軍国少年の半世紀、そして結局．．．
×
[PR]上記の広告は3ヶ月以上新規記事投稿のないブログに表示されています。新しい記事を書く事で広告が消えます。
本来ならいないはずだった正月をこっちで過ごすことになっちゃった関係でこのところ極めて暇な毎日を送っていることはご存じかと思うんだけど、暇だ暇だとぐうたらしてれば金食うばっかりでなんにも楽しくない。
で久々に山に入ろうと思い立ったんだが、最後の山が途中下山という不名誉な結果となったため、今回は万全を期するべくカンジキをやめスノーシューを持っていくことにした。
さりとてスノーシューに関しては何の予備知識もないし、身の回りに履いたことのある奴もいないので、ここは一番専門家に聞こうと、旧知で登山用具販社・KS社のK氏を訪ねた。
まあ色々と懇切丁寧に話を聞かせてくれたんだが、僕の一番懸念事項であった、カンジキ履いても腰くらいまで来る積雪の場合どうよ？という質問に極めて明快に膝以下！！っと答えてくれたのですかさず買うことになった。
氏の推奨で買ったのは
これなんだけど、1.7kgと軽い！！
いずれにしてもこれだけでは山には入れないのでストック1セット、スパッツ、これは持っちゃいるんだが、もう随分使い込んだので新調、でザックなんだが、今持ってるやつが75Lでかなりでかく、もう歳が歳だからとにかくザックは中身込みで20kg以下に抑えたいという気があって60Lのを新調した。
あと靴。
これまで使ってきた奴が重い上にそろそろソールの耐用年数を過ぎるところなので、少々無理をして軽くて少々底が柔いやつに買い換えた。
そして防寒なんだけども、前回マイッタ原因はカンジキばかりではなく、ダウンにあったんだな。
なんせボコボコのを着ていったもんだからアウターが上から着られない、で内側に雪が回ってしまったんだが、昼間行動している場合は吹雪ででもない限りは良いんだが、夜が保たない。
おそらくあの時下山を決意しなかったら夜になってかなり厳しい目に遭い、下手をすれば死んだと思うんだが、今回はその反省にたって薄めのダウンに買い直した。（ほしけりゃ古のノースフェイスあげるよん！！ 但し色はド派手で街中ではきれんぞｗ）
薄めとおは言え、値段は今持ってるやつより倍近く高かった。
で「お勘定！！」っと言ったらば「じゅうごまんにひゃくはちじゅう円ですぅ！！まいどありぃ！！」だと！？
「少しくらいまけなさいって！！」ちゅうと「へい！！でわじゅうごまん円丁度で！！」だとよ。
280円値引きでおわりかよ！？ 言っても仕方ないんでそっこー金を払って包装してもらったんだが、何だこの大荷物は！！
これじゃ電車に乗る気せんのよ、僕はね、基本的に怠け者だからさ。
また車を手放したのを後悔はしたんだが、電車なんぞ乗りたくねぇ～からタクシー拾って帰ってきたんだが、高速込みで万券一枚だよ。
なんとも高い買い物行であったことよ。
いよいよどの山に入ろうかって段階なんだが、まあここは勝手を知った山の方が無難だろうということで、今のところは浅草岳を中心に日程を組んでみているのよね。
で靴新調しちゃったからさ、これから出発までは毎日靴はいて歩き慣らさんといかんわけ、しかもここんところ重い物持って歩いてないからさ、ザックに20kgくらいのバラスト詰めてさ。
今週末以降、都区内の街の真ん中を登山用のくそでかいザックを背負ってスノトレ履いてあるってるおっさんがいたらそれたぶん僕．．．
それにしてもスノーシューを使ってみるのが楽しみなこった。
で久々に山に入ろうと思い立ったんだが、最後の山が途中下山という不名誉な結果となったため、今回は万全を期するべくカンジキをやめスノーシューを持っていくことにした。
さりとてスノーシューに関しては何の予備知識もないし、身の回りに履いたことのある奴もいないので、ここは一番専門家に聞こうと、旧知で登山用具販社・KS社のK氏を訪ねた。
まあ色々と懇切丁寧に話を聞かせてくれたんだが、僕の一番懸念事項であった、カンジキ履いても腰くらいまで来る積雪の場合どうよ？という質問に極めて明快に膝以下！！っと答えてくれたのですかさず買うことになった。
氏の推奨で買ったのは
これなんだけど、1.7kgと軽い！！
いずれにしてもこれだけでは山には入れないのでストック1セット、スパッツ、これは持っちゃいるんだが、もう随分使い込んだので新調、でザックなんだが、今持ってるやつが75Lでかなりでかく、もう歳が歳だからとにかくザックは中身込みで20kg以下に抑えたいという気があって60Lのを新調した。
あと靴。
これまで使ってきた奴が重い上にそろそろソールの耐用年数を過ぎるところなので、少々無理をして軽くて少々底が柔いやつに買い換えた。
そして防寒なんだけども、前回マイッタ原因はカンジキばかりではなく、ダウンにあったんだな。
なんせボコボコのを着ていったもんだからアウターが上から着られない、で内側に雪が回ってしまったんだが、昼間行動している場合は吹雪ででもない限りは良いんだが、夜が保たない。
おそらくあの時下山を決意しなかったら夜になってかなり厳しい目に遭い、下手をすれば死んだと思うんだが、今回はその反省にたって薄めのダウンに買い直した。（ほしけりゃ古のノースフェイスあげるよん！！ 但し色はド派手で街中ではきれんぞｗ）
薄めとおは言え、値段は今持ってるやつより倍近く高かった。
で「お勘定！！」っと言ったらば「じゅうごまんにひゃくはちじゅう円ですぅ！！まいどありぃ！！」だと！？
「少しくらいまけなさいって！！」ちゅうと「へい！！でわじゅうごまん円丁度で！！」だとよ。
280円値引きでおわりかよ！？ 言っても仕方ないんでそっこー金を払って包装してもらったんだが、何だこの大荷物は！！
これじゃ電車に乗る気せんのよ、僕はね、基本的に怠け者だからさ。
また車を手放したのを後悔はしたんだが、電車なんぞ乗りたくねぇ～からタクシー拾って帰ってきたんだが、高速込みで万券一枚だよ。
なんとも高い買い物行であったことよ。
いよいよどの山に入ろうかって段階なんだが、まあここは勝手を知った山の方が無難だろうということで、今のところは浅草岳を中心に日程を組んでみているのよね。
で靴新調しちゃったからさ、これから出発までは毎日靴はいて歩き慣らさんといかんわけ、しかもここんところ重い物持って歩いてないからさ、ザックに20kgくらいのバラスト詰めてさ。
今週末以降、都区内の街の真ん中を登山用のくそでかいザックを背負ってスノトレ履いてあるってるおっさんがいたらそれたぶん僕．．．
それにしてもスノーシューを使ってみるのが楽しみなこった。
PR
つい最近まで「■2007/12/04 (火) 徴兵/徴農発言で謝罪？ おかしな国の首長さん」http://www2.diary.ne.jp/user/119209/#1196754066は
論争にもなにもなってないし、そんなことを語れる見識も教養も知識も婆さんにはないことがメールでのやりとりで明らかだから無意味だろ？、僕はこういう理由で断ったわけね。
でなに、言うに事欠いてそのまんま東知事には
そんでもって日記の嘘書いた部分をこっそり書き換えちゃったじゃん（大爆
謝ったとは言え核心をずらした
この婆さんの書きようでは経緯もなにも解らない人が多かろうから婆さんとのメールでのやりとりを資料室に永久保存しときますわ。
それにしてもこの平気で大嘘書き倒してばれりゃこっそり書き換えて居直るような腐り果てて恥知らずな人格で日本再生だの日本精神だの言われちゃ迷惑だぞ。（藁
クライン孝子の日記・大嘘こっそり書き換えの事実を含め詳細は
「クライン孝子だいせんせいとの文通記録」
をお読みください。（藁
民主党の大量訪中で衆参本会議中止 与党カンカンだけだったんだが先ほど気づいたら大幅に加筆された挙げ句にこんな負け惜しみが書いてある。
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20071203-00000946-san-pol
東国原宮崎県知事＞徴兵制発言を謝罪 「不適切だった」
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20071204-00000073-mai-pol
今度は“徴農”発言を陳謝 東国原知事、興奮の場面も
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/local/071204/lcl0712041711003-n1.htm
そういえば、私もあることで反論メールが届いたものですから、、こっそり書くなって（大爆
メールではどうも歯がかみ合いそうにないので、会って論争しようと
申し込んだところ、１月から外国に出るとかで
論争できないと断ってきました。
何だかねえ、こんなものかなあと残念な思いをしました。
論争にもなにもなってないし、そんなことを語れる見識も教養も知識も婆さんにはないことがメールでのやりとりで明らかだから無意味だろ？、僕はこういう理由で断ったわけね。
でなに、言うに事欠いてそのまんま東知事には
相手からいちゃもんつけられや、すぐ謝ってしまう。僕はイチャモンはつけていないけども、質問に耐えかねてすかさず謝ったの婆さんでしょ？
これだから、中国や北朝鮮、韓国など近隣諸国
だけでなく、欧米諸国から、軽く見られ舐められてしまうのだ。
そんでもって日記の嘘書いた部分をこっそり書き換えちゃったじゃん（大爆
謝ったとは言え核心をずらした
表現についてのご指摘、有難うございました。ってなトンチンカンな謝り方だけどね。ｗ
この婆さんの書きようでは経緯もなにも解らない人が多かろうから婆さんとのメールでのやりとりを資料室に永久保存しときますわ。
それにしてもこの平気で大嘘書き倒してばれりゃこっそり書き換えて居直るような腐り果てて恥知らずな人格で日本再生だの日本精神だの言われちゃ迷惑だぞ。（藁
クライン孝子の日記・大嘘こっそり書き換えの事実を含め詳細は
「クライン孝子だいせんせいとの文通記録」
をお読みください。（藁
僕はあんなもん食わんからどうでも良いんだが、それにしても汚い絵だった。
あの動画見てもまだ吉牛食えるちゅう奴は基本的になんでも食っちゃう奴なんだろうよ。
まあだから吉牛食ってるんだろうが．．．
で処分ったってなｗ
ああいうところに得体の知れんバイト使ってるちゅう神経の方が処分対象だろうよ？
これは吉野家に限ったことではなくマックにもファミレスにも言えることだけど。
吉野家、「テラ豚丼」で関与した店員処分
あの動画見てもまだ吉牛食えるちゅう奴は基本的になんでも食っちゃう奴なんだろうよ。
まあだから吉牛食ってるんだろうが．．．
で処分ったってなｗ
ああいうところに得体の知れんバイト使ってるちゅう神経の方が処分対象だろうよ？
これは吉野家に限ったことではなくマックにもファミレスにも言えることだけど。
吉野家、「テラ豚丼」で関与した店員処分
こりゃ産経の古森さんのブログのエントリなんだがね
大手マスコミが報じないイラク情勢の改善――潮流は変わったのか
そこにあるのはテロ組織から連合軍に対する攻撃であったりテロ組織からイラク治安部隊や警察に対する攻撃であったり宗派を背景にした武装組織間の対立であったりするわけで、この場合に取り上げられるのは前二者、つまりテロ組織ね。
でテロ組織はやりやすいところで攻撃を仕掛けるわけで、イラクが少々やりにくくなったのは事実だろうけど、その分がスワート渓谷なんかに回っちゃってるんだな。
でここからはアフガニスタンはおろかパキスタンにまで出動してるわけなんだが、問題はアメリカだぞ。
パキスタン国軍が頼りないからいわゆる部族、これは当然武装組織なんだが、こいつらに武器弾薬を供与してタリバンやアルカイダに対向させようと企んでる。
でも考えてみろや、こいつらの武装解除を苦労してやったのは日本だぞ。
で一説に拠れば、既にこいつらはアルカイダと通じているらしい。
となればアメリカはアルカイダに武器弾薬を供与するちゅう間抜けなことになるわけだ罠。
で日にちが前後するからこれで古森氏を批判しちゃ可哀想だけど、ゲイツ自身がテロ拡散とイラクの安寧が表裏一体だちゅうことを認めてるんだわ。
大手マスコミが報じないイラク情勢の改善――潮流は変わったのか
イラクの治安の回復が顕著になってきました。解っててこういうこと書くからこの人は信用出来ないんだが、そもそも、フセイン政権崩壊後今日までイラクで行われている戦い中のはイラクとアメリカを中心とする連合国の戦争じゃないんだよ。
えっ？ と思う方も多いでしょう。
イラクといえば、あまりに多くの人たちの頭に「内戦」「泥沼」「殺戮」「破壊」そして「アメリカの挫折」というような言葉がインプットされてきたからです。
しかしイラクではここ数ヶ月、テロ攻撃が減り、宗派間の戦闘も、米軍やイラク国軍への攻撃も、減ったことは、どうにも否定のできない事実となってきたようです。
この事実は日本の大手マスコミではほとんど報道されていません。産経新聞には出ていますが、あと日本経済新聞が
同趣旨の傾向を伝える記事を一回、載せただけぐらいで、私のみる限り、残りは皆無です。
そこにあるのはテロ組織から連合軍に対する攻撃であったりテロ組織からイラク治安部隊や警察に対する攻撃であったり宗派を背景にした武装組織間の対立であったりするわけで、この場合に取り上げられるのは前二者、つまりテロ組織ね。
でテロ組織はやりやすいところで攻撃を仕掛けるわけで、イラクが少々やりにくくなったのは事実だろうけど、その分がスワート渓谷なんかに回っちゃってるんだな。
でここからはアフガニスタンはおろかパキスタンにまで出動してるわけなんだが、問題はアメリカだぞ。
パキスタン国軍が頼りないからいわゆる部族、これは当然武装組織なんだが、こいつらに武器弾薬を供与してタリバンやアルカイダに対向させようと企んでる。
でも考えてみろや、こいつらの武装解除を苦労してやったのは日本だぞ。
で一説に拠れば、既にこいつらはアルカイダと通じているらしい。
となればアメリカはアルカイダに武器弾薬を供与するちゅう間抜けなことになるわけだ罠。
で日にちが前後するからこれで古森氏を批判しちゃ可哀想だけど、ゲイツ自身がテロ拡散とイラクの安寧が表裏一体だちゅうことを認めてるんだわ。
昨日も暇だったんでちょっくら電車に乗って横浜まで出掛けてきた。
関内で降りたんだが、降りた頃が丁度昼飯時、でわ！！ っと中華街に向かったんだが、相も変わらず道を歩いていても日本語が聞こえてこないんだな。
相も変わらず道を歩きながら携帯電話で「ぴーちくぱーちく」、まったくヘドが出そうな喧噪で、どうにも僕はこういう環境で飯を食う気にはならんのよ。
仕方なく更に歩を進めて元町に行ってみた。
なにしろ車では入って行きにくいところなんでゆっくり歩くのは数十年ぶりになるんだが、随分変わっちゃったもんだよ。
でも昔からあるお店はまだ随分残ってて、そんな店の一件で危うくレザーのジャケットを衝動買いしてしまうところだった。
なんで衝動買いしそうになったかというと、染めが良かったし一見皮が良かった、でありながら値段が８万円っと安かったからなんだが、しかし買わなかった。
なんでかというと、よく見るとフラップポケットのところで皮が接いであるからなんだな。
これが二十歳代や三十歳代の頃ならそれくらい我慢して買っちゃったんだろうけど、さすがにこの歳になると、そこが一枚皮じゃないと表に着て出る気はしない。
僕としては珍しく、買う前に慎重に見定めた結果大枚八万円を失うことを免れたわけだが、結局、今更ネクタイ買う気もしないしスーツを買う気もしないし、カジュアル系の靴もってことで服飾系はなにも買わなかったんだが、それにしても元町にはまだハマトラの香りが残っているのがなんとも嬉しかった。
なんだかんだと一時間半ほどウインドー・ショッピングしながら歩き回ったんで疲れてきた上に腹も減ってきたんで飯を食おうということになったんだが、いわゆる「洋食屋」ってのがほぼ死に絶えたね。
であるのは中途半端なイタ飯屋とこれまた正体不明のフランス料理屋と銘打った国籍不明料理屋ばっかなんだな。（だったら「洋食屋」にしとけって！！）
ボチボチ探すのも面倒になってきたんで目の前にあった「Italian El Ella」ちゅうとこ入ったんだが、時間帯が悪いのかメニューが最悪で選択肢がほぼ無いんだな。
選択肢がないちゅうのは「イタ飯屋」を広く主張出来そうなメニューしかないちゅうことで、仕方なくサラダとパスタとくったんだが、ちなみに酢はただのりんご酢だろ？ヴォケ！！
まあ払った金は三千円弱なんでかつて霧笛楼の「いくら創作ちゅうてもだな、基本無視すりゃアウトだろ！！」ちゅうよなインチキ臭いフランス料理に七千なんぼ払った時ほどには腹は立たなかったが、少なくともデイタイムの元町は真面目に飯を食うところではなかった。
でまたプラプラと歩き出し、石川町の駅に向かおうとしたんだが、そうえいば先々週くらいに来た時に銀杏がもう少しだったなってことを思い出し、横浜人形の家の前の歩道橋で写真だけ撮ってきた。
横浜人形の家でライブイベント－ブレッド&バターら出演
関内で降りたんだが、降りた頃が丁度昼飯時、でわ！！ っと中華街に向かったんだが、相も変わらず道を歩いていても日本語が聞こえてこないんだな。
相も変わらず道を歩きながら携帯電話で「ぴーちくぱーちく」、まったくヘドが出そうな喧噪で、どうにも僕はこういう環境で飯を食う気にはならんのよ。
仕方なく更に歩を進めて元町に行ってみた。
なにしろ車では入って行きにくいところなんでゆっくり歩くのは数十年ぶりになるんだが、随分変わっちゃったもんだよ。
でも昔からあるお店はまだ随分残ってて、そんな店の一件で危うくレザーのジャケットを衝動買いしてしまうところだった。
なんで衝動買いしそうになったかというと、染めが良かったし一見皮が良かった、でありながら値段が８万円っと安かったからなんだが、しかし買わなかった。
なんでかというと、よく見るとフラップポケットのところで皮が接いであるからなんだな。
これが二十歳代や三十歳代の頃ならそれくらい我慢して買っちゃったんだろうけど、さすがにこの歳になると、そこが一枚皮じゃないと表に着て出る気はしない。
僕としては珍しく、買う前に慎重に見定めた結果大枚八万円を失うことを免れたわけだが、結局、今更ネクタイ買う気もしないしスーツを買う気もしないし、カジュアル系の靴もってことで服飾系はなにも買わなかったんだが、それにしても元町にはまだハマトラの香りが残っているのがなんとも嬉しかった。
なんだかんだと一時間半ほどウインドー・ショッピングしながら歩き回ったんで疲れてきた上に腹も減ってきたんで飯を食おうということになったんだが、いわゆる「洋食屋」ってのがほぼ死に絶えたね。
であるのは中途半端なイタ飯屋とこれまた正体不明のフランス料理屋と銘打った国籍不明料理屋ばっかなんだな。（だったら「洋食屋」にしとけって！！）
ボチボチ探すのも面倒になってきたんで目の前にあった「Italian El Ella」ちゅうとこ入ったんだが、時間帯が悪いのかメニューが最悪で選択肢がほぼ無いんだな。
選択肢がないちゅうのは「イタ飯屋」を広く主張出来そうなメニューしかないちゅうことで、仕方なくサラダとパスタとくったんだが、ちなみに酢はただのりんご酢だろ？ヴォケ！！
まあ払った金は三千円弱なんでかつて霧笛楼の「いくら創作ちゅうてもだな、基本無視すりゃアウトだろ！！」ちゅうよなインチキ臭いフランス料理に七千なんぼ払った時ほどには腹は立たなかったが、少なくともデイタイムの元町は真面目に飯を食うところではなかった。
でまたプラプラと歩き出し、石川町の駅に向かおうとしたんだが、そうえいば先々週くらいに来た時に銀杏がもう少しだったなってことを思い出し、横浜人形の家の前の歩道橋で写真だけ撮ってきた。
横浜人形の家でライブイベント－ブレッド&バターら出演
産経新聞の仏大統領、植民地時代の謝罪せず アルジェと原子力協力って記事が
「謝罪しる！！」っと言われたら「馬鹿が喋ってろ！！」くらい言ってみんか？
大統領は滞在中、一般的な植民地制度を「不正だ」と糾弾したが、アルジェリアが要請していた仏植民地時代（１８３０～１９６２）に関する直接の謝罪はしなかった。っとなんとも嬉しそうで微笑ましいんだが、でもな、フランスが謝罪しないんだから日本もってのはあまりにもネガティブでね、フランスのような強さを持てちゅうことだろ？
「謝罪しる！！」っと言われたら「馬鹿が喋ってろ！！」くらい言ってみんか？
Net-Centric Airborne Defence Element（NCADE）！？なんだそりゃ？
Daily Telegraphの「US hails success in anti-ballistic missile test」によれば
Daily Telegraphの「US hails success in anti-ballistic missile test」によれば
The test at White Sands in New Mexico involved an F-16 fighter that fired two modified AIM-9X missiles at a research rocket.で中距離弾道弾と短距離弾道弾を対象にしてるらしいんだが、有人機で撃つにしろ無人機で撃つにしろ、発射サイトの160kmまで接近しないと有効じゃないつうんだから、あくまでも実験成功ってレベルの話だろ？ｗ
The first missile destroyed the target and the second recorded the interception, according to the Pentagon's Missile Defence Agency.
以下ハドリー補佐官会見全文
Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
For Immediate Release December 3, 2007
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room
3:35 P.M. EST
MR. HADLEY: Good afternoon, I'm Steve Hadley, the President's National Security Advisor. I want to talk a little bit about the recent National Intelligence Estimate that was released to the executive branch and to the Congress today.
There was an earlier briefing this afternoon by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Don Kerr, and also by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mike Hayden.
And I wanted to give a little bit more context and set the findings of the NIE in a broader historical perspective.
The introduction is going to go on a little bit; there's a lot to tell. This is a complicated estimate.
The unclassified key judgments that were released today are a little difficult to sort through and I want to try and lay this out for everybody, so I'll have an opening statement, probably 15-20 minutes, but there will be lots of time to answer questions at the end.
The Director of National Intelligence has today released the unclassified key judgments from the intelligence community's latest estimate of Iran's nuclear weapons efforts and its uranium enrichment program.
The classified version of this National Intelligence Estimate was briefed to the President last Wednesday, November 28, and has been delivered to relevant congressional committees this morning.
On balance, the estimate is good news.
On one hand, it confirms that we were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, it tells us that we have made some progress in trying to ensure that that does not happen.
But it also tells us that the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a very serious problem.
The estimate offers grounds for hope that the problem can be solved diplomatically, without the use of force, as the administration has been trying to do. And it suggests we have the right strategy: intensified international pressure, along with a willingness to negotiate a solution that serves Iranian interests while ensuring the world that it will never have to face a nuclear-armed Iran.
But the bottom line is that for that strategy to succeed, the international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran -- with diplomatic isolation, United Nations sanctions, and with other financial pressure.
And Iran has to decide that it wants to negotiate a solution.
This is a complicated subject and the new Intelligence Estimate is a complicated document.
Let me summarize the key judgments and then try and walk you through it and answer your questions.
First, let me summarize the key judgments.
The IC has high confidence -- high confidence -- that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program that it has never acknowledged and continues to deny.
The intelligence community has high confidence that Iran halted its covert nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003.
And they have moderate confidence that it had not restarted that program as of mid-2007.
They judge with high confidence that the halt in other nuclear-related decisions was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure, resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work involving uranium enrichment.
The intelligence community says they do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, but they assess with moderate to high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
And the intelligence community assesses with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult.
Let me see if I can unpack this a bit and put it in context.
First, remember how we got here.
A little background: If a state is looking to become a nuclear-weaponed state, it needs three things.
It needs weapons-grade nuclear material.
It needs the technical know-how to fashion this nuclear material into a weapon.
And it needs a means to deliver the weapon on a target, like a ballistic missile.
The hardest step in today's world is acquiring weapons-grade nuclear material.
Unless you steal it, there are two ways to get it: If you have a nuclear power reactor you can reprocess spent fuel coming out of that reactor, or you can create nuclear material by a process called uranium enrichment.
This process produces fuel for nuclear power reactors, but it can also create weapons-grade nuclear material for a nuclear bomb.
In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and pledged never to seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
That's what Iran undertook to do. It signed what is called a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, under which it was to declare all its nuclear-related activities and open itself up to inspections by the IAEA.
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of a secret uranium enrichment plant in Iran at a place called Natans.
The plant was secret.
It had not been declared, as required, to the IAEA.
Iran at that time had no operational nuclear power reactors, so why did it need a uranium enrichment plant?
Iran was actively developing ballistic missiles.
These facts raised a real concern that this was all part of an effort to develop nuclear weapons.
So the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, backed by the international community, began a vigorous effort to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment activity, and thus reassure the world that it did not intend to develop nuclear weapons.
And the pressure seemed to work.
In October 2003, Iran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA and suspend its uranium enrichment activities.
Considerable further diplomacy involving both the IAEA and what's called the EU-3 -- representatives of Britain, France and Germany -- resulted in what's called the Paris Agreement of November 2004.
In this agreement, Iran reaffirmed and extended the suspension of its enrichment activities.
And the EU-3 agreed to negotiate long-term technology, economic and security arrangements for Iran.
Despite this progress, the intelligence community in May of 2005 assessed with high confidence that Iran currently was determined to develop nuclear weapons.
The intelligence community maintained this assessment throughout this year, 2007.
Indeed, Director of National Intelligence Negroponte told an open session of the House intelligence community on January 1, 2007, that, "our assessment is that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons." DNI McConnell later told a Senate panel in open session on February 27 that, "We assess that Tehran seeks to develop nuclear weapons."
The irony is that one month after the intelligence community released this assessment, in June of 2005, Ahmadinejad wins a runoff election and becomes Iran's President.
On August 1, 2005, just two months after taking power, Ahmadinejad informs the IAEA that he has decided to resume uranium enrichment, and does so beginning in January 2006.
For the next two years, through a whole series of IAEA Board of Governors resolutions urging Iranian compliance, through two U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions, sweetened by negotiating offers by the EU-3 and the promise that the United States would join those negotiations, the international community tried unsuccessfully to get Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and those efforts to get the suspension continue today.
Also during this period, the President directs the intelligence community to enhance its capabilities to gather intelligence on Iran's nuclear programs.
Earlier this year, Congress called for a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.
It is in part delayed in order to process -- the finalization of that NIE is delayed in part in order to process new intelligence, some of which has been received in the last few months.
The National Intelligence Estimate released today reveals that there was a covert nuclear weapons program.
It also reveals that, unknown to us, that program was halted in the fall of 2003.
So the covert nuclear weapons program was unknown to us, suspected, unknown; now confirmed.
But what was also unknown was that the program was halted in the fall of 2003.
That secret -- that covert nuclear weapons program was halted at the same time the Iranians publicly announced that they were suspending their public and declared uranium enrichment program.
So where does that leave us?
One, we have good reason to continue to be concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon, even after this most recent National Intelligence Estimate.
In the words of the NIE, "Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so." For example, Iran's civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing.
And as you know, once a country masters the technology to enrich uranium for use even in a civilian nuclear power program, it could readily use the same technology to produce weapons-grade uranium.
As we have said, weapons-grade uranium is the long pole in the tent for a nuclear weapon.
And Iran continues to develop, test and deploy ballistic missiles -- a very attractive delivery system for a nuclear weapon.
For example, the Iranian Defense Minister publicly acknowledged a medium-range ballistic missile called the Ashura, which could reach much of Eastern Europe.
Finally, we are very unsure of Iran's attentions [sic], even with respect to the covert nuclear weapons program that Iran has halted.
Again, let me quote the National Intelligence Estimate: "We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidentially whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program."
Again from the NIE: "We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran's key national security and foreign policy objectives."
But the NIE gives us reason to believe that our current strategy stands the best chance of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions.
Again, let me quote for a final time from the NIE: "Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003, primarily in response to international pressure, indicates Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach, rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of political, economic and military costs.
This in turn suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige and goals for regional influence in other ways might, if perceived by Iran's leaders as credible, prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify just what such a combination might be."
We have been pursuing this very strategy for over two years, since Iran resumed its nuclear enrichment.
If we are to avoid the grim choice between accepting an Iran on the path to nuclear weapons or considering the use of force, we need to intensify our pressure on Iran, while making clear that if they do suspend enrichment, there is an opportunity for better relations with the international community.
And with that, I'll stop and I'd be pleased to answer your questions.
Q It is troubling that the United States was so wrong about what Iran was doing or what its intentions were?
MR. HADLEY: I don't think we were wrong about what it's doing or what its intentions were.
Our concern was that they were pursuing a nuclear weapon.
We saw the enrichment, which we couldn't really explain; we saw the ballistic missiles.
And it led people to conclude: We are concerned that they were pursuing a nuclear weapons program and might have a covert program to actually weaponize highly-enriched uranium in order to be a nuclear weapon.
And that's what the NIE has now discovered.
The President said some months ago, probably over a year ago, we need to have better intelligence on Iran's nuclear program; we have these suspicions, we have this concern, we need better intelligence to get greater certainty.
The intelligence community increased their efforts, and lo and behold, in the last few months we get credible evidence that gives them a high confidence that they had a covert nuclear weapons program to weaponize weapons grade highly-enriched uranium into a weapon.
Q But in 2005 you thought that they had a nuclear weapons program, whereas you now think they abandoned it, or put it aside in 2003.
MR. HADLEY: We thought they had that program, we did indeed, in 2005.
Q So that's what I meant when I said, wrong.
MR. HADLEY: We have looked at it and we have determined that, indeed, they did have a program, and a covert program, which we had not been able to detect, but we also determined that they had suspended it in -- or halted it -- which is the term of art -- in fall of 2003 in response to international pressure.
That's exactly right.
Q But, Steve, the question is, how did the government get it wrong?
And isn't that troubling that it got so wrong over that two-year span?
MR. HADLEY: I don't think it is so wrong. I think it is right.
If they had been saying in 2005 not to worry, Iran has no nuclear weapons ambitions, then we would have clearly got it wrong, because they did have such a program.
I would say to you, they got it right, in terms of being concerned about Iran seeking a nuclear weapon.
And we continue to be concerned about a nuclear weapon.
Remember, Iran is one of a handful of the hardest intelligence targets going.
They are very good at this business of keeping secrets.
And there's probably no secret that will be more closely kept by Iran than what it's doing on nuclear weapons.
So I think the fact that we have got this additional information is an indication that we are succeeding in learning more about this program.
And I think you have to recognize we're going to continue to dig, continue to learn more, and that's a good thing.
That's --
Q Steve, let me follow on this point.
If we now estimate with high confidence that it was shut down as of 2003, that it was halted, in October of this year, in 2007, the President is speaking about the Iranian threat, in terms of World War III.
Why wouldn't you conclude that this President is hyping the threat?
MR. HADLEY: Because he was describing the threat as the intelligence community itself had been describing the threat both publicly and in their briefings to him.
The President, as I think if you look at the testimony that was given by Don Kerr and Mike Hayden today, they basically said that the intelligence community finally came to the judgments that they came to on this issue Tuesday of last week.
The President was briefed on Wednesday.
So this is challenging information.
The intelligence community had to decide what they thought about it.
They were sufficiently uncertain about it that they delayed the publication of the NIE until they could come to the bottom of it, reach their conclusions, present it to the President, as they did on Wednesday, and then at that point, obviously, we wanted to get it out quickly.
Q They describe the Iranian threat today differently than the President would have even a month ago.
MR. HADLEY: Because our intelligence community has told us effective today that their assessment is somewhat different than it was before.
That's correct.
Q How does this -- how does this not undercut the effort to get an international coalition?
The urgency of doing that -- I would think all the international partners would say, wait a minute, they haven't had a program since 2003, so let's back off a little with the urgency.
MR. HADLEY: I think there is going to be a tendency or a lot of people to say, the problem is less bad than we thought, let's relax.
And I think our view is that would be a mistake.
Why?
Because, as we said, in today's world the critical problem for making a nuclear weapon is getting the weapons-grade nuclear material.
And for Iran, they are trying to get the capability to do that.
Let me put it this way, their path to getting that capability is the enrichment program.
This is the program that they agreed to shut down in 2003, 2004, but restarted in 2005.
It has been championed by Ahmadinejad.
He is now making public announcements that they have 3,000 centrifuges and have mastered that technology.
You don't need to take those assertions to the bank to be concerned that Iran is getting to the point where it will have mastered the ability to enrich uranium.
And having mastered that ability to enrich uranium, they have the -- they will have the capacity to make weapons-grade nuclear uranium.
That is the long pole in the tent, and that's what the international community has been trying, in a pretty united way, for the last three or four years to get the Iranians to suspend.
Q What do you know about the program that you say now you have confirmed the Iranians were conducting, that they suspended in 2003?
What do you know about that program now?
How long had that program been in place?
How effective, how far along before they halted?
MR. HADLEY: Those are good questions.
They are questions that I think Don Kerr and Mike Hayden should address.
Some of this gets into portions of these materials that are still classified.
Let me read you, though, I think as a starting point, a footnote that appears in the declassified key judgments that were put out today.
When you talk about a nuclear weapons program, what the intelligence community says they mean is Iran's nuclear weapon design -- that is to say, an effort to design a nuclear weapon.
And weaponization work -- that is to say, taking weapons-grade uranium and adapting it so that it can be an operational nuclear weapon.
And covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work.
And that suggests that part of the program was a covert uranium enrichment facility.
And why would we worry about that?
Because we would worry about it that in -- paired with an overt, declared uranium enrichment program, the information and know-how gleaned by that -- from that public uranium enrichment program could be passed at some time -- in the past or in the future -- to a covert uranium enrichment program, which could be used to develop and produce nuclear weapons grade material for a nuclear weapon.
Q There had to be more than an inkling before today that this information, this intelligence, that the Iranians had an ongoing nuclear weapons program was incorrect.
So why wasn't -- why then would the President allow it or advise to go ahead with ratcheting up the rhetoric, instead of toning it down, when right now this obviously raises issues of credibility with the American public and with American allies about U.S. intelligence?
MR. HADLEY: Two things.
One, when the President was told that we had some additional information, he was basically told:
stand down; needs to be evaluated; we'll come to you and tell you what we think it means.
So this was basically -- as we said, this is information that came in the last few months, and the intelligence community spent a lot time to get on top of it.
Secondly, I would disagree with you that the President has ratcheted up the rhetoric.
We have said -- he has said, I have said, other administration officials have said many times, look, we want diplomacy to work.
Because, as I said in my statement, we don't want to be in a situation where the only two choices this or a future President has is to accept Iran on a path to a nuclear weapon or to have to contemplate the use of nuclear force -- sorry, use of military force.
Because that in the context of today's Middle East is a big move.
And so the President, in that statement -- as he said before and as he explained afterwards -- was trying to give a wake-up call to the international community that we needed to step up the diplomacy and step up the pressure to get Iran to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program.
And that still is the case today, because that is the path to weapons-grade material which would give Iran the option in the future to produce a nuclear weapon.
Q The President -- you said the President was told to stand down on that --
MR. HADLEY: No, I said just the opposite.
I said the President was told, we have some information, we have some new information not to stand down -- said, we have some new information;
give us some time to analyze it, and we will come to you and tell you what we think it means.
Q Was he told that before or after --
MR. HADLEY: And that's what he was told, and they -- as was briefed by the intelligence community today, they came to their final judgments on Tuesday of last week, and they told the President of the United States on Wednesday.
Q But was he given that advice before or after the World War III comment?
MR. HADLEY: I'll have to -- I'll have to look.
Q Which was on October 20th.
MR. HADLEY: From my mind, it doesn't make any difference, because the World War III comment you characterize as stepping up the rhetoric.
I would say it was making a point that the President and we have been making for two or three years, that the international community has to exert more pressure because Iran needs to suspend its enrichment program.
That was the position of our policy before the National Intelligence Estimate, and for the reasons I said.
That continues to be our policy after this latest National Intelligence Estimate.
Q Steve, just to clarify.
MR. HADLEY: Sure.
Q Is it fair to say that the intelligence came in, in recent weeks, not recent months?
Because this -- as was pointed out, the press briefing was late October when the President was asked definitively, do you believe Iran wants to build a nuclear bomb?
And that's where you get, in the second part of that answer, the World War III comment.
MR. HADLEY: Correct.
Q So was it recent weeks that this intelligence came in?
MR. HADLEY: What the intelligence community has said is in the last few months.
And again I would say, if they were working on this information before that quote in October, again, in terms of the point the President was making, he would have made that comment before we got -- the intelligence community got this information.
He would have made that, I believe, that comment after.
I just made it in this statement, which is, the international community has to understand that if we want to avoid a situation where we either have to accept Iran on the road to a nuclear weapon, with a path to a nuclear weapon, or the possibility of having to use force to stop it, with all the connotations of World War III, then we need to step up the diplomacy, step up the pressure to get Iran to stop their civilian -- so-called civilian uranium enrichment program.
That was our policy before his October comment, that was the policy between October -- his October comment and today, and that's our policy going forward;
no change.
Q Steve, you just said you would describe it quite different.
Just a minute ago --
MR. HADLEY: I think that's right.
And we would describe it --
Q Are you being consistent?
I don't think you're being consistent.
MR. HADLEY: I am being consistent, because what we can say now is, that they actually had -- which we did not know at the time of 2005 -- they actually had a covert weapons program, which means we were right to be concerned;
it was probably worse than we thought.
We would also say now, but that program, that covert nuclear weapon program has been suspended.
And therefore it is important for our policy to continue to put diplomatic pressure on Iran so that the suspension -- the halting, excuse me -- the halting of their covert nuclear weapons program continues and that they suspend their uranium enrichment program.
Because if you can do both of those things, maintain the halting of the nuclear weapons program and obtain the suspension of the uranium enrichment program, you've got some real assurance that Iran is not going to be on the path towards a nuclear weapon -- assuming they don't steal the weapon, they don't get weapons-grade nuclear material from some other source.
And it still leaves the worrisome fact that they're working and developing ballistic missiles.
But it is a -- so I would describe our posture differently.
I would describe our assessment -- the intelligence community would describe the assessment in a different way.
But in terms of our policy, it continues to be one.
And I would say it both underscores the urgency of the policy, and also gives us some confidence that it actually can work, but only if we pick up the pace.
Yes, ma'am.
Q Given the halting, as you described it, does this strengthen the position of Russia and China on sanctions, specifically?
MR. HADLEY: Well, we hope not, because as I said, the problem presented by the continuing uranium enrichment program continues, because that is the long pole for a country like Iran on the way towards having a path towards a nuclear weapon.
That's something that Russia has said clearly they don't want Iran to do;
that's something we think, less clearly, China has said the same thing.
So again, as the President says many times, we're asking people to do hard things.
We're asking people to put pressure on Iran, and it has consequences for their diplomacy, it has consequences for their companies doing business with Iran.
People don't like to do that.
So I'm sure some people will try and use this as an excuse or a pretext for flagging on the effort.
Our argument is, actually, it should be just the reverse, because we need to keep the halting of the nuclear weapons program in place;
we need to achieve the suspension of the enrichment program;
and the only way -- what this NIE says is that the best path to do that is to continue what we've been doing, which is diplomatic isolation, U.N. sanctions and other financial pressure, plus the option for negotiations.
Q Second question.
When did the Vice President get briefed on this?
Because he was warning of serious consequences just last month, too.
MR. HADLEY: I've just got a note from him -- I did it once, I'll do it again.
In terms of stand down, they did not tell the President to stand down and stop talking about Iran's nuclear program;
they told him just the opposite:
Mr. President, we have new information.
Or let me put it this way, not just the opposite, let me be precise.
He was not told to stop talking about Iran's nuclear weapons program.
He was not told to change what he says about it.
What he was told was, we have new information;
it is interesting;
it is going to take us some time to understand it, to assess it, to know what it means, and to know how credible it is, and we will come back to you when that process is done. And they did.
And they came back to him Wednesday, and the results of their work is included in this estimate. Is that okay? (Laughter.)
I'm sorry, you asked a question and I didn't answer. Could you restate it, please?
Q When was the Vice President briefed on this?
You mentioned when the President was, what about the Vice President?
MR. HADLEY: He, of course, can answer that for himself.
I will say that the week before the Tuesday/Wednesday, there was a meeting that was held with the principals -- including the Vice President, myself and others -- to get a preliminary look at this information, to get some sense of it, and to give us an opportunity to test it and ask questions about it, and probe it a little bit, as part -- and we thought, one, so we would understand it, and two, as part of the process for the intelligence community, you know, coming to its conclusion about what this all meant.
And those were the conclusions that they reached on Tuesday, and which were briefed to the President on Wednesday of last week. Peter.
Q Steve, when was the first time the President was given the inkling of something?
I'm not clear on this.
Was this months ago, when the first information started to become available to intelligence agencies?
MR. HADLEY: You ought to go back to the intelligence community.
We will get you an answer on that.
There's two questions: one, when did they first get the information?
-- you ought to ask that to them -- two, when was the President notified that there was new information available?
We'll try and get you a precise answer.
As I say, it was, in my recollection, is in the last few months.
Whether that is October -- August, September, we'll try and get you an answer to that.
Q What about the -- I mean, in your view, for a lot of people will sound like echoes of Iraq, what we thought they -- we talked about what programs we thought they had -- in fact they suspended it or stopped it and so forth.
I mean, how does this affect the credibility of everything you want to say about this or any other threat that might be out there in the world today?
MR. HADLEY: Well, I think all we can do is try and -- and I think all the intelligence community can do -- is try and get the best information they can, to try and be straight with the Congress and the President about how they assess that information, with what level of confidence, and to continue to get additional information.
And when they get that additional information, if it changes their assessment, to come out and so inform people.
You know, these are not puzzles that once you solve them, you have solved them for all times.
These are challenges that are ongoing against very hard targets that lie, that try and prevent things from becoming public, and that try and mislead.
And it is a very difficult intelligence channel.
So I think the answer is, in some sense, you know, welcome to the real world.
And so the challenge for the intelligence community is to say, in all of this work -- and it's very challenging -- what they know, what they assess, what's the confidence of their assessment, and what they don't know.
And that's what the intelligence community tries to do, and I think in some sense the unclassified key judgments -- if you read them with care -- show very clearly that that's what they're trying to do. And I will tell you, I'm sure we are going to -- I hope we are going to learn more, and that's probably going to change what we know and probably change our assessments, probably change our confidence level, because this is going to be something that this administration and future administrations are working with for a long time.
Q Just to turn your premise around a little bit, you said that you should keep the pressure up on the international -- with the international community.
But doesn't the fact that Iran halted its program, even if it was covert, suggest that perhaps there is room for a negotiated settlement that would keep nuclear weapons out of the government --
MR. HADLEY: Yes, I said two things.
I said we need to keep the pressure up, but also make clear there is a path for negotiation that will assess Iranian concerns.
Our job is to keep up the pressure, but also to offer this negotiating path.
But in the end of the day, the Iranians have to signal that they're willing to accept a negotiation path.
And as you know, there have been now almost three years of off-and-on meetings -- two years probably -- off-and-on meetings between an Iranian negotiator -- for the longest time that was Larijani -- and with the EU-3, in terms of Javier Solana;
that various offers have been put down for the EU-3 about how to address Iran's security, economic and diplomatic concerns;
a path where Iran could reliably know that it could have a purely civil nuclear power program.
There have been several offers of that sort.
So the combination that the intelligence community says is most likely to work is pressure, plus a negotiating option.
That continues to be the case to this day.
But at some point, Iran has to indicate a willingness to sit down and negotiate.
And that's what we have not yet seen.
Thank you very much.
END 4:14 P.M. EST
以下12月4日の国務省ブリーフィングにおける質疑応答抜粋
Daily Press Briefing
Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC December 4, 2007
こうしてみると現実の脅威を否定はしていない点が、昨日あたりにしきりに国内で流布された共同電の記述とは多少異なる印象ではあるんだが、いずれにしてもブッシュ政権はイラクでもインチキ情報で国際社会を引っ張ったわけでさ、これでも日米安保強化と言うのかね、媚米似而非保守は？
Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
For Immediate Release December 3, 2007
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room
3:35 P.M. EST
MR. HADLEY: Good afternoon, I'm Steve Hadley, the President's National Security Advisor. I want to talk a little bit about the recent National Intelligence Estimate that was released to the executive branch and to the Congress today.
There was an earlier briefing this afternoon by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Don Kerr, and also by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mike Hayden.
And I wanted to give a little bit more context and set the findings of the NIE in a broader historical perspective.
The introduction is going to go on a little bit; there's a lot to tell. This is a complicated estimate.
The unclassified key judgments that were released today are a little difficult to sort through and I want to try and lay this out for everybody, so I'll have an opening statement, probably 15-20 minutes, but there will be lots of time to answer questions at the end.
The Director of National Intelligence has today released the unclassified key judgments from the intelligence community's latest estimate of Iran's nuclear weapons efforts and its uranium enrichment program.
The classified version of this National Intelligence Estimate was briefed to the President last Wednesday, November 28, and has been delivered to relevant congressional committees this morning.
On balance, the estimate is good news.
On one hand, it confirms that we were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, it tells us that we have made some progress in trying to ensure that that does not happen.
But it also tells us that the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a very serious problem.
The estimate offers grounds for hope that the problem can be solved diplomatically, without the use of force, as the administration has been trying to do. And it suggests we have the right strategy: intensified international pressure, along with a willingness to negotiate a solution that serves Iranian interests while ensuring the world that it will never have to face a nuclear-armed Iran.
But the bottom line is that for that strategy to succeed, the international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran -- with diplomatic isolation, United Nations sanctions, and with other financial pressure.
And Iran has to decide that it wants to negotiate a solution.
This is a complicated subject and the new Intelligence Estimate is a complicated document.
Let me summarize the key judgments and then try and walk you through it and answer your questions.
First, let me summarize the key judgments.
The IC has high confidence -- high confidence -- that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program that it has never acknowledged and continues to deny.
The intelligence community has high confidence that Iran halted its covert nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003.
And they have moderate confidence that it had not restarted that program as of mid-2007.
They judge with high confidence that the halt in other nuclear-related decisions was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure, resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work involving uranium enrichment.
The intelligence community says they do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, but they assess with moderate to high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
And the intelligence community assesses with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult.
Let me see if I can unpack this a bit and put it in context.
First, remember how we got here.
A little background: If a state is looking to become a nuclear-weaponed state, it needs three things.
It needs weapons-grade nuclear material.
It needs the technical know-how to fashion this nuclear material into a weapon.
And it needs a means to deliver the weapon on a target, like a ballistic missile.
The hardest step in today's world is acquiring weapons-grade nuclear material.
Unless you steal it, there are two ways to get it: If you have a nuclear power reactor you can reprocess spent fuel coming out of that reactor, or you can create nuclear material by a process called uranium enrichment.
This process produces fuel for nuclear power reactors, but it can also create weapons-grade nuclear material for a nuclear bomb.
In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and pledged never to seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
That's what Iran undertook to do. It signed what is called a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, under which it was to declare all its nuclear-related activities and open itself up to inspections by the IAEA.
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of a secret uranium enrichment plant in Iran at a place called Natans.
The plant was secret.
It had not been declared, as required, to the IAEA.
Iran at that time had no operational nuclear power reactors, so why did it need a uranium enrichment plant?
Iran was actively developing ballistic missiles.
These facts raised a real concern that this was all part of an effort to develop nuclear weapons.
So the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, backed by the international community, began a vigorous effort to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment activity, and thus reassure the world that it did not intend to develop nuclear weapons.
And the pressure seemed to work.
In October 2003, Iran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA and suspend its uranium enrichment activities.
Considerable further diplomacy involving both the IAEA and what's called the EU-3 -- representatives of Britain, France and Germany -- resulted in what's called the Paris Agreement of November 2004.
In this agreement, Iran reaffirmed and extended the suspension of its enrichment activities.
And the EU-3 agreed to negotiate long-term technology, economic and security arrangements for Iran.
Despite this progress, the intelligence community in May of 2005 assessed with high confidence that Iran currently was determined to develop nuclear weapons.
The intelligence community maintained this assessment throughout this year, 2007.
Indeed, Director of National Intelligence Negroponte told an open session of the House intelligence community on January 1, 2007, that, "our assessment is that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons." DNI McConnell later told a Senate panel in open session on February 27 that, "We assess that Tehran seeks to develop nuclear weapons."
The irony is that one month after the intelligence community released this assessment, in June of 2005, Ahmadinejad wins a runoff election and becomes Iran's President.
On August 1, 2005, just two months after taking power, Ahmadinejad informs the IAEA that he has decided to resume uranium enrichment, and does so beginning in January 2006.
For the next two years, through a whole series of IAEA Board of Governors resolutions urging Iranian compliance, through two U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions, sweetened by negotiating offers by the EU-3 and the promise that the United States would join those negotiations, the international community tried unsuccessfully to get Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and those efforts to get the suspension continue today.
Also during this period, the President directs the intelligence community to enhance its capabilities to gather intelligence on Iran's nuclear programs.
Earlier this year, Congress called for a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.
It is in part delayed in order to process -- the finalization of that NIE is delayed in part in order to process new intelligence, some of which has been received in the last few months.
The National Intelligence Estimate released today reveals that there was a covert nuclear weapons program.
It also reveals that, unknown to us, that program was halted in the fall of 2003.
So the covert nuclear weapons program was unknown to us, suspected, unknown; now confirmed.
But what was also unknown was that the program was halted in the fall of 2003.
That secret -- that covert nuclear weapons program was halted at the same time the Iranians publicly announced that they were suspending their public and declared uranium enrichment program.
So where does that leave us?
One, we have good reason to continue to be concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon, even after this most recent National Intelligence Estimate.
In the words of the NIE, "Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so." For example, Iran's civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing.
And as you know, once a country masters the technology to enrich uranium for use even in a civilian nuclear power program, it could readily use the same technology to produce weapons-grade uranium.
As we have said, weapons-grade uranium is the long pole in the tent for a nuclear weapon.
And Iran continues to develop, test and deploy ballistic missiles -- a very attractive delivery system for a nuclear weapon.
For example, the Iranian Defense Minister publicly acknowledged a medium-range ballistic missile called the Ashura, which could reach much of Eastern Europe.
Finally, we are very unsure of Iran's attentions [sic], even with respect to the covert nuclear weapons program that Iran has halted.
Again, let me quote the National Intelligence Estimate: "We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidentially whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program."
Again from the NIE: "We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran's key national security and foreign policy objectives."
But the NIE gives us reason to believe that our current strategy stands the best chance of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions.
Again, let me quote for a final time from the NIE: "Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003, primarily in response to international pressure, indicates Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach, rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of political, economic and military costs.
This in turn suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige and goals for regional influence in other ways might, if perceived by Iran's leaders as credible, prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify just what such a combination might be."
We have been pursuing this very strategy for over two years, since Iran resumed its nuclear enrichment.
If we are to avoid the grim choice between accepting an Iran on the path to nuclear weapons or considering the use of force, we need to intensify our pressure on Iran, while making clear that if they do suspend enrichment, there is an opportunity for better relations with the international community.
And with that, I'll stop and I'd be pleased to answer your questions.
Q It is troubling that the United States was so wrong about what Iran was doing or what its intentions were?
MR. HADLEY: I don't think we were wrong about what it's doing or what its intentions were.
Our concern was that they were pursuing a nuclear weapon.
We saw the enrichment, which we couldn't really explain; we saw the ballistic missiles.
And it led people to conclude: We are concerned that they were pursuing a nuclear weapons program and might have a covert program to actually weaponize highly-enriched uranium in order to be a nuclear weapon.
And that's what the NIE has now discovered.
The President said some months ago, probably over a year ago, we need to have better intelligence on Iran's nuclear program; we have these suspicions, we have this concern, we need better intelligence to get greater certainty.
The intelligence community increased their efforts, and lo and behold, in the last few months we get credible evidence that gives them a high confidence that they had a covert nuclear weapons program to weaponize weapons grade highly-enriched uranium into a weapon.
Q But in 2005 you thought that they had a nuclear weapons program, whereas you now think they abandoned it, or put it aside in 2003.
MR. HADLEY: We thought they had that program, we did indeed, in 2005.
Q So that's what I meant when I said, wrong.
MR. HADLEY: We have looked at it and we have determined that, indeed, they did have a program, and a covert program, which we had not been able to detect, but we also determined that they had suspended it in -- or halted it -- which is the term of art -- in fall of 2003 in response to international pressure.
That's exactly right.
Q But, Steve, the question is, how did the government get it wrong?
And isn't that troubling that it got so wrong over that two-year span?
MR. HADLEY: I don't think it is so wrong. I think it is right.
If they had been saying in 2005 not to worry, Iran has no nuclear weapons ambitions, then we would have clearly got it wrong, because they did have such a program.
I would say to you, they got it right, in terms of being concerned about Iran seeking a nuclear weapon.
And we continue to be concerned about a nuclear weapon.
Remember, Iran is one of a handful of the hardest intelligence targets going.
They are very good at this business of keeping secrets.
And there's probably no secret that will be more closely kept by Iran than what it's doing on nuclear weapons.
So I think the fact that we have got this additional information is an indication that we are succeeding in learning more about this program.
And I think you have to recognize we're going to continue to dig, continue to learn more, and that's a good thing.
That's --
Q Steve, let me follow on this point.
If we now estimate with high confidence that it was shut down as of 2003, that it was halted, in October of this year, in 2007, the President is speaking about the Iranian threat, in terms of World War III.
Why wouldn't you conclude that this President is hyping the threat?
MR. HADLEY: Because he was describing the threat as the intelligence community itself had been describing the threat both publicly and in their briefings to him.
The President, as I think if you look at the testimony that was given by Don Kerr and Mike Hayden today, they basically said that the intelligence community finally came to the judgments that they came to on this issue Tuesday of last week.
The President was briefed on Wednesday.
So this is challenging information.
The intelligence community had to decide what they thought about it.
They were sufficiently uncertain about it that they delayed the publication of the NIE until they could come to the bottom of it, reach their conclusions, present it to the President, as they did on Wednesday, and then at that point, obviously, we wanted to get it out quickly.
Q They describe the Iranian threat today differently than the President would have even a month ago.
MR. HADLEY: Because our intelligence community has told us effective today that their assessment is somewhat different than it was before.
That's correct.
Q How does this -- how does this not undercut the effort to get an international coalition?
The urgency of doing that -- I would think all the international partners would say, wait a minute, they haven't had a program since 2003, so let's back off a little with the urgency.
MR. HADLEY: I think there is going to be a tendency or a lot of people to say, the problem is less bad than we thought, let's relax.
And I think our view is that would be a mistake.
Why?
Because, as we said, in today's world the critical problem for making a nuclear weapon is getting the weapons-grade nuclear material.
And for Iran, they are trying to get the capability to do that.
Let me put it this way, their path to getting that capability is the enrichment program.
This is the program that they agreed to shut down in 2003, 2004, but restarted in 2005.
It has been championed by Ahmadinejad.
He is now making public announcements that they have 3,000 centrifuges and have mastered that technology.
You don't need to take those assertions to the bank to be concerned that Iran is getting to the point where it will have mastered the ability to enrich uranium.
And having mastered that ability to enrich uranium, they have the -- they will have the capacity to make weapons-grade nuclear uranium.
That is the long pole in the tent, and that's what the international community has been trying, in a pretty united way, for the last three or four years to get the Iranians to suspend.
Q What do you know about the program that you say now you have confirmed the Iranians were conducting, that they suspended in 2003?
What do you know about that program now?
How long had that program been in place?
How effective, how far along before they halted?
MR. HADLEY: Those are good questions.
They are questions that I think Don Kerr and Mike Hayden should address.
Some of this gets into portions of these materials that are still classified.
Let me read you, though, I think as a starting point, a footnote that appears in the declassified key judgments that were put out today.
When you talk about a nuclear weapons program, what the intelligence community says they mean is Iran's nuclear weapon design -- that is to say, an effort to design a nuclear weapon.
And weaponization work -- that is to say, taking weapons-grade uranium and adapting it so that it can be an operational nuclear weapon.
And covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work.
And that suggests that part of the program was a covert uranium enrichment facility.
And why would we worry about that?
Because we would worry about it that in -- paired with an overt, declared uranium enrichment program, the information and know-how gleaned by that -- from that public uranium enrichment program could be passed at some time -- in the past or in the future -- to a covert uranium enrichment program, which could be used to develop and produce nuclear weapons grade material for a nuclear weapon.
Q There had to be more than an inkling before today that this information, this intelligence, that the Iranians had an ongoing nuclear weapons program was incorrect.
So why wasn't -- why then would the President allow it or advise to go ahead with ratcheting up the rhetoric, instead of toning it down, when right now this obviously raises issues of credibility with the American public and with American allies about U.S. intelligence?
MR. HADLEY: Two things.
One, when the President was told that we had some additional information, he was basically told:
stand down; needs to be evaluated; we'll come to you and tell you what we think it means.
So this was basically -- as we said, this is information that came in the last few months, and the intelligence community spent a lot time to get on top of it.
Secondly, I would disagree with you that the President has ratcheted up the rhetoric.
We have said -- he has said, I have said, other administration officials have said many times, look, we want diplomacy to work.
Because, as I said in my statement, we don't want to be in a situation where the only two choices this or a future President has is to accept Iran on a path to a nuclear weapon or to have to contemplate the use of nuclear force -- sorry, use of military force.
Because that in the context of today's Middle East is a big move.
And so the President, in that statement -- as he said before and as he explained afterwards -- was trying to give a wake-up call to the international community that we needed to step up the diplomacy and step up the pressure to get Iran to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program.
And that still is the case today, because that is the path to weapons-grade material which would give Iran the option in the future to produce a nuclear weapon.
Q The President -- you said the President was told to stand down on that --
MR. HADLEY: No, I said just the opposite.
I said the President was told, we have some information, we have some new information not to stand down -- said, we have some new information;
give us some time to analyze it, and we will come to you and tell you what we think it means.
Q Was he told that before or after --
MR. HADLEY: And that's what he was told, and they -- as was briefed by the intelligence community today, they came to their final judgments on Tuesday of last week, and they told the President of the United States on Wednesday.
Q But was he given that advice before or after the World War III comment?
MR. HADLEY: I'll have to -- I'll have to look.
Q Which was on October 20th.
MR. HADLEY: From my mind, it doesn't make any difference, because the World War III comment you characterize as stepping up the rhetoric.
I would say it was making a point that the President and we have been making for two or three years, that the international community has to exert more pressure because Iran needs to suspend its enrichment program.
That was the position of our policy before the National Intelligence Estimate, and for the reasons I said.
That continues to be our policy after this latest National Intelligence Estimate.
Q Steve, just to clarify.
MR. HADLEY: Sure.
Q Is it fair to say that the intelligence came in, in recent weeks, not recent months?
Because this -- as was pointed out, the press briefing was late October when the President was asked definitively, do you believe Iran wants to build a nuclear bomb?
And that's where you get, in the second part of that answer, the World War III comment.
MR. HADLEY: Correct.
Q So was it recent weeks that this intelligence came in?
MR. HADLEY: What the intelligence community has said is in the last few months.
And again I would say, if they were working on this information before that quote in October, again, in terms of the point the President was making, he would have made that comment before we got -- the intelligence community got this information.
He would have made that, I believe, that comment after.
I just made it in this statement, which is, the international community has to understand that if we want to avoid a situation where we either have to accept Iran on the road to a nuclear weapon, with a path to a nuclear weapon, or the possibility of having to use force to stop it, with all the connotations of World War III, then we need to step up the diplomacy, step up the pressure to get Iran to stop their civilian -- so-called civilian uranium enrichment program.
That was our policy before his October comment, that was the policy between October -- his October comment and today, and that's our policy going forward;
no change.
Q Steve, you just said you would describe it quite different.
Just a minute ago --
MR. HADLEY: I think that's right.
And we would describe it --
Q Are you being consistent?
I don't think you're being consistent.
MR. HADLEY: I am being consistent, because what we can say now is, that they actually had -- which we did not know at the time of 2005 -- they actually had a covert weapons program, which means we were right to be concerned;
it was probably worse than we thought.
We would also say now, but that program, that covert nuclear weapon program has been suspended.
And therefore it is important for our policy to continue to put diplomatic pressure on Iran so that the suspension -- the halting, excuse me -- the halting of their covert nuclear weapons program continues and that they suspend their uranium enrichment program.
Because if you can do both of those things, maintain the halting of the nuclear weapons program and obtain the suspension of the uranium enrichment program, you've got some real assurance that Iran is not going to be on the path towards a nuclear weapon -- assuming they don't steal the weapon, they don't get weapons-grade nuclear material from some other source.
And it still leaves the worrisome fact that they're working and developing ballistic missiles.
But it is a -- so I would describe our posture differently.
I would describe our assessment -- the intelligence community would describe the assessment in a different way.
But in terms of our policy, it continues to be one.
And I would say it both underscores the urgency of the policy, and also gives us some confidence that it actually can work, but only if we pick up the pace.
Yes, ma'am.
Q Given the halting, as you described it, does this strengthen the position of Russia and China on sanctions, specifically?
MR. HADLEY: Well, we hope not, because as I said, the problem presented by the continuing uranium enrichment program continues, because that is the long pole for a country like Iran on the way towards having a path towards a nuclear weapon.
That's something that Russia has said clearly they don't want Iran to do;
that's something we think, less clearly, China has said the same thing.
So again, as the President says many times, we're asking people to do hard things.
We're asking people to put pressure on Iran, and it has consequences for their diplomacy, it has consequences for their companies doing business with Iran.
People don't like to do that.
So I'm sure some people will try and use this as an excuse or a pretext for flagging on the effort.
Our argument is, actually, it should be just the reverse, because we need to keep the halting of the nuclear weapons program in place;
we need to achieve the suspension of the enrichment program;
and the only way -- what this NIE says is that the best path to do that is to continue what we've been doing, which is diplomatic isolation, U.N. sanctions and other financial pressure, plus the option for negotiations.
Q Second question.
When did the Vice President get briefed on this?
Because he was warning of serious consequences just last month, too.
MR. HADLEY: I've just got a note from him -- I did it once, I'll do it again.
In terms of stand down, they did not tell the President to stand down and stop talking about Iran's nuclear program;
they told him just the opposite:
Mr. President, we have new information.
Or let me put it this way, not just the opposite, let me be precise.
He was not told to stop talking about Iran's nuclear weapons program.
He was not told to change what he says about it.
What he was told was, we have new information;
it is interesting;
it is going to take us some time to understand it, to assess it, to know what it means, and to know how credible it is, and we will come back to you when that process is done. And they did.
And they came back to him Wednesday, and the results of their work is included in this estimate. Is that okay? (Laughter.)
I'm sorry, you asked a question and I didn't answer. Could you restate it, please?
Q When was the Vice President briefed on this?
You mentioned when the President was, what about the Vice President?
MR. HADLEY: He, of course, can answer that for himself.
I will say that the week before the Tuesday/Wednesday, there was a meeting that was held with the principals -- including the Vice President, myself and others -- to get a preliminary look at this information, to get some sense of it, and to give us an opportunity to test it and ask questions about it, and probe it a little bit, as part -- and we thought, one, so we would understand it, and two, as part of the process for the intelligence community, you know, coming to its conclusion about what this all meant.
And those were the conclusions that they reached on Tuesday, and which were briefed to the President on Wednesday of last week. Peter.
Q Steve, when was the first time the President was given the inkling of something?
I'm not clear on this.
Was this months ago, when the first information started to become available to intelligence agencies?
MR. HADLEY: You ought to go back to the intelligence community.
We will get you an answer on that.
There's two questions: one, when did they first get the information?
-- you ought to ask that to them -- two, when was the President notified that there was new information available?
We'll try and get you a precise answer.
As I say, it was, in my recollection, is in the last few months.
Whether that is October -- August, September, we'll try and get you an answer to that.
Q What about the -- I mean, in your view, for a lot of people will sound like echoes of Iraq, what we thought they -- we talked about what programs we thought they had -- in fact they suspended it or stopped it and so forth.
I mean, how does this affect the credibility of everything you want to say about this or any other threat that might be out there in the world today?
MR. HADLEY: Well, I think all we can do is try and -- and I think all the intelligence community can do -- is try and get the best information they can, to try and be straight with the Congress and the President about how they assess that information, with what level of confidence, and to continue to get additional information.
And when they get that additional information, if it changes their assessment, to come out and so inform people.
You know, these are not puzzles that once you solve them, you have solved them for all times.
These are challenges that are ongoing against very hard targets that lie, that try and prevent things from becoming public, and that try and mislead.
And it is a very difficult intelligence channel.
So I think the answer is, in some sense, you know, welcome to the real world.
And so the challenge for the intelligence community is to say, in all of this work -- and it's very challenging -- what they know, what they assess, what's the confidence of their assessment, and what they don't know.
And that's what the intelligence community tries to do, and I think in some sense the unclassified key judgments -- if you read them with care -- show very clearly that that's what they're trying to do. And I will tell you, I'm sure we are going to -- I hope we are going to learn more, and that's probably going to change what we know and probably change our assessments, probably change our confidence level, because this is going to be something that this administration and future administrations are working with for a long time.
Q Just to turn your premise around a little bit, you said that you should keep the pressure up on the international -- with the international community.
But doesn't the fact that Iran halted its program, even if it was covert, suggest that perhaps there is room for a negotiated settlement that would keep nuclear weapons out of the government --
MR. HADLEY: Yes, I said two things.
I said we need to keep the pressure up, but also make clear there is a path for negotiation that will assess Iranian concerns.
Our job is to keep up the pressure, but also to offer this negotiating path.
But in the end of the day, the Iranians have to signal that they're willing to accept a negotiation path.
And as you know, there have been now almost three years of off-and-on meetings -- two years probably -- off-and-on meetings between an Iranian negotiator -- for the longest time that was Larijani -- and with the EU-3, in terms of Javier Solana;
that various offers have been put down for the EU-3 about how to address Iran's security, economic and diplomatic concerns;
a path where Iran could reliably know that it could have a purely civil nuclear power program.
There have been several offers of that sort.
So the combination that the intelligence community says is most likely to work is pressure, plus a negotiating option.
That continues to be the case to this day.
But at some point, Iran has to indicate a willingness to sit down and negotiate.
And that's what we have not yet seen.
Thank you very much.
END 4:14 P.M. EST
以下12月4日の国務省ブリーフィングにおける質疑応答抜粋
Daily Press Briefing
Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC December 4, 2007
QUESTION: And given all the outreach, both on the part of the President and the Secretary and Under Secretary Burns, does that reflect a fear that the NIE might undercut your diplomatic effort to persuade Iran to abandon what you regard as its pursuit of nuclear weapons?
MR. CASEY: Well, I think the NIE is a significant document and it is the latest and best assessment, a snapshot, if you will, of our intelligence community's understanding of Iran's nuclear program and of the nature of it.
So clearly, it's something that is of interest and of significance to our partners as we all try and move forward with efforts to try and get the Iranians to change their behavior and to come to the negotiating table with us.
So I think it is certainly reflective of our desire to make sure that our best understanding is an understanding that we explain and share with our friends and allies, since it concerns them and concerns their interest as much as it concerns ours.
I will say, too, that I think, as the President said, this does, in many ways, serve as a reminder or a continued warning to the international community.
Saying that Iran, for many years too -- as certainly as the intelligence community can determine -- has pursued a nuclear weapons program, even though it may have been in suspension for the last several years, shouldn't be a great comfort for anybody;
having someone standing around with a book of matches and some tinder there, but just not actually going ahead and trying to light it shouldn't be a lot of comfort for people.
So I think it is important that we took this opportunity to explain to our friends in the international community exactly what our understanding of their program was.
And I do think when you look at what is required to have a nuclear weapon, we still see Iran progressing on what has been described by various people as the long pole in the tent, which is producing through uranium enrichment enough fissile material to be able to turn that into a weapon.
And certainly the fact that they have suspended their weaponization program does not in any way indicate that they have made some sort of definitive decision to forego a nuclear weapon.
In fact, I think the language in the NIE makes clear that that's not a determination we've made.
And the NIE also makes clear that this is a program that they could restart at any time.
So even though it's a positive thing, the international pressure, we believe, has caused them to suspend the weaponization program;
the fact that they are continuing to pursue, in defiance of UN resolutions and the will of the international community, the most important and often most difficult component of producing a nuclear weapon -- again, getting enough highly enriched uranium to be able to turn into a nuclear device, I don't think should provide people with comfort.
And again, I think the NIE in its conclusions bears out the logic of our diplomatic strategy, and we certainly hope that our friends in the international community, including the members of the P-5+1, will continue to see the advantage and the benefit of continuing to keep this pressure on Iran so that we can, in fact, keep them both from returning to a weaponization program as well as making sure that we prevent them from obtaining the major piece of know-how required to ultimately produce such a weapon.
QUESTION: And I can't speak about everybody else. (Laughter.)
But look, surely, the U.S. intelligence community's judgment that they ceased work on the actual weaponization in 2003 should provide some kind of a view on the part of the U.S. Government that perhaps this problem is not as acute or as imminent as you had previously thought.
MR. CASEY: Well, I think that when you look at, whether it's this NIE or any other judgments of the intelligence community, they're a snapshot.
And they're a snapshot based on everybody's best understanding of the information that's available.
And people in the community as well as Steve Hadley spoke yesterday about the fact that there's constant information coming in and that this information -- some of the information involved in these latest judgments is relatively new.
But I don't think it decreases our sense of urgency about the need to respond in an appropriate way to Iran's nuclear program and about our desire to see Iran take up the opportunity provided to engage in negotiations with us.
Again, it doesn't, I don't think, provide people with any great comfort to know that Iran, in fact, has had a clandestine nuclear weapons program and that while in suspension it certainly hasn't been dismantled, disabled, to use a phrase from another nuclear issue we've talked about, and that Iran certainly has not made any admission that it even had this program or has this program in the first place.
So there are still a tremendous number of questions out there, and I think one thing the NIE affirms is that this is a serious question and a serious problem.
Estimates will always vary between exactly when this concern would turn into an actual nuclear weapon on the part of Iran, but I think from our perspective it only reinforces our desire to take action on this now and to work in concert with the international community, because no one wants to see Iran get to the point where it is capable of building a nuclear weapon.
こうしてみると現実の脅威を否定はしていない点が、昨日あたりにしきりに国内で流布された共同電の記述とは多少異なる印象ではあるんだが、いずれにしてもブッシュ政権はイラクでもインチキ情報で国際社会を引っ張ったわけでさ、これでも日米安保強化と言うのかね、媚米似而非保守は？
■2007/12/04 (火) 国会議員に世界情勢の試験を科すべしって、どう？
その点が自称でなれるうん国際ジャーナリストや僭称出来るノンフィクション作家とは重みが違うと思うぞｗ
そしてさ、国会議員なんちゅうのは国を代表はしてないんだよ、これ以上知ったぶった駄法螺並べて無知をさらけ出すなってば。（大爆
でなに？「とりわけ外国に関することになると、幼稚を通り越して無知というしかない。」ですとな？
そりゃ益々あんたにに言えるセリフじゃなかろ？
だってあんたってば居住国のドイツのことすら知らんじゃないかよ、「ドイツから見て」とか言う割には引用するソースはすべて日本語記事だしぃ～、勝手にでっち上げた妄想書き散らかすしぃ～。（大爆
「国際情勢＝時事に関するテスト」ちゅうのも噴飯でさぁ、他人のことよりあんた自身が無知ぢゃん、そしてなにより母国語・日本語ですらがデタラメだ。
母国語が満足に習得出来ていないような人間が多国語習得出来るわけない、これ語学の常識なわけで、定めしドイツでは言語的に苦労してるんだろうな。
あんたに必要なのは「国際情勢＝時事に関するテスト」なんかよりもっと基礎的な「漢字の書き取り」とか「四文字熟語」とか「ことわざ」とか「てにをは」のテストだぞ。
で最後は「イラクのある場所さえ知らずにイラクを論じていたという笑い話」か？
まあそりゃあり得るだろう、イギリスやフランスやドイツには日本の場所を知らん議員もいるわけだからな。
でもこれも「人権擁護法」の中身も知らずに賛成し、いつの間にかこれまた中身を知らないままに反対に転じたり、山崎拓を国士だなんだと持ち上げまくったうん国際ジャーナリストどのよりゃましだろ？
ところで婆さん！！モスラってのはイラクのどこにあるんだ？
このモスラは２ちゃんねるで嗤いの種になっているんだが、この2003年03月24日の更新の嗤い所はそればかりじゃないな。
■2003/03/24 (月) 米国･クルト族･トルコの同床異夢でオイル合戦
げらげらげら！！！
トルコがクルディスタンに越境攻撃をしようとし、しているのは油田がどうこうじゃないだろが？（大爆
あんたほんとに昔っからデタラメばっか書き散らかしてるんだな！？
最近も越境攻撃はやってるんだが、そりゃイラク国内のクルディスタンにいるクルド労働者党（ＰＫＫ）のゲリラがトルコに越境攻撃繰り返すからだべ？
馬鹿じゃね？
でもう一個質問なんだがクルト族ってなに？
日本へ帰国すると、時間があれば、部屋のベットに寝転んで、NHKの国会討論番組を見ている。確かに日本の国会議員に限らず資質の低い奴はいるだろうが、少なくとも自由主義体制の国の国会議員は選挙によって選ばれて席を得るんだよ。
その感想は、よくこれで国会議員やってられるなというもの。
質問が幼稚で、要領を得ない。
とりわけ外国に関することになると、幼稚を通り越して無知というしかない。
以前から思っていることだが、国を代表する国会議員さんに少なくとも基礎的な知識を養ってもらうために、国際情勢＝時事に関するテストを行ってはいかが。
そういえばいつだったかテレビ出演の某議員がイラクのある場所さえ知らずにイラクを論じていたという笑い話を聞いたことがある。
その点が自称でなれるうん国際ジャーナリストや僭称出来るノンフィクション作家とは重みが違うと思うぞｗ
そしてさ、国会議員なんちゅうのは国を代表はしてないんだよ、これ以上知ったぶった駄法螺並べて無知をさらけ出すなってば。（大爆
でなに？「とりわけ外国に関することになると、幼稚を通り越して無知というしかない。」ですとな？
そりゃ益々あんたにに言えるセリフじゃなかろ？
だってあんたってば居住国のドイツのことすら知らんじゃないかよ、「ドイツから見て」とか言う割には引用するソースはすべて日本語記事だしぃ～、勝手にでっち上げた妄想書き散らかすしぃ～。（大爆
「国際情勢＝時事に関するテスト」ちゅうのも噴飯でさぁ、他人のことよりあんた自身が無知ぢゃん、そしてなにより母国語・日本語ですらがデタラメだ。
母国語が満足に習得出来ていないような人間が多国語習得出来るわけない、これ語学の常識なわけで、定めしドイツでは言語的に苦労してるんだろうな。
あんたに必要なのは「国際情勢＝時事に関するテスト」なんかよりもっと基礎的な「漢字の書き取り」とか「四文字熟語」とか「ことわざ」とか「てにをは」のテストだぞ。
で最後は「イラクのある場所さえ知らずにイラクを論じていたという笑い話」か？
まあそりゃあり得るだろう、イギリスやフランスやドイツには日本の場所を知らん議員もいるわけだからな。
でもこれも「人権擁護法」の中身も知らずに賛成し、いつの間にかこれまた中身を知らないままに反対に転じたり、山崎拓を国士だなんだと持ち上げまくったうん国際ジャーナリストどのよりゃましだろ？
ところで婆さん！！モスラってのはイラクのどこにあるんだ？
このモスラは２ちゃんねるで嗤いの種になっているんだが、この2003年03月24日の更新の嗤い所はそればかりじゃないな。
■2003/03/24 (月) 米国･クルト族･トルコの同床異夢でオイル合戦
それからなぜトルコ軍が米国のいうことをきかずにイラク北部のクルト族に住む領域に進撃しようとしているかって？
あそこにはモスラという油田があって，そこを狙っているらしい。
もちろんクルト族は警戒して米国のお尻を叩いて，トルコ進撃を食い止めようとしている。
そう、あそこも火だねとなりそう。
米国･クルト族･トルコが同床異夢で、オイルを狙っているんだもの。
げらげらげら！！！
トルコがクルディスタンに越境攻撃をしようとし、しているのは油田がどうこうじゃないだろが？（大爆
あんたほんとに昔っからデタラメばっか書き散らかしてるんだな！？
最近も越境攻撃はやってるんだが、そりゃイラク国内のクルディスタンにいるクルド労働者党（ＰＫＫ）のゲリラがトルコに越境攻撃繰り返すからだべ？
馬鹿じゃね？
でもう一個質問なんだがクルト族ってなに？
ネオコンが完全に敗北したのかなんなのか、そこは解らんけどさ、ぶっさいくな話だこと。
それにしてもアメリカちゅうのは詐欺師だなｗ
Iran's nuclear ambitions on hold, U.S. agencies conclude
U.S. Finds Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003
A Blow to Bush's Tehran Policy
US spies give shock verdict on Iran threat
Iran welcomes US nuclear report
Iran-Dossier rückt Bushs Kriegsrhetorik ins Zwielicht
Iran welcomes new US intelligence report
それにしてもアメリカちゅうのは詐欺師だなｗ
Iran's nuclear ambitions on hold, U.S. agencies conclude
U.S. Finds Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003
A Blow to Bush's Tehran Policy
US spies give shock verdict on Iran threat
Iran welcomes US nuclear report
Iran-Dossier rückt Bushs Kriegsrhetorik ins Zwielicht
Iran welcomes new US intelligence report
まあ見たいちゅう人もいるから止めろとは言わんがさ
槇原敬之
はもう時効成立か？
槇原敬之
はもう時効成立か？
ったってアメリカの話だけど、ワシントン州のレントンのマックが燃えたっと。
それにしても大雪が降ったりなんだりと忙しいな。
それにしても大雪が降ったりなんだりと忙しいな。
産経新聞の正論に久々に阿川さんが登場して【正論】日米同盟 慶応大学教授・阿川尚之 「一極主義」は日本こそ問題だを書いている。
まあ現象的にはこの人の書いている通りなんだけどさ、しかし不思議なのは
そして結局
こういうことを言ってるわけだよな。
フリーハンドを持てない最大の障害は日本国憲法であり、日米安保条約なわけなんだが媚米保守はそういうところには言及しない。
僕は日米安保を破棄しようなんてことを言う気はないが、少なくとも独自の軍事力がある程度の牽制力となりうる仕組みにしなけりゃ、結局阿川さんの言うように「誰も日本を守ってくれない」って現実にそう遠くない将来直面することになると思うぞ。
その為にはまず憲法を改正し、不平等条約、こりゃどっちにとってもそうなんだが、の日米安保条約を改定してフリーハンドを得るちゅうことじゃないの？
でその補完が同盟じゃないの？
そうすりゃ防衛省にももう少し緊張感は出てくんじゃね？
だいたい
でありながら
それにしても産経新聞の日米同盟キャンペーンちゅうのはとどまるところを知らずだな。
参考資料
日米地位協定（略称）
関連過去記事
テロ特失効の影響？：アホの産経新聞は分かり易すぎだぞｗ
まあ現象的にはこの人の書いている通りなんだけどさ、しかし不思議なのは
アメリカは時々ひどくわがままだが、日本もしばしば自らの立場をかたくなに譲らない。ただ両国の一極主義には、一つ違いがある。それは、アメリカは一極主義でも何とかやっていけるが、日本はまったく不可能だという単純な事実である。と書く割にはその淵源に遡って「なんでそういう状況がある」ということに関する言及はないし、それを打破するためにはなにをすべきかという言及もない。
そして結局
だからこそ戦後、アメリカと同盟を組んで自国の安全を守ると決めた。中国が軍事大国化し、日本の人口が減少しはじめた今、東アジアで生き延びるためには、アメリカとの同盟維持・強化が必須である。無論近隣諸国との友好は大事だが、彼らは日本を守ってくれない。国連も同じだ。媚米保守が等しく落とす結論に落とし込んでいるんだが、要するに、こういう人はなんだかんだ言いながらもフリーハンドは持つな、アメリカの属国でいろ。
こういうことを言ってるわけだよな。
フリーハンドを持てない最大の障害は日本国憲法であり、日米安保条約なわけなんだが媚米保守はそういうところには言及しない。
僕は日米安保を破棄しようなんてことを言う気はないが、少なくとも独自の軍事力がある程度の牽制力となりうる仕組みにしなけりゃ、結局阿川さんの言うように「誰も日本を守ってくれない」って現実にそう遠くない将来直面することになると思うぞ。
その為にはまず憲法を改正し、不平等条約、こりゃどっちにとってもそうなんだが、の日米安保条約を改定してフリーハンドを得るちゅうことじゃないの？
でその補完が同盟じゃないの？
そうすりゃ防衛省にももう少し緊張感は出てくんじゃね？
だいたい
第四条（臨時協議）なんちゅう条約がどこまであてになるかちゅうことなんだけど、とりあえずアメリカの同盟国同士の紛争には無力だちゅうことだろ？
締約国は、この条約の実施に関して随時協議し、また、日本国の安全又は極東における国際の平和及び安全に対する脅威が生じたときはいつでも、いずれか一方の締約国の要請により協議する。
第五条（共同防衛）
１
各締約国は、日本国の施政の下にある領域における、いずれか一方に対する武力攻撃が、自国の平和及び安全を危うくするものであることを認め、自国の憲法上の規定及び手続に従つて共通の危険に対処するように行動することを宣言する。
でありながら
第二条（経済的協力の促進）こういうワケワカメな経済植民地化条項も含まれてんだな。
締約国は、その自由な諸制度を強化することにより、これらの制度の基礎をなす原則の理解を促進することにより、並びに安定及び福祉の条件を助長することによつて、平和的かつ友好的な国際関係の一層の発展に貢献する。締約国は、その国際経済政策におけるくい違いを除くことに努め、また、両国の間の経済的協力を促進する。
それにしても産経新聞の日米同盟キャンペーンちゅうのはとどまるところを知らずだな。
参考資料
日米地位協定（略称）
関連過去記事
テロ特失効の影響？：アホの産経新聞は分かり易すぎだぞｗ
きょうも暇ｗ
でいま気づいたんだけどさ、なにこれ？
■2007/12/03 (月) 国連常任理事国＋ドイツ、日本は仲間はずれ
で先の訪米でメルケルは、イランに対する制裁強化に協力する言質をとられた挙げ句に環境問題では聞こえないふりをされた、これで媚米だちゅう批判を連立内から受けてるわけぢゃん。
たとえばだぜ、婆さんの理屈に従うと、北朝鮮の核協議に独仏英が入ってないことはどういう評価になるわけ？（大爆
でいま気づいたんだけどさ、なにこれ？
■2007/12/03 (月) 国連常任理事国＋ドイツ、日本は仲間はずれ
イラン追加制裁へ５常任理と独、決議草案作成で合意ドイツってのはさ、EU三大国の一角だし先進国中イランともっとも経済的結びつきが強い国なんだよ、核疑惑発覚前からいまに至ってもね。
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/news/20071202i115.htm?from=main1
上記のニュースでも明らかなように、いつの間にか日本は世界の大国から仲間はずれにされてしまいましたね。
常任理事国入り不可能でも、真の実力さえあれば、世界の大国は 実力に準じた待遇をしてくれるものです。
ところが日本ときたら・・・
で先の訪米でメルケルは、イランに対する制裁強化に協力する言質をとられた挙げ句に環境問題では聞こえないふりをされた、これで媚米だちゅう批判を連立内から受けてるわけぢゃん。
たとえばだぜ、婆さんの理屈に従うと、北朝鮮の核協議に独仏英が入ってないことはどういう評価になるわけ？（大爆
ぶっはっは。
暇な時にいじってるだけだから。
まああれも、おとなしく家業のFrankfurter Klebstoff Fabrikで「糊屋のばばあ」やってりゃそこそこ八っあん熊さんに愛されるんだろうが、なまじ背伸びするから恥をさらす。
御執心の出羽の守は歴史修正主義者なんだろうけどってことだけどさ、ご執心といわれるのは少々心外だな。
暇な時にいじってるだけだから。
まああれも、おとなしく家業のFrankfurter Klebstoff Fabrikで「糊屋のばばあ」やってりゃそこそこ八っあん熊さんに愛されるんだろうが、なまじ背伸びするから恥をさらす。
都鳥といえばまず思い浮かぶのが在原業平の
いつも通ってる場所なんだが、外堀通りと白山通りが交差する水道橋駅の脇なんだな。
まあそりゃ神田川があるといえばあるんだが、けど今まで一度も気づかなかった、そしてこんな所の街灯の上とか信号の上にわんさかとまってんだよ。
名にし負はばいざ言問はむ都鳥で、東京ではさして珍しいとも思わない鳥なんだが、今日とんでもないところにいるのを知った。
わが思ふ人はありやなしやと
いつも通ってる場所なんだが、外堀通りと白山通りが交差する水道橋駅の脇なんだな。
まあそりゃ神田川があるといえばあるんだが、けど今まで一度も気づかなかった、そしてこんな所の街灯の上とか信号の上にわんさかとまってんだよ。
バシル大統領の特赦特権で特赦になるようだ、ちゅうかもうなったろ？
昨日の段階でイギリスのイスラム教徒の上院議員二人がスーダンに飛んだって話は報じられたたんだけれども、スーダン世論の反発が凄そうだったんで、果たして上手くゆくもんかいな？
こんな感じで見守ってたんだけど、AFPの2007/12/03の8:27発では、バシルの顧問の談話として
以下はGUARDIANの伝える話で、コメントとったのはREUTERSのようだけど
参照記事
British parliamentarians in Sudan
Sudan pardons British teacher, to be freed in hour: presidential advisor
Teddy teacher pardoned in Sudan
Teddy row teacher to be released
Sudan to free teddy row teacher
昨日の段階でイギリスのイスラム教徒の上院議員二人がスーダンに飛んだって話は報じられたたんだけれども、スーダン世論の反発が凄そうだったんで、果たして上手くゆくもんかいな？
こんな感じで見守ってたんだけど、AFPの2007/12/03の8:27発では、バシルの顧問の談話として
Sudanese President Omar al-Beshir on Monday pardoned a British woman teacher jailed for 15 days for insulting religion and she will be released in an hour, a presidential advisor told AFP.っと書かれているんで日本時間の17時頃には釈放されてんだろうな。
以下はGUARDIANの伝える話で、コメントとったのはREUTERSのようだけど
Asked whether Gibbons had been pardoned, a presidential adviser told Reuters: "Definitely, yes."
参照記事
British parliamentarians in Sudan
Sudan pardons British teacher, to be freed in hour: presidential advisor
Teddy teacher pardoned in Sudan
Teddy row teacher to be released
Sudan to free teddy row teacher
僕はこの記事タイトルだけ読んだ段階では、女性下着を100回穿いてから捨てた変態親ぢの話だと思ったんだが、どうもそうではなく、女性下着を穿き、それを100回くらい捨てた変態親ぢの話だった。
産経新聞さん、日本語は正しく使ってよね。
でこのおっさん、といっても僕よりゃ若いんだが、女性下着を穿くなとは言わんし興奮するだろうこともなんとか想像出来る。
しかしだな、そういうことをするのは密室限定にしておきたまえよ。
しかし一番笑ったのは適用された罪状なんだが、
パンティー捨てて廃棄物処理法違反かよ！？
女性用下着１００回はいて捨て…廃棄物法違反で男逮捕
産経新聞さん、日本語は正しく使ってよね。
でこのおっさん、といっても僕よりゃ若いんだが、女性下着を穿くなとは言わんし興奮するだろうこともなんとか想像出来る。
しかしだな、そういうことをするのは密室限定にしておきたまえよ。
しかし一番笑ったのは適用された罪状なんだが、
パンティー捨てて廃棄物処理法違反かよ！？
女性用下着１００回はいて捨て…廃棄物法違反で男逮捕
同署によると、茨木市や箕面市のニュータウンで昨年６月以降、女性用下着が民家の庭の植木にひっかけられたり、自転車などにくくりつけられる被害が１００件以上確認された。
これは映画「The man who knew too much」を見た人間にしかわからないことかも知れないけど、同じ映画の中に二つあるDoris DayがQue Sera Seraを歌うシーンのうちの後を推奨したかちゅうことなんだな。
映画を全編見てなければ、僕が推奨したシーンはただDorisが「Que Sera Sera！！」っと叫んでいるようにしか見えないし、実際叫んでる。
しかしなぜ叫んだかには意味があって、僕が推奨しなかったシーンってのはその布石のシーンなんだな。
僕が推奨したシーンは母と誘拐された息子が呼び合うシーン、お互いが「たすけに来たよ！！」「僕はここにいるよ！！」っと知らせ合うシーンなんだな。
あのシーンでかすかに聞こえる口笛、これは母、つまりDorisがピアノで弾き語るQue Sera Seraのメロディーを追って息子が吹いている口笛で、この映画には幾つか見せ場があるんだけど、その最大の見せ場でのQue Sera Seraなんだな。
さて、なんでだかわけわからんけどDoris DayはB.B. kingと共にThe Beatlesの「Dig it!!」の中に登場する。
映画を全編見てなければ、僕が推奨したシーンはただDorisが「Que Sera Sera！！」っと叫んでいるようにしか見えないし、実際叫んでる。
しかしなぜ叫んだかには意味があって、僕が推奨しなかったシーンってのはその布石のシーンなんだな。
僕が推奨したシーンは母と誘拐された息子が呼び合うシーン、お互いが「たすけに来たよ！！」「僕はここにいるよ！！」っと知らせ合うシーンなんだな。
あのシーンでかすかに聞こえる口笛、これは母、つまりDorisがピアノで弾き語るQue Sera Seraのメロディーを追って息子が吹いている口笛で、この映画には幾つか見せ場があるんだけど、その最大の見せ場でのQue Sera Seraなんだな。
さて、なんでだかわけわからんけどDoris DayはB.B. kingと共にThe Beatlesの「Dig it!!」の中に登場する。
このところしきりに媚米似而非保守のフロントランナー産経新聞は監視の網の目は…情報収集にも影響 補給活動中断１カ月に象徴されるような「テロ特キャンペーン」を張ってるんだけどさ
でリキ入れて重箱の隅まで探った結果ようやく探し当てたのが
ブッシュは10月に「日本が給油活動を停止したらばムシャラフ政権が大打撃を受ける。」なんちゅうわけわからんことを言い、結果ムシャラフはピンチなんだが、そりゃ日本のせいじゃなくてよ、アメリカがアホな背面介入やって騒ぎを拡大したんぢゃんかｗ
そしてイギリス海軍御用達の舶用燃料でイギリスの艦船は動いてるわけでさ、それで動かなくなりそうなのは動かなくなりそうなパキスタン艦船が悪いんだし、パキスタンの護衛艦や警備艇がポンコツなのは日本のせいぢゃなくってパキスタンの安全保障上の正面がどっちにあるかちゅう問題でしかないだろ？ｗ
昨日やり玉に挙げた正論執筆者にしても大うそとデタラメ満載だし、時々軍事評論ちゃらなんちゃら書く野口某もいい加減なことばっか書くけどこりゃ産経の体質か？
ちゅうか、なんでこんなことまでして世論誘導したいわけ？ｗｗｗｗ
他の国ではテロ特失効なんてそんなにニュースになって無くてさ、ダメ晋三が腹イタ辞任した時の理由の一つに数え上げられた、福田さんが総理になった時に懸念材料に数え上げられた、守屋の疑惑が報じられる時にほんのおまけとして取り上げられる、この程度でさ、寧ろ世界的な潮流としてはアメリカの「おれ様正義」に嫌気がさしてる国がますます増えてる、こういうことだと思うぞ。
ちなみに「US says it has right to kidnap British citizens」はヨーロッパにおけるアメリカの最友好国（であった）イギリスはSunday Timesの12月2日付の記事でイラクやアフガンとは直接関係ないんだが、アメリカに対する感情のうつろいはよく表していると思うぞ。
あぁ訳文つけるのは面倒くさいからかってに訳してくれろ。
日本が「テロとの戦い」から離脱したことによる空白の影響はあったのか。海自部隊の撤収で日本は何を失ったかを探った。探らなくったってそんなもん大してあるわけねぇぢゃんｗ
でリキ入れて重箱の隅まで探った結果ようやく探し当てたのが
海自の撤収直後、パキスタン艦が英補給艦からの艦船用軽油の受け取りを拒否するトラブルがあった。ちゅうんぢゃ笑い話だ罠。
海自は提供する燃料を複数のフィルターでこしたうえで相手艦に提供してきた。老朽艦にとって、燃料に含まれる不純物はエンジンの不具合を起こしかねず、パキスタン側は神経をとがらせる。英補給艦の燃料のサンプルをみて、給油は受けられないと判断したパキスタン艦は母港に引き返した。
ブッシュは10月に「日本が給油活動を停止したらばムシャラフ政権が大打撃を受ける。」なんちゅうわけわからんことを言い、結果ムシャラフはピンチなんだが、そりゃ日本のせいじゃなくてよ、アメリカがアホな背面介入やって騒ぎを拡大したんぢゃんかｗ
そしてイギリス海軍御用達の舶用燃料でイギリスの艦船は動いてるわけでさ、それで動かなくなりそうなのは動かなくなりそうなパキスタン艦船が悪いんだし、パキスタンの護衛艦や警備艇がポンコツなのは日本のせいぢゃなくってパキスタンの安全保障上の正面がどっちにあるかちゅう問題でしかないだろ？ｗ
昨日やり玉に挙げた正論執筆者にしても大うそとデタラメ満載だし、時々軍事評論ちゃらなんちゃら書く野口某もいい加減なことばっか書くけどこりゃ産経の体質か？
ちゅうか、なんでこんなことまでして世論誘導したいわけ？ｗｗｗｗ
他の国ではテロ特失効なんてそんなにニュースになって無くてさ、ダメ晋三が腹イタ辞任した時の理由の一つに数え上げられた、福田さんが総理になった時に懸念材料に数え上げられた、守屋の疑惑が報じられる時にほんのおまけとして取り上げられる、この程度でさ、寧ろ世界的な潮流としてはアメリカの「おれ様正義」に嫌気がさしてる国がますます増えてる、こういうことだと思うぞ。
ちなみに「US says it has right to kidnap British citizens」はヨーロッパにおけるアメリカの最友好国（であった）イギリスはSunday Timesの12月2日付の記事でイラクやアフガンとは直接関係ないんだが、アメリカに対する感情のうつろいはよく表していると思うぞ。
あぁ訳文つけるのは面倒くさいからかってに訳してくれろ。
アメリカがテロ支援国家指定を外すハードルを高くした、これのソースはWashington Timesらしいですが、公式にはアメリカは否定してます。
そして同様にソースは聯合通信だそうですが、ウラン濃縮計画の存在の確かな証拠に関する発言をヒルがやったちゅうんだが、これも公式には肯定されていない。
なぜ熱湯浴や媚米似而非保守が随喜の涙を流して喜ぶかと言えば、ここ暫くの風向きが、どうにも我が国、就中拉致問題にとって芳しくない、つまりアメリカはというよりブッシュ政権は、残り少ない任期中になんでも良いから成果を残すために日本を置き去りにする、こういう懸念が強くなって物が言いにくくなってきているからなんですが、その懸念に対する反証としてこれらの報道を一斉に取り上げている。
しかし、こんな筋の悪い情報源が垂れ流す情報に藁をも掴むじゃないですが少々みっともなさ過ぎやしません？
少なくともここ数日のヒルの発言、国務省の記者発表の内容や印象には変化はないのですから、引き続きアメリカを猜疑の眼差しで注視する、これが同盟国の国民としては一番正しいスタンスだと思いますよ。（藁
U.S. says has proof of N.Korea uranium program
そして同様にソースは聯合通信だそうですが、ウラン濃縮計画の存在の確かな証拠に関する発言をヒルがやったちゅうんだが、これも公式には肯定されていない。
なぜ熱湯浴や媚米似而非保守が随喜の涙を流して喜ぶかと言えば、ここ暫くの風向きが、どうにも我が国、就中拉致問題にとって芳しくない、つまりアメリカはというよりブッシュ政権は、残り少ない任期中になんでも良いから成果を残すために日本を置き去りにする、こういう懸念が強くなって物が言いにくくなってきているからなんですが、その懸念に対する反証としてこれらの報道を一斉に取り上げている。
しかし、こんな筋の悪い情報源が垂れ流す情報に藁をも掴むじゃないですが少々みっともなさ過ぎやしません？
少なくともここ数日のヒルの発言、国務省の記者発表の内容や印象には変化はないのですから、引き続きアメリカを猜疑の眼差しで注視する、これが同盟国の国民としては一番正しいスタンスだと思いますよ。（藁
U.S. says has proof of N.Korea uranium program
11月の中旬にメタンガス爆発で100人が死んだウクライナのザシャチコ炭鉱でまたしてもメタン爆発が起きたそうだ。
今回は今のところ5人が重傷で行方不明が35人ちゅうことなんだけども、とにかく世界的に炭鉱ってのは老朽化してんだな、でここんところのエネルギー需要の急な高まりで稼働率だけは上がってる。
ザシャチコ以外では記憶にあるだけでも今年に入って中国の露天掘りじゃない炭鉱で2件の事故、アメリカでも1件の事故。
全部安全設備の老朽化に起因するんだけど、このザシャチコの場合は更に悪い要素が重なっており、とにかく深いとこ掘ってんだそうだ。
この記事に拠れば地下900ｍ以上の深さだそうで、これはヨーロッパの一般的な炭鉱の約2倍の深さであり、且つまたメタン層ちゅうのがこの深さに密集してんだそうだ。
それにしてもこの短期間に2回重大事故ちゅうんだからもう少しなんとかしる！！
参照記事
Interfax: Blast Shakes Ukrainian Mine
Reports: Blast shakes Ukrainian mine
今回は今のところ5人が重傷で行方不明が35人ちゅうことなんだけども、とにかく世界的に炭鉱ってのは老朽化してんだな、でここんところのエネルギー需要の急な高まりで稼働率だけは上がってる。
ザシャチコ以外では記憶にあるだけでも今年に入って中国の露天掘りじゃない炭鉱で2件の事故、アメリカでも1件の事故。
全部安全設備の老朽化に起因するんだけど、このザシャチコの場合は更に悪い要素が重なっており、とにかく深いとこ掘ってんだそうだ。
この記事に拠れば地下900ｍ以上の深さだそうで、これはヨーロッパの一般的な炭鉱の約2倍の深さであり、且つまたメタン層ちゅうのがこの深さに密集してんだそうだ。
それにしてもこの短期間に2回重大事故ちゅうんだからもう少しなんとかしる！！
参照記事
Interfax: Blast Shakes Ukrainian Mine
Reports: Blast shakes Ukrainian mine
なんなんだろうか？これじゃ回答になっていないんだが、ちなみに僕が送った質問状は
「一言で言い切れない」わけないだろうよ、事実なら？
たとえばアデナウアーがいつの何時にかくかくしかじかの声明を出したとか、僕が求めた答えちゅうのはそういう答えだし、何故そういう答えを求めたかといえば婆さんが
こりゃもう嗤うしかないわ。
一体何を本にまとめる気なんだろうか？
まあしかし始めたことなんで、以下の再質問を送った。
そして返事は来たが予想通りだ。
おそらくこの人は自分がなに書いているかわかってないんだろうと思わせる内容ですわ。
となれば、大上段に振りかざした今後出てくる物、つまり、某月刊誌に連載し、まとめて一冊にするという本だが、の内容は推して知るべしで、憶測の上に憶測を重ねた挙げ句にデタラメをまき散らす正体不明な本になることだろう。
ってか頭痛がしてくる。
ちなみに今さっき来た返事はこうだｗ
僕が指摘したのは表現の問題ではなく、内容に虚偽があるということだよ、すり替えようったってそうはいかんぜ。
そして、歯がかみ合わないちゅうのはどういうこと指すんだ？
ちなみに僕は入れ歯のことはよくわからんのだが．．．ｗ
まあそれでも気を取り直してとりあえず返信は撃っておいた。
さてその後 ２ちゃんねるの415 ：文責・名無しさん：2007/12/01(土) 15:26:35 ID:qcUuxamb0見て確認したらやっぱ婆さんってばこっそり書き換えてやがんのｗ
どうせこっそり書き換えるだろうと思ったから、質問状を送る前に使用前の画面をキャプチャしてあるわい。
なんちゅうのか？
やっぱ頭悪いのか無知なのかその両方なのかだろうが、「宣言しています。」を削ったところで「国は認めていません」を残してりゃ同じことなんだが、まあそういうことを言っても無駄な相手だからいまさら言わん。
それにしても自称とはいえなんとももの凄い国際ジャーナリストだこと。
使用前
使用後
関連過去記事
したたかな中国とお花畑の老婆
送信者： <******@excite.co.jp>なんだが、回答は以下だ。
送信日時： Fri, 30 Nov 2007 22:59:44 +0900
宛先： ****@******.de
Cc：
件名： 「クライン孝子の日記」の記述についてのお問い合わせ
拝啓 初めてメールをお送りいたします。
時折「クライン孝子の日記」を拝見いたしておりますが、本日の更新
「■2007/11/30 (金) 映画「南京の真実」スタジオを見学」の中に少
々合点のいきかねる記述がございますので質問させていただくことに
致しました。
問題の記述は「ちなみにドイツ連邦共和国はあのニュルンベルグ裁
判については不当裁判として一切、国は認めていませんし、そう宣言
しています。」との部分ですが、歴史上のどの事象を指してこうお書
きになったのか、差し支えなければお教え願いたいと思います。
なにかとご多用のこととは存じますが宜しくお願い申し上げます。
敬具
東京都****
*****
送信者： Takako Klein <****@*****.de>
受信日時： Sat, 01 Dec 2007 01:22:28 +0900
宛先： ******@excite.co.jp
Cc：
件名： Re: 「クライン孝子の日記」の記述についてのお問い合わせ
*****さま
メールありがとうございます。
この一件に関しては、来年３月より、
某月刊雑誌において、連載として詳細に
まとめます。
一言で言い切れないので、まことに申し訳ありませんが、
この裁判が戦勝国による報復裁判であったことは
第一次、二次世界大戦を通して、歴史を探求していきますと
見事に浮き彫りにされてきます。
連載終了後、一札の本にまとめます。
どうかそれまで、お待ちくださいますよう。、
今後ともよろしくお願い申し上げます。
クライン孝子
「一言で言い切れない」わけないだろうよ、事実なら？
たとえばアデナウアーがいつの何時にかくかくしかじかの声明を出したとか、僕が求めた答えちゅうのはそういう答えだし、何故そういう答えを求めたかといえば婆さんが
ちなみにドイツ連邦共和国はあのニュルンベルグ裁判については不当裁判として一切、国は認めていませんし、そう宣言しています。つまり、ドイツ政府が公式に宣言したと書いているからなんだな。
こりゃもう嗤うしかないわ。
一体何を本にまとめる気なんだろうか？
まあしかし始めたことなんで、以下の再質問を送った。
送信者： <******@excite.co.jp>これで明確な内容摘示がなければ「せんせい！！お逃げになるの？」だ罠。
送信日時： Sat, 01 Dec 2007 01:57:19 +0900
宛先： ****@******.de
Cc：
件名： 回答ありがとうございます。
前略 早速にご回答賜りありがとうございました。
しかし少々納得いたしかねるご回答内容ですので再度確認させていただき
ますが、当方の指摘した記述ではあなたは、ドイツ政府が公式にニュルン
ベルグ裁判を否認する宣言をしているという内容をお書きになっているわ
けです。
それに対して当方は、歴史的事実として、それはどの事象を指すのでし
ょうか、こういうことを伺ったわけです。
すなわち、その事実の摘示をお願いしたわけですから、著作の刊行まで秘
匿する必要のある問題ではあり得ませんでしょう？
それともあなたがお書きになった「ドイツ政府の宣言」というのは事実ではなく、あなたの独自の憶測なのでしょうか？
宜しければご回答いただくことを重ねてお願い申し上げます。
草々
東京都太田区
********
そして返事は来たが予想通りだ。
おそらくこの人は自分がなに書いているかわかってないんだろうと思わせる内容ですわ。
送信者：Takako Klein <*****@********.de>読んでもらえばわかる通り、答えにもなんにもなっていないし事実を摘示することも出来ないようだ。
受信日時： Sat, 01 Dec 2007 02:44:06 +0900
宛先： *******@****.co.jp
Cc：
件名： Re: 回答ありがとうございます。
******さま
憶測ではなく、ドイツ連邦共和国はこの裁判を
戦勝国の一方的裁判であるとして、
認めていないのは事実であり、
今日、今一度、その事実を確認いたしました。
誤解を招いてもうしわけありませんでしたが、何も私の著作の
宣伝をしたわけではないのです。
歴史的事実ということであれば、一言では語れないということを
お知らせしたかったまでで、その点、ご理解くださいますよう。
さて、貴殿のご質問ですが、
もし歴史的事実を「限定」するのであれば、
敗者を一方的に悪と決め付け裁いた勝者によるニュルンベルグ裁判と
申し上げておきましょう。
いいかえれば、戦後６０年という月日が経過した今日、ドイツでも敗者側からの
歴史の掘り起しが始まり、これまでタブーとされ封印されてきた
当時の事実が、静かに、公の場で公開され論じられるようになってきた、
といっていいのかもしれません。
というわけです。
では。
クライン孝子
となれば、大上段に振りかざした今後出てくる物、つまり、某月刊誌に連載し、まとめて一冊にするという本だが、の内容は推して知るべしで、憶測の上に憶測を重ねた挙げ句にデタラメをまき散らす正体不明な本になることだろう。
送信者： <******e@excite.co.jp>一応再々質問はしておいたが、これ以上何回やっても同じだろうからこれでこの件は終わりねｗ
受信日時： Sat, 01 Dec 2007 11:10:52 +0900
宛先： ****@********.de
Cc：
件名： 再度の回答ありがとうございます。
クライン孝子さま
前略 ご多用中にもかかわらず回答賜り恐縮です。
しかしながら私が伺っているのはそういうことでもありませんし、あなたが
書籍の宣伝をされようとしたなどという邪推も致してはおりません。
今回ご回答の中に
> 憶測ではなく、ドイツ連邦共和国はこの裁判を
> 戦勝国の一方的裁判であるとして、
> 認めていないのは事実であり、
> 今日、今一度、その事実を確認いたしました。
という一節があるのですが、「ドイツが国家として否認した。」
あなたはそれが事実であると主張されており、私はそれが事実であると主張
するに足るtipsをお示しくださいとお願いしております。
今回はそこが微妙に変化して「認めていないのは事実であり」だけとなっ
ておりますが、原文では「ドイツ連邦共和国はあのニュルンベルグ裁判につ
いては不当裁判として一切、国は認めていませんし、そう宣言しています。」
と書かれています。
この二つの文から窺える文意は大きく異なります。
後者では、「事実」ではなくあなたの「推論」でしかないということにな
ります。
そして、その「推論」の根拠が、アデナウアーの時代にナチ政権時代の官僚
等を特に外務省に多数任用したという事実であれば、それは見当違いである
ことは、当時のアデナウアーの発言からも明らかだろうと思いますし、以後
ブラントの時代に入るとドイツは政治取引の材料であったにしろ寧ろ積極的
に認めるようになっていると思います。
修正学派やネオナチが騒ぐことと国家が宣言するということは歴史的意味
、政治的意味も重みもまったく異なることなのであり、そのことを混同され
ているとすると些かおかしな話になると思います。
繰り返しますが、私がご質問を致しましたのは、あなたが当初お書きにな
った「国家として宣言した。」を主張するに足るだけのtipsをお示しくださ
いということであり、それは「そう考えることも出来る。」といった程度の
事象ではなく国家あるいは国家元首としてのdeclarationであるとかstateme
ntである必要があると思います。
つまり今回お返しいただいた
> さて、貴殿のご質問ですが、
> もし歴史的事実を「限定」するのであれば、
> 敗者を一方的に悪と決め付け裁いた勝者によるニュルンベルグ裁判と
> 申し上げておきましょう。
というような内容では回答にもなんにもなっていないと言えますし
> いいかえれば、戦後６０年という月日が経過した今日、ドイツでも敗者側
> からの
> 歴史の掘り起しが始まり、これまでタブーとされ封印されてきた
> 当時の事実が、静かに、公の場で公開され論じられるようになってきた、
> といっていいのかもしれません。
この程度のことは日本国民中の中程度以上の学歴者なら誰でも知っている
話であり、今更解説を賜る必要は無かろうと思います。
どうにもおわかりにならないようなのでくどく書きますが、私が最初から
お伺いしたいのは、あなたが今回お書きになっている「もし歴史的事実を「
限定」するのであれば」なのであり、それは、「ドイツが国家としてニュル
ンベルグ国際法廷を否認したと。」断定し得る事実なのです。
そしてあなたからの回答が「それはニュルンベルグ裁判だ。」ではこれは些
か失笑を禁じ得ない、こういうこととなりますが如何でしょうか？
草々
東京都大田区
******
ってか頭痛がしてくる。
ちなみに今さっき来た返事はこうだｗ
送信者： Takako Klein <****@*****.de>やっぱ頭痛がしてきた．．．．
受信日時： Sat, 01 Dec 2007 13:02:58 +0900
宛先： ******@*****.co.jp
Cc：
件名： Re: 再度の回答ありがとうございます。
******さま
ご指摘の一件
三月ごろ日本へ帰国しますので、お会いして
ご説明しようかと思います。
どうも、その辺、お互いに歯がかみ合いそうにありませんので。
どうでしょう？
いろいろとお教えいただくこともありましょうし、
私の方からも、最近のドイツ事情に関してお話したいと思います。
表現についてのご指摘、有難うございました。
今後ともご教示のほど、よろしくお願い申し上げます。
クライン孝子
僕が指摘したのは表現の問題ではなく、内容に虚偽があるということだよ、すり替えようったってそうはいかんぜ。
そして、歯がかみ合わないちゅうのはどういうこと指すんだ？
ちなみに僕は入れ歯のことはよくわからんのだが．．．ｗ
まあそれでも気を取り直してとりあえず返信は撃っておいた。
送信者： <******@excite.co.jp>三月に合おうとのことだが、たったこれだけのことにも文章で答えられない人物の話を聞くことに、あるいはその為に時間を割くことに価値があるとは思わない、なによりそこ頃には僕はもう日本にはいないのよ。
送信日時： Sat, 01 Dec 2007 14:46:28 +0900
宛先： ****@*******.de
Cc：
件名： ありがとうございました。
前略 長々とおつきあいをいただきありがとうございました。
当方がお願いしたことは、あなたがお書きになった内容に関する確認であり
ますから、本来ならさして面倒な作業でもございません。
たった何年何月の誰それの声明なり演説なり宣言であるとお答えいただけば
足りるものでした。
しかしながら明確なお答えがいただけなかったことは残念であります。
そういう性質の事項であります故、今回摘示をいただけないものがお会い
してお話しをしたところで解明されるとは思えませんし、なによりも、公式
にそういう事実はないわけですから「ドイツは国家として宣言した。」とあ
なたがお書きになったことに対する当方の質問への反証はもとより不能なの
ですよ。
また、それとは異なる理由として、当方一月末を以て日本を離れます故、お
誘いの件に関しましては辞退させていただくことと致します。
とまれおつきあいをいただきありがとうございました。
東京都大田区
********
さてその後 ２ちゃんねるの415 ：文責・名無しさん：2007/12/01(土) 15:26:35 ID:qcUuxamb0見て確認したらやっぱ婆さんってばこっそり書き換えてやがんのｗ
どうせこっそり書き換えるだろうと思ったから、質問状を送る前に使用前の画面をキャプチャしてあるわい。
なんちゅうのか？
やっぱ頭悪いのか無知なのかその両方なのかだろうが、「宣言しています。」を削ったところで「国は認めていません」を残してりゃ同じことなんだが、まあそういうことを言っても無駄な相手だからいまさら言わん。
それにしても自称とはいえなんとももの凄い国際ジャーナリストだこと。
使用前
使用後
関連過去記事
したたかな中国とお花畑の老婆
前にも書いたけど、相変わらずサーチエンジンから飛んでくるケースの検索語のトップは不動なんだな。
しかしなんで学歴なんだ？
学歴 守屋事務次官 28.1%ご覧のように、あわせれば40％近いわけなんだが、守屋はまだわかる。
学歴 守屋次官 9.3%
しかしなんで学歴なんだ？
| 04 | 2024/05 | 06 |
| S | M | T | W | T | F | S |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |||
| 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 |
| 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
リンク
ブログ内検索
カテゴリー
アーカイブ
最新記事
(01/18)
(01/17)
(01/15)
(01/15)
(01/14)
(01/12)
(01/12)
(01/11)
(01/11)
(01/10)
(01/10)
(01/10)
(01/09)
(01/07)
(01/05)
(01/04)
(01/04)
(01/02)
(01/01)
(12/31)
(12/31)
(12/30)
(12/30)
(12/29)
(12/29)
最新トラックバック