外の報道ぶり
テレビでも報じられているように、基本的には「日本の内政問題である」というスタンス、当たり前だけど、です。
そしてこれも当たり前ですが、新しい政府がこれまで同様に「親米的」であることを願うっと。
さて、先稿では書き忘れましたが、安倍辞任とは符合することなく、少日前に王毅在日本中国大使の異動が公表されています。
王毅は小泉時代に日本の反中感情慰撫のために特命で、外交部長から格下ポストの駐日大使になってきていたわけですが、安倍政権成立で親中政権を樹立をみた、中国側はそういう判断をしているんでしょう、だから王毅は引き上げた。
このあたりにも媚米、嫌中、似而非保守、熱湯浴の認識のとの捻れを感じますね。
Press Briefing by Tony Snow
Q Is the President disappointed with Prime Minister Abe's resignation? And does he --
MR. SNOW: You asked me that this morning. (Laughter.)
Q I have one more. (Laughter.) And does the administration expect continued support and assistance from Japan in Afghanistan?
MR. SNOW: Well, again, we have a very important working relationship with the Japanese. The President certainly respected his working relationship with Prime Minister Abe. But let's see what happens in Japanese politics. He resigned, you're going to have the formation of a new government, and we look forward to working with them.
Daily Press Briefing
QUESTION: On Japan. I know you were saying that they're internal domestic --
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: -- political developments.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: But what does the U.S. hope for from the new Japanese Prime Minister once it's decided?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think what we have had over our -- over the recent decades and that is a good partner and I suspect that that will be the case. Japan's a good friend and ally and I expect that we are going to work very well with whomever is in the next Japanese Government as well as whomever leads that government.
QUESTION: Just to follow up, regarding the Anti-terrorism and Special Measures Law and with Abe's resignation, it looks like it could possibly be more difficult to get it extended.
Is the U.S. a little bit concerned about this or --
MR. MCCORMACK: I'll let others do vote-counting in the Japanese Diet. We've made it clear that we support the continuation of that mission, that -- in support of OEF, but ultimately, it's going to have to be the Japanese people and their representatives who decide on that. Yeah.
QUESTION: Sean, before the announcement of the resignation this morning, Ambassador Schieffer was called into the Prime Minister's office. Do you know if that's how the United States was informed of the intent of resignation or was it through --
MR. MCCORMACK: I don't know. Don't know.
関連過去記事
安倍晋三総理が自慰
安倍晋三自慰に関する海外の報道ぶり
izaに共同電を引用した特措法否決で「安倍政権崩壊も」 米紙Wポスト
記事書いたのはブレイン・ハーデンという記者ですがもうタイトルからして下僕扱いだな。(爆
Japan's Floundering Abe Fights for Floating Gas Stationちゅうんだから「断末魔の日本の安倍は洋上ガソリンスタンドのために戦う。」んなことになります。
そして記事は冒頭から
まあしかし、これはなにもこの記者だけが感じることではなく広く共有されている観測ですね。
そして共同電の報じる内容中一番の注目点はこれらの部分ですが、まず安倍総理の主張に関する言及部分。
大意としては「イラク戦争、あるいはあまねく主人と下僕の関係のように理解される日米関係により、世論調査結果はブッシュ政権に対する不評を示している。」といった感じでしょう。
ですから確かに書かれている。
僕はこの世論調査結果は知りませんが、嫌米家や左翼はそう主張するし、嫌米家の僕もアメリカの国益と日本の国益をまったく区別しない安倍政権の主張、媚米論陣の主張には首を傾げたくなる次第で、そういう世論調査結果があるとしても違和感は感じません。
なによりこの記事がアメリカの理解を象徴すると思うのは、小泉・安倍政権がなんと強弁しようが、アメリカにとって日本の洋上給油はなんとも便利な「無料の洋上ガソリンスタンド」だちゅうことですね。
日中間における同じ現象に関して媚米論陣は同趣の批判をする、逆に媚中論陣は日米関係においてこういう批判をする。
しかし、こいつらは日本の国益を優先していない点において同根なんであって、差がない、似たようなバカ、こういうことになると思います。
ただ、この記事は、小沢さんのテロ特措法反対表明に関しては指摘すべきところを忘れてはおらず、
米紙ワシントン・ポストは8日の国際面で、日本のテロ対策特別措置法をめぐる協議を報じ、特措法の延長が否決され海上自衛隊が実施している多国籍軍艦船への給油活動が停止となれば「安倍政権は終了する公算がある」と伝えた。という記事があったのでソースのWashington Postをあたってきました。
同紙は参院選で勝利した民主党の小沢一郎代表にすれば、特措法の延長を否決し給油活動の停止に持ち込めば、既に世論が抱いている安倍首相の政治家としての能力のなさを国民にアピールする格好の機会となると報じた。
また、同紙は安倍首相が給油継続で「頼りになる同盟国である日本」を証明できると主張しているのに対して、日本の世論は日米同盟を「主人と下僕の関係」ととらえていると伝えた。(共同)
記事書いたのはブレイン・ハーデンという記者ですがもうタイトルからして下僕扱いだな。(爆
Japan's Floundering Abe Fights for Floating Gas Stationちゅうんだから「断末魔の日本の安倍は洋上ガソリンスタンドのために戦う。」んなことになります。
そして記事は冒頭から
For the election-battered, scandal-plagued and competence-challenged government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, it has come down to this: If he cannot keep a floating gas station open in the Indian Ocean, Abe may be finished as the leader of Japan.というのですから「選挙での惨敗、スキャンダル禍、統治能力不足を露呈した安倍政権だが、インド洋で開業している洋上ガソリンスタンドを継続できなければ安倍は首相の地位を終えることになるかもしれない。」な訳で良いでしょう。
まあしかし、これはなにもこの記者だけが感じることではなく広く共有されている観測ですね。
そして共同電の報じる内容中一番の注目点はこれらの部分ですが、まず安倍総理の主張に関する言及部分。
A champion of strong ties between Japan and the United States, Abe argues that giving fuel to Americans and other allies shows the world that Japan is a reliable partner in fighting terrorism. "We must do everything we can to somehow continue this operation that is regarded highly by the international community," he said this week.強力な日米関係の推進者である安倍総理は「アメリカや他の連合国に燃料を供給することは、日本がテロとの戦いにおける信頼に足る盟友であることを世界に示す。」と主張する。 彼は今週「我々は、なんとしてでも国際社会から高く評価されるこの活動を継続するためになし得るすべてをしなくてはならない。」と語った。こんな内容で、そして日本の世論に関する言及部分ですが、
Polls show the growing unpopularity of the Bush administration, of its war in Iraq and of a U.S.-Japan tie that is widely perceived as one of master and servant.という風に書かれています。
大意としては「イラク戦争、あるいはあまねく主人と下僕の関係のように理解される日米関係により、世論調査結果はブッシュ政権に対する不評を示している。」といった感じでしょう。
ですから確かに書かれている。
僕はこの世論調査結果は知りませんが、嫌米家や左翼はそう主張するし、嫌米家の僕もアメリカの国益と日本の国益をまったく区別しない安倍政権の主張、媚米論陣の主張には首を傾げたくなる次第で、そういう世論調査結果があるとしても違和感は感じません。
なによりこの記事がアメリカの理解を象徴すると思うのは、小泉・安倍政権がなんと強弁しようが、アメリカにとって日本の洋上給油はなんとも便利な「無料の洋上ガソリンスタンド」だちゅうことですね。
日中間における同じ現象に関して媚米論陣は同趣の批判をする、逆に媚中論陣は日米関係においてこういう批判をする。
しかし、こいつらは日本の国益を優先していない点において同根なんであって、差がない、似たようなバカ、こういうことになると思います。
ただ、この記事は、小沢さんのテロ特措法反対表明に関しては指摘すべきところを忘れてはおらず、
There is some irony in Ozawa's opposition to the gas station. After the Persian Gulf War, he wrote a book that argued for a robust foreign policy and criticized Japan for just giving money to the coalition that defeated Saddam Hussein.のように、湾岸戦争当時の彼の主張と今回の主張にある矛盾は指摘しており、日本国内のアナリストや評論家のコメントを引用しながら、
But at this point, several analysts agreed, Ozawa is most interested in closing the gas station to bring Abe down.結局小沢さんは、テロ特措法を政争の具にしているに過ぎないと断定しており、これも誤りではないでしょう。
"They are not off this list,"、彼らはリストから除外されていない。
"Whether they get off will depend on further denuclearization,"、彼らが除外されるか否かは更なる非核化にかかっている。
とにかく、現段階ではテロ支援国家リストから除外はしていないが...ということですね。
しかしながら、アメリカは既に北京合意の段階で北朝鮮をリストから除外する準備は始めている、これは国務省の公式文書に書かれている事実です。
でありながらダメ晋三は「アメリカはそうは言っていない。」、マッチーと寝業師与謝野は「アメリカからそういうことは聞いていない。」、あんた等それで国民騙せると思ってんの?
そしてもっとも気に入らないのは、ダメ晋三にしても外相マッチーにしても始まる前から腰が砕けているということで、左傾マスコミですらが北朝鮮の被災状況と余波については懐疑的なのに、前のめりすぎですわ。
二人揃って「6カ国協議とは別枠で緊急支援は考えても良い。」と語ったそうだが、そんなロンパリみたいな二国間関係がどこにあるんだ?
一体さ、人道のない国北朝鮮に人道支援ってあり得るわけ?
でもってここ数年たびたび流されるんだが、闇市の映像では、売られている食料には相も変わらず赤十字のマークがバリバリ入ってるんだな。
要するに国際的な支援物資はいまだに配給には回らずに闇市に流れているということ、そして国境がここ数年かなりポーラスになってきているから中国から物資はガンガン入っているわけで、とりあえず、金さえそこそこあれば餓死はしない、こういうことですよ。
いつまで北朝鮮の災害・飢饉ビジネスに無料で商品を供給する気だ?
なお、「さて、アメリカは北朝鮮をテロ支援国家リストから外すか? 」
に
U.S. says North Korea remains on terrorism list
"Whether they get off will depend on further denuclearization,"、彼らが除外されるか否かは更なる非核化にかかっている。
とにかく、現段階ではテロ支援国家リストから除外はしていないが...ということですね。
しかしながら、アメリカは既に北京合意の段階で北朝鮮をリストから除外する準備は始めている、これは国務省の公式文書に書かれている事実です。
でありながらダメ晋三は「アメリカはそうは言っていない。」、マッチーと寝業師与謝野は「アメリカからそういうことは聞いていない。」、あんた等それで国民騙せると思ってんの?
そしてもっとも気に入らないのは、ダメ晋三にしても外相マッチーにしても始まる前から腰が砕けているということで、左傾マスコミですらが北朝鮮の被災状況と余波については懐疑的なのに、前のめりすぎですわ。
二人揃って「6カ国協議とは別枠で緊急支援は考えても良い。」と語ったそうだが、そんなロンパリみたいな二国間関係がどこにあるんだ?
一体さ、人道のない国北朝鮮に人道支援ってあり得るわけ?
でもってここ数年たびたび流されるんだが、闇市の映像では、売られている食料には相も変わらず赤十字のマークがバリバリ入ってるんだな。
要するに国際的な支援物資はいまだに配給には回らずに闇市に流れているということ、そして国境がここ数年かなりポーラスになってきているから中国から物資はガンガン入っているわけで、とりあえず、金さえそこそこあれば餓死はしない、こういうことですよ。
いつまで北朝鮮の災害・飢饉ビジネスに無料で商品を供給する気だ?
なお、「さて、アメリカは北朝鮮をテロ支援国家リストから外すか? 」
に
そういう意味では小沢一郎さんは良い仕事をしたと言えるんでしょうが(藁と書いたことに対して誤解があっちゃいかんのですが、由来の問題は別にして仮に小沢さんの「テロ特措法延長反対」発言がなかったらアメリカは我が国に対してこうまで神経質な対応はしませんよ。
U.S. says North Korea remains on terrorism list
Tue Sep 4, 2007 12:38AM EDT
SYDNEY (Reuters) - Top U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill said on Tuesday that North Korea must do more to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme before it can be removed from Washington's list of states that sponsor terrorism. On Monday, Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency quoted a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying the United States had agreed during bilateral talks in Geneva to take North Korea off the list. "They are not off this list," Hill told reporters in Sydney, which is hosting the annual meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. He flew in from Geneva, where he had met North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan over the weekend. "Whether they get off will depend on further denuclearization," added Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Japan's top government spokesman also said Tokyo had not heard of any U.S. decision to take North Korea off the list, which currently also includes Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria. "The United States has told us that there would be no delisting until (North Korea) disables its nuclear facilities," Chief Cabinet Secretary Kaoru Yosano told reporters. North Korea was put on Washington's blacklist in January 1988 after a North Korean agent confessed to the 1987 bombing of a South Korean passenger jet over the Indian Ocean that killed all 115 people on board. North Korea said it had agreed with the United States in Geneva to take "practical measures to neutralize the existing nuclear facilities in the DPRK (North Korea) within this year", KCNA quoted the Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying on Monday. "In return for this, the U.S. decided to take such political and economic measures for compensation as delisting the DPRK as a terrorism sponsor and lifting all sanctions that have been applied according to the Trading with the Enemy Act," the unnamed spokesman was quoted as saying. Hill said in Geneva that the communist state had agreed to fully account for and disable its nuclear program by the end of the year. He confirmed the delegations had discussed the terms under which Washington would drop North Korea from its terrorism list. The blacklist imposes a ban on arms-related sales, keeps the economically isolated country from receiving U.S. economic aid and requires the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions. Tokyo has been pressing Washington not to take the North off the list until the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korean agents in the past is resolved. Japan is demanding the return and information of the abductees, but North Korea insists the issue has been resolved after it allowed a number of former abductees and their families to return in 2002 and 2004.
これは平壌発のロイターですが、これに拠れば、北朝鮮の外務相スポークスマンの談話として朝鮮中央通信が「アメリカは北朝鮮敵視政策を止めて、北朝鮮得おテロ支援国家リストから外すことに同意した。」と伝えた、まあこれは朝から国内でもしきりに報じられて入るんですが、ヒルは「我々が得た合意の一つは、北朝鮮がすべての核開発計画を申告し、年内にその全ての核開発計画を放棄し無能力化することだ。」と語りはしたが、テロ支援国家リストからの除外に関しては合意したとは語らなかった、こういうことですね。
N.Korea says U.S. to remove it from terrorism list
そういう意味では小沢一郎さんは良い仕事をしたと言えるんでしょうが(藁、現段階では国務省の関連サイトにはニュースはありません。
この後の推移で間もなく安倍政権が倒れてしまえばアメリカは仮に合意をしているとすれば、臆面なく突っ走るんでしょうが、いま表に出せば安倍政権は間違いなく倒れる。
さて外務相ですが、これも朝から報じられています。
北朝鮮問題
まっち~もダメですね、これはもう模範的な官僚答弁ですわ。
アメリカが言ったことがそれほどの担保にはならないことは上野公園のパンダを見れば思い出せるでしょう。
過度な楽観もなにも。
それがなければ北朝鮮がこんな合意をするはずがないですよ。
まあね、今の段階でそういう通告を受けたなんてことは言えっこないけどさ。(藁
N.Korea says U.S. to remove it from terrorism list
North Korea said on Monday the United States had agreed to remove it from its list of countries that support terrorism, a move long sought by Pyongyang to better its status with the outside world.
"The U.S. agreed to take political and economic compensation measures such as deleting our country from the list of terror-supporting nations and fully lifting sanctions imposed under the law on trading with enemy countries," its KCNA news agency reported a Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying.
"One thing that we agreed on is that the DPRK will provide a full declaration of all of their nuclear programs and will disable their nuclear programs by the end of this year, 2007," Hill said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. However, Hill did not say that Washington had agreed to remove North Korea from its list of state that sponsor terrorism.ではその他の合意はなにか?という話になりますが、恐らくこれは日本の政局を見てるんでしょう。
そういう意味では小沢一郎さんは良い仕事をしたと言えるんでしょうが(藁、現段階では国務省の関連サイトにはニュースはありません。
この後の推移で間もなく安倍政権が倒れてしまえばアメリカは仮に合意をしているとすれば、臆面なく突っ走るんでしょうが、いま表に出せば安倍政権は間違いなく倒れる。
さて外務相ですが、これも朝から報じられています。
北朝鮮問題
(問)先の米朝会談の評価と今後の日朝、そして六者会合全体への期待、その辺についてお願いします。
(外務大臣)米朝会談は、全体としては前向きに評価出来る話合いであったとの報告を受けております。完全な申告と核の無能力化、こうした方向について、どこまで細部に亘って合意しつつあるのか未だ分かりませんが、前向きな話合いが行われたということは六者会合全体にとっても良い方向に進んでいるということが言える訳ですし、また米朝会談の中でも日朝の話合いが前進することを米国側からも期待するという発言をされたと聞いていますから、モンゴルで開かれる日朝作業部会も成果のあがるものになることを期待しております。ただ、過度な楽観はしておりません。
(問)テロ支援国家指定解除を幾分か米国が仄めかしたという話があるようですが。
(外務大臣)詳しくは良く分かりませんが、日米関係を犠牲にして米朝関係を進めることはないということは米国側から言われて来ているところです。
まっち~もダメですね、これはもう模範的な官僚答弁ですわ。
アメリカが言ったことがそれほどの担保にはならないことは上野公園のパンダを見れば思い出せるでしょう。
過度な楽観もなにも。
それがなければ北朝鮮がこんな合意をするはずがないですよ。
まあね、今の段階でそういう通告を受けたなんてことは言えっこないけどさ。(藁
時々読んでるブログの最新エントリーにこういう記述がある。
我が国の政府のセリフが変わったのは北京合意からで、それまで「解決」といわれてきた部分がこっそりと「進展」に置き換えられた。
そしてその後はご存じのように中露米から「Progressの定義を示せ!!」っと畳みかけられるという愚を演じてまいりますた。
そして今度はこれですわ。(藁
過去記事
腰砕けの新内閣:北朝鮮の災害ビジネスに援助物資か?
あれ?前は「拉致問題の解決なくして」って言ってなかったけ?これは最近のマッチー外相の発言に対するコメントのようだが、少し認識に誤りがあるぞ。
それが「拉致問題の進展なくして支援なし」って、さりげなく変わっているけど、相変わらず姑息だね。
我が国の政府のセリフが変わったのは北京合意からで、それまで「解決」といわれてきた部分がこっそりと「進展」に置き換えられた。
そしてその後はご存じのように中露米から「Progressの定義を示せ!!」っと畳みかけられるという愚を演じてまいりますた。
そして今度はこれですわ。(藁
過去記事
腰砕けの新内閣:北朝鮮の災害ビジネスに援助物資か?
外相が替わった途端にこれかよ。
これというのは他でもない、北朝鮮であったと伝えられる水害に対する支援に参加するということなんだけど、国連からの要請だと言えばなんでも「ごもっとも!!」と思っちゃう世論も悪い罠。
Tokyo mulls aid for N Korea flood victims
拉致再調査なら人道支援検討
ちなみにこれまでの日本政府のちゅうより安倍内閣の「拉致に関する誤魔化し」の変遷を辿るとだな、官房長官時代から首相就任直後までは「拉致問題の解決なくして」であり、これで絶大な人気を博してきたんだが、北京合意のあたりからそれがこっそり「拉致問題に進展無くして」に変わった、そしてついに「拉致再調査」だとよ!!
ミエミエだ罠。
これで一人か二人還してくるのかも知れんがあとは死亡、それで拉致問題終結宣言だべ?
嘘つくにしてももっとましなカラクリ考えろよ。
そしてね、孤児やホームレス、行き倒れが溢れているはずだった北朝鮮ではテーマパークが大盛況、北朝鮮が喧伝する災害なんてあてになるもんかい。
President Bush and Prime Minister Abe of Japan Participate in a Joint Press Availability
Country Reports on Terrorism
安倍は勝負勘がない、風が読めないと書いてきたわけですが、かすます磨きがかかってます。
安倍は一体中山恭子さんのトップ当選をどういう風に見ていたんだろうか?
僕は少なくとも東京都民は拉致問題を忘れてはいないという証明だと思っていたんだが、安倍は国民の記憶力を自分並みに悪いとでも思っているのか? あるいは覚悟の自殺か?
いずれにしろ総裁就任の多数派工作のために靖国を捨て、そして今更維持する意味もないような敗戦処理内閣維持のために拉致まで捨てようとしているのは事実のようだ。
さて安倍マンセ~諸君、これに対してなんと言うんだ?
拉致まで捨てたらこの馬鹿には何も残るものはないんだが?
なめられまくりでんがな。
もうこんなインチキ保守内閣は百害あって一理もない。
とっとと総辞職しる!!
以下参考資料として昨日のクリス・ヒルの会見録と外務相の会見録の抜粋を貼っておきます。
明らかにこれまでのヒルの拉致問題に関する言及の仕方とは変わってますが、どう変わったと言えば、これまでは触れられたくないという印象、そして触れられた場合にも、「憂慮すべき問題である。」というのが精一杯で、多くの場合は「我々の目的は北朝鮮の核の無力化である。」という、木で鼻を括ったような言い方、これは恐らくライスのこの問題に対するスタンスの代弁なんですが、に終始していた。
それが今回は同盟国として日本を思い切り持ち上げた挙げ句に「機会のある限り拉致問題を提起してきた。」、「すべての作業部会において拉致問題を提起してきた。」、「拉致問題は日本にとって重要な問題であるから我々にとっても重要な問題だ。」なんちゅうことを言っている。
これは邪推が過ぎるかも知れませんが、テロ特措法の帰趨を気にしての日本世論に対するリップサービスなんでしょう。
やっぱり言うべき時には言うべきことを言わなくちゃいけません。
そして最終的に、北朝鮮をテロ支援国家リストから除外する件は大統領の専権に属すると言い切ってます。
一つ気になるのは、ヒルはカウンターパートと言っていながら佐々江さんのことを「ケン・ササイ」と呼んでいる、これは速記者のミスなのかも知れませんが...w
参考資料 クリストファー・ヒル会見録(2007年8月29日)
QUESTION: In relation to the State Sponsor of Terrorism list issue, does the U.S. or do you have any idea how they can possibly go forward on the Japanese abduction issue and are you going to talk about it in the working group?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We will talk about it. And I'm sure that is a subject that the Japanese delegation will talk about in their bilateral working group meeting in connection with the Japanese DPRK issues. So it's an issue that I think will be addressed. And you know, I've raised it on every -- I've raised it in every six-party meeting. I've raised it in every bilateral meeting. It's an issue we want to see some resolution to. Yes.
中略
QUESTION: Yeah, just to follow up on that, the reasons why they were put on the list have to do with things that took place many years ago. But does the -- the instances of the abductions of Japanese citizens, does that play any role in potential removal from that list?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You know, the U.S. has a very close and very special relationship with Japan. It's not only a close and special relationship, it's an alliance. So we care very much what our Japanese friends and allies have to say about an issue. And so in addressing this issue, we want to make sure that as we get -- as we work through this, that we do it in a way that strengthens not only the six-party process, which -- and strengthens the -- increases the momentum toward denuclearization, but we want to do it in a way that strengthens our relationship with Japan. And you can look at that and say, well, this looks a little contradictory. Well, life is full of these things and especially in my line of work. So we just have to keep working through this. We certainly are in very close contact with our Japanese friends and allies on this. And I think we'll -- we can find a way through this.
QUESTION: So -- does that mean -- did you say "yes" to my question? (Laughter.)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I mean, you work for a newspaper. You're not looking for a "yes" or "no." I mean, what about the rest of the page? I mean -- (laughter.) You're asking a question that obviously this is an important issue for Japan, and because it's an important issue for Japan, it's an important issue for us. And so as we try to address this issue, we have to do it, keeping in mind the importance of this issue. So I can't give you a "yes" or "no" on that.
QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up? I mean -- but you're talking about a legal determination of this designation and you're saying that it's become a political issue.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I think if you look at the legal definition, I mean, there has to be a presidential determination and a president is going to look at a lot of factors and needs to justify those factors when he makes that determination. So I wouldn't just look at this as a simplistic check-the-box issue. I think it's an issue that has to be worked through and that's what we're doing.
参考資料 外務省会見録(平成19年8月29日(水曜日)10時40分~ 於:大臣接見室前
北朝鮮問題
(問)日朝作業部会についてですが、本日も閣議後、総理とお話になられていたようですが、総理から具体的にはどのような指示があったのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)今日、総理と日朝作業部会の具体的な話をした訳ではありません。主として総理と話したのは来週APEC外相会合がありますから、それに行ってどのようなことをするのかという話が中心です。その他、色々な外交案件がありますから、その内の幾つかについてお話しました。
(問)作業部会については未だ、具体的な指示というものは出ていないのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)指示というものはありません。
(問)昨日、総理は会見の中で、北朝鮮の誠意ある対応、誠意ある態度を、というお話をされていたのですが、具体的にはどのようなものを北朝鮮側の誠意ある対応とお考えですか。
(外務大臣)拉致問題は解決済みという彼らの主張のままでは何の話にもならない訳ですから、その点は懸案事項の最大のものでしょうから、それについて彼らもきちんとした話し合いに対応することを求めるということは当然のことだと思います。
(問)一般的にWFPの方からも、北朝鮮の水害支援について話が来ているようですが、水害支援ということと拉致問題についての考え方については如何でしょうか。
(外務大臣)国連の色々な機関が色々な災害に応じて、各国に要請をして来る、今回は諸機関の統一アピールが現地の月曜日、従って日本では昨日火曜日に発出されたということですから、それを受けてどう対応するのか、そのことを先ず考えようということでありまして、未だ具体的にどうこうというところまで話は至っておりません。
(問)昨夜、ライス米国務長官と電話会談されたということですが、その中で北朝鮮問題、特に米朝、日朝作業部会についてはどのような話が出たのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)電話会談ですから、向こうから大臣就任のお祝いの電話ということです。旧知の仲でもありますから、お久しぶりですねと、お久しぶりというのはちょっと表現が不適切かなと思いますが、引き続き共に努力しましょうという趣旨で、個別具体の話を突っ込んでした訳ではありません。日程調整がつけば、来週APEC外相会合にライス長官も出席されるでしょうから日程調整が出来れば個別会談を行いたいなと思っております。そのような話はしました。
(問)水害支援ですが、具体的にどうこうという段階ではないということですが、何らかの支援は行おうということで検討しているのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)やるかやらないかを含めて今、考えているということです。
(問)北朝鮮に対する水害支援とはいえ、拉致問題を解決していない中で北朝鮮の支援に踏み込むことに国民の理解を得られるとお考えでしょうか。
(外務大臣)やるかやらないかは検討中だということを今、申し上げた訳であります。
これというのは他でもない、北朝鮮であったと伝えられる水害に対する支援に参加するということなんだけど、国連からの要請だと言えばなんでも「ごもっとも!!」と思っちゃう世論も悪い罠。
Tokyo mulls aid for N Korea flood victims
Nobutaka Machimura, Japan's newly appointed foreign minister, was quoted in the Japanese press on Wednesday as saying Tokyo was prepared to consider a request from the United Nations to give aid to North Korea. "Given the magnitude of the disaster, we should consider whether everything should be linked to the abduction issue," he was reported as saying.この記事の拠ればソースは日本の報道だというのであたってみたら産経にもあった。
拉致再調査なら人道支援検討
外務省は29日、北朝鮮が拉致問題で前向きな対応を示した場合、豪雨による水害被害への人道支援を行う方向で検討に入った。9月5、6の両日にモンゴルで開かれる6カ国協議の日朝国交正常化作業部会で、拉致問題の進展を促す狙いがある。町村信孝外相は29日の臨時閣議後の記者会見で、人道支援について「やるか、やらないかを含めて考えている」と北朝鮮側の出方を見極める考えを示した。外務省内では、北朝鮮が拉致被害者の再調査を約束することなどを条件とする案が浮上している。つまり、国内的には「国連の要請」を旗標にしてだまくらかし、アメリカがかねがね主張する「拉致問題交渉にProgressがあった場合」という状況を作り出す、これはもう昨日のクリストファー・ヒルの「テロ支援国家リストから北朝鮮を外すか外さないかには拉致問題もじゅうぶん考慮される。」という趣旨の会見発言とぴったり呼応してますわ。
ちなみにこれまでの日本政府のちゅうより安倍内閣の「拉致に関する誤魔化し」の変遷を辿るとだな、官房長官時代から首相就任直後までは「拉致問題の解決なくして」であり、これで絶大な人気を博してきたんだが、北京合意のあたりからそれがこっそり「拉致問題に進展無くして」に変わった、そしてついに「拉致再調査」だとよ!!
ミエミエだ罠。
これで一人か二人還してくるのかも知れんがあとは死亡、それで拉致問題終結宣言だべ?
嘘つくにしてももっとましなカラクリ考えろよ。
そしてね、孤児やホームレス、行き倒れが溢れているはずだった北朝鮮ではテーマパークが大盛況、北朝鮮が喧伝する災害なんてあてになるもんかい。
President Bush and Prime Minister Abe of Japan Participate in a Joint Press Availability
Country Reports on Terrorism
安倍は勝負勘がない、風が読めないと書いてきたわけですが、かすます磨きがかかってます。
安倍は一体中山恭子さんのトップ当選をどういう風に見ていたんだろうか?
僕は少なくとも東京都民は拉致問題を忘れてはいないという証明だと思っていたんだが、安倍は国民の記憶力を自分並みに悪いとでも思っているのか? あるいは覚悟の自殺か?
いずれにしろ総裁就任の多数派工作のために靖国を捨て、そして今更維持する意味もないような敗戦処理内閣維持のために拉致まで捨てようとしているのは事実のようだ。
さて安倍マンセ~諸君、これに対してなんと言うんだ?
拉致まで捨てたらこの馬鹿には何も残るものはないんだが?
Japan's sentiment was received positively by North Korea. Song Il-ho, the official in charge of talks with Japan, said he saw "some progress" in Japan's attitude.で北朝鮮のネズミ男・宋日昊がなんと言うとるかといえばだな「日本の態度にいくらかの進歩がうかがえる。」と宣ぅているようぢゃ。
なめられまくりでんがな。
もうこんなインチキ保守内閣は百害あって一理もない。
とっとと総辞職しる!!
以下参考資料として昨日のクリス・ヒルの会見録と外務相の会見録の抜粋を貼っておきます。
明らかにこれまでのヒルの拉致問題に関する言及の仕方とは変わってますが、どう変わったと言えば、これまでは触れられたくないという印象、そして触れられた場合にも、「憂慮すべき問題である。」というのが精一杯で、多くの場合は「我々の目的は北朝鮮の核の無力化である。」という、木で鼻を括ったような言い方、これは恐らくライスのこの問題に対するスタンスの代弁なんですが、に終始していた。
それが今回は同盟国として日本を思い切り持ち上げた挙げ句に「機会のある限り拉致問題を提起してきた。」、「すべての作業部会において拉致問題を提起してきた。」、「拉致問題は日本にとって重要な問題であるから我々にとっても重要な問題だ。」なんちゅうことを言っている。
これは邪推が過ぎるかも知れませんが、テロ特措法の帰趨を気にしての日本世論に対するリップサービスなんでしょう。
やっぱり言うべき時には言うべきことを言わなくちゃいけません。
そして最終的に、北朝鮮をテロ支援国家リストから除外する件は大統領の専権に属すると言い切ってます。
一つ気になるのは、ヒルはカウンターパートと言っていながら佐々江さんのことを「ケン・ササイ」と呼んでいる、これは速記者のミスなのかも知れませんが...w
参考資料 クリストファー・ヒル会見録(2007年8月29日)
QUESTION: In relation to the State Sponsor of Terrorism list issue, does the U.S. or do you have any idea how they can possibly go forward on the Japanese abduction issue and are you going to talk about it in the working group?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We will talk about it. And I'm sure that is a subject that the Japanese delegation will talk about in their bilateral working group meeting in connection with the Japanese DPRK issues. So it's an issue that I think will be addressed. And you know, I've raised it on every -- I've raised it in every six-party meeting. I've raised it in every bilateral meeting. It's an issue we want to see some resolution to. Yes.
中略
QUESTION: Yeah, just to follow up on that, the reasons why they were put on the list have to do with things that took place many years ago. But does the -- the instances of the abductions of Japanese citizens, does that play any role in potential removal from that list?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You know, the U.S. has a very close and very special relationship with Japan. It's not only a close and special relationship, it's an alliance. So we care very much what our Japanese friends and allies have to say about an issue. And so in addressing this issue, we want to make sure that as we get -- as we work through this, that we do it in a way that strengthens not only the six-party process, which -- and strengthens the -- increases the momentum toward denuclearization, but we want to do it in a way that strengthens our relationship with Japan. And you can look at that and say, well, this looks a little contradictory. Well, life is full of these things and especially in my line of work. So we just have to keep working through this. We certainly are in very close contact with our Japanese friends and allies on this. And I think we'll -- we can find a way through this.
QUESTION: So -- does that mean -- did you say "yes" to my question? (Laughter.)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I mean, you work for a newspaper. You're not looking for a "yes" or "no." I mean, what about the rest of the page? I mean -- (laughter.) You're asking a question that obviously this is an important issue for Japan, and because it's an important issue for Japan, it's an important issue for us. And so as we try to address this issue, we have to do it, keeping in mind the importance of this issue. So I can't give you a "yes" or "no" on that.
QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up? I mean -- but you're talking about a legal determination of this designation and you're saying that it's become a political issue.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I think if you look at the legal definition, I mean, there has to be a presidential determination and a president is going to look at a lot of factors and needs to justify those factors when he makes that determination. So I wouldn't just look at this as a simplistic check-the-box issue. I think it's an issue that has to be worked through and that's what we're doing.
参考資料 外務省会見録(平成19年8月29日(水曜日)10時40分~ 於:大臣接見室前
北朝鮮問題
(問)日朝作業部会についてですが、本日も閣議後、総理とお話になられていたようですが、総理から具体的にはどのような指示があったのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)今日、総理と日朝作業部会の具体的な話をした訳ではありません。主として総理と話したのは来週APEC外相会合がありますから、それに行ってどのようなことをするのかという話が中心です。その他、色々な外交案件がありますから、その内の幾つかについてお話しました。
(問)作業部会については未だ、具体的な指示というものは出ていないのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)指示というものはありません。
(問)昨日、総理は会見の中で、北朝鮮の誠意ある対応、誠意ある態度を、というお話をされていたのですが、具体的にはどのようなものを北朝鮮側の誠意ある対応とお考えですか。
(外務大臣)拉致問題は解決済みという彼らの主張のままでは何の話にもならない訳ですから、その点は懸案事項の最大のものでしょうから、それについて彼らもきちんとした話し合いに対応することを求めるということは当然のことだと思います。
(問)一般的にWFPの方からも、北朝鮮の水害支援について話が来ているようですが、水害支援ということと拉致問題についての考え方については如何でしょうか。
(外務大臣)国連の色々な機関が色々な災害に応じて、各国に要請をして来る、今回は諸機関の統一アピールが現地の月曜日、従って日本では昨日火曜日に発出されたということですから、それを受けてどう対応するのか、そのことを先ず考えようということでありまして、未だ具体的にどうこうというところまで話は至っておりません。
(問)昨夜、ライス米国務長官と電話会談されたということですが、その中で北朝鮮問題、特に米朝、日朝作業部会についてはどのような話が出たのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)電話会談ですから、向こうから大臣就任のお祝いの電話ということです。旧知の仲でもありますから、お久しぶりですねと、お久しぶりというのはちょっと表現が不適切かなと思いますが、引き続き共に努力しましょうという趣旨で、個別具体の話を突っ込んでした訳ではありません。日程調整がつけば、来週APEC外相会合にライス長官も出席されるでしょうから日程調整が出来れば個別会談を行いたいなと思っております。そのような話はしました。
(問)水害支援ですが、具体的にどうこうという段階ではないということですが、何らかの支援は行おうということで検討しているのでしょうか。
(外務大臣)やるかやらないかを含めて今、考えているということです。
(問)北朝鮮に対する水害支援とはいえ、拉致問題を解決していない中で北朝鮮の支援に踏み込むことに国民の理解を得られるとお考えでしょうか。
(外務大臣)やるかやらないかは検討中だということを今、申し上げた訳であります。
ネットゲリラ先生のところの「おバカなブッシュのおバカな演説」を読むまで見落としてたんだけど朝日新聞にこんな記事がある。
米大統領、戦前日本とアルカイダ同列視 歴史観に批判
それを朝日は朝日なりに日本国内における反米感情を煽る道具にしようとしている。
これも言ってみりゃ「馬鹿の一つ覚え」だ罠。
「りばてぃ~!!」「ふりーだむ!!」「でもくらし~!!」っと叫び続けた俺様正義を振りかざすアホの国アメリカが、その成果として唯一残したのが「戦後の日本」ぢゃよ。
こりゃもう日本にとっちゃ恥ずかしい以外の何物でもないんだけど、「こうも容易くアメリカの謀略に屈した唯一の国なんだぞ!!」こういう事をブッシュ君は退役軍人共の前で宣言してるわけね。
そういう切り口で見れば戦後日本はアルカーイダ以下だ。(大爆
要旨として引用されている部分は講演録の概ねこの部分(全文を読みたい人はここ)ですが、天皇を占領統治の道具に使ったことで占領政策は大成功を収め、お陰でいまや日本は世界でもっともアメリカに忠実な属国であるとは書かれていますが、アルカイダと日本を同一視はしてないですね。
ブッシュに噛みつくならば朝日のこの恣意的な取り扱い方にも噛みつきましょう!!、そういう記事かと思います。
参考資料
いま私が話した敵はアルカイダではないし、攻撃とは9/11のテロでもなく、帝国とはウサマビンラディンがもくろむイスラム原理主義集団でもない。
そして、この会場の多くの人々は、それらの軍事行動の復員軍人であった。
一旦人々が、たとえささやかであっても自由を手にしたならば、彼らは完全な自由を手にするまで弛むことはないだろう。
今日この会場にいる退役軍人なしではこうはあり得なかった。
そして、私はあなたにあなたの従軍に対して感謝する。(拍手。)
しかしこれらにはその核心部分において、イデオロギーの闘争であるという重要な一つの相似性がある。
彼らは、我々が彼らの思想を他に押し拡げようとする企みの前に立ちはだかったために多くのアメリカ人を殺害した。
イラクやアフガンなどで紛争を引き起こしているテロリスト達は過去の我々の敵と同様に、彼ら自身の政治的な構想、自由や寛容や意見の相違を粉砕する非人間的な計画を押し拡げようとしている。
この敵は危険である、この敵は発見される、そしてこの敵は破られるだろう。(拍手。)
アメリカに、日本の敗北を民主主義に転換することを促進させるよう導いた理念と関心は、アフガンとイラクに我々が関わり続けるよう導く理念と同じものである。
アジアにおけるアメリカの犠牲と忍耐の結果は、自由な人々であり、そこに住まう人々がアメリカとの平和の共有を望みアメリカと戦うことを欲しない、より繁栄し安定した豊かな大陸である。
今日、アジアの大部分の国は自由である、そして、その民主政体は地域の多様性を反映する。
幾つかは立憲君主制であり、幾つかは議会制、そして幾つかは大統領制をとる。
ある国はキリスト教国でありある国はイスラム教国、そしてある国はヒンドゥーであったり仏教国であったりする。
略
これらアメリカと日本の当局者は共同して、天皇制を廃止する替わりに民主主義的政治制度の中に天皇の位置を見いだすことにつとめた。
略
そして私はあなた達に、二十世紀におけるイデオロギー闘争のアメリカの敵であった日本が、二十一世紀におけるアメリカのイデオロギー闘争のもっとも強力な同盟国の一つに変容したというこの決定的な意味を注意深く聞いて貰いたい。(拍手)
以下略
米大統領、戦前日本とアルカイダ同列視 歴史観に批判
2007年08月24日06時49分こりゃもう笑う価値もない記事なんですが、こりゃさ、歴史も浅く誇るほどの文化を持たないアメリカの歴代政権に独特のレトリックでしょうよ、もっと解りやすく言えば「馬鹿の一つ覚え」です罠。
ブッシュ米大統領が22日に中西部ミズーリ州カンザスシティーで行った演説は、自らのイラク政策を正当化するため、日本の戦後民主主義の成功体験を絶賛、フル活用する内容だったが、半面で戦前の日本を国際テロ組織アルカイダになぞらえ、粗雑な歴史観を露呈した。米軍撤退論が勢いを増す中でブッシュ氏の苦境を示すものでもある。
冒頭は9・11テロかと思わせて、実は日本の真珠湾攻撃の話をする、という仕掛けだ。戦前の日本をアルカイダと同列に置き、米国の勝利があって初めて日本が民主化した、という構成をとっている。大正デモクラシーを経て普通選挙が実施されていた史実は完全に無視され、戦前の日本は民主主義ではなかった、という前提。「日本人自身も民主化するとは思っていなかった」とまで語った。
退役軍人の会合とあって、朝鮮戦争やベトナム戦争の意義にも言及。すべて一緒くたにして「アジアでの勝利」は中東でも出来る、と訴えた。だが、米メディアは「日本や韓国は国民が同質的であり、イラクとは違う」「歴史から間違った教訓を引き出している」などと批判を伝えている。
民主党のヒラリー・クリントン上院議員は同日、イラクのマリキ首相の罷免を要求。9月にはイラク駐留米軍のペトレイアス司令官の議会への報告があるが、抜本的な進展は見込まれておらず、かえって一層の批判が予想されている。
だが、ブッシュ氏が政策転換に踏み切る兆しはない。最近は、第2次大戦末期に登場しながら不人気に終わったトルーマン大統領に「魅力を感じている」(関係者)という。共産主義と戦う姿勢が後世、一定の評価を得たためとみられる。
テロとの戦いにかけるブッシュ氏だが、今回の演説は日本を含めた諸外国の歴史や文化への無理解をさらした。都合の悪い事実を捨象し、米国の「理想」と「善意」を内向きにアピールするものとなっている。
■米大統領演説の日本関連部分(要旨)
ある晴れた朝、何千人もの米国人が奇襲で殺され、世界規模の戦争へと駆り立てられた。その敵は自由を嫌い、米国や西欧諸国への怒りを心に抱き、大量殺人を生み出す自爆攻撃に走った。
アルカイダや9・11テロではない。パールハーバーを攻撃した1940年代の大日本帝国の軍隊の話だ。最終的に米国は勝者となった。極東の戦争とテロとの戦いには多くの差異があるが、核心にはイデオロギーをめぐる争いがある。
日本の軍国主義者、朝鮮やベトナムの共産主義者は、人類のあり方への無慈悲な考えに突き動かされていた。イデオロギーを他者に強いるのを防ごうと立ちはだかった米国民を殺害した。
第2次大戦に着手した時、極東の民主主義国は二つしかなかった。オーストラリアとニュージーランドだ。日本の文化は民主主義とは両立しないと言われた。日本人自身も民主化するとは思っていなかった。
結局、日本の女性は参政権を得た。日本の防衛大臣は女性だ。先月の参院選では女性の当選が過去最高になった。
国家宗教の神道が狂信的すぎ、天皇に根ざしていることから、民主化は成功しないという批判があった。だが、日本は宗教、文化的伝統を保ちつつ、世界最高の自由社会の一つとなった。日本は米国の敵から、最も強力な同盟国に変わった。
我々は中東でも同じことができる。イラクで我々と戦う暴力的なイスラム過激派は、ナチスや大日本帝国や旧ソ連と同じように彼らの大義を確信している。彼らは同じ運命をたどることになる。
民主主義の兵器庫にある最強の武器は、創造主によって人間の心に書き込まれた自由を求める欲求だ。我々の理想に忠実であり続ける限り、我々はイラクとアフガニスタンの過激主義者を打ち負かすだろう。
それを朝日は朝日なりに日本国内における反米感情を煽る道具にしようとしている。
これも言ってみりゃ「馬鹿の一つ覚え」だ罠。
「りばてぃ~!!」「ふりーだむ!!」「でもくらし~!!」っと叫び続けた俺様正義を振りかざすアホの国アメリカが、その成果として唯一残したのが「戦後の日本」ぢゃよ。
こりゃもう日本にとっちゃ恥ずかしい以外の何物でもないんだけど、「こうも容易くアメリカの謀略に屈した唯一の国なんだぞ!!」こういう事をブッシュ君は退役軍人共の前で宣言してるわけね。
そういう切り口で見れば戦後日本はアルカーイダ以下だ。(大爆
要旨として引用されている部分は講演録の概ねこの部分(全文を読みたい人はここ)ですが、天皇を占領統治の道具に使ったことで占領政策は大成功を収め、お陰でいまや日本は世界でもっともアメリカに忠実な属国であるとは書かれていますが、アルカイダと日本を同一視はしてないですね。
ブッシュに噛みつくならば朝日のこの恣意的な取り扱い方にも噛みつきましょう!!、そういう記事かと思います。
参考資料
I want to open today's speech with a story that begins on a sunny morning, when thousands of Americans were murdered in a surprise attack -- and our nation was propelled into a conflict that would take us to every corner of the globe.私は、何千ものアメリカ人が奇襲攻撃で殺されたある晴れた朝に始まり、そして我々が世界の隅々の紛争に駆り立てられることになった話から今日のスピーチを始めたいと思う。
The enemy who attacked us despises freedom, and harbors resentment at the slights he believes America and Western nations have inflicted on his people.我々を攻撃した敵は自由を否定し、そして、彼はアメリカや西欧諸国が彼の国民に投げつけていると信ずる蔑視に対する憤怒を心に抱く。
He fights to establish his rule over an entire region.彼は、すべての領域に彼の支配を打ち立てるべく戦う。
And over time, he turns to a strategy of suicide attacks destined to create so much carnage that the American people will tire of the violence and give up the fight.そして彼は時と共に、アメリカ国民の厭戦気分を煽るために、おびただしい悲惨な死を創出することを目途とする特攻攻撃に戦略を転じた。
If this story sounds familiar, it is -- except for one thing. The enemy I have just described is not al Qaeda, and the attack is not 9/11, and the empire is not the radical caliphate envisioned by Osama bin Laden.もしこの話をどこかで耳にしたことがあるとすれば、もう一つある。
いま私が話した敵はアルカイダではないし、攻撃とは9/11のテロでもなく、帝国とはウサマビンラディンがもくろむイスラム原理主義集団でもない。
Instead, what I've described is the war machine of Imperial Japan in the 1940s, its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and its attempt to impose its empire throughout East Asia.私が話したのは寧ろ、1940年代の日本帝国の軍事力であり、その真珠湾への奇襲攻撃であり、東アジアにその支配を拡大しようとする企みである。
Ultimately, the United States prevailed in World War II, and we have fought two more land wars in Asia. And many in this hall were veterans of those campaigns.最終的に、アメリカ合衆国は第二次世界大戦に勝った、そして、我々はアジアでもう2つの地上戦を行った。
そして、この会場の多くの人々は、それらの軍事行動の復員軍人であった。
Yet even the most optimistic among you probably would not have foreseen that the Japanese would transform themselves into one of America's strongest and most steadfast allies, or that the South Koreans would recover from enemy invasion to raise up one of the world's most powerful economies, or that Asia would pull itself out of poverty and hopelessness as it embraced markets and freedom.そして、あなた達の中のもっとも楽観的な人ですら日本がアメリカの最強でもっとも信頼できる盟邦になることも、韓国が敵の侵入から回復して世界でも有数の経済大国になることも、アジア社会が市場経済と自由主義を取り入れて貧困と絶望から脱出することも予見出来なかっただろう。
The lesson from Asia's development is that the heart's desire for liberty will not be denied. Once people even get a small taste of liberty, they're not going to rest until they're free.アジアの発展から得られる教訓は、自由を希求する心を否認することは出来ないということだ。
一旦人々が、たとえささやかであっても自由を手にしたならば、彼らは完全な自由を手にするまで弛むことはないだろう。
Today's dynamic and hopeful Asia -- a region that brings us countless benefits -- would not have been possible without America's presence and perseverance. It would not have been possible without the veterans in this hall today. And I thank you for your service. (Applause.)今日の躍動的で希望に満ちたアジア、この地域は我々に限りない利益をもたらす地域であるのだが、アメリカの存在と忍耐無くしてはアジアはこうはあり得なかった。
今日この会場にいる退役軍人なしではこうはあり得なかった。
そして、私はあなたにあなたの従軍に対して感謝する。(拍手。)
There are many differences between the wars we fought in the Far East and the war on terror we're fighting today. But one important similarity is at their core they're ideological struggles.我々が極東で戦った戦争と今日戦っているテロとの戦いには多くの相違点がある。
しかしこれらにはその核心部分において、イデオロギーの闘争であるという重要な一つの相似性がある。
The militarists of Japan and the communists in Korea and Vietnam were driven by a merciless vision for the proper ordering of humanity. They killed Americans because we stood in the way of their attempt to force their ideology on others.日本の軍国主義者、朝鮮とベトナムの共産主義者はその非人道性ゆえに駆逐された。
彼らは、我々が彼らの思想を他に押し拡げようとする企みの前に立ちはだかったために多くのアメリカ人を殺害した。
Today, the names and places have changed, but the fundamental character of the struggle has not changed. Like our enemies in the past, the terrorists who wage war in Iraq and Afghanistan and other places seek to spread a political vision of their own -- a harsh plan for life that crushes freedom, tolerance, and dissent.今日、呼び名と場所は変わったが、闘争の基本的な性格は変わっていない。
イラクやアフガンなどで紛争を引き起こしているテロリスト達は過去の我々の敵と同様に、彼ら自身の政治的な構想、自由や寛容や意見の相違を粉砕する非人間的な計画を押し拡げようとしている。
Like our enemies in the past, they kill Americans because we stand in their way of imposing this ideology across a vital region of the world. This enemy is dangerous;this enemy is determined;and this enemy will be defeated. (Applause.)この思想を世界中で最も重要な地域に遍く強要しようとする彼らの前に我々が立ちはだかるので、過去の我々の敵と同様に彼らはアメリカ人を殺害する。
この敵は危険である、この敵は発見される、そしてこの敵は破られるだろう。(拍手。)
We're still in the early hours of the current ideological struggle, but we do know how the others ended -- and that knowledge helps guide our efforts today. The ideals and interests that led America to help the Japanese turn defeat into democracy are the same that lead us to remain engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq.我々にはまだこのイデオロギー闘争の暁光は見えてはいないが我々はこのほかの戦いがどのように終焉したかを知っている、そしてその経験知は今日の我々の努力を善導する。
アメリカに、日本の敗北を民主主義に転換することを促進させるよう導いた理念と関心は、アフガンとイラクに我々が関わり続けるよう導く理念と同じものである。
The defense strategy that refused to hand the South Koreans over to a totalitarian neighbor helped raise up a Asian Tiger that is the model for developing countries across the world, including the Middle East. The result of American sacrifice and perseverance in Asia is a freer, more prosperous and stable continent whose people want to live in peace with America, not attack America.南朝鮮の人々を隣国の全体主義者に譲り渡すことを阻み、彼らがアジアのトラにまで発展することを支援した防衛戦略は、中東を含む世界中の発展途上国に対する場合のひな形である。
アジアにおけるアメリカの犠牲と忍耐の結果は、自由な人々であり、そこに住まう人々がアメリカとの平和の共有を望みアメリカと戦うことを欲しない、より繁栄し安定した豊かな大陸である。
At the outset of World War II there were only two democracies in the Far East -- Australia and New Zealand. Today most of the nations in Asia are free, and its democracies reflect the diversity of the region. Some of these nations have constitutional monarchies, some have parliaments, and some have presidents. Some are Christian, some are Muslim, some are Hindu, and some are Buddhist.第二次世界大戦の端緒の時には極東の民主国家はオーストラリアとニュージーランドの二カ国しかなかった。
今日、アジアの大部分の国は自由である、そして、その民主政体は地域の多様性を反映する。
幾つかは立憲君主制であり、幾つかは議会制、そして幾つかは大統領制をとる。
ある国はキリスト教国でありある国はイスラム教国、そしてある国はヒンドゥーであったり仏教国であったりする。
略
In the aftermath of Japan's surrender, many thought it naive to help the Japanese transform themselves into a democracy. Then as now, the critics argued that some people were simply not fit for freedom. Some said Japanese culture was inherently incompatible with democracy.日本の降伏直後に多くの人は日本がを民主国家に変貌しようとすることを推進するのは愚直だと考えた。そして現在のように、批評家は、多くの日本人は絶対にに自由には適合しないと主張した。ある人は、日本文化は本質的に民主主義とは相容れなかったと語った。
Joseph Grew, a former United States ambassador to Japan who served as Harry Truman's Under Secretary of State, told the President flatly that -- and I quote -- "democracy in Japan would never work." He wasn't alone in that belief. A lot of Americans believed that -- and so did the Japanese -- a lot of Japanese believed the same thing: democracy simply wouldn't work.かつての駐日大使でありトルーマンの国務次官を務めたグルーがトルーマンに断言した、それを引用しよう。「民主主義は日本では決して機能しない。」そしてこれは彼の独断ではなかった。多くのアメリカ人が、民主主義が絶対に機能しないだろうと信じており、そして多くの日本人ですらが同じ考えであった。
Others critics said that Americans were imposing their ideals on the Japanese. For example, Japan's Vice Prime Minister asserted that allowing Japanese women to vote would "retard the progress of Japanese politics." It's interesting what General MacArthur wrote in his memoirs.また別の批評家は、アメリカ人は自らの理念を日本人に強要していると批判した。たとえば興味深いことに、マッカーサー回想録に、日本の副首相が、日本女性に参政権を認めることは日本の政治的な進化を遅らせると主張したと記されている。
He wrote, "There was much criticism of my support for the enfranchisement of women. Many Americans, as well as many other so-called experts, expressed the view that Japanese women were too steeped in the tradition of subservience to their husbands to act with any degree of political independence." That's what General MacArthur observed. In the end, Japanese women were given the vote;39 women won parliamentary seats in Japan's first free election. Today, Japan's minister of defense is a woman, and just last month, a record number of women were elected to Japan's Upper House.マッカーサーは当時の状況を「私が婦人参政権付与を支援することに対してはいわゆる専門家と称する人々だけでなく多くのアメリカ人が、"日本女性には、いかなる政治的独立を伴う選択に関しても夫に追従するという伝統が染みついている。"という見解を表明した。」と書いているしかし結局日本女性は参政権を与えられ、第一回の普通選挙で女性は39議席を獲得した。そして今日日本の防衛大臣は女性であり、ちょうど先月実施された参議院選挙では記録的な数の女性議員が選出された。
Other critics argued that democracy -- (applause.) There are other critics, believe it or not, that argue that democracy could not succeed in Japan because the national religion -- Shinto -- was too fanatical and rooted in the Emperor.民主主義に関して他の批評家は主張した。(拍手) 信じがたいかも知れないが、国教である神道、これが天皇に由来しあまりにも狂信的であるために、日本では民主主義は成功しないと主張する別の批評家もいた。
Senator Richard Russell denounced the Japanese faith, and said that if we did not put the Emperor on trial, "any steps we may take to create democracy are doomed to failure." The State Department's man in Tokyo put it bluntly: "The Emperor system must disappear if Japan is ever really to be democratic."リチャード・ラッセル上院議員は日本人の信仰を非難しながら"もし我々が天皇を裁判に掛けないのなら、我々が企図する民主化のためのあらゆる処置が必然的に失敗することになる。"と語った。駐東京の国務省職員はそれをより率直に"日本がより確実に民主国家であろうとするなら天皇制は廃されるべきだ。"と表明した。
Those who said Shinto was incompatible with democracy were mistaken, and fortunately, Americans and Japanese leaders recognized it at the time, because instead of suppressing the Shinto faith, American authorities worked with the Japanese to institute religious freedom for all faiths. Instead of abolishing the imperial throne, Americans and Japanese worked together to find a place for the Emperor in the democratic political system.これらの、神道と民主主義が相容れないと主張した人達は誤っていた。 しかし幸いなことにその時の日米の指導者はそれが誤りであることを認識しており、日本人と作業をしていたアメリカの当局者は神道信仰を禁止するのではなく信教の自由を認めた。
これらアメリカと日本の当局者は共同して、天皇制を廃止する替わりに民主主義的政治制度の中に天皇の位置を見いだすことにつとめた。
And the result of all these steps was that every Japanese citizen gained freedom of religion, and the Emperor remained on his throne and Japanese democracy grew stronger because it embraced a cherished part of Japanese culture. And today, in defiance of the critics and the doubters and the skeptics, Japan retains its religions and cultural traditions, and stands as one of the world's great free societies.(Applause.) You know, the experts sometimes get it wrong.そしてこの措置の結果あらゆる日本国民は信仰の自由を手にし、天皇は玉座に残ることとなり、その処置が日本の文化の枢要な部分を包含することとなったことによって日本の民主政治はより強固になった。そして今日、批判的な人達や懐疑的な人達の主張に反して、日本はその宗教的伝統的や文化的伝統を保持したまま、世界でも有数の自由社会を打ち立てている。(拍手) わかりますか?専門家は時として判断を誤るのです。
略
The alliance between our two nations is the lynchpin for freedom and stability throughout the Pacific. And I want you to listen carefully to this final point: Japan has transformed from America's enemy in the ideological struggle of the 20th century to one of America's strongest allies in the ideological struggle of the 21st century. (Applause.)我々二カ国の同盟は太平洋全体における自由と安定の要である。
そして私はあなた達に、二十世紀におけるイデオロギー闘争のアメリカの敵であった日本が、二十一世紀におけるアメリカのイデオロギー闘争のもっとも強力な同盟国の一つに変容したというこの決定的な意味を注意深く聞いて貰いたい。(拍手)
以下略
BDA問題がこじれまくっている時には知ってる癖になにも書かなかった産経新聞。
それを今頃になって遅ればせながらこういう記事を書く意図やいかに?
今日の昼に指摘した大島さんの「北朝鮮は自然からも見放されようとしているのか」 の内容のインチキ臭さもこれで更に極まったわけだ、なんせ身内だもんな。(爆
【やばいぞ日本】対北投資ファンド暗躍
過去記事
[北朝鮮の核と拉致]
あてにならないニュースですが:AFP経由の連合通信が報じるBDA
BDAそしてDaedong
対北朝鮮制裁をどこもやってないという話(藁
それを今頃になって遅ればせながらこういう記事を書く意図やいかに?
今日の昼に指摘した大島さんの「北朝鮮は自然からも見放されようとしているのか」 の内容のインチキ臭さもこれで更に極まったわけだ、なんせ身内だもんな。(爆
【やばいぞ日本】対北投資ファンド暗躍
北朝鮮のウラン資源をめぐり「ロンドン・平壌コネクション」といわれる国際金融ルートが、その全容をみせつつある。
2006年9月、北朝鮮による核実験の1カ月前、ロンドンで「朝鮮開発投資ファンド(略称、朝鮮ファンド)」が創設された。欧州、中国などの大口投資家などから総額5000万ドル(約60億円)を集める。秘密厳守、一般投資家は相手にしない。「金、銀、亜鉛、マグネサイト、銅、ウラン、プラチナを採掘するための設備」(同ファンド幹部)を将軍様こと金正日総書記系の鉱山企業に提供する。代金代わりに鉱物を獲得し、国際市場で売りさばく。
北朝鮮のウラン埋蔵量は潜在的には世界最大との説も米中ロシアの専門家の間では有力だ。ウラン価格はこの4年間で12倍以上も上がった。
「金正日は狂っちゃいない。完璧(かんぺき)にまともだ」と公言するのは朝鮮ファンドを取り仕切るコリン・マクアスキル氏。北専門ビジネスの「高麗アジア」社(ロンドン)会長でもある。
冷戦の最中、1970年代末から北朝鮮ビジネスにかかわり、93年までの10年間、年間1トンの割合で北の金塊をロンドン市場で販売する仲介を行ったが、「北朝鮮は金取引でトラブルを起こしたことはない」と強調する。高麗アジア会長として、ロンドン、平壌を軸に香港、上海、ワシントンと人脈ネットワークを広げている。
朝鮮ファンドの資産管理はロンドンの金融監督局監督下の「アングロ中国キャピタル投資」が担当。アドバイザーには米国務省北朝鮮担当元高官のリン・ターク氏を誘い込んだ。
高麗アジアは朝鮮ファンド設立に合わせ、ロンドンの投資家グループから平壌の合弁外資銀行「大同信用銀行」の70%の保有株式を買収した。大同信用銀行はマカオの銀行「バンコ・デルタ・アジア(BDA)」に700万ドル預けていたが、米国の金融制裁により全額が凍結されていた。
過去記事
[北朝鮮の核と拉致]
あてにならないニュースですが:AFP経由の連合通信が報じるBDA
BDAそしてDaedong
対北朝鮮制裁をどこもやってないという話(藁
北朝鮮は自然からも見放されようとしているのか
これは産経新聞記者の大島さんのブログのエントリーなんだが、こう結んである。
今の北朝鮮は日本以外からは熱い視線を送られていると思うんだが、それでも「も」かよ?
普通に考えれば「は」が正しいと思うんだが?
これは産経新聞記者の大島さんのブログのエントリーなんだが、こう結んである。
北朝鮮の洪水は、人災の面が強いだけに深刻である。人災というのは、いうまでもなく乱伐であり、森林をむやみに伐採して燃料などにしたので、洪水に歯止めがかからなくなっている。下手に自然にさからうと、人間は自然の怒りを招くのだ。北朝鮮は、自然からも見放されようとしているのか。この人はここで並列の助詞「も」を正気で用いているんだろうか?
今の北朝鮮は日本以外からは熱い視線を送られていると思うんだが、それでも「も」かよ?
普通に考えれば「は」が正しいと思うんだが?
色々言われる小沢一郎ですが、僕は小沢氏の魂胆がどこにあるとしても、小沢氏の立場を支持するね。
もっと言えば、これを、アメリカが「2006年国務省年次報告」出した瞬間に政府にやって欲しかった。
早速WASPの片割れイギリスからも小沢発言にはブーイングが起きているようですが、そのイギリスもイラクからの撤兵を模索中。
イギリスは迂闊にも既にオーストラリアのハワードに先を越され、オーストラリアは来年早々の撤兵を具体的に検討しているとか、ここで日本にまで先を越された場合にはいわゆる「引き際」ってものが無くなっちゃうから必死でしょう。
これはアフガンについても同じでさ、NATO軍なんて全然やる気なし。
大義名分とは掲げる物であって信じる物ではないってことだと思うし、国益を考える場合には、今は媚米を隅っこに押しやっておく時だと思う。
もっと言えば、これを、アメリカが「2006年国務省年次報告」出した瞬間に政府にやって欲しかった。
早速WASPの片割れイギリスからも小沢発言にはブーイングが起きているようですが、そのイギリスもイラクからの撤兵を模索中。
イギリスは迂闊にも既にオーストラリアのハワードに先を越され、オーストラリアは来年早々の撤兵を具体的に検討しているとか、ここで日本にまで先を越された場合にはいわゆる「引き際」ってものが無くなっちゃうから必死でしょう。
これはアフガンについても同じでさ、NATO軍なんて全然やる気なし。
大義名分とは掲げる物であって信じる物ではないってことだと思うし、国益を考える場合には、今は媚米を隅っこに押しやっておく時だと思う。
ライス長官も9日の会談で、北朝鮮による日本人拉致事件の解決に期待感を表明するなど、拉致問題に関与してきた小池氏に配慮を示した。小池氏によると「姉妹のような関係。今度ゴルフを一緒にしましょうという話をした」という。
なんか違ゃしね?
ってか、日本以外ぢゃニュースにすらなってないぞ、今のところ。
U.S.: 6-party talks still needed on N. Korea
Washington said the six-nation disarmament talks remained the main focus for the international community as it seeks to stop North Korea from making nuclear bombs. "The center of gravity of everybody's diplomatic efforts here really is in the six-party talks," U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters Wednesday in Washington. He added that the summit "in no way detracts from the efforts in the six-party talks to denuclearize the Korean peninsula."
この件はテレビでも流れてましたが、もう遅いよね。
まんまとこの流れに乗せられてしまったA級戦犯はアメリカ以外の誰でもないですから。
その他参照記事
South Korea's Roh may take rail or road to North
民主党内にはテロ特措法の延長阻止を通じて安倍晋三政権退陣や衆院解散総選挙に追い込む計算もあるとされるが、シーファー・小沢会談が設定されたことによって、民主党が日米同盟の意義を選ぶか、延長問題を政争の道具にするかきわめて重大な選択を迫られることになった。
シーファー大使は参院選の民主党勝利について「歴史的な変化だが、それがどんな変化をもたらすかはわからない」とした上で、大切なことは「大多数の国民が日米関係全体の健全な発展と強化を望んでいることだと思う」と語った。
シーファーが誰と会おうがシーファーの勝手なんだけどね、そして民主党の思惑がどこにあるかはおいといてだね、イラク特措法の継続意味については懐疑的な意見も多く見られるわけで、一概に「政争の道具」であるとか「大多数の国民が日米関係全体の健全な発展と強化を望んでいることだと思う」ちゅうのは独善が過ぎやせんか?
僕は北朝鮮に関する件もあるわけだし、アメリカの掲げたテロとの戦いってスローガンの完全に色あせた今、もうボチボチ撤退だと思うぞ。
この記事に違和感感じるのって僕だけ?
日本を放置して北朝鮮との国交樹立をめざし始めた段階でヒビが入り、慰安婦決議で地割れが起きてるんだよ。
今更なにをいっとるのかい?
産経古森さんのブログの最新エントリー「アメリカ最高裁は「慰安婦の訴え」を却下した」なんだけど、なんでこういう理屈に辿り着くのか、いつものように皆目解らない。
まず、アメリカの司法が訴そのものを門前払いにした、これは当たり前のことで、なんでこれを評価するのか解らない。
そして門前払いの根拠なんだけど、この種の訴をアメリカで起こす法的根拠がないという判断をしたこと、これも当たり前で、なんで評価するのかが解らない。
かんじんなのはアメリカが根底の「慰安婦」というものをどう位置づけているかということなんだが、この人がこの件を扱う際には必ず表層に留めてそこに立ち入ろうとはしないんだな。
そしてアメリカの邪悪なところは、風向きが変われば、こういう事態を利用して世論を扇動し、それを背景にして金融制裁、経済制裁を発動して来かねないところなんだが、古森さんがその点における安堵を示したつもりであれば、そのことだけは理解できる。
しかし、どうもこの人の用いるレトリックは、先日の岡本行夫さんの産経新聞正論「なんのための教科書修正か」同様に媚米ぶりが胡散臭くていただけない。
まず、アメリカの司法が訴そのものを門前払いにした、これは当たり前のことで、なんでこれを評価するのか解らない。
そして門前払いの根拠なんだけど、この種の訴をアメリカで起こす法的根拠がないという判断をしたこと、これも当たり前で、なんで評価するのかが解らない。
かんじんなのはアメリカが根底の「慰安婦」というものをどう位置づけているかということなんだが、この人がこの件を扱う際には必ず表層に留めてそこに立ち入ろうとはしないんだな。
そしてアメリカの邪悪なところは、風向きが変われば、こういう事態を利用して世論を扇動し、それを背景にして金融制裁、経済制裁を発動して来かねないところなんだが、古森さんがその点における安堵を示したつもりであれば、そのことだけは理解できる。
しかし、どうもこの人の用いるレトリックは、先日の岡本行夫さんの産経新聞正論「なんのための教科書修正か」同様に媚米ぶりが胡散臭くていただけない。
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